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Chapter One 
 
Art and Silence 
 
I. Introduction 
 
My guiding question is: how does silence mean in aesthetic experience and in 
communication about works of art?  This inquiry involves the investigation of judgments 
of taste, the complications presented by works of genius, and the ways in which culture 
shapes both production and reception.  Importantly, each of these conceptual perspectives 
on how we respond to the demands of art shows how silence and silencing foster disunity 
as a result of marginalization, as seen in the formation of cults and subcultures that are 
distinct from mainstream culture, and simultaneously strengthen and forge new 
associations of unity within those groups and within the exclusionary culture in question.  
As a result of difficulties in expression or meaning making, some persons try to find new 
communities or societies in which they will be accepted and understood.  We must 
examine the various reasons for difficulty in expression ranging from the cognitive 
inability to fully process aesthetic ideas, to the social enculturation of meaning when 
sense is not shared by community members, to the tensions introduced by new ways of 
expression.  These include, but are not limited to: the introduction of new words and 
phrases, new works of art, works of genius, avant-garde art, and cult or subcultural 
expression.  We must consider how these new approaches to expression are related to 
silence and silencing. 
Art makes unique demands upon the individuals who experience it.  What are the 
demands set by art?  What counts as an adequate response to them?  Of primary interest 
to this investigation is the connection between art and silence.  From the perspective of 
   2 
reception, we are often silent in the encounter with art as a matter of concentration and 
convention.  This holds in different media, whether in a concert hall where listening and 
sound are of paramount importance, or in a museum, gallery, or theater.  In order to 
experience the work, we try to eliminate distractions in order to fully “take it in.”  As a 
result, silence is an integral part of most of our aesthetic experiences.  The exception, of 
course, regards happenings or events that openly invite audience participation in some 
fashion.1  Such works call into question and blur the relationship between art and life, as 
Allan Kaprow puts it. 2  
Setting these explicitly provocative or boundary testing works aside for the 
moment, we must consider the way in which all art unsettles us and calls our expectations 
into question.  The result of challenges set forth by art is often hesitation or silence on the 
part of the audience.  Our conceptual resources through which we make sense of the 
world (and the art in it) are inadequate to our experience of art.  We search (in vain) for a 
concept that will encapsulate the experience and help us make sense of the work and our 
relation to it.3  But we are thrown.  Art outstrips our ability to express ourselves 
linguistically.  Due to our nature as rational beings that inhabit the world in a social 
manner, we are driven to try to comprehend works of art and to communicate about them 
with others.  Due to our proclivity for communication, we must examine what happens 
when we are unable to express ourselves effectively.  
                                                
1 Consider notions of guerilla theater, public or street performance, and improvisational art of all sorts.  For 
an in depth discussion of modes of interaction with art, and in particular, how art requires the relationship 
between audience and work, see Nicolas Bourriaud.  Relational Aesthetics. Trans.  Simon Pleasance and 
Fronza Woods, with participation of Mathieu Copeland.  Dijon, France: Les Presse Du Reel, 1998. 
2 Allan Kaprow.  Essays on the Blurring of Art and Life.  Jeff Kelley, ed.  Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1993. 
3 My general approach to aesthetic experience is Kantian in its bent.  I will elaborate upon this frame in 
Chapter Two.  Let us note here, that our conceptual resources are capable of expansion.  
   3 
It is my contention that silence is a crucial aspect of aesthetic experience.  The 
conventions of the observation of art established through training and practice require 
silence as a primary mode of response.  Such behavior establishes membership in 
cultured communities.4  Beyond mere convention, however, the inability to fully 
comprehend and express our thoughts in reaction to a work of art silences individuals as 
they try to communicate.  I argue that silence as response is an adequate and legitimate 
answer to the demands art sets forth.  The trouble here is that silence may be mistaken for 
a lack of response, consideration, or contemplation on the part of the subject.  In the 
chapters that follow, I establish the crucial role that silence and silencing play in 
understanding and communicating about art.  While it may seem to indicate a lack, I 
examine cases in which silence is saturated with meaning. 
Because silence is multivalent, how can we unpack its content or meaning?  For 
instance, how can we distinguish between silent observance that is a matter of decorum 
and situations in which we are actively silenced by art?  How can we distinguish between 
silence that is full of meaning – full of cognitive activity and the striving to comprehend a 
work – and silence that indicates a lack of interest or a lack of response?  Clearly this is 
no easy task.  However, the sorts of expressions we try out when confronted with 
challenging works are perhaps the best indicators of the significance of the silence in 
question.  While our conceptual resources may not at first be adequate to the meaning of 
the work and our judgments about it, new aesthetic and linguistic expressions will emerge 
in order to meet these needs and fill in the gaps in expression.  Therefore, the introduction 
                                                
4 For an in depth discussion of the formation of aesthetic communities and their conventions see Jürgen 
Habermas.  The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society.  Trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991. 
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of new ways of meaning making and the expansion of our conceptual resources are 
crucial to the investigation at hand – both in terms of the needs that give rise to new 
expressions and to the manner of their fulfillment and uptake.    
 
II. Kant and Wittgenstein on Expression 
Kant’s concept of genius and Wittgenstein’s metaphor of new boroughs of 
language both address the expansion of expression to meet new needs in meaning.  While 
the differences between the philosophies of Kant and Wittgenstein may seem to render 
the joint use of them problematic, there is a productive confluence of their philosophies 
regarding the difficulties involved in the introduction of new expressions.  At first blush, 
Kant’s focus upon subjectivity and judgments in the Critique of Judgment seems to 
present an individualized account of taste.  For instance, according to the doctrine of the 
transcendental unity of apperception, subjective experience is unified by the fact that 
there is an “I” who experiences it.5  And we each feel the need to experience and judge 
works of art for ourselves and to communicate our judgments to others.  In fact, on 
Kant’s account, we are driven to seek the agreement of others as regards our judgments.  
Trusting in the judgment of others is never enough to establish our own taste.  Instead, we 
seek to communicate our judgments to others and to demand agreement about them.  As 
Kant states, “[o]nly in society is the beautiful of empirical interest.”6  Judgments of taste 
are social matters that carry normative weight in the community.  Our experience of art is 
                                                
5 Immanuel Kant.  The Critique of Pure Reason.  Trans.  Norman Kemp Smith.  New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2003., A 105-130, B 130-146. Kant reorients our understanding of the fit between mind and 
world and asserts that the mind shapes our experience of the world. 
6 Kant, §41, p. 163, 296, emphasis in original. 
   5 
not complete until we communicate our pleasure or displeasure to others, at least 
imaginatively. 
This demand for agreement is also seen in Wittgenstein’s linguistic theory.  For 
Wittgenstein, however, agreement in judgment and use are actually agreements in form 
of life. 7   The very meaning of expressions depends upon agreement and repetition in use.  
Language only becomes meaningful when it is valued and utilized by others in a social 
context.  There is no such thing as private meaning for Wittgenstein.  In fact, he has no 
notion at all of a transcendental subject who is the master of her experience.  This 
displaces or even sidelines the subjective dimension of meaning.  As Janet Farrell Smith 
articulates the point, we are not the “owners” of our experience; we are not proprietary 
subjects.8  For Wittgenstein, our experience of the world is developed through social 
enculturation into language established through repetition and agreement in use.  The 
intersubjective and social dimensions of expression are crucial to meaning for 
Wittgenstein because of their importance to use.   
Although Kant and Wittgenstein do not share the same view on consciousness and 
the role of subjective experience, their juxtaposition will help highlight the 
interconnection of the individual, social, and cultural aspects of expression.  
Wittgenstein’s contextual and intersubjective model of expression will help us tease out 
the social elements that are already present (but sometimes overlooked) in Kant’s account 
of taste.  I do not aim to address the disagreements of the two philosophers, or to make 
claims about which philosophy is “right.”  Instead, with questions of the expansion of 
                                                
7 Ludwig Wittgenstein.  Philosophical Investigations.  Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe.  Third Edition.  Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2001., §241 and 242. 
8 Janet Farrell Smith.  “‘No Master Outside Or In?’: Wittgenstein’s Critique of the Proprietary Subject.”  In 
Feminist Interpretations of Ludwig Wittgenstein.  Ed. Naomi Scheman and Peg O’Connor.  University 
Park: Penn State University Press, 2002. 
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expression in mind, I put Kant and Wittgenstein into conversation in order to construct 
my own perspective on aesthetic expression and response based upon elements inspired 
by both.  With the personal and interpersonal dimensions of expression in play, we can 
address responses to art, including silence and silencing, on a social and cultural level. 
I begin the analysis in this chapter with Wittgenstein’s treatment of language 
competence as socially enculturated.9  The investigation of the use of language as a 
determinant of meaning is crucial to understanding other forms of expression and 
communication, particularly aesthetic expression and judgments of taste.  Put another 
way, this portion of the argument will help us understand how communication of an 
everyday variety is suffused with social and cultural concerns.  The investigation of 
social and intersubjective linguistic dimensions of expression will provide an important 
foundation upon which to build arguments regarding more specialized modes of 
expression in Chapters Two through Five.  In these chapters, aesthetic expression of 
various sorts, especially ingenious, avant-garde, cult, and subcultural expression become 
the central focus.   
In the next section of argument, utilizing Philosophical Investigations, and to a 
lesser degree, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, I show how linguistic expression 
shapes the way we inhabit the world, and thereby affects our “form of life” as 
Wittgenstein puts it.  According to Wittgenstein, language and life are intertwined.  The 
customs we develop, the practices we participate in, and how we (choose to) express 
ourselves indicate something essential about who we are as individuals.  Context plays a 
deep role in how we make meaning and live with one another in linguistic communities.  
                                                
9 For the purposes of this section, I will focus on linguistic expression as understood by Wittgenstein in 
Philosophical Investigations. 
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Therefore, as I argue in the next section, our use of language reveals something deep 
about our community and cultural affiliations and identities.  
 
III. Meaning in Use: Enculturation and Meaning 
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein develops his notion of language as 
“meaning in use” in accord with the notions of rule following and custom by enmeshing 
meaning and its social establishment.  On that basis, Wittgenstein raises the issue of the 
separability of meaning and interpretation.  His imaginary interlocutor starts the section 
with a query regarding rule following.  He ponders:    
‘But how can a rule shew [sic] me what I have to do at this point?  Whatever I do 
is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule.’ – That is not what we ought to 
say, but rather:  any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it 
interprets, and cannot give it any support.  Interpretations by themselves do not 
determine meaning […] Let me ask this:  what has the expression of a rule – say a 
sign-post – got to do with my actions?  What sort of connexion [sic] is there here? 
– Well perhaps this one:  I have been trained to react to this sign in a particular 
way, and now I do so react to it […] I have further indicated that a person goes by 
a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom.10  
 
Wittgenstein asserts that the rules of a language game are social constructs that only have 
meaning insofar as the members of a community recognize and follow them regularly.  
The recognition of rules, or “sign-posts” as Wittgenstein calls them, requires training and 
habituation on the part of language users.  Once followed consistently, these signs 
become “customs” of meaning; customs of repeated use concretize and legitimate the 
meaning of a word or phrase.  An expression becomes socially established and regarded 
as meaningful within a community when individuals use it to communicate with one 
another.  Put another way, meaning is determined by and intertwined with use.  Meaning 
                                                
10 Wittgenstein, §198, emphasis in original. 
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and interpretation, by contrast, are dissociated by Wittgenstein in a radical way.  Meaning 
cannot lie in an individual’s particular manner of interpreting a gesture or expression.11  
Instead, it is a communal affair.   
 As a result of such reasoning, Wittgenstein advances the notion that language is 
thoroughly dependent upon social constructions, interactions, and usages of words and 
phrases.12  In order for a given word, phrase, or gesture to have meaning in the 
Wittgensteinian sense, one’s expression must be received and understood by one’s fellow 
interlocutor.  Such understanding, upon Wittgenstein’s account, stems from the repeated 
practice or use of a word or phrase in a recognized language game.  Repetition and habit 
establish an expression’s place in the language game and broader social context as that 
which has meaning and purpose.  Therefore, meaning in the Wittgensteinian sense is not 
a private affair.  Instead, it is based upon the social or intersubjective dimension of 
communication.  The question of how much agreement or repetition is required to 
establish a comprehensible meaning arises even at this early stage of the argument.  Let’s 
put this issue on hold and return to it during our discussion of the new boroughs of 
meaning. 
Wittgenstein recognizes the existence of a multiplicity of interpretations that an 
individual may advance in response to a statement or gesture.  He states, 
“[i]nterpretations by themselves do not determine meaning;” they can only “hang in the 
                                                
11 Although Wittgenstein is dealing with interpretation rather than meaning here, one might argue that this 
passage lays the groundwork for the Private Language Argument in §243-363.  Saul Kripke makes a 
version of this claim in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.  In this work, he suggests that the 
PLA begins as early as §193, which is usually classified as part of the “rules and rule following” portion of 
the Investigations.  He argues that §193-242 is the primary exposition of the PLA, while §243 onward is 
the reiteration and development of this earlier argument.   See Saul Kripke.  Wittgenstein on Rules and 
Private Language.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982. 
12 Ibid., §198, 202, 208. 
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air,” without providing support.13  Support for meaning must come from social use and 
establishment.  So even though an interlocutor can produce several interpretations of 
another’s (or her own) statement, this by no means suggests that all interpretations are 
equally accurate with respect to what the first individual actually intended to express or 
communicate.14  For instance, miscommunication could be due to:  a failure on the part of 
the speaker to clearly express the intended sense, so that the thought she had in mind to 
communicate may not be properly interpreted by her interlocutor; a failure on the part of 
the interlocutor to interpret even the well expressed message; a new expression that is not 
yet comprehensible because its meaning has not been socially established and thus, is not 
shared; or some combination of such factors.  Thus, although agreement on usage dictates 
meaning, interpretations must be defended or given further evidentiary support.15   
Wittgenstein combines his notions about language and communication with the 
social manner in which humans inhabit the world.  He states:  “It is what human beings 
say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use.  That is not agreement 
in opinions but in form of life.”16  In this statement, Wittgenstein connects meaning in 
use, custom, and practice, and claims that how we utilize language to communicate with 
others shapes and even constitutes our “form of life.”  Put more strongly, the language we 
use determines who we are and is part of our way of being both individually and socially.  
                                                
13 Individual interpretations by themselves cannot determine meaning.  There must be social enculturation 
and agreement in use in order to establish a meaning as acceptable. 
14 For a more radical approach to this issue, see Roland Barthes’s essay, “The Death of the Author” in 
Image / Music / Text.  Trans. Stephen Heath.  New York: Hill and Wang, 1977.  Barthes goes farther than 
Wittgenstein in separating intended meaning and interpretation.  According to Barthes, “To give a text an 
Author is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing.” (p. 147).  
Each reader brings her own impressions and experiences to the text.  For this reason, there is no fixed or 
definite interpretation of a work.  Even though Barthes draws a distinction between spoken and written 
expression, we might nonetheless consider the way in which new linguistic expressions need to be 
disentangled just as texts do because of the potential for multiple meanings.  
15 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §198, 199, 201, 208. 
16 Ibid., §241. 
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Wittgenstein elaborates upon the connection of language and value with the statement:  
“If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in 
definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments.”17  Wittgenstein enmeshes 
language and judgment, intimating the normative dimension of expression. Whether we 
are fully conscious of the values inherent in our statements or not, our language is value-
laden.  Because community formation is bound up with the language we use, it is also 
bound up with normativity.   
The language we use shapes our personal and community identities.  
Communities generate and maintain meaning in an important fashion.  Because we aim to 
establish a community of shared linguistic meaning and value,18 agreement between 
members determines the meaning of words and phrases and secures their vitality for us.  
Thus, agreement in judgment and in language has important political implications.19  The 
safeguarding of expressions is proportional to the value the meanings have for the 
community in question.  For Wittgenstein, norms of meaning are norms of assent (and 
dissent).  Wittgenstein’s argumentative move towards agreement and safeguarding within 
communities is analogous to the Kantian demand for assent to judgments of taste.  We 
demand that a cultured community of meaning or understanding be established with 
respect to works of art.  While disagreement is certainly possible, individuals continue to 
                                                
17 Ibid., §242. 
18 In Chapter Two, I explore this point in connection with the development of aesthetic communities and 
Kantian taste.  I draw upon Jerome Kohn’s article, “Kant’s Common World” to fill out this argument.  See 
Jerome Kohn.  “Kant’s Common World.”  Raritan 22 (3) (Winter 2003): 102-113. 
19 Here, I am using political in the sense of “community” or “polis.”  The potential for exclusion that 
attends community formation is important to consider in the context of the social enculturation of meaning.   
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demand assent to their own judgments and ways of seeing and experiencing art.20  They 
demand agreement in values.  
Returning to Wittgenstein:  instances of the contestation of value lead to further 
questions.  What does it mean to share meaning through agreement in use?  Who must 
share and how much?  If meaning is socially enculturated, what happens when customs 
and cultures clash?  What happens to meanings that are only shared and valued by part of 
the community or population?  What if the conflict of judgment and value leads to 
problematic exclusions of words and expressions because of their inexpedience to those 
in positions of greater authority?   
The influence of such individuals on what gets shared or valued among the 
community at large can be very great indeed.  In fact, however, Wittgenstein doesn’t 
discuss power or authority very much at all, despite the fact that he is interested in 
agreement in judgment and form of life.21  As contested meanings become more 
controversial, the influence of authority becomes all the more important.  When 
individuals are unable to fully and freely express themselves in a given community or 
context, they may seek out an alternative site for meaning making and communication.  
Thus, cults, counterpublics, and subcultures emerge as alternative communities of 
meaning.22  After their initial moment of separation, these groups can either continue an 
“isolationist” existence apart from the central public, or they could try to reestablish 
                                                
20 I will return to these concerns in detail in Chapter Two. 
21 Peg O’Connor makes a similar observation about Wittgenstein’s avoidance of this issue in “Moving to 
New Boroughs: Transforming the World by Inventing Language Games.”  Feminist Interpretations of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein.  Ed. Naomi Scheman and Peg O’ Connor.  University Park: Penn State University 
Press, 2002.  On p. 441 she states, “Wittgenstein is remarkably silent about the uses and abuses of power by 
those institutions and individuals possessing authority.  […]  There needs to be a much more sophisticated 
and sustained discussion of the operations of power.  This issue of power is central to how oppressive 
backgrounds are maintained.”   
22 I will discuss these communities in detail in Chapter Four and Chapter Five. 
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communication with or gain reentry into the cultural and linguistic center.23  With these 
considerations of competing meaning and exclusion in mind, let us turn to Wittgenstein’s 
image of new boroughs of language and the growing pains associated with the expansion 
of language and meaning. 
    
IV. Wittgenstein’s New Boroughs: Rethinking Center and Margins 
Despite Wittgenstein’s resistance to the possibility of critical private languages 
and meanings,24 he accounts for the ability of language to expand in other ways.  It is a 
living form, capable of change and innovation.  As such, language transforms and 
expands to account for new needs and meanings that arise.  Individuals change language 
through the words and phrases they use by introducing new meanings that serve new 
purposes (the additive model of the expansion of language) or by transforming current 
words and phrases through using them in new and sometimes subversive ways (the queer 
model of the expansion of language).25  While a new word cannot enter into a context in 
which it has no basis – with no supporting language games or customs – language adapts 
to include new meanings that were not part of language before.  It will be fruitful to 
ponder the tension Wittgenstein sets up here:  If language is able to incorporate new 
meanings that did not exist at one point in time, and meaning is determined through 
customary use, what is required for a new meaning to become meaningful?  Put in 
                                                
23 I will return to these issues in Chapter Four in connection with the work of Nancy Fraser on publics and 
counterpublics.  The “isolationist” and “publicist” functions of counterpublics are crucial to understanding 
marginalized communities vis-à-vis the central public. 
24 See the Private Language Argument in Philosophical Investigations, §243-315. 
25 See José Medina.  Speaking From Elsewhere: A New Contexualist Perspective on Meaning, Identity, and 
Discursive Agency.  Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006. 
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Wittgensteinian terms, how many houses or streets does it take before a town begins to be 
a town?  
To answer these questions, we must reexamine Wittgenstein’s analogy between 
language and the structure of a city:   
…ask yourself whether our language is complete; – whether it was so before the 
symbolism of chemistry and the notation of infinitesimal calculus were 
incorporated in it; for these are, so to speak, suburbs of our language.  (And how 
many houses or streets does it take before a town begins to be a town?)  Our 
language may be seen as an ancient city:  a maze of little streets and squares, of 
old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this 
surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and 
uniform houses.26 
 
Wittgenstein raises a question about the limits of language and its adaptability to new 
contexts and values.  Is our language complete, he ponders?  The answer is at once 
straightforward and complex.  As long as language is a living form, it will continue to 
expand into new areas of meaning and value whether this means the addition of new 
words and phrases or the transformation of existing expressions.  Therefore, our language 
is neither complete nor capable of completion as long as it is tied to an ongoing form of 
life.27  Language adapts and expands to fit the dynamic needs of its community.  The city 
center becomes labyrinthine as its current structures and usages are transformed to fit 
new ways of living and being.  New boroughs can extend the reach of existing language 
games into new territories or make space for new meanings and language games that did 
not exist prior to some period. 
                                                
26 Ibid., §18. 
27 The dynamism of life and language prevents such completion.  As circumstances change, new linguistic 
needs arise and are met by changes in language. 
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This promising depiction of language raises interesting questions:  if language is 
socially constructed, and meaning thus lies in agreed upon use,28 there will be junctures at 
which new meanings arise that cannot be communicated and understood by others.  But 
how long will that recognition and agreement take?  How long does it take for a city to 
become a city?  Put differently, how many must agree on a meaning for it to be deemed 
meaningful?  Or how many times?  How long will it take for the outlying boroughs to 
gain enough structure to become distinct from, yet connected to, the city at large (i.e., 
language at large)?  What if these new meanings never solidify into a borough, but 
instead, become the linguistic equivalent of a dead end street or a cul-de-sac? 
 While Wittgenstein is reluctant to pin down a specific timetable for such 
occurrences, he depends upon the foundation of “meaning in use” to begin to sketch an 
answer.  In his discussion on the communication of private sense, he states: 
Well, let’s assume the child is a genius and himself invents a name for the 
sensation! – But then, of course, he couldn’t make himself understood when he 
used the word. – So does he understand the name, without being able to explain 
its meaning to anyone? – But what does it mean to say that he has ‘named his 
pain?’ – How has he done this naming of pain?!  And whatever he did, what was 
its purpose? – When one says ‘He gave a name to his sensation’ one forgets a 
great deal of stage-setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of 
naming is to make sense.  And when we speak of someone’s having given a name 
to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word ‘pain;’ it 
shews [sic] the post where the new word is stationed.29 
 
In other words, whenever a new meaning emerges, its way must be duly prepared; a 
context must be established into which the new word or meaning is to fit.  One can’t 
                                                
28 This consensus is not without challenge.  In fact, the meanings that are agreed upon are always subject to 
revision based upon the needs of the community.  As Medina puts the point, “Meanings are dynamic 
structures; and they cannot be rigidly tied to particular contexts and fixed once and for all […] Our 
repetitive agency reproduces and yet transforms the consensus of action of our linguistic practices and 
meanings that emerge from that consensus.  So in its performative regeneration, the consensus of action of 
language users is always being reconstructed and rearticulated.” See p. 27-28. 
29 Ibid., §257. 
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merely inject a word into a context in which it can have no meaning because meaning lies 
in use, customs, social settings, and practices.  Put differently, the boroughs depend upon 
the city itself in order to have meaning; they rely upon the foundational meanings that 
have been established in the city at large.30  Nonetheless, Wittgenstein also recognizes 
that established usages are subject to challenge and change as long as the dynamism of 
language and life remain intact.  Again, this connection does not give us any sense of 
how long it will take for the various boroughs of language to be recognized as 
meaningful.  Wittgenstein’s hesitance on this point relates to the uncertainty about 
whether a new expression will become meaningful and therefore be incorporated into 
language or about how long this process might take.  So what happens in the interim?  
What happens to new expressions that aren’t yet recognized as meaningful?  What is 
necessary for them to become socially established? 
 The incorporation of new meanings depends upon their value.  If a community 
values the contribution an expression makes to understanding and communication, it 
adopts it as meaningful.31  If, on the other hand, it fails to adopt the expression, it is an 
indication that the community (or at least influential members of it) does not see the 
significance of adding this new meaning.  However, failure to adopt an expression could 
                                                
30 This dependency relation brings to mind the “umbilical cord of gold” that connects the avant-garde to 
the monied center that Clement Greenberg discusses in “Avant-Garde and Kitsch.”  This line of argument 
relates to the problem of the avant-garde versus the vanguard, or, differently cast, between the center and 
the margins.  This opens up avenues of further argument with respect to issues of censorship and 
marginalization.  See Clement Greenberg.  “Avant-Garde and Kitsch.” Partisan Review Fall 1939.  
Republished in Art in Theory 1900-1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas.  Charles Harrison and Paul 
Wood, eds.  Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1993. 
31 I do not mean to suggest that this process is always a conscious one involving choice.  Some new 
additions to language are assimilated without deliberation in the community.  This interpretation accords 
with Medina’s reading of Wittgenstein.  He states, “[T]here is a constant rearticulation of discursive 
practices and restructuration of discursive contexts through an agency that is always, at some level, 
unconscious and nondeliberate.  For our speech acts and the changes they produce in our practices are not 
driven by our conscious desires and intentions, but by life itself.”  See Medina, p. 189. 
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also be the result of powerful community members recognizing a meaning, but viewing it 
as inexpedient or threatening to the status quo.  This active barring of meaning has 
serious implications for the addition of counter-cultural or controversial meanings that 
challenge the status quo.  As such, the incorporation of new meanings is social and 
political in nature.  Which meanings become customary or well established depends upon 
acceptance by the community in which they are introduced.  
 Let us return to Wittgenstein’s analogy.  At once pictorial and architectural, the 
depiction of language as an ancient and expanding city addresses community building 
and community life directly.  However, the examples Wittgenstein provides regarding the 
expansion of language are not drawn from common practices.  For instance, he turns to 
the introduction of symbolism in chemistry and notation in infinitesimal calculus for 
examples of the expansion of language.32  By focusing on very technical additions to 
language,33 Wittgenstein seems intent on neutralizing questions of value and authority 
that are crucial considerations for the expansion of a city.  But why?  Wittgenstein seems 
both to face and skirt questions of community and value in this section of argument.   
In the same passage when Wittgenstein ponders how many houses or streets it 
takes for a town to become a town, he brings the issues of life and value to the fore once 
again.  Because chemistry and calculus language games do not raise much debate or 
concern among the general population, we must also consider examples that have more to 
do with value considerations.  Peg O’Connor, for instance, raises the issues of silencing 
and reclamation of voice that attend the practices of “coming out” and “breaking silence” 
                                                
32 Wittgenstein, §18. 
33 These technical and highly structured additions to language also show that the additive model of the 
expansion of language does not fully account for transformations of language through adaptive usage 
through queering. 
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about abuse.34  Each practice is a difficult undertaking that may be met with resistance 
and cause emotional turmoil for the individuals who aim to express themselves in these 
areas.  O’Connor argues that “the creation of new language games engenders new 
meanings” that can “enable people to make sense of their lives in ways that can be 
validating and liberating”35 rather than isolating and discouraging.  Because some 
communities or families are not open to revelations about homosexuality or abuse, 
individuals are often silent about formative aspects of their experience.   
O’Connor claims that some language games form discourses which come into 
being in order to make public and visible unrecognized needs that have important 
political implications.36  Utilizing Nancy Fraser’s37 notion of “oppositional discourses” 
O’Connor states:  
They offer alternative interpretations, descriptions, and understandings of 
experience.  By doing this, they challenge and undermine hegemonic worldviews.  
Oppositional discourses contribute to the crystallization of new social identities 
on the part of subordinated social groups.  They can also lead to the adoption of 
new social identities.  Oppositional discourses also provide a ground from which 
to challenge and undermine dominant language games and worldviews.38   
 
By giving voice to different experiences and understandings, oppositional discourses 
push and test the boundaries of the existing language.  By subverting current modes of 
expression, oppositional discourses present an opportunity to adapt language to new 
needs that arise.  This can occur through the transformation of the city itself, or through 
the expansion into new boroughs of expression.  It is the latter of these two 
interpretations that O’Connor most closely endorses.  She goes on to identify these 
                                                
34 O’Connor, p. 432-433. 
35 Ibid., p. 433. 
36 Ibid., p. 445. 
37 See Nancy Fraser’s Unruly Practices for a detailed discussion of these issues. 
38 O’Connor, p. 445. 
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pioneering discourses as the new boroughs or suburbs of the city described by 
Wittgenstein.  She continues: 
Suburbs are not completely detached from the city, but they are clearly 
recognizable as different from the city.  Because they are newer and in many 
ways more planned, for example, the streets are more uniform.  In a similar 
manner, the meanings of words in an oppositional discourse will be more uniform 
and planned.  What happens, though, is that as other people make use of these 
same words and phrases and begin to apply them to situations other than the ones 
for which they were created, their meanings change.  The meanings of words, as 
Wittgenstein constantly notes, are in their use.  Who is using these words, in what 
circumstances they are being used, and for what purposes, all affect the meaning 
of these words.  The ‘straight original’ meanings become twisty.39  
 
Here, O’Connor raises questions about the inclusions and exclusions that take place on 
the margins of the established city.  As new space for meaning is staked out, it can still be 
poached and encroached upon by those in positions of power.   Struggles to control 
meaning through use can turn into battles of co-optation and reclamation.40  The new 
boroughs, by these lights, are the front line of the battle to establish and maintain 
meaning through both addition and transformation.41 
I see the concepts of new boroughs, suburbs, margins, edges, and front lines as 
connected.  In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein utilizes the terms “new 
boroughs” and “suburbs” interchangeably, understanding them to mean areas that are 
                                                
39 O’Connor, p. 446.  While O’Connor primarily promotes the additive model of the expansion of 
language, the end of this quotation reveals her interest in the queering model as well.  The notion that “the 
‘straight original’ meanings become twisty” suggests that she recognizes how transformation and 
adaptation figure into the dynamism of language. 
40 Luce Irigaray deals with an alternative to co-optation and reclamation in This Sex Which Is Not One.  
When meanings are in jeopardy, particularly ones relating to identity, sometimes “mimicry” can be a 
powerful tactic.  Here, individuals re-twist meaning to their own uses and thereby subvert expectations 
about meaning and identity.  This most closely aligns with the queering model of the expansion (or 
protection) of language.  The danger of this technique lies in reinscribing stereotyped behaviors instead of 
undermining them. 
41 O’Connor’s work provides one example of contests of meaning based upon the encounter between 
language and value.  For additional examples, see also Judith Butler’s Excitable Speech, in which she 
discusses the “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell Policy,” or the current legal debates about the meaning of the term 
“marriage” in California and other states. 
   19 
connected to the city at large (language at large) and yet distinct from it.  In other words, 
these are the areas in which new expressions are tried out and new possibilities for 
meaning are explored.  Taking new boroughs and suburbs as my starting point, I will 
expand into the investigation of the edges or margins of the city.  This is particularly 
important on the meaning in use model, because the edges and margins show how 
inclusion and exclusion work to locate meaning and value in the linguistic city and 
thereby impact the lives of those living within it.  The margins and edges are exciting 
places where new ways of living and meaning are explored, but these expressions and 
ways of life are not guaranteed incorporation into the city at large.  Just as with the 
creativity and innovation of the avant-garde in aesthetics, activity at the linguistic 
margins may expand expression in significant ways.  When combined with exclusions, 
these areas may become the frontline in the battle for meaning for expressions whose 
value has been contested.  
The re-characterization of the new boroughs as the front line of battle brings me 
to another point about the organization of the borders and limits of meaning making.  I 
must confess my own propensity to misremember Wittgenstein’s picture of the city:  I 
often think of the margins of the city as labyrinthine and free-wheeling spaces that adapt 
to the needs of the people and incorporate new interests and values into language.  
Logically, it takes time for these meanings to become regularized, consistent, and 
customary.  For this reason, I imagine the city expanding without the strict need to form 
tight corners and neat byways.  I imagine the new boroughs as places for experimentation 
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and ingenuity in structure, as places to try things differently than in the city proper.  In 
short, I imagine the margins of the city as the home of avant-garde activity.42   
My interpretation of the new boroughs is of course belied by Wittgenstein’s 
modernist vision of the city.  His city expands into boroughs that are the most regimented 
and highly structured areas to be encountered.  Recall the additions to language he 
proposes – symbolism in chemistry and notation in infinitesimal calculus.  These 
additions are highly technical and structured contributions to the ongoing language games 
of mathematics and chemistry.  These disciplines, let us note, are already highly 
organized; any new contributions must also be so.  For Wittgenstein, the labyrinthine 
ancient city center expands into an increasingly ordered suburban area.  As language 
expands on the Wittgensteinian model, it too becomes increasingly structured, ordered, 
and rule-governed.  Returning to the battle metaphor, my perspective on the expansion of 
expression is influenced by the conception of the avant-garde as the leading edge of 
expression.  At its introduction, such expression hasn’t been regulated or co-opted by the 
center or vanguard yet.  Instead, the avant-garde spreads its innovation from the outskirts 
by trying things out in a space that isn’t as rule-laden as the city center.43 
                                                
42 Marjorie Perloff discusses one interpretation of the connection between Wittgenstein and the avant-garde 
in Wittgenstein’s Ladder: Poetic Language and the Strangeness of the Ordinary.  Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press, 1996.  Perloff draws parallels between Wittgenstein’s experience as a soldier in WWI 
and the avant-garde character of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.  See in particular, p. 38-39.  She does 
not carry this connection into the Philosophical Investigations, however. 
43 Admittedly, comparing the avant-garde to the frontline of a battalion is a bit complicated.  In reality, the 
leading edge of warriors would be highly ordered and disciplined rather than free-wheeling.  Perhaps it is 
the bravery and skill of frontline soldiers that I aim to connect to avant-garde artists.  So too, the ancient 
city may not be as regular as suggested above.  The city center would probably indicate the 
experimentation of its founding days, and the area directly surrounding it would be more structured and 
orderly before reaching the outskirts where experimentation begins again.  On the other hand, we must also 
recognize that this experimentation and adaptation of meaning is an ongoing process.  Thus, even the city 
center is marked by old and current experimentation.  In part, this is why the city center is labyrinthine and 
“twisty” in Wittgenstein’s conception. 
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As a complement to my “front lines” notion of innovation that occurs on and 
spreads from the margins, we must also recognize how the city center can be the home of 
innovation and transformation.  The queering model of the expansion of language helps 
to account for this reading of Wittgenstein’s new boroughs.  According to Medina,  
Following Jane Braaten, [Naomi] Scheman (2002) argues that the city analogy 
identifies different ways in which linguistic innovations can result from our 
agency.  As she puts it, ‘it is not only in the newly constructed outlying boroughs 
that change can occur; rather, moving around in the inner city in different ways 
can subtly reshape its face, even as we acknowledge the importance of the ancient 
and nondeliberate history embedded in the old walls and lanes’ (p. 10).  This point 
about the different kinds of discursive agency that can lead to innovation can be 
further elaborated through a polyphonic interpretation of the city analogy.44 
 
The recognition of polyphony within the city and its boroughs parallels the multiplicity of 
individuals and communities living there.45  In Chapter Four and Chapter Five, I explore 
this multivocality in more detail through an investigation of counterpublics, cults, and 
subcultures whose expressions are under pressure of exclusion.  Because of their 
perceived subversiveness, these groups are often marginalized by culture.  As a result, 
they manifest varying levels of openness to communication with culture from 
isolationism and internal communication to engagement and publicist communication.46 
According to Wittgenstein, the limits of language are the limits of the world.47  
These ideas about the expansion of meaning and language into new and uncharted 
territories force us to consider who stakes out new territories and lives at the limits of 
expression.  Who lives in these new boroughs or competing communities of meaning?  
What sort of innovation occurs there?  As threats to the dynamism of life and language 
                                                
44 Medina, p. 188. 
45 Ibid., p. 188. 
46 In order to make these distinctions, I utilize the work of Nancy Fraser and Robert Asen. 
47 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.  Trans.  D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness.  New 
York: Routledge, 2001., §5.6. 
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emerge, we must explore their implications for both individuals and communities.   In the 
next section, I connect the architectural avant-garde ideas of Gordon Matta-Clark (1943-
1978) with Wittgenstein’s notion of new boroughs.  Matta-Clark explicitly challenges 
customary modes of expression with his building cuts, thereby transforming current 
aesthetic practice.  I argue that Matta-Clark’s works explore the limits of expression by 
queering current modes and structures and expand aesthetic expression by contributing 
something new. 
 
V. Gordon Matta-Clark’s New Boroughs:   
Englewood, NJ, Splitting, and the Limits of Expression  
 
“Why hang things on the wall when the wall itself is so much more a challenging 
medium? […] A simple cut or series of cuts acts as a powerful drawing device able to 
redefine spatial situations and structural components […] There is a kind of complexity 
that comes from taking an otherwise completely normal, conventional, albeit anonymous 
situation and redefining it, retranslating it into overlapping and multiple readings of 
conditions past and present.  Each building generates its own unique situation.” – Gordon 
Matta-Clark, interview in Antwerp, 1977.48  
 
 To make these connections about the limits of language and community, I want to 
turn to an artist for whom these issues are of central importance.  Gordon Matta-Clark 
was an artist interested in bringing people together to share in a common experience and 
perspective.  The majority of his works are built around the idea of involving others in his 
vision, in making visible a space, a situation, or a problem and addressing it in 
cooperation with others.  That Matta-Clark invited individuals to physically occupy and 
traverse his transformed spaces or “building cuts” and participate in his projects reveals 
the relational and performative dimensions of his work.  Matta-Clark contributed works 
that transformed current architectural structures and thereby expanded aesthetic practice.  
                                                
48 Thomas Crow, Corinne Diserens, Christian Kravagna, and Judith Russi Kirschner.  Gordon Matta-Clark.  
Phaidon Press, 2003., p. 19. 
   23 
In this way, we can see that Matta-Clark utilized both the additive and queer models of 
the expansion of expression.  Building cuts are “sculptural transformations of abandoned 
buildings produced by cutting and dismantling a given architectural site.”49  In this 
section, I argue that Matta-Clark’s art interrupts the degradation of community life 
occurring across the United States in the 1970s by bringing people together and building 
new relationships through aesthetic experience.  The separation of persons caused by the 
exclusions of gentrification and eviction spurred Matta-Clark to foster community 
through participation in art.  By doing so, Matta-Clark transformed current aesthetic 
practice and contributed new works that expanded the artworld. 
The relation of persons and space, particularly space reorganized or reimagined 
through building cuts, presented an opportunity to revise or reorient views on place and 
community.  New possibilities for meaning and living emerged as people experienced 
and moved through Matta-Clark’s building cuts.  The ingenious use of buildings marked 
for demolition allowed Matta-Clark to reclaim spaces and create transitory beauty in the 
face of impending destruction.  As Corinne Diserens notes, “With his ‘extractions,’ 
Matta-Clark, saw in hand and with a never ending energy, altered places, piercing edifice 
foundations, cutting into ceilings, walls, and floors.  He restored seemingly doomed 
situations, reorganizing them into new, alternative forms of expression.”50  Matta-Clark 
reimagined the possibilities of expression and literally opened up space for new meaning 
through his activities.  In this section of argument, I investigate the expansion of 
community and the transformation of meaning presented in Matta-Clark’s work.  When 
examining Wittgenstein’s question, “how many houses or streets does it take before a 
                                                
49 Pamela Lee.  Object to be Destroyed.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000., xii. 
50 Crow, p. 6. 
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town begins to be a town?,”51 we must ask ourselves what would happen if those houses 
really tested the boundaries of city and community.  What if Wittgenstein’s new 
boroughs were occupied by Matta-Clark’s building cuts?  What if Matta-Clark’s building 
cuts became part of the city center? 
The focal point for answering this question is Matta-Clark’s 1974 work, Splitting.  
After performing building cuts in Genoa, Italy the year prior, Matta-Clark wanted to 
continue and to refine his practice in the United States.52   He acquired permission to alter 
the house used for the Splitting project from Holly and Horace Solomon, his art dealers 
and the owners of the property.  The house, located in Englewood, NJ, “a banal thing in a 
decrepit neighborhood,”53 would become more than the home from which its former 
tenants had been evicted,54 and more than the value of its soon to be vacant lot.  In 
between residence and land speculation, 322 Humphrey Street would become a work of 
art that raised questions about home and community life.  It is important to note that the 
house offered by the Solomons was not in an upscale area:  
The property was a suburban one, but not an instance of the comfortable affluence 
that the word normally conveys.  New York, like many major cities abuts a ring 
of decaying, lower-density jurisdictions, whose residents once served more 
prosperous commuters or worked in light industries fleeing congested urban 
confines.  The forlorn dwelling at 322 Humphrey Street in Englewood, which the 
Solomons planned to demolish later, lay squarely within such a precinct.55   
 
While we might not consider this location to be a new borough, it is nonetheless on the 
outskirts of New York City rather than part of the city proper.  In this case, the 
marginality of the Humphrey Street property took on a different meaning.  By all 
                                                
51 Wittgenstein, §18. 
52 Matta-Clark’s Genoa works include A W-Hole House: Atrium Roof and A W-Hole House: Datum Cuts. 
53 Lee, p. 11. 
54 Crow, p. 74. 
55 Ibid., p. 74. 
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accounts, the house was by turns banal, pathetic, ill-maintained, or in gross disrepair.  
Such descriptions paint a picture of a neighborhood or community that is falling apart – 
or being forced apart, as the eviction of the residents in this case shows. The specter of 
gentrification looms in the background here, as might be inferred from the Solomons’s 
intent to destroy the house in order to take advantage of property values after Matta-
Clark’s project had run its course.  
Matta-Clark recognized the competing notions of community that were at stake in 
gentrification projects.  Areas with low-income housing that cities or states want to 
“clean up,” improve, rehabilitate, and make safe are sites that are often selected for the 
re-imagination of community.  This ultimately means, however, that the new community 
is purely imaginary, and often does not include the current residents.  Thus, such projects 
reveal underlying racist and classist motivations because “improvement” is achieved by 
displacing current residents for other, more acceptable, ones.  Gentrification often 
promotes one community and its interests over those of a disenfranchised or 
underprivileged group of people.  Such projects do more to reinforce differences and to 
drive people of different backgrounds apart than to bring them together.  
Through the controlled destruction and manipulation of the architecture of the 
house in Splitting, Matta-Clark made this split physical.  Matta-Clark began the project 
by moving the former occupants’ remaining possessions and cast-offs into the basement 
without going through what he called the “fragmented biographical garbage heap.”56  “He 
then cut two parallel, vertical lines through the middle of the building with a chainsaw 
[…] With the assistance and knowledge of Manfred Hecht  [his partner on the project] 
                                                
56 Ibid., p. 18.  The quote is from an interview between Gordon Matta-Clark and Liza Bear in Avalanche. 
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[…] Matta-Clark set to tipping the house back on its foundations.”57  Using beveling 
tools and building jacks, Matta-Clark eventually lowered the building, finishing its 
bisection in a dramatic fashion.58  Thomas Crow recounts the details of the process as 
follows: 
Keeping one end of the balloon-frame superstructure propped up on jacks, Matta-
Clark and his helpers beveled down the cinderblock foundation at a 5 percent 
grade from the point of the split to the rear of the house, where the base was 
lowered by a full foot.  Then, gingerly lowering the jacks, they were able to make 
one half of the house rock gently back to rest on the descending incline (‘like a 
perfect dance partner’) and the narrow split at the center widened into a wedge 
open to the sky.59 
 
The movement of the building, or what Matta-Clark referred to as “the realization of 
motion in a static structure,” and the movement of people through the work, were both 
required for Splitting to be fully actualized. 
 For this reason, Holly Solomon organized a bus tour from New York so that 
people could see, experience, and participate in the work in person.60  Sculptor Alice 
Aycock recalls: “Starting at the bottom of the stairs where the crack was small, you’d go 
up, and as you’d go further up, you’d have to keep crossing the crack.  It kept widening 
as you made your way up to the top, the crack was one or two feet wide.  You really had 
to jump it.  You sensed the abyss in a kinesthetic and psychological way.”61  In order to 
experience the work fully, the audience must be present to witness the sun as it changes 
position throughout the day and to see how it illuminates the space differently.  
According to Richard Nonas, “Gordon’s work…needed, in fact, to be inhabited […] 
                                                
57 Ibid., p. 18. 
58 Ibid., p. 21. 
59 Crow, p. 77.  The quote is from an interview between Gordon Matta-Clark and Liza Bear in Avalanche. 
60 Ibid., p. 77. 
61 Lee, p. 29. 
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needed to be populated, to be lived in, walked through, experienced and not just seen or 
understood.”62  The performative dimension of Matta-Clark’s work indicates the need for 
active participation in his art. 
 One might recast the notion of participation in Gordon Matta-Clark’s work by 
combining it with ideas of play and use: “That Matta-Clark referred to his principle 
activity as ‘unbuilding’ points to the ways in which he was confronting the logic of 
artistic as well as architectural production.  In contrast to an artistic ‘work’ he offered 
instead a kind of artistic play – an idea of art as practice or use.”63  This formulation has 
particularly Wittgensteinian resonance in that Matta-Clark helped renegotiate the 
meaning of buildings and spaces through reimagining their use.  Again, this shows that 
Matta-Clark altered aesthetic expression by transforming or queering existing structures.  
Put another way, Matta-Clark took buildings that had fallen out of use and gave them 
new purpose.  He transformed condemned or abandoned structures into works of art, 
restoring the buildings by giving them “purposiveness without a purpose,” to borrow a 
Kantian phrase.  Both of these formulations allow us to consider how reimagined and 
reconfigured structures can serve as the focal point for gathering and the establishment of 
community.  As Pamela Lee writes, “the artist posed a larger sense of community against 
the alienation of modern housing his work assailed.  For Matta-Clark, the participation, 
social, and inclusive ritual of art making was understood as a democratic solution to the 
‘state of isolationism’ engendered by urban and suburban space.”64  Bringing people 
together in order to experience space and place in a new way, through re-imagining the 
                                                
62 Crow, p. 134. 
63 Lee, p. xiii. 
64 Lee, p. 164. 
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limits of a structure and how persons relate to it, builds community and participation.  
Through such projects, Matta-Clark established new meaning through use. 
 But the demand for participation and movement in deconstructed spaces was 
sometimes a dangerous dance for audience and collaborators alike, as Horace Solomon 
recalls:  “After it had been cut I felt nervous being in the house, I thought it would 
collapse at any minute.  I really didn’t enjoy being in it, though I loved the way it looked 
from outside, and liked standing back and looking at it.”65  Matta-Clark’s partner on the 
Splitting project, Manfred Hecht, felt the tension of the work, but had a different reaction 
to it:  “It was always exciting working with Gordon – there was always a good chance of 
getting killed.  That’s what I liked.”66  Or as Holly Solomon commented about 1975’s 
Day’s End, “I remember when I saw the piece for the first time, it reminded me of the 
first moments of seeing a Michelangelo, of being in a cathedral with flying buttresses and 
light-stained glass.  Yet I was also afraid.  I was afraid to cross the cut he made in the 
floor; I’m afraid of heights.  He made a small handrope for me and other people who 
were fearful.”67   
 Some interpretations of Matta-Clark’s work bear out these concerns of 
endangerment by viewing the cuts as acts of violence.  Because the object of this cut was 
a house – a dwelling, a home – Splitting was harshly criticized, particularly by feminists.  
Some accused Matta-Clark of a “misogynistic […] violent attack against the domestic 
order gendered as feminine” and of “out and out rape” on the house.68  But Matta-Clark 
wanted persons to participate in this space, to walk through it and experience it before its 
                                                
65 Crow, p. 140. 
66 Crow, p. 77. 
67 Lee, p. 130. 
68 Ibid., p. 21. 
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destruction, which contradicts this violent reading of Splitting.  He wanted to draw 
attention to the disintegration of community that occurs along with the eviction of 
persons and to simultaneously bring community together around and through this issue.  
As Les Levine points out, “The metapsychology of Gordon’s art was to embrace the 
abandoned.  He worked in old buildings, neighborhoods in a state of rejection.  He would 
nurture a building that had lost its soul.”69  Through reclaiming forgotten spaces, Matta-
Clark cared for and reawakened them.  By making such sites visible and vital again, 
Matta-Clark sought to enliven community.  As Lee notes, “the dissipation of 
communities and the demolition of site served as the generating principles of much of 
Matta-Clark’s work, and were its objects of critique.”70  In nurturing abandoned buildings 
marked for demolition, and making visionary cuts, Matta-Clark opposed the violent 
destruction of spaces and opened the possibility for reinterpreting them as vital and 
meaningful once again.  
 As I have argued, Gordon Matta-Clark showed us a way to understand the 
possibilities of transforming and expanding meaning and use through reclaiming 
abandoned or condemned spaces located at the margins of the city.  Through his 
ingenious building cuts, he exposed forgotten or forlorn spaces and made them visible 
again.  Works such as Splitting forced individuals to reexamine the conditions of their 
communities.  Space and place were made visible through Matta-Clark’s transitory 
beautification projects, often with demolition crews waiting in the wings to swing the 
wrecking ball.  In particular, because some of the buildings he altered were emptied 
because of evictions, Matta-Clark’s projects made visible the displacement of persons 
                                                
69 Ibid., p. 58. 
70 Ibid., p. 162. 
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and the attendant disintegration of communities.  Such problems were given new 
attention in Matta-Clark’s work.  He transformed everyday or commonplace decaying 
structures that wouldn’t cause a second thought or a second look into extraordinary 
spaces that generated awareness and community through the innovative reorganization of 
space and the movement of persons through it.  In Chapter Five, I explore the particular 
type of community that Matta-Clark garnered with his work.  In the next two sections of 
this chapter, I examine the work of David Lynch and Andy Warhol.  Each artist explores 
the boundaries of meaning and use through their innovative and exemplary art.  As a 
result of their investigation of limits and borders, these artists have transformed and 
expanded aesthetic expression. 
 
VI. David Lynch’s Liminal World:  Blue Velvet 
 
Matta-Clark’s building cuts are but one way to conceive of the expansion and 
transformation of expression.  What else (and who else) occupies the periphery of 
expression?  To answer this question, let us turn to an artist who we might consider 
Matta-Clark’s neighbor: the filmmaker David Lynch.  Both craft works that demand that 
we look closer at our environments, and often, that we critically examine them as socially 
and politically charged contexts.   So too, both artists deal with issues of visibility and 
silencing – the places we usually can’t go, and the words that are difficult to speak.  In 
the this section of argument, I examine how David Lynch’s works treat the limits of 
expression, and more specifically, pain at the limits of expression.  Because his films deal 
with borders and limits, Lynch’s work is engaged with questions of inclusion and 
exclusion. 
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The films of Lynch allow a return to the Wittgensteinian notion of meaning in use 
and the metaphor of language as an ancient city with expanding boroughs.  The first and 
maybe the most obvious connection is Lynch’s interest in the shaping power of locations 
and spaces.  Many of his films deal with conflicts in and between communities.  From the 
beginning of his feature length career with Eraserhead and its depiction of urban decay 
and despair in Philadelphia, to the seemingly idyllic Lumberton in Blue Velvet, to the 
small Pacific Northwest town in Twin Peaks, to explorations of Los Angeles and 
Hollywood in Lost Highway, Mulholland Drive, and Inland Empire, location has been 
extremely important to establishing the tone of his narratives.  While these locales may 
be rather disparate, Lynch’s abiding interest in the exploration of places and how people 
inhabit them provides a crucial link between his films.  What impact do cities, towns, and 
suburban-scapes have upon the lives individuals lead there? 
Red roses pop against the white picket fence that simultaneously keeps out and 
keeps in.  A fire engine drives by in surreal slow motion, complete with smiling fire 
fighters and Dalmatian aboard the truck.  A crossing guard waves school children across 
the street with a glazed expression, at once friendly and somehow zombific.  The 
lethargic speed of the action in combination with the swooning soundtrack (Bobby 
Vinton’s “Blue Velvet”) transforms the innocuous symbols of suburban life into a 
terrifying display.  Overly saturated with color, these opening shots of Blue Velvet verge 
on the grotesque.  They also foreshadow the grotesque’s larger presence in this town and 
its presence even in the midst of the beautiful.  The roses and fire engine are the color of 
blood.  The clear robin-egg blue sky seems menacing, its pure color uncannily devoid of 
clouds.  The environment is claustrophobic and threatening.  A man in one of the yards 
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waters his lawn and the hose gets twisted up.  He attempts to untangle it, and 
unexpectedly falls to the ground, clutching at his neck.  Now set loose, a small dog 
attacks the water issuing from the hose with feral intensity.  Captured in even slower 
motion, the ferocity of the dog, bearing its teeth while drinking the water, is alarming.  
From there, the camera navigates between blades of grass to uncover bugs teeming and 
grappling just beneath the surface of ground cover and dirt. 
In Blue Velvet, Lynch asks us to look closer at our conceptions of small town 
life.71  Anthony Vidler observes in Warped Space that “[w]e seldom look at our own 
surroundings.  Streets and buildings, even those considered major monuments are, in 
everyday life little more than background for introverted thought, passages through which 
our bodies pass ‘on the way to work.’  In this sense, cities are invisible to us, felt rather 
than seen, moved through rather than visually taken in.”72  Instead of separating the 
idealized 1950’s sugar sweetness of suburban life from the dangerous mysteries and 
degradation of the underworld, Lynch discomfortingly unites them.  
To keep this uneasiness at bay, many critics try to decouple Lynch’s depiction of 
the “seedy underbelly” and idealized surface of the town as completely disconnected 
elements.  They treat surface and interior as opposed to one another.  I aim to resist such 
a reading by showing how Lynch views them as complexly enmeshed.  Instead of 
depicting a false dualism of “appearance” / “reality” or “surface” / “interior,” Lynch 
exposes the ways in which these seeming opposites are intertwined through the edge, 
                                                
71 This opening scene has left its mark on several films / directors.  Most notably, Sam Mendes’s American 
Beauty takes up this opening quite explicitly mirroring the picket fences and rose bushes that are merely a 
tranquil façade.  The main character, Lester Burnham has a clipping in his cubicle that reads, “Look 
Closer.” 
72 Anthony Vidler.  Warped Space: Art, Architecture, and Anxiety in Modern Culture.  Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2000., p. 81. 
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border, or limn.73  Put more directly, Lynch is interested in how these surfaces and 
underbellies are actually part of the same body, each inextricably tied to and enmeshed 
with the other.  The “underworld” elements aren’t foreign to the rest of existence in a 
Lynchian universe; they are constitutive of it.   
This view of the relationship between good and evil unsettles many viewers.  As 
David Foster Wallace states in “David Lynch Keeps His Head”: 
I’m going to claim that evil is what David Lynch’s movies are essentially about 
and that Lynch’s explorations of human beings’ various relationships to evil are, 
if idiosyncratic and Expressionistic, nevertheless sensitive and insightful and true.  
I’m going to submit that the real ‘moral problem’ a lot of us cinéastes have with 
Lynch is that we find his truths morally uncomfortable, and that we do not like, 
when watching movies, to be made uncomfortable.  (Unless, of course, our 
discomfort is used to set up some kind of commercial catharsis – the retribution, 
the bloodbath, the romantic victory of the misunderstood heroine, etc. – i.e. unless 
the discomfort serves a conclusion that flatters the same comfortable moral 
certainties we came into the theater with.)74 
 
As Wallace points out, most Americans like their films to be morally tidy and 
uncomplicated.75  Lynch’s films, however, deal with what Irena Makarushka refers to as 
the “ambiguity of evil.”76  His characters are not easily defined as wholly “good” or 
“evil.”  They are often torn, conflicted, complicated; in other words, Lynch’s characters 
are all too human.77  Location is especially important on this score.  Most people want to 
believe that their seemingly tranquil town is impervious to crime or intrigue; we have a 
                                                
73 I will return to this point in a moment. 
74 David Foster Wallace.  “David Lynch Keeps His Head.”  In A Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never Do 
Again: Essays and Arguments.  New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1997., p. 203, emphasis in 
original. 
75 Consider, for example, the color-coded morality of old Westerns.  The good guy wears white, the bad 
guy wears black, etc. 
76 Irena Makarushka.  “Subverting Eden: Ambiguity of Evil and the American Dream in Blue Velvet.”  
Religion and American Culture 1 (Winter 1991): 31-46. 
77 Lynch is also interested in various senses of doubling.  Divided selves and Doppelgängers figure 
prominently in his films. 
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“that can’t happen here” mentality.78  But as Lynch’s location choices show, struggles of 
morality can happen anywhere, whether in the suburbs or the “dream city” of Los 
Angeles.  Put another way, Lynch’s films bring these questions of moral ambiguity home. 
Let’s return to the opening sequence of Blue Velvet.  This scene prepares the way 
for what is to follow: a study in contrasts, of surfaces and interiors, of the intertwinement 
of good and evil in small town American life.  The presence of insects teeming and 
grappling in the dirt just beneath the surface provides the overriding leitmotif of the entire 
film.79  Just as bugs live beneath the well-manicured surface, shady dealings and 
dangerous circumstances lurk just out of sight, or in this case, just beyond Lincoln 
Avenue.  This is the border across which the protagonist, Jeffrey Beaumont, is told not to 
go.  Mysterious circumstances prove too much for his curiosity, however.  At first, 
Jeffrey appears to be an upstanding college student who has been called home due to his 
father’s illness – someone who cares for family and community.  But he is drawn into a 
mystery when he finds a severed ear in a field.   
Because Jeffrey traverses his suburban community and the underworld, we 
viewers are granted access to the forbidden zone as well.  While he begins his quest with 
the best of intentions, first trying to solve a mystery and then trying to save a beleaguered 
woman, Jeffrey is drawn into a world of vice, kidnapping, abuse, sado-masochism, and 
                                                
78 Let’s note that such comments are often followed on television interviews about persons suspected of 
murder, with claims that, “he was such a nice boy.” 
79 Lynch is fascinated by dirt as an organic material.  In an interview with Chris Rodley, Lynch states:  “I 
like mounds of dirt – I really like mounds of dirt.  When we were doing Eraserhead, Peggy and I lived with 
Jennifer in a single house in LA that was in a neat area but the house was pretty cheap. And it had a 
circular, wooden dining table.  On her birthday, Peggy went out for some reason, and Jennifer and I started 
carrying in buckets of dirt.  And we made a pile of dirt about four feet high on the dining room table, 
covered the whole thing in just a mountain of dirt, and then dug little tunnels into it and put little clay 
abstract sculptures in the front of the tunnels.  And Peggy, bless her heart, was over the moon about it when 
she came home.  So we left it there for months.  And it ate the surface of the wood, you know, on the table, 
because it started going to work organically.  So the veneer was pretty much toasted when we finally took it 
off.  It was a neat sculpture.” Lynch on Lynch.  Ed.  Chris Rodley.  London: Faber and Faber, 1997., p. 49. 
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drugs.  He soon finds that merely casual entry into such a world is nearly impossible; 
Jeffrey begins to question everything he thought he once knew including his own 
allegiances, motives, and morals.  The warning not to cross Lincoln Avenue, then, may 
be interpreted as both physical and psychical.  The impact this liminal location has upon 
Jeffrey suggests that even proximity to this place is dangerous.  As Vidler states, “the 
modern subject [is] caught in spatial systems beyond its control […] Fear, anxiety, 
estrangement, and their psychological counterparts, anxiety neuroses and phobias, have 
been intimately linked to the aesthetics of space throughout the modern period.”80  Jeffrey 
gets in over his head.  His lack of self-control in the situation involving Frank Booth and 
Dorothy Vallens affects his behavior, both psychologically and morally. 
To distill the point:  Jeffrey’s morality is threatened as he turns away from trying 
to save Dorothy and instead begins to participate in her violent world.81  This 
transformation is expressed in terms of spatial mutations.  Wallace picks up on this 
connection by stating:  
The fact is that David Lynch treats the subject of evil better than just about 
anybody else making movies today – better and also differently.  His movies 
aren’t anti-moral, but they are definitely anti-formulaic.  Evil-ridden though his 
filmic world is, please notice that responsibility for evil never in his films 
devolves easily onto greedy corporations or corrupt politicians or faceless serial 
kooks.  Lynch is not interested in the devolution of responsibility, and he’s not 
interested in moral judgments of characters.  Rather, he’s interested in the psychic 
spaces in which people are capable of evil.  He is interested in Darkness.  And 
Darkness, in David Lynch’s movies, always wears more than one face.  Recall, 
for example, how Blue Velvet’s Frank Booth is both Frank Booth and “the Well-
Dressed Man.”82   
 
                                                
80 Vidler, p.1. 
81 This is most evident when Jeffrey consents to hitting Dorothy during sex. 
82 Wallace, p. 203, emphasis in original. 
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To restate the point:  the town beyond Lincoln Avenue is a space where Jeffrey is capable 
of evil, or at least, of abandoning his current system of judgment.  And this turning is 
more frightening than the Janus face of Frank.  Even as Frank dons the mask and 
becomes the “Well-Dressed Man,” we know where his allegiances lie.  We have 
witnessed his monstrous behavior and know that he is responsible for kidnapping and 
abuse.  Jeffrey and the crooked cop, on the other hand, embody the ambiguity of morality 
in Blue Velvet, and how capacity for evil can easily become actual evil.  But as Wallace 
points out, Lynch isn’t interested in judging, let alone in condemning, these characters.83  
He does, however, want to set them in motion to see what happens when they are loosed 
on screen.   
As we have seen, locations have the power to shape the lives of the individuals 
who inhabit them.  In a certain way, this can be read as a spatialized version of the 
Wittgensteinian thought that value and use impact form of life, or put more strongly, are 
a form of life.  Martha Nochimson makes the link between Lynch’s work and 
Wittgenstein’s metaphor of language as an expanding city more explicit.  In the 
introduction to The Passion of David Lynch: Wild at Heart in Hollywood, she states: 
The development of Lynch’s body of work is informed by a realist’s optimism  
that there is an exit from the linguistic labyrinth and that this exit is richly  
available to us. […] Lynch told me this, in so many words, confirming the 
interpretations of his films that I had evolved in the intervening years.  His use of 
language – and of cinematic vocabulary – suggests that, once we understand that 
we ourselves have created cultural forms and that they only have the meaning we 
                                                
83 Ibid., p. 202.  As Wallace puts it, “Moral atrocities in Lynch movies are never staged to elicit outrage or 
even disapproval.  The directorial attitude when hideousness occurs seems to range between clinical 
neutrality and an almost voyeuristic ogling.  It’s not an accident that Frank Booth, Bobby Peru, and Leland 
/ ‘Bob’ steal the show in Lynch’s last three films, that there is almost a tropism about our pull toward these 
characters, because Lynch’s camera is obsessed with them, loves them; they are his movies’ heart.” See p. 
202. 
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give them, we are free to understand the forces in the universe that are truly larger 
than we are and how they connect us to a greater reality.84 
 
Here, Nochimson articulates a version of the Wittgensteinian notion of language as a 
shared form of life.  Meaning is established through agreement in the words we use and 
the meanings we attach to them.  In the case of Blue Velvet, the suburbs are coded with 
the expectations Lynch lays out visually in the opening sequence.  In this area, we expect 
picket fences encircling yards where the children will play in safety.  We don’t expect the 
degeneracy of human life and the degradation of morality.  But because darkness wears 
more than one face, as Wallace points out, we erect an idyllic image of suburbia to 
protect us from what we already know exists there.  While there isn’t much wrong with 
an interest in safety, if it is valued over knowledge about our communities, it may be 
counterproductive.  As long as we value such places, spaces, and ways of living, we 
safeguard their existence and their meaning for our lives at the cost of exploring 
differences and how they can enrich our lives. 
 As we have seen in this section, Lynch’s films deal with liminal locations, 
characters, and subjects.  As Wallace comments, their form is also liminal: 
David Lynch’s movies are often described as occupying a kind of middle ground 
between art film and commercial film.  But what they really occupy is a whole 
third different kind of territory.  Most of Lynch’s best films don’t really have 
much of a point, and in lots of ways they seem to resist the film-interpretive 
process by which movies’ (certainly avant-garde movies’) central points are 
understood.  […]  The absence of point or recognizable agenda in Lynch’s films, 
though, strips […] [our] subliminal defenses and lets Lynch get inside your head 
in a way movies normally don’t.  This is why his best films’ effects are often so 
emotional and nightmarish (we’re defenseless in our dreams, too).  This may, in 
fact, be Lynch’s true and only agenda: just to get inside your head.85  
  
                                                
84 Martha Nochimson.  The Passion of David Lynch: Wild at Heart in Hollywood.  Austin, TX: University 
of Texas Press, 1997., p. 4. 
85 Wallace, p. 170-171, emphasis in original. 
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This perspective on Lynch’s liminality helps to explain some of the aforementioned 
difficulties involved in the reception of his works.86  His cult is a community comprised 
of self-selecting individuals who are dedicated to trying to interpret and communicate 
about Lynch’s film and television projects with one another.  I will fill out this argument 
in Chapter Five.  Because Lynch’s films cross the boundaries of commercial and avant-
garde art, his work is connected to that of Andy Warhol, the subject of the next section.   
 
 
VII. Warhol’s Factory:  Subculture in the City 
 
At the beginning of his career, Warhol worked between advertising, commercial, 
and fine art, or between low and high art.  He published his first drawing of shoes 
climbing up a ladder for a story entitled, “Success Is a Job in New York” in a 1949 issue 
of Glamour magazine shortly after moving to New York City from Pittsburgh.87  
“[Warhol] started off illustrating stories in Charm, Seventeen, and Mademoiselle and 
drawing covers for Columbia Records.”88  In 1955, he received an important job with I. 
Miller Shoes to “update” their image in full and half-page ads in the New York Times 
Society pages.  In spite of his success with advertising and commercial art, Warhol had 
difficulty securing an exhibition in the fine art world.89  
                                                
86 In addition to having “sick” subject matter that sometimes makes individuals uncomfortable, audiences 
have trouble figuring out what Lynch’s films want or what they’re getting at.  For this reason, his films are 
difficult both to categorize and to talk about.  This complexity does not suggest that Lynch’s films have no 
point, contra Wallace’s intimations, but rather that audience members and critics will have to work hard to 
grapple with the unconventionality of Lynch films – alone and in conversation with others.  Put in more 
Kantian terms, Lynch’s films place heavy demands on the audience to respond.   
87 Stephen Watson.  Factory Made: Warhol and the Sixties.  New York: Pantheon Books, 2003., p. 25 
88 Ibid., p. 25-26. 
89 Ibid., p. 31.  His first exhibition was in the window of Bonwit Teller’s department store.  Interestingly, 
Jasper Johns and Robert Rauschenberg had also designed windows for the shop.  
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Warhol continued to cross the boundaries of art and advertising throughout his 
career.  According to David James,  “[H]is first ‘real’ paintings were themselves used in 
his window displays; his breakthrough paintings were reproductions of ads; and 
throughout his life he made paintings or silk-screens of advertisements…”90  James goes 
on to claim that Warhol was unique because of the entrepreneurial bent of his work.  As 
Stephen Watson frames the point, Warhol displayed an abiding aspiration to be what he 
called a “business artist.”91  “For his was a career that was historically prototypical and 
prescient not because he engaged so many mediums, but because he engaged so many of 
them as an entrepreneur, carelessly crossing the ideological and functional boundaries of 
art itself, thus repudiating one of its most crucial criteria, its self-definition against 
advertising.”92 
In the sixties, Warhol’s boundary crossing would take a different turn as he set up 
his base of operations in a large building located on East 47th Street in Midtown 
Manhattan.  The industrial scale of the space allowed Warhol to mass-produce larger 
works using the silk-screening process.  It was called the Factory:   
‘Factory is as good a name as any,’ said Andy.  ‘A factory is where you build 
things.  This is where I make or build my work.  In my artwork hand painting 
would take much too long, and anyway that’s not the age we live in.  Mechanical 
means are today, and using them I can get more art to more people.  Art should be 
for everyone.’93 
 
In addition to using industrial production techniques, Warhol also employed assistants to 
help him complete his works.  The spirit of the Factory was communal: large numbers of 
visitors and guests participated in whatever project was underway. 
                                                
90 David James.  “The Unsecret Life: A Warhol Advertisement.” October 56 (Spring 1991): 21-41., p. 23. 
91 Watson, p. 26, p. 152. 
92 James, p. 22-23. 
93 Watson, p. 126, emphasis in original. 
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 The Factory became the site of multiple and overlapping artistic activities from 
painting and silk-screening to filmmaking, photography, poetry, and music.94  It was a 
gathering place, a social space, a home,95 and critically, a creative arena.  The participants 
in this atmosphere of collaboration and creativity are often remembered as “Superstars.”  
It is easy to imagine that Warhol merely shined a light on persons with already luminous 
characters who found their way to the Factory.  In reality, Warhol had a stronger hand in 
fashioning them into influential tastemakers and stylish personas.  Kathy Acker observed 
that the members of the Factory were undesirables, persons “who at the time no decent 
person, not even a hippy would recognize as being human.”96  Warhol propelled this 
group of misfits, druggies, drag queens, thieves, and outcasts from no status to star status.  
Perhaps Warhol assembled his inner circle from these eccentrics because he did not see 
himself as glamorous.  Even after his rise to fame, he still viewed himself as “Andy the 
Red Nosed Warhola.”97  
The Factory was the site for inclusion of “actors and poets, socialites and thieves, 
models, consumers of amphetamine, painters, filmmakers, and musicians”98 and the 
exclusion of others.99  As Warhol gathered more individuals into his orbit, the Factory 
                                                
94 The height of Warhol’s liminality was the “Exploding Plastic Inevitable,” which combined the music of 
the Velvet Underground with noise, dance, lighting displays, strobe lights, and multi-screen film 
projections.  See Branden Joseph.  “‘My Head Split Open’: Andy Warhol’s Exploding Plastic Inevitable.” 
Grey Room 8 (Summer 2002): 80-107.  See also Callie Angell.  Andy Warhol’s Screen Tests: The Films of 
Andy Warhol.  Catalogue Raisonné.  New York: Abrams, in association with the Whitney Museum of 
American Art, 2006., p. 18-19. 
95 Both Gerard Malanga and Billy Linich lived in the Factory at various points.  See Watson, p. 121-122. 
96 Kathy Acker quoted in Joseph, p. 97.  Joseph continues, “It was a group, however, that would later 
emerge within punk and a politicized gay subculture.” 
97 Watson, p. 7.  The nickname relates to Warhol’s trouble with his complexion, and in particular, with 
acne. 
98 Reva Wolf.  “Collaboration as Social Exchange: Screen Tests / A Diary by Gerard Malanga and Andy 
Warhol.”  Art Journal 52 (4) (Winter 1993): 59-66, p. 59. 
99 Most notably, this was the case with Valerie Solanas.  She was close enough to strive for inclusion, but 
far enough to feel as though Warhol did not take her seriously.  She later shot him. 
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became a sort of New York underground or subculture.100  As Annette Michelson notes 
about the Factory, “the prohibitions and restrictions that govern the structure of everyday 
life are suspended, together with the decorum that underwrites traditional forms of social 
hierarchy.  From this world are excised pity, piety, and etiquette that are linked to those 
forms.  Here distances between persons are abrogated and eccentricity is exalted.”101  As 
you might imagine, this environment spurred competitive tensions and creativity in the 
same stroke.  While this environment might make some uncomfortable, Warhol 
thrived.102  By some accounts, he openly courted competition between members of his 
coterie and delighted in their shows of renewed loyalty.  Perhaps his privileged position 
as ringmaster contributed to Warhol’s unnatural comfort at the Factory. 
Membership in this community of misfits with “anything goes” attitudes was 
often cemented by an invitation to participate in Warhol’s Screen Tests.  The Screen 
Tests were designed as short film portraits of subjects captured during the span of a single 
reel of film.103  Shot at a standard twenty-four frames per second, the films were replayed 
at the silent speed of sixteen frames per second in order to accentuate the effects of any 
movements in a surreal and clinical slow motion.  For this reason, they were sometimes 
called “stillies”:  Warhol was slowing down the concept of “motion” picture with the 
nearly unmoving appearance of the Screen Tests.  The films were regularly shown at the 
                                                
100 In Chapter Five, I will explore the Factory subculture in greater detail. 
101 Annette Michelson. “‘Where Is Your Rupture?’: Mass Culture and the Gesamtkunstwerk.” October 56 
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Factory, as a sort of background to other activities, and in a more organized fashion as 
part of the Exploding Plastic Inevitable, and as part of Jonas Mekas’s Floating 
Cinematheque.104  Hundreds of subjects sat for the portraits, (there are 472 Screen Tests 
in all) and individuals who really interested Warhol were invited to sit on multiple 
occasions.105   
Because the set up for these short films was extremely similar, the reactions of the 
sitters set the individual Screen Tests apart.106  As Reva Wolf writes:  
At the Factory, they were instructed to have a seat, usually in a cubicle like area 
set up expressly for the purpose of making screen tests.  The camera rested on a 
tripod, one or two lights were temporarily installed, and at times a white or black 
backdrop was added.  Warhol generally framed the composition of the head shot.  
Most often, sitters were instructed to gaze, without moving, directly at the camera 
lens, although examples also exist of profile and three-quarter views.107  
 
Warhol set himself basic conventions for capturing these portraits: “the camera should 
not move; the background should be as plain as possible; subjects must be well lit and 
centered in the frame; each poser should face forward, hold as still as possible, refrain 
from talking or smiling, and try not to blink.”108  These ground rules guaranteed that the 
real focus for each Screen Test would be the individual at hand.  Variations, then, would 
be due only to the character of the individual and how he or she reacted to the scenario. 
A combination of flattery and vanity lured individuals into sitting for their screen 
tests, but the results revealed so much more:  
Vanity might lead one to sit for a portrait film, and the nomenclature ‘screen test’ 
might conjure up nothing more than the superficiality of appearances.  
                                                
104 Mekas was influential in the creation of underground and alternative cinema in New York in the 1960s.  
He was also the editor of Film Culture.  See Watson, p. 66. 
105 Edie Sedgwick, Ivy Nicholson, Ann Buchanan, Gerard Malanga, and members of the Velvet 
Underground have several Screen Tests. 
106 Wolf, p. 62. 
107 Ibid., p. 61-62. 
108 Angell, p. 14. 
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Nonetheless, the intensity of gaze that often resulted from Warhol’s instruction to 
sitters to stare directly into the camera lens had the capacity to communicate more 
meaningful associations […] In a 1966 study, cultural critic John Gruen described 
the screen-test film as ‘an intense study in involuntary character revelation.’109  
 
Intensity and vulnerability were often revealed through the unwavering lights and gaze of 
the camera.  Some, like Salvador Dalí, boldly confronted the camera, manifesting the 
intensity of his persona.  Others, like Ann Buchanan, took the instruction not to blink 
very seriously; she cried from the effort by the end of her session. 
 The interaction between Warhol and his sitter during a Screen Test is as important 
as that of a painter and subject during a more traditional portrait.  Art critic Robert 
Pincus-Warren recalls the comments of Gerard Malanga and Warhol to Malanga’s screen 
test:  “I remember Gerry Malanga and Andy Warhol were there, and Andy would say 
things like, ‘Isn’t it wonderful!  Isn’t he terrific!  He’s doing it!’  As if one is really doing 
something wonderful by simply remaining static and unmoving before the lens, but the 
hype was very, very exciting.”110  Hype, flattery, vanity, and the idea of inclusion in 
Warhol’s community played a large role in the seating so many interesting individuals for 
their screen tests.  These factors coalesced into collaboration between sitter and film 
portraitist, in which neither party had full control.  This situation was characteristic of 
most of Warhol’s endeavors; he gained a type of control by ceding control to others.  
Warhol was a master facilitator of the creative process, helping to release the creativity of 
others.   
But what was Warhol’s ultimate role at the Factory?  Due to the collaborative and 
social model of art making he adopted, it is difficult to discern.  Watson contemplates the 
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question:  “Warhol’s role at the Factory was tantalizingly ambiguous.   Were the Factory 
denizens a family, with Warhol as the permissive father?  Was it a giant couch with 
Warhol as the silent analyst?  Was it a court, with Warhol as its Machiavellian monarch?  
Or was it a movie studio with Warhol as its passive mogul?”111  Perhaps, it is all of the 
above.  Or perhaps, more directly, Warhol was the facilitator of creativity.  His genius 
was social in nature; Warhol managed to focus the talents of others through his 
innovative approach to communal art making.  Watson states: 
The artifacts of the Factory collaborations demand models of authorship that do 
not fit conventional monographic discourse, interpreting the artist as a solitary 
genius […] One of Warhol’s greatest ‘works’ was, in fact, psychological: the 
creation of a physical/social place where people ‘performed themselves.’  They 
determined how they would present themselves to the camera or to the tape 
recorder; Andy Warhol framed them and pushed the button.  The Silver Factory 
was a ‘social sculpture,’ in which Warhol broadened the concept of authorship.112 
 
Not only did Warhol broaden the concept of authorship, but he also redefined what it 
meant to be an artist.  In addition to having a natural talent for making artworks that are 
both innovative and exemplary, Warhol turned his genius into a social activity.  He 
thereby set the new rule to art in the process. 
In conclusion, while Warhol encountered difficulties in breaking in to the fine art 
world at the beginning of his career, he is now considered one of the greatest American 
artists of the 20th Century.  As a 1997 Chicago Tribune article put it, “anyone seeking an 
understanding of modern and contemporary art will have to come up against, and if 
possible, accept” Warhol and his influential work.113  Thus, the influence of his art has 
proven ingenious: his innovative and exemplary works have endured over time and have 
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impacted the history of art.  Warhol’s work tells us a great deal about how ingenious 
expression can transform and expand the boundaries of meaning and communication.  
While it took some time for the significance of his art to be recognized, Warhol’s 
explorations of the new boroughs of meaning ultimately expanded the boundaries of the 
city itself (communication itself).  His centrality to the artworld suggests that his 
explorations of silk-screen paintings and cooperative production techniques in the new 
boroughs were incorporated into the city at large.  In Chapter Five, I will explore 
Warhol’s transformation from a cult figure into the leader of the Factory subculture.  The 
types of communities Warhol gathered are crucial to understanding his aesthetic process 
and how his work was received. 
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Chapter Two 
 
 The Unfulfillable Demand to Respond to Genius 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In the last chapter, we investigated Wittgenstein’s notion of “new boroughs” in 
order to better understand the social dimension of novel forms of expression.  In this 
chapter, we will turn to aesthetic expression, and in particular Kantian works of genius, in 
order to explore how these expressions affect community and culture.  The social 
dimension of taste is sometimes ignored in discussions of Kantian aesthetics, but by 
pairing it with the notion of shared community found in Wittgenstein, I will highlight the 
intersubjectivity already present in Kant’s account of taste.  As I show in this chapter, 
discussions of matters of taste in communication with others is crucial to Kant’s 
conception of art, taste, and genius.   
In this chapter, I lay out in three moments an argument about how humans strive 
to be adequate to the demands of art as characterized by Kant in the Critique of Judgment.  
In the first moment, I explain the demand to respond to art cognitively despite the 
ineffability of aesthetic ideas.  Due to the meaningful excess of aesthetic ideas in 
comparison to normal concepts of cognition, an individual is silenced while she attempts 
to process the experience and searches for concepts with which to communicate about art.  
I establish the way in which art is a crucial consideration in the investigation of 
communication and culture.  
In the second moment, I explore the way in which the demand of art on and for 
cognition is enmeshed with the demand to communicate with others through judgments 
of taste.  This intersubjective aspect of response to art involves communication to and 
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with other people and so exposes the social dimension of the demands made by art.  This 
social interaction is further complicated and fueled by the Kantian claim that humans are 
driven to gain assent from others about their judgments of taste despite the merely 
subjective basis of those judgments.  The need for such agreement is a mark of 
refinement and humanity; according to Kant, it is not easy to achieve among different 
subjects. 
In the third moment, I investigate how the social demand for agreement in 
judgment relates to culture.  In particular, I explore the cultural effects of restrictions on 
aesthetic expression executed in the name of taste.  Culture is that set of customs, 
practices, mores, and traditions particular to group of people that shares a way of life.  
Culture unites group members through the shared perspectives and habits they develop 
through living together.  Often the commonalities are linguistic, moral, and aesthetic in 
nature, and for this reason, are of particular interest to my inquiry.  Culture can also refer 
to those individuals who possess it; one can be a “cultured” or “civilized” person.  This is 
slightly different from the sense articulated above, in that it signifies the development of 
higher motivations, purposes, and tastes that are not based upon mere need, desire, or 
natural inclination.  This second sense of culture is also important to my inquiry because 
it highlights the normative notion of civilization in contrast with what is “natural,” 
“untrained,” or “unrefined.”114   
With these definitions of culture in mind, in the third moment I also discuss 
Kant’s notions of the culture of discipline and the culture of skill in order to show the 
connection between culture and the role of taste in clipping the wings of genius.  With 
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this restrictive power of culture in mind, I explore how nature in the subject in general is 
“shaped” or “tamed” so that humans can pursue higher purposes such as art, science, and 
culture and how those endowed with genius have further limitations placed upon them.  
According to Kant, genius is in a double bind: genius is necessary to the advancement of 
culture, yet it is also made unfree by it.  This moment of restriction upon genius exposes 
several dangers to freedom of expression for artists and audiences alike. 
I single out these three moments for individual treatment because they relate to 
three different ways in which we might approach art: (a) a focus on the perceiving subject, 
(b) a focus on the interaction of individuals through conversations and judgments of taste, 
and (c) a focus on the sphere of discourse in which these interactions take place and are 
shaped, i.e., culture.  
 
II. First Moment 
 
Cognition and Aesthetic Ideas:  
The Objective and Subjective Moments of Aesthetic Response 
 
Works of art set forth demands for engagement to individuals who encounter 
them.  Specifically, this demand is for cognitive engagement that is sometimes 
transformed into verbal or written responses.  Broadly speaking, the aim of cognitive 
engagement is to make sense of the works and to communicate about them.  The initial 
conditions of cognitive engagement with works of art typically require, as a matter of 
convention, silence on the part of the audience.  We see this norm upheld in museums, 
galleries, theaters, and auditoriums during exhibitions or performances.  Silence is 
expected of attentive individuals in these settings; it is a conventional measure of 
membership in a community marked by civilization and culture.  Examined from another 
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perspective, however, it isn’t merely a matter of convention.  Works of art themselves 
silence their audience as a precondition for engagement with them.  
The kinds of ideas that constitute works of art are responsible for the intrinsic 
demand for silence.  Instead of engaging in silence as a matter of mere decorum or 
simply in order to concentrate more fully upon a work, audience members are silenced by 
the complexity of the ideas with which they are presented.  I will focus upon the 
cognitive dimension of the demands of art through a thorough examination of the impact 
of aesthetic ideas upon cognitive processes.  This is an essential starting point for the 
investigation at hand because attempts at communication with other people about art are 
built upon the cognition that underlies it, and works of art present an excess of ideas and 
experience that subjects are unable to fully articulate.   
Although individuals are able to feel this surplus, the meaning of these works 
exceeds our ability to fully process, conceptualize, or communicate about them – in short, 
to cognize them.  Kant asserts that an aesthetic idea is a “presentation of the imagination 
which prompts much thought, to which no determinate concept is adequate, so that no 
language can express it completely and also allow us to grasp it.”115  We seek to give our 
aesthetic experience some sort of boundaries in order to comprehend it; we search for a 
unified concept (or set of concepts) by which to comprehend the meaning of the art we 
encounter.  Yet, due to the multitude of partial and related presentations, it is difficult to 
do so.  Kant states: 
Now if a concept is provided with [unterlegen] a presentation of the imagination 
such that, even though this presentation belongs to the exhibition of the concept, 
yet it prompts, even by itself, so much thought as can never be comprehended 
within a determinate concept and thereby the presentation aesthetically expands 
                                                
115 Immanuel Kant.  The Critique of Judgment.  Trans. Werner Pluhar.  Indianapolis, IN:  Hackett 
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the concept itself in an unlimited way, then the imagination is creative in [all of] 
this and sets the power of intellectual ideas (i.e., reason) in motion: it makes 
reason think more, when prompted by a [certain] presentation, than what can be 
apprehended and made distinct in the presentation (though the thought does 
pertain to the concept of the object [presented]).116 
 
Thus, the excess of aesthetic ideas stretches the bounds of our concepts and threatens the 
coherence of our experience.  The result is a struggle to fit our experience into a concept 
that is too constrictive for it.   While concepts fail to adequately capture the meaning of 
the work of art, still we struggle to find them.  Otherwise, the excess would escape 
conceptualization and fall away from experience altogether.  Because our ready-to-hand 
concepts are too narrow, too weak, or both, to engage adequately with works of art, the 
surplus produces further thought and activity in the attempt to process and comprehend it.   
Kant argues that because aesthetic ideas challenge and stretch conceptual 
boundaries, they expand the mind itself.  Aesthetic ideas activate and quicken the mental 
faculties through the excess that they contain. 
[W]e present something that prompts the imagination to spread over a multitude 
of kindred presentations that arouse more thought than can be expressed in a 
concept determined by words.  These aesthetic attributes yield an aesthetic idea, 
which serves the mentioned rational idea as a substitute for a logical exhibition, 
but its proper function is to quicken [beleben] the mind by opening up for it a 
view into an immense realm of kindred presentations […] that give the 
imagination a momentum which makes it think more in response to these objects, 
though in an undeveloped way, than can be comprehended within one concept 
and hence in one determinate linguistic expression.117 
 
Aesthetic ideas quicken the mind to engage in what Kant calls reflective judgment, in 
which we search for the right concept to apprehend a sensuous particular.  The 
imagination strives to attain its goal of fitting a concept to the presentations.  This 
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quickens the faculties and thus drives more cognition.118  Put another way, aesthetic ideas 
“make reason think more” by trying to join together a multiplicity of partial and kindred 
presentations.  The mind springs into action, but it is not well directed.  As Werner Pluhar 
explains in a passage about empirical judgment, “The imagination ‘apprehends’ (takes 
up) what is given in intuitions and then puts together or ‘combines’ this diversity (or 
‘manifold’) so that it matches the concept.  In this way the imagination ‘exhibits’ 
(darstellen, traditionally rendered as ‘to present’) the concept, i.e., provides it with a 
matching or ‘corresponding’ intuition.”119  The excess of aesthetic ideas exacerbates the 
disjunction between the imagination and the understanding.  The understanding is unable 
to craft a concept that fits the experience and the imagination is unable to successfully 
join together the multiplicity of presentations. 
The work of art, in short, both stimulates our cognitive faculties and also 
frustrates them; we are unable to fully cognize our experience and yet are driven to do so 
all the same.  For Kant, this is both a source of pleasure and discomfort for the subject.  
This excess is pleasurable because it enlivens our faculties; we gain even more pleasure 
in our attempt to make something productive out of this excess.  It results in the 
expansion of the mind beyond its current bounds and in the quickening of its faculties.  
This expansion and quickening of the mind are part of what we like about art and why we 
find it to be valuable.  The displeasure, on the other hand, stems from the inability to fully 
align all the presentations into a single, well-formed concept or expression. 
Under such circumstances, we silently strive to communicate, both to ourselves 
and to others, what is by nature difficult to express.  Aesthetic ideas foil our ability to 
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communicate with ease; as Kant puts it, they are “unexpoundable presentations of the 
imagination.”120  Put differently, we can never fully unpack their meaning; they are 
unexpoundable due to the sheer amount of related presentations and the “thoughts of 
much that is ineffable”121 that we add to the concept in question.  We cannot fully grasp 
(fassen) their meaning, but we endeavor to understand and express them nonetheless.  
Yet, these attempts at articulation and explanation are never complete.  There is always 
more to be said about aesthetic ideas and experience.   
Considering that works of art make us feel our selves in response to them, the 
expression of our judgments of taste is the most difficult and intimate form of 
communication that we can undertake, and one of the most valuable. 122   According to 
Kant, it is the communication of one’s self or the experience of feeling one’s self through 
the encounter with art.123  There is no end to the struggle to express our selves to others 
about art.  As a further complication, individual selves are continually developing and 
changing as they accumulate experience of the world (and the art in it).  As Thierry de 
Duve claims, selves are constituted, in part, through judgments of taste:     
In love affairs, with works of art as with people, your feelings are of course 
determined by past experience, channeled through the story of your family, 
conditioned by your belonging to this or that social class, by your sex and your 
gender, by your education, by your heredity.  Obviously, you can only love within 
the limits of your social determination and of the cultural opportunities that are 
objectively available to you, but that doesn’t stop you from loving. […] You have 
introjected the socially acquired dispositions that produce the love of art; you 
have let them lie fallow, or you have cultivated them to a greater or lesser extent; 
regardless, they shape you just as intimately as anything else in your 
personality.124 
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   53 
De Duve rightly emphasizes the dialectical relationship of selves and tastes.  As 
individual selves develop, so do their tastes.  Conversely, these tastes shape the selves 
that have them.    
Along with Kant, de Duve asserts that what individuals feel in response to art is 
uncontrollable, compulsive even, if it has its roots in the history of the self in question.  
De Duve states, “Like your choices in love affairs, your choices in art are free and at the 
same time compulsive.  Something irresistible attracts you.  You don’t always know what, 
but you know that you are attracted because you feel it.”125  Taking these passages 
together, we note that taste is both socially determined and yet somehow “innate” to the 
subject.   This reinforces the point about judgments of taste and the communication of 
selves: if tastes are shaped (or freely determined) by the self, then their expression gets at 
something extremely intimate about the person articulating them.  The expression of 
one’s judgments of taste to others is the deepest form of self-expression.  For this reason, 
it is also the most difficult to communicate.  Finishing out de Duve’s dialectic, judgments 
of taste shape the selves who try to communicate (themselves) to others.  The judgments 
they express, in turn, may be used to persuade or move other individuals to experience art 
in the same manner, and effectively, to have the same taste.    
The foregoing analysis applies to various forms of response to art.   For instance, 
we might be inspired to produce works of art in response to another work of art.  It is 
much more common, however, to discuss works of art than to respond by writing a song 
or painting a picture, for instance.  My focus upon the ability to linguistically respond to 
works of art is due, in part, to the public prevalence of discussions of art and taste.  One 
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need not be an artist herself in order to respond to art; everyone can participate in such 
conversations.  Although the ineffability of aesthetic ideas compromises our ability to 
communicate effectively about art, linguistic utterances are still the most common form 
of intimate self-expression.  We are sometimes silenced by our encounters with art, but 
strive nonetheless to communicate our aesthetic experiences to others.  
 
Summary 
 
A work of art makes the subject feel her self and reflect upon her encounter with 
it.  She wants to talk about it, but is unable to find words and concepts that are adequate 
to her experience.  The work has spurred such an excess in cognition that it cannot be 
easily grasped or communicated to others; cognitively full silence can result from 
aesthetic experience in these circumstances.  Despite the difficulties involved, humans 
strive to express themselves with respect to aesthetic experience even if (and especially 
if) the demand to respond is greater than our powers of communication (and 
conceptualization).  One cannot fully explicate the content of aesthetic ideas, but one 
continues to try.  The inability to fully comprehend and communicate about art makes the 
demand to respond all the more persistent.  
To this point, I have set up the relation of individual selves to works of art and the 
effect that art has upon cognition and communication.  At this juncture, we must begin to 
examine where these attempts at communication and agreement with other people lead.  
If aesthetic ideas are ineffable and elude conceptualization, why strive to communicate 
them?  Why don’t we remain silent in the presence of that which has silenced us?  Why 
struggle to express that which is difficult to communicate?  Having established the 
objective and subjective aspects of aesthetic response, let us turn to the intersubjective 
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aspect of response.  In the next section of argument, I examine the inability to fully 
communicate about art to others and what happens when these expressions are 
incomplete.  The ongoing attempt to communicate judgments to others has wide reaching 
implications for what Kant calls “the advancement” of communication, art, and culture. 
 
 
III. Second Moment 
Communication and Community: 
The Intersubjective Moment of Aesthetic Response 
 
Humans not only attempt to make sense of their aesthetic experience and to 
express themselves regarding it, but also to discuss art with others and to gain assent with 
respect to judgments of taste.  We are not satisfied to merely express our judgments; we 
must attempt to convince others of their correctness, to get them to see as we do, and to 
make our selves understood.126  This opens up the intersubjective demand of art to 
communicate about our selves and our responses to art.  In this section of the argument, I 
will begin to address judgments of taste, the sociability that befits our humanity, and the 
civilization of the subject from an intersubjective perspective.   
 Allow me to re-raise some of the questions that remained at the end of the first 
moment:  Why attempt to communicate in spite of the difficulties it presents for subjects?   
Why try to express ourselves if it is impossible to fully communicate about aesthetic 
ideas?  Why not pass over in silence that which we cannot speak about?  To begin to 
sketch an answer, we must consider the fact that communication is a sign of a culture that 
is both civilized and advanced.127  Moreover, communication about art indicates that 
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humanity aspires to its vocation of being rational agents that are capable of more than 
mere desire and inclination.  Humans can design and communicate about purposes, such 
as art, that are not purely based on need.128  However, humans need training to be able to 
effectively communicate and live in society with one another.  Kant states:  
Only in society is the beautiful of empirical interest.  And if we grant that the urge 
to society is natural to man but that his fitness and propensity of it, i.e., sociability, 
is a requirement of man as a creature with a vocation for society and hence is a 
property pertaining to his humanity, then we must also inevitably regard taste as 
an ability to judge whatever allows us to communicate even our feeling to 
everyone else, and hence regard taste as a means of furthering something that 
everyone’s natural inclination demands.129  
 
In this passage, Kant links the demands of art (the demands of taste) to the demands of 
sociability (the demands of communication).  While humans have the natural urge to live 
in society, they are not immediately prepared to live alongside one another in a peaceful 
manner.  Rather, humans need training in sociability – in communication with one 
another – in order to form a harmonious society.  The most refined communication is of 
judgments of taste in regard to our feelings about art, that which, more generally, exhibits 
purposiveness without a purpose.130   
Communication itself is a source of pleasure for humans because it serves to 
strengthen our social ties and thereby to advance our culture.131  We aim to express our 
pleasure about the beautiful and to demand the same response from others: 
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That the ability to communicate one’s mental state, even if this is only the state of 
one’s cognitive powers, carries a pleasure with it, could easily be established 
(empirically and psychologically) from man’s natural propensity for sociability.  
But that would not suffice for our aim here.  When we make a judgment of taste, 
the pleasure we feel is something we require from everyone else as necessary, just 
as if, when we call something beautiful, we had to regard beauty as a 
characteristic of the object, determined in it according to concepts, even though in 
fact, apart from the reference to the subject’s feeling, beauty is nothing by 
itself.132 
 
In talking about art, we are really talking about ourselves and about what we experience 
in the encounter with beauty.  We express the pleasure that accompanies the attunement 
and quickening of the faculties in response to art.  In other words, we express our 
subjectivity.  Due to the intimacy of such self-expression, it is curious that this 
communication also serves society’s purposes.  Kant states: “Fine art […] is a way of 
presenting that is purposive on its own and that furthers, even though without a purpose, 
the culture of our mental powers to [facilitate] social communication.”133  We gain a 
double pleasure here from the attunement of the faculties and from the attempts at 
communicating it to others.  As such, communication about art is beneficial both 
cognitively and socially; it is the refinement and civilization of beings that are socially 
engaged with the world and with each another: 
It seems that for all fine art, insofar as we aim at its highest degree of perfection, 
the propaedeutic does not consist in [following] precepts but in cultivating our 
mental powers by exposing ourselves beforehand to what we call humaniora [the 
humanities]; they are called that presumably because humanity [Humanität] 
means both the universal feeling of sympathy, and the ability to engage 
universally in very intimate communication.  When these two qualities are 
combined, they constitute the sociability that befits [our] humanity [Menschheit] 
and distinguishes it from the limitation [characteristic] of animals.134 
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What is at stake in the communication of judgments of taste isn’t just the character, 
content, or meaning of the art; rather, it is the individual’s experience of art and her 
ability to communicate it to others.  Such communication brings our subjectivity into the 
social sphere.  This tests how our individuality fits or conflicts with that of other agents.  
Judgments of taste are about our fellow feeling with others.  
Despite the fact that judgments of taste do not strictly refer to an object, we 
nonetheless demand universal agreement about them:     
But if a judgment has subjective – i.e. aesthetic – universal validity, which does 
not rest on a concept, we cannot infer that it also has logical universal validity, 
because such judgments do not deal with the object [itself] at all.  This is precisely 
why aesthetic universality we attribute to a judgment of a special kind; for 
although it does not connect the predicate of beauty with the concept of the object, 
considered in its entire logical sphere, yet it extends that predicate over the entire 
sphere of judging persons.135 
 
This is what Kant refers to as the “subjective universality” of judgments of taste.136  We 
demand that others assent to our judgments of taste due to the common basis we have for 
making them, our sensus communis.137  Yet, we do not take this commonality for granted 
in practice; humans feel the need to solicit responses from others about their experience 
and in turn, demand agreement with their own assessments.  This is because humans live 
together in societies where persons are expected to communicate with one another.  As 
Kant puts it, such sociability and communication are required of humans.138   
Building off of these points, Jerome Kohn asserts that the sensus communis is the 
basis for a “common world” of communication and the exchange of judgments.  He states, 
“By sensus communis [Kant] meant a sense that all human beings, human beings as such, 
                                                
135 Ibid., §8, p. 58-59, 215, emphasis in original. 
136 Ibid., §6, §8. 
137 Ibid., §19-22. 
138 Ibid., §41, p.163, 296-297.  Cf., §2, 205, note 10. 
   59 
have in common; it is the source of human communication – that is, speech, the 
communicability of subjective feelings, and the ground of human community.”139  Here, 
in a Kantian fashion, Kohn connects communication and community building.  He goes 
on to say that this common sense is the “ground from which aesthetic judgments 
arise.”140  It is that “through [which] the faculty of imagination, represents and 
discriminates as fit or unfit to appear in a common world, a world that a community of 
judges would be pleased to share with one another.”141   
Building a community through “settling matters of taste” is an ongoing process.  
As Kohn articulates the point, “aesthetic reflective judgments are open-endedly 
intersubjective,”142 meaning that discussions of taste are always incomplete.  Put more 
strongly, they are “in principle unending”143 due to the potentially infinite number of 
interlocutors with whom one may converse.  What’s more, it is difficult to convince 
others to adopt one’s taste despite the pressing need to gain agreement about it.  Kant 
states:  
If we judge objects merely in terms of concepts, then we lose all presentation of 
beauty.  This is why there can be no rule by which someone could be compelled 
to acknowledge that something is beautiful.  No one can use reasons or principles 
to talk us into a judgment on whether some garment, house, or flower is beautiful.  
We want to submit the object to our own eyes, just as if our liking of it depended 
on that sensation.  And yet, if we then call the object beautiful, we believe we 
have a universal voice, and lay claim to the agreement of everyone, whereas any 
private sensation would decide solely for the observer himself and his liking.144  
 
                                                
139 Jerome Kohn, “Kant’s Common World.”  Raritan 22 (3) (Winter 2003), pp. 102-112, p.102-103, 
emphasis in original. 
140 Ibid., p. 102. 
141 Ibid., p. 103, emphasis in original. 
142 Ibid., p. 103, emphasis in original. 
143 Joseph Cannon.  “The Intentionality of Judgments of Taste in Kant’s Critique of Judgment.”  Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 66 (1) (Feb. 2008), pp. 53-65, p. 59. 
144 Kant, §8, p. 59-60, 215-216. 
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We demand the agreement of others even if we acknowledge that they will want their 
own “proof” through their own experience of the work, just as we ourselves would.  The 
communication of judgments of taste and demands of agreement to them, even if not 
finally persuasive, can nonetheless facilitate the formation of people who are deeply 
expressive. 
De Duve reinforces Kant’s idea that all seek to judge art for themselves by stating, 
“Artistic culture transmits art just as jurisprudence passes along judgment: by re-
judging.”145  The implication here is that individuals are not satisfied to merely accept the 
judgments of others, but that they must judge and even re-judge art for themselves based 
upon their own experiences.146  De Duve relates this point to how personal experience 
serves as a forceful justification of judgment.  He states:  “Something irresistible attracts 
you.  You don’t always know what, but you know that you are attracted because you feel 
it.  All you have for knowledge is your own certitude and all you have for certitude is 
your own feeling.  To you it is indisputable; it is its own proof.”147  Since attractions to 
art are indisputable for the individuals who feel them, argumentation cannot gain much 
traction on judgments of taste.  Everyone feels certain about their own experience, so we 
each demand that others agree with our own judgments of taste. 
The cultivation of taste is further complicated by the fact that there is no law by 
which we can demonstrate the correctness of our judgments of taste; instead, taste is a 
                                                
145 De Duve, p. 38. 
146 Of course, de Duve is suggesting quite a bit more in this passage.  He addresses the larger point of how 
culture and taste change and develop through time.  This means that some art that was initially neglected or 
rejected can later be accepted through subsequent judgments that take into account the trajectory of taste 
over time.  I will not take up this point in detail here. 
147 De Duve, p. 31, emphasis mine.  Cf. Cannon, p. 54 and p. 57. 
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“mere ideal standard”148 that we strive to achieve.  Kant goes on to clarify that a universal 
voice “does not postulate everyone’s agreement (since only a logically universal 
judgment can do that, because it can adduce reasons); it merely requires this agreement 
from everyone, as an instance of the rule, an instance regarding which it expects 
confirmation not from concepts but from the agreement of others.”149  It is important not 
to lose sight of the fact that judgments of taste are aesthetic, that is, they are based upon 
feeling rather than upon concepts.  Kant states:   
Whenever we make a judgment declaring something to be beautiful, we permit no 
one to hold a different opinion, even though we base our judgment only on our 
feeling rather than on concepts; hence we regard this underlying feeling as a 
common rather than a private feeling.  But if we are to use this common sense in 
such a way, we cannot base it on experience; for it seeks to justify us in making 
judgments that contain an ought: it does not say that everyone will agree with my 
judgment, but that he ought to.150  
 
Aesthetic judgments are universally valid subjectively, not universally valid objectively, 
because such judgments are not governed by a determinate concept.151  Even in cases 
where a determinate concept does govern, subjects often disagree with respect to 
particular judgments.  This, however, is a disagreement about how to apply reflective 
judgment correctly, not about whether it is “universally valid for everyone.”152  Increased 
communication of and about judgments of taste is not enough to guarantee agreement.  
Nonetheless, agents continue to require it of others.153  As subjects capable of reasoning 
and communication, we strive to express ourselves ever more perfectly in harmony with 
other people even without having a law to follow.  More than agreement in taste, then, 
                                                
148 Kant, §8, p. 58, 215. 
149 Kant, §8, p. 60, 216, emphasis in original. 
150 Ibid., §22, p. 89, 239, emphasis in original. Cf., §6, 211-212; §7, 212-213; §8, 214-216; §38, 290; §40, 
293-296. 
151 Ibid., §8, p. 58, 215. 
152 Ibid., §8, p. 58, 214-215. 
153 Ibid., §7. 
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individuals desire understanding and agreement in communication.  To return to Kohn’s 
formulation, we desire to live in a “common world.” 
 Joseph Cannon elaborates upon the demands expressed in the exchange of 
judgments of taste.  From a Kantian position, he asserts that these demands generate new 
ways of communicating with one another and that this communication is ongoing and 
even incompleteable:  “[B]eauty creates unique milieus for interaction and 
communication between finite and rational beings.  All claims that something is beautiful 
are necessarily provisional; thus the conversation about them is in principle unending.”154  
Cannon arrives at this conclusion by considering the unexpoundability of aesthetic ideas 
in connection with the indeterminacy of the concepts upon which they are built.  He goes 
on to suggest that these factors contribute to the “provisionality” of judgments of taste:   
Kant expresses this explicitly: the demand that others agree with a judgment of 
taste is always and necessarily provisional. […] The interpretation I offer provides 
this provisionality with a definite shape: the claim implied in any assertion that an 
object is beautiful is ‘there is something about this object (performance, and so 
forth) that will outstrip any attempt to determine it.’   But such a claim can never 
be made with any certainty – one can have true belief, but no account.155 
 
This provisionality spurs further attempts at communication with others, but there is no 
guarantee (or possibility) that we will reach the agreement we seek.156  The belief that 
this painting is beautiful, even if justified, does not aid in our ability to articulate our 
feelings about it.  As a result, the demand issued by art to respond to it asserts itself all 
the more persistently; individuals respond by striving to communicate their tastes in spite 
of the difficulties involved. 
                                                
154 Cannon, p. 59.  I will expand upon this point in a few pages.   
155 Ibid., p. 59, emphasis in original.  Cf. Kant §5, 214-215. 
156 While Cannon claims that conversations about taste are in principle unending, he goes on to suggest 
that judgments of taste are “closed to the discursive point of view.”  I will return to this point in a few 
paragraphs in order to illustrate how his position differs from my own. 
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The drive to communicate with others about art, as well as to demand agreement 
in judgment, is a sign of sophistication and culture in an individual.  To reiterate, this 
sociability requires the training of subjects.157  Kant states: “For we judge someone 
refined if he has the inclination and the skill to communicate his pleasure to others, and if 
he is not satisfied with an object unless he can feel his liking for it in community with 
others.  Moreover, a concern for universal communication is something that everyone 
expects and demands from everyone else, on the basis, as it were, of an original contract 
dictated by [our] very humanity.”158  Taste involves the continual demand to exchange 
our aesthetic judgments with others.  Because it is intertwined with a concern for 
communication, the establishment of taste is a social matter.  
Taste requires individuals to seek out society and value and concord with others.  
In order to discuss matters of taste, one must be able to communicate well with others, as 
well as respect the manner in which others give accounts of their judgments.  One must 
be able to both give reasons and listen to those offered by others in order for taste to 
function properly, even if the desired and required agreement cannot be reached.  Art 
issues a demand to those who encounter it to cognize and respond to the work, and to 
respond to others who respond to the work.  Put another way, a demand internal to art 
itself (to respond to art) is intertwined with a demand internal to communication (to 
express oneself to others and to attempt to understand their responsive utterances).  Thus, 
the demand to respond to art produces intersubjectivity. 
  Much in this argument hinges upon Kant’s idea that the persistent demand for 
universal communicability is a demand to communicate with all potential interlocutors.  
                                                
157 Kant, §41, p. 163, 297. 
158 Ibid., §41 p. 164, 297. 
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Aesthetic communication is open-ended because there will always be more conversation 
partners with whom to discuss our experiences and to convince about the validity of our 
judgments of taste.  This is what Kant means by “universal communicability.”  This idea 
does not imply exhaustive communication that ably expresses all the cognition that 
underlies aesthetic experience, but rather the inconclusiveness of all aesthetic 
communication.  
We are already faced with a problem here.  As Kant sketches it, the demand for 
universal communicability with respect to judgments of taste arises, but without the 
guarantee that this communication will (or can) be complete.159  It is a demand that we 
can never fully fulfill.  Instead, he asserts that such communication will be ongoing, both 
because there will always be more interlocutors, but also because each individual will 
continue to try to perfect her expressions and to give fuller accounts of her aesthetic 
experience.  This gets at a social aspect of the issue – the aforementioned drive to 
develop culture, sociability, and humanity through communication.  The unending 
character of communication in these circumstances isn’t necessarily negative.  Instead, it 
suggests that the attempt to communicate with others is a continual project that has wide 
reaching implications for expression and culture.160  
Cannon also addresses the issue of cognitive and communicative incompleteness.  
While this issue is not the focal point of his article, it is crucial to his analysis of the 
                                                
159 I touched upon this point in connection with both de Duve and Cannon and aim to more fully articulate 
it here. 
160 Even if such communication is incomplete or inadequate to the experience, it nevertheless answers the 
demand set by art – to cognize and attempt to communicate our experience to others.  The attempt here is 
crucial: we strive to communicate with others about aesthetic experience even though our thoughts and 
mental attunement can never be completely divulged.  The demand to respond to fine art isn’t about the 
completeness of the communication.  Rather, it is about the attempt to express one’s experience of art.   
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intentional structure of judgments of taste.  Positioning himself in the debate between 
Kant scholars Henry Allison and Paul Guyer, Cannon states: 
I take judgments of taste to start (but not end) with a cognitive interest in the 
object: our cognitive capacities are enlivened because they are engaged. We 
approach the object by trying to determine what it is or means.  The enlivenment 
of our faculties is a result of the way certain objects invite judgment but exceed 
our every attempt to determine them, which makes them compelling and ‘always 
new’ to us.161 
 
In this passage, he addresses the excessiveness of mental activity and our inability to 
fully process and express it.  By saying that we start, but not end, with the object, Cannon 
gets at what I discussed in the first moment of response to art:  how the work of art is an 
occasion for reflection upon and response to both the work and oneself.  As Cannon 
points out here (and as I do above), this cognition is ongoing and enlivening because we 
are never “done” grappling with art.  This is because we can never fully conceptualize a 
work of art in a determinate fashion.  Therefore, we can never fully expound upon that 
work linguistically. 
Cannon’s position and mine diverge in terms of how we view the excess of 
aesthetic ideas and the impact it has upon expression and culture.  As a result, we differ 
on how to interpret the importance of this excess.  Cannon does not follow out how the 
excess of cognition and judgments has an impact beyond the object and the individual 
interlocutors trading their judgments of taste.162  Cannon thereby fails to recognize the 
                                                
161 Cannon, p. 57, emphasis in original.  Cannon positions his discussion of intentionality and taste amidst 
the ongoing debate between Henry Allison and Paul Guyer about how to understand the character of 
judgments of taste in Kant.  See also Paul Guyer, The Claims of Taste.  Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1979., and Henry Allison, Kant’s Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of the Critique of 
Aesthetic Judgment.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
162 As aforementioned, Cannon’s article focuses on intentionality and judgments of taste rather than their 
implications.  I do not mean to criticize him solely because we have different interests in The Critique of 
Judgment.  On the contrary, the basis of my criticism lies in some of his key phrasings that do more than 
bracket the question of the implications of judgments of taste; these phrases neutralize the importance and 
impact of such judgments.  I will elaborate upon this point presently. 
   66 
intersubjective and cultural implications of judgments of taste (moments two and three in 
my analysis).  Put more plainly, Cannon focuses on what cannot be unpacked from a 
judgment of taste in a way that understates the significance of the overabundance of 
cognition that is spurred by aesthetic ideas.  By terming judgments of taste “discursively 
mute” and “closed to the discursive point of view,” Cannon misses the contributions to 
communication, sociability, and culture that stem from them.163  Instead, Cannon refers to 
what we cannot communicate about in judgments as “mute” and “closed” to discursivity, 
thereby devaluing any attempts to communicate them and neglecting the possibility that 
they could have a meaningful impact on future expression.  This devaluation is implied in 
the connotations of “mute” and “closed” as what does not speak and does not mean.164  
As a result, Cannon disregards the possibility that the struggle to communicate aesthetic 
ideas can open opportunities for future meanings and expressions.  
Furthermore, Cannon asserts that judgments of taste are mute to theory, thereby 
elaborating upon the scope of his claim about what cannot be made discursive.165  He 
states:   
We as theorists cannot provide an account of how in a particular instance a 
judgment of taste will proceed.  Although, according to Kant, we can discuss 
judgments of taste in general terms of what of our capacities are involved and 
how they relate to one another in the moment of judging, in their particulars 
judgments of taste are closed to the discursive point of view.  Thus they are, to us 
as theorists, mute.166  
 
Cannon states that we can exchange judgments with one another in conversation while in 
the encounter with an aesthetic object, but claims that such judgments are only expressive 
                                                
163 Cannon, p. 61. 
164 See Judith Butler’s Excitable Speech for an interesting discussion of issues of marginalization and 
censorship through exclusion. See also Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One for notions of 
exclusionary definition related to feminist thought. 
165 Cannon, p. 61.  He states, “Thus they [judgments of taste] are, to us as theorists, mute.” 
166 Ibid., p. 61. 
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in that context.167   As theorists, he suggests, we cannot talk about the “particulars” of 
judgments of taste with any authority.  Cannon goes on to say that “in a moment where 
one is confronted with an aesthetic idea and the duty or desire to express it to others, 
things may be different.  Judgments of taste are mute outside of that context, and we as 
theorists are (or should be) mute within that context.”168  Cannon is right if all he means 
is that we cannot express aesthetic ideas linguistically in a way that will capture their full 
meaning.169  But it seems that he is reaching for something more in the phrases 
“discursively mute” and “closed to the discursive point of view.”  While I would not go 
so far as to claim that theorists can know in advance how particular judgments will 
proceed, I do claim that such judgments have an important impact upon future expression, 
communication, and taste.  
I want to explore this possibility by redescribing the inability to fully 
communicate as a potentially creative experience with implications beyond the particular 
judgments exchanged by individual interlocutors.  For example, what is not or cannot be 
said might be redescribed as “silence that is full of meaning.”  Such a redescription points 
towards the positive effects of the inability to fully communicate.170  Insofar as our 
attempts to express aesthetic ideas are buzzing and bursting at the seams with meaningful 
content, where does that excess go, and what form does it take?  In his too-narrow focus 
                                                
167 Ibid., p. 61. 
168 Ibid., p. 61, emphasis in original.  This is a very confusing passage.  The demands of art I have been 
referring to throughout this chapter imply the duty and desire to communicate about aesthetic ideas.  It is 
unclear what Cannon means by claiming that “things may be different” when we are responding to such 
duties and desires – a phrase that trembles with uncertainty.  Since the rest of Cannon’s analysis circles 
around our inability to expound upon aesthetic ideas, it seems quite important to specify how things may be 
different in this scenario.  Unfortunately, Cannon is mute on this point.  In the paragraphs that follow, I aim 
to show what difference our responses to aesthetic ideas (and the demands of art that underlie them) make 
to expression and culture. 
169 This is the same Kantian thought I have articulated above in moments one and two.   
170 I will return to this point shortly. 
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on the cognitive processes of judgments of taste and our inability to get at their 
“particulars” to explain how we came by them,171 Cannon neglects how the silences 
involved in these exchanges also speak.   
 
Summary 
 
Why try to communicate that which eludes expression, namely, aesthetic ideas in 
judgments of taste?  Kant’s answer is that we are social beings who are not satisfied until 
we can communicate the cognitive experience of art and the feelings of pleasure that 
attend it to others.  According to Kant, this is the sociability that befits our humanity.172   
Such sociability is for him a sign of civilization in the subject.  The highest mark of 
refinement is the need for others to assent to one’s judgments of taste.  Aesthetic 
communication expresses the play of our faculties as well as the feelings that accompany 
such play.  In this light, the call for assent with respect to judgments of taste is the 
demand for agreement in subjectivity, or for subjective universality, as Kant puts it.  It is 
a call to turn communication with others into community.  The demand that we respond to 
works of art requires us to respond to, communicate with, and be understood by other 
people.  Seen in this light, it is a demand of intersubjectivity and sociability.   
 
 
 
 
                                                
171 Cannon is interested in how to explain what it is about a specific work of art that really excites us in 
order predict how another judgment might unfold in the future.  He is interested in the reception of the 
work, but only insofar as it is connected to the intentional structure of judgments of taste.  I am interested in 
reception as it extends beyond the individual to the intersubjective and cultural levels of response. 
172 Kant, §60, p. 231. 
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IV. Third Moment 
The Cultural Moment of Aesthetic Response 
Standards of taste depend upon the culture that has shaped them.  As such, we 
have to examine judgment in relation to the cultural demands of aesthetic response.  We 
must investigate the production and reception of works of art in order to understand how 
our responses are shaped by culture.  The third moment examines cultural restrictions 
upon expression and how such limitations make aesthetic expression unfree.  These 
restrictions run in both directions – towards artist and audience alike.  As Kant claims, 
this is due, in part, to the fact that evaluations of art are based upon their contributions to 
culture, or as he puts it, to the importance of and the need for open and ongoing 
communication to cultural advancement.  
 
A. Ingenious Complications 
 
Considering the fact that the intersubjective moment of response involves 
engagement with others about the work of art, it is important to consider the mores and 
regulations of the culture in which individuals are communicating about art.  To that end, 
we must examine how culture shapes the expressions of artists, and in particular, the 
expressions of artists endowed with genius.  As we have seen, art serves as the occasion 
for cognition and response.  Art issues demands on the subject to feel something, to 
experience something, and ultimately, to do something.  I put extra emphasis on action 
here because art changes the way individuals view the world and thereby changes how 
they inhabit it.  As such, culture often aims to regulate what kinds of actions and 
responses are deemed acceptable.  In some cases these regulations serve as restrictions 
rather than as mere guidelines.  Take, for instance, works of genius that give meaning 
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new form.  They are proposals for the inclusion of new meanings in the realm of 
communication.  Because they serve as models for future expression, restrictions upon 
works of genius are all the more dangerous.  If the new works do not conform to cultural 
or political powers, the expansion of expression is particularly endangered. 
Works of genius pose several challenges.  They change the way we see and 
experience the world through their innovation and exemplarity.  Hence, they are often 
difficult to understand in their own time.  This is a great loss, especially if ingenious 
works are not recovered and reconsidered later.  The new perspectives offered by these 
works challenge traditional ways of doing, making, and expressing.  More specifically, 
works of genius threaten to subvert the status quo and the mores of culture.  As Kant puts 
the point, genius sets the (new) rule to art.173  It thereby changes (old) rules in the process.  
As a result, culture often suppresses these threats to its authority and power.  And this is 
so, whether those threats really challenge cultural norms or are merely imagined to do 
so.174   To be clear, the challenge posed by works of genius typically comes from within 
culture rather than from outside of it.  It stems from the conflict of nature and that which 
aims to civilize it, culture.175   
What are the costs of such restrictions?  Not only do restrictions have an effect on 
what genius is permitted to produce, so that its contributions are (made) “fit for an ever 
advancing culture,”176 but they also have an impact upon what the public at large deems 
appropriate expression.  This, in turn, influences the sorts of expressions that speakers 
                                                
173 Kant, §46, 307-308. 
174 In Kantian terms, taste (as the agent of culture) clips the wings of genius in order to make its 
contributions fit for an ever advancing culture.  
175 I will add one caveat to this point.  The challenge comes from within culture, but from the force of 
nature within culture.  Kant sometimes frames this as a tension between nature and culture and sometimes 
as between genius and taste. 
176 Kant, §50. 
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and artists put forth in the future.  While wing clipping may not begin with the intention 
of harnessing genius for a particular cultural end, like protecting and advancing its own 
traditions and interests, those in positions of political or cultural authority can abuse the 
power of wing clipping to secure their own positions.  It is important to understand that 
the political and cultural restriction of works sometimes appears under the guise of the 
“advancement” or “safeguarding” of culture.177  Such dissimulation imperils the 
expansion of art and language into new territories of meaning and sense.  Clipping the 
wings of genius can suppress important innovations in expression that are not easily 
understood at their introduction and which give “voice” to that which hasn’t yet found 
expression.  The contribution of this section is that it intertwines discourses about 
language and aesthetic expression with notions of marginalization, censorship, and genius.   
 
B. The Paradox of Genius: Cultural Champion and Cultural Enemy 
 
Kant defines genius as “the talent (natural endowment) that gives the rule to art.  
Since talent is an innate productive ability of the artist and as such belongs itself to nature, 
we could also put it this way:  Genius is the innate mental predisposition (ingenium) 
through which nature gives the rule to art.”178  Kant uses the term “genius” in a slightly 
different sense than we might today.  Genius is the force or power of nature working 
through the subject.179  An individual is not a genius; she exhibits genius.  Put differently, 
                                                
177 One can interpret Kant’s account of wing clipping to mean that taste safeguards the authority of 
tradition through this activity.  This is just one way to interpret this passage.  Kant himself seems 
ambivalent about the role of taste.  Sometimes Kant moves more towards taste’s restrictive role (in relation 
to genius), at other times, he moves more towards taste in its “disinterested interest” role.  I will discuss the 
dialectic of taste in greater detail momentarily. 
178 Kant, §46, p. 174, 307, emphasis in original. 
179 Ibid., §46.  Later in this section, Kant uses the term “Gewalt,” meaning force or power.  I have infused 
my definition of genius with this sense.  The term also comes up in Kant’s definition of the dynamically 
sublime.  Cf., §28. 
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genius is nature in the subject.  This force is what makes works of art Geistreich, or “full 
of spirit.”180 
According to Kant, however, works of genius must be more than just innovative.  
They must also be exemplary.  The art cannot simply be novel; it must also have some 
quality that sets it apart and by which it becomes an exemplar for future works to follow.  
Such art sets a (new) rule to art and thereby offers a new model in the sphere of aesthetic 
expression.  Kant expands upon this point:  
(1) Genius is a talent for producing something for which no determinate rule can 
be given, not a predisposition consisting of a skill for something that can be 
learned by following some rule or other; hence the foremost property of genius 
must be originality.  (2) Since nonsense too can be original, the products of genius 
must also be models; i.e., they must be exemplary; hence, though they do not 
themselves arise through imitation, still they must serve others for this, i.e., as a 
standard or rule by which to judge.  (3) Genius itself cannot describe or indicate 
scientifically how it brings about its products, and it is rather as nature that it 
gives the rule.  That is why, if an author owes a product to his genius, he himself 
does not know how he came by the ideas for it; nor is it in his power [Gewalt] to 
devise such products at his pleasure, or by following a plan, and to communicate 
[his procedure] to others in precepts that would enable them to bring about like 
products.  (Indeed, that is presumably why the word genius is derived from 
[Latin] genius, [which means] the guardian and guiding spirit that each person is 
given at his own birth, and to whose inspiration [Eingebung] those original ideas 
are due.  (4) Nature, through genius, prescribes the rule not to science but to art, 
and this only insofar as the art is to be fine art.181 
 
More simply put, genius is the talent, endowed by nature, through which subjects give the 
rule to art through original and exemplary art-making.  As Kant states, “fine art is 
possible only as the product of genius.”182  
                                                
180 Ibid., §47, p. 176, 308.  Kant states, “one cannot learn to write inspired poetry.”  In footnote 41, Pluhar 
explains that “inspired” is a translation of “Geistreich, literally ‘rich in spirit.’”  Cf., §46, 306-307, 
particularly when Kant talks about the derivation of genius from Latin “genius,” meaning guiding spirit or 
guardian.  This connects Kant’s use of inspired and inspirited to describe genius / works of genius. 
181 Ibid., §46, p. 175-176, 307-308, emphasis in original. 
182 Ibid., §46, p. 175, 307. 
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Although genius is required in order for fine art to progress, this advancement 
does not hinge upon the artist’s ability to communicate in any other medium about her 
ingenious works and what they mean.  In fact, genius exacerbates the difficulties of 
communicating about fine art.  Kant states, “if an author owes a product to his genius, he 
himself does not know how he came by the ideas for it; nor is it in his power [Gewalt] to 
devise such products at his pleasure, or by following a plan, and to communicate [his 
procedure] to others in precepts that would enable them to bring about like products.”183  
Because the very rules of art are changed or made anew during the production process, 
the contribution of the ingenious work cannot be foreseen or expressed in advance.  As 
Kant puts it, “fine art cannot itself devise the rule by which it is to bring about its product.  
Since, however, a product can never be called art unless it is preceded by a rule, it must 
be nature in the subject (and through the attunement of his powers) that gives the rule to 
art, in other words, fine art is possible only as the product of genius.”184  Moreover, since 
the rule isn’t supposed to “hover before the eyes of the artist,”185 the new rule can only be 
discerned in retrospect when it becomes a guide for future works.  This does not mean 
that the productions are wholly unruly, but only that rules didn’t guide the production 
process.  Instead, the rules are the result of the new work inspired by genius. 
Upon first examination, one might expect those endowed with genius to be able to 
explain their works precisely because they serve to advance culture and set the (new) rule 
to art through their novel insights.  But as established above, although genius has an 
                                                
183 Ibid., §46, p. 175, 308. 
184 Ibid., §46, p. 175, 307. 
185 Ibid., §45, p. 174, 307.  Kant states, “There must be no hint that the rule was hovering before the artist’s 
eyes and putting fetters on his mental powers.” 
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essential role in the development of art and culture, it isn’t necessarily a discursive one.186  
Kant makes clear that ingenious artists are no better equipped than non-artists to explain 
the new rules in art or the aesthetic ideas that they set forth in their works.  The talent of 
genius is to transmit such ideas through works of art.  Therefore, the excess of cognition 
spurred by aesthetic experience remains, even for those artists who are naturally talented 
in the production of art that is innovative and exemplary. 
This is both counterintuitive in the sense set forth above, with respect to the 
expectations we have for genius, and intuitive in the following sense:  It is easy to 
imagine an innovative, creative, ingenious artist – one who has advanced the field and 
thereby, culture itself – who is less than articulate about her art and what it means.187  The 
artist, in such cases, proves unable to explain the very art she produced.  This argument 
has a lineage connecting all the way back to Plato.  In the Apology and the Ion, the 
character Socrates advances the claim that poets are the least equipped to explain their 
works’ meaning or content because they were inspired by the gods.188  Kant presents a 
similar argument insofar as genius inspirits the artist through the “hand of nature;”189 the 
artist is moved, but is unable to explain the production process or the ideas present in the 
work.   
                                                
186 See Cannon, footnote #25, p. 64.  
187 Take for instance, Andy Warhol and David Lynch.  Both communicate relatively little about their own 
work, but it is debatable whether their expressions (or lack thereof) are due to an inability or an 
unwillingness to communicate about their work.  Put differently, there may be a range of reasons for not 
communicating about one’s work.  Some artists may be terse due to a lack of knowledge or communicating 
ability (as articulated above) while others may be driven by a desire to protect their art through withholding 
information or courting mystery.  I will return to this issue in Chapter Five. 
188 Plato. Apology in Five Dialogues.  Trans.  G.M.A. Grube.  Indianapolis, IN:  Hackett Publishing Inc., 
2002., p. 27, 22b-d.  
189 Kant, §47, p. 177, 309.  Cf. §47, p. 176, 308. 
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Genius is required to produce and advance fine art, just as taste is required in 
order to judge it.190  Kant thereby distinguishes between the skills and talents required for 
production and reception, respectively.  He intertwines genius and taste and makes them 
necessary complements to one another.191  Even as genius expands the sphere of 
expression, it also complicates the non-artist’s ability to communicate about art.  Because 
the rule does not precede the production, but emerges only afterward, there is no ready-
to-hand guide to understanding or grappling with works of genius.  Thus, clarity of 
expression in making judgments proves even more difficult when dealing with works of 
genius than in general cases because there is no established rule to follow in one’s 
judgments of ingenious work.  Those who exercise taste are not equipped to make sense 
of works of genius because they do not fit into the framework of conventional art.  In this 
situation, a prospective judge of taste may be silenced by the work due to the excess of 
cognitive activity taking place that cannot be fully processed or put into linguistic terms.  
This excess may spur attempts to communicate that only partially capture the aesthetic 
experience at hand. 
To summarize: works of genius embody a new way to mean.  They give meaning 
new form and give form to new meanings.  Works of genius reveal important insights 
into expression.  In retrospect, these insights become the new rules that are set to art.  It is 
not the content of these rules that concerns me here.  Rather, the ramifications for 
meaning making and subsequent rule derivation are of especial interest due to their 
impact upon communication in the public sphere.  Our silence before them indicates that 
                                                
190 Ibid., §48, p. 179, 311. 
191 Ibid., §48, p. 181, 313.  According to Kant, “a would-be work of fine art that manifests genius without 
taste, or another that manifests taste without genius” is not fine art, properly called.  Lack of restraint and 
lack of spirit are both errors to be avoided in fine art.  Cf., §49, p. 181, 313.  As we shall see, Kant favors 
the restriction of genius rather than taste if the two conflict.  Cf., §50.  
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works of genius open up conceptual space in which new ways of meaning emerge.  These 
meanings expand the sphere of communication through their exemplary form.   
The demand set forth by works of genius is double: 1) the demand to respond to / 
communicate with others about works of art via judgments of taste (*the demand set by 
all works of art); and 2) the demand to derive the rule that is set by works of genius in 
order to make communication about them possible in relation to the works that came 
before them.  Put differently, works of genius redouble the demand to respond to works 
of art, making more persistent its force.  Because of their confounding exemplarity, 
works of genius call out for increased communication with others through judgments of 
taste.  As articulated above, this paradoxically leads to silence rather than communication 
in many cases. 
 
C. Disciplining Nature (Part I): Taste Clips the Wings of Genius 
 
 Thus far, I have been focusing on how genius advances expression and culture 
through innovative and exemplary works of art.  But I haven’t yet explained the 
paradoxical nature of genius.  While genius advances expression through art, this process 
isn’t necessarily smooth or peaceful.  Instead, it involves upheaval and challenge to the 
established order, due to the tension between genius and taste, which is to say, between 
nature and culture.  As aforementioned, genius is nature in the subject; taste is the agent 
of culture that regulates or refines nature.  Genius is expected to advance culture, but it 
must be “tamed” or “refined” before it can do so.  
As genius moves beyond the strictures of taste and towards the establishment of 
new rules and modes of artistic expression, taste restricts it.  The tension of this complex 
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and intrinsically antagonistic relationship is discharged when taste clips the wings of 
genius in order to make its expressions fit for the advancement of culture.  Kant states: 
Taste, like the power of judgment in general, consists in disciplining (or training) 
genius.  It severely clips its wings, and makes it civilized, or polished; but at the 
same time it gives it guidance as to how far and over what it may spread while 
still remaining purposive.  It introduces clarity and order into a wealth of thought 
and hence makes the ideas durable, fit for approval that is both lasting and 
universal, and [hence] for being followed by others and fit for an ever advancing 
culture.192 
 
Kant praises the imagination (and thereby genius) for provoking much thought that 
cannot be contained in a single concept,193 for “mak[ing] reason think more,”194 and for 
quickening the mental faculties through increased activity.195   But when taste and genius 
come into conflict, Kant is all too willing to sacrifice this natural talent to the purposes of 
culture.196  As stated above, wing clipping is done in order to refine ingenious ideas and 
make them durable and lasting.  This durability is attained through civilizing genius’s 
expressions, making them fit for and understandable by culture.  From there, we can 
deduce that taste clips the wings of genius for the sake of communication, through which 
culture advances. 
For this reason, Kant claims that innovative but nonsensical expressions of genius 
must be tempered by taste:   
In order [for a work] to be beautiful, it is not strictly necessary that [it] be rich and 
original in ideas, but it is necessary that the imagination in its freedom be 
commensurate with the lawfulness of the understanding.  For if the imagination is 
left in lawless freedom, all its riches [in ideas] produce nothing but nonsense, and 
it is judgment that adapts the imagination to the understanding.197   
                                                
192 Ibid., §50, p. 188, 319. 
193 Ibid., §49, p. 182, 314. 
194 Ibid., §49, p. 183, 314. 
195 Ibid., §49, p. 183-184, 315. 
196 Kant is explicit about this point:  Only when a conflict arises between taste and genius does he side with 
taste in products of art. 
197 Kant, §50, p. 188, 319. 
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Kant promotes the free play of imagination and understanding, but only until a conflict 
arises.  Then the freedom of the imagination must submit to the rule-boundedness of the 
understanding.  This restriction doesn’t destroy the free play of the faculties.  Rather, it 
forces the imagination to harmonize with the understanding in a way that limits its own 
freedom to an extent.198   
The passage above shows that Kant values understanding and communication 
over innovation in expression.  As he frames the issue, innovative but nonsensical 
expressions are restricted for the sake of expressions that will make a “greater” 
contribution to mutual understanding.   Kant states:  “Therefore, if there is a conflict 
between these two properties [taste and genius] in a product, and something has to be 
sacrificed, then it should be on the side of genius; and judgment, which in matters 
[Suchen] of fine art bases its pronouncements on principles of its own, will sooner permit 
the imagination’s freedom and wealth to be impaired than that the understanding be 
impaired.”199  While genius moves culture and communication forward, it is in jeopardy 
if its expressions are too wild or nonsensical.  
 While the pursuit of understanding is intuitively important, we must also consider 
the underlying intersubjective and cultural reasons why Kant values the preservation and 
advancement of communication through art so highly.  In his conception of human 
character, some capacities and processes are natural, while others require training before 
                                                
198 Kant makes a similar point in the General Comment on the First Division of the Analytic:  “It seems 
therefore that only a lawfulness without a law, and a subjective harmony of the imagination with the 
understanding without an objective harmony – where the presentation is referred to a determinate concept 
of an object – is compatible with the full lawfulness of the understanding (which has also been called 
purposiveness without a purpose and with the peculiarity of a judgment of taste” p. 92, 241.  Here, Kant 
makes the point that in pure judgments of taste the imagination is not referred to a determinate concept of 
the object, even if the imagination obeys the laws of the understanding. 
199 Kant, §50, p. 188-189, 320. 
   79 
they can be actualized.  For instance, humans have a natural urge to society, but we are 
not automatically suited to such a life.  Instead, we must be trained to achieve the 
“sociability that befits [our] humanity.”200  This means that we must check our natural 
urges and learn how to understand and communicate with each other for the sake of our 
individual vocations and society more generally.  Achieving these goals requires the 
training and refinement of subjects; they require the civilization of our natures and of our 
expressions.  The training of our natural inclinations is the genus of which wing clipping 
is one instance.  Put more strongly, the demands of sociability and the demands of taste 
are enmeshed with each other for Kant. 
Taste furthers what everyone’s natural inclination demands:  the establishment 
and development of society through the promotion of sociability and communication.  
Social communication – even of, or especially of, our feelings – is valuable according to 
Kant.  Therefore, taste furthers society and culture through clipping the wings of genius 
to promote mutual understanding rather than nonsensical innovation.  “Genius is 
responsible for the idea, taste for its universal expression,” as Joseph Cannon states.201  
Humans must be trained to develop civilized tastes and to communicate their judgments 
in order to achieve their vocation as rational, civilized, and moral agents.  
Communication brings together our natural urge for society and the not quite natural – 
the trained – drive for sociability.  Sociability must become second nature in order to 
advance culture.202   
                                                
200 Ibid., §60, p. 231. 
201 Cannon, footnote #19, p. 63-64. 
202 Higher ends and tastes are interconnected with the training and refinement that allow us to achieve our 
vocation as rational and moral agents.  I will develop this point in greater detail in Part II of my discussion 
of the disciplining of nature, based on the culture of discipline in Part II of the Critique of Judgment. 
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Keeping this argument about the importance of understanding and communication 
in mind, we must still interrogate whether wing clipping achieves the end of promoting 
and increasing communication, or whether it inhibits communication.  The severity of the 
language that Kant utilizes regarding taste and genius exposes his anxiety about the 
matter; we should all be concerned about restrictions on aesthetic expression.  Kant 
makes clear that wing clipping isn’t about refining genius in a gentle manner, but about 
doing so in a severe fashion.  A close examination reveals Kant’s aggressive tone:  
“disciplining,” “training,” “severely,” “civilized,” “polished,” “clarity,” “order,” 
“durable.”  Such language indicates that Kant simultaneously views genius as a 
dangerous force – because it threatens order and culture – and as one that is necessary to 
the advancement of culture.  Therefore, Kant asserts that genius needs to be disciplined in 
order to make “safe” and “durable” contributions to culture.  Thinking through what it 
would take to bring order to the wealth of thought introduced by genius reveals that only 
a firm and perhaps ruthless hand (and one bearing shears, no less) could combat the wild 
innovation of unfettered genius.  Taste will stop at nothing to civilize genius, despite the 
fact that it is impossible to fully achieve this end. 
Because works of genius serve as exemplary models for others, they must be 
resilient enough to endure clipping by taste.  “A certain boldness of expression, and in 
general some deviation from the common rule, is entirely fitting for a genius; it is 
however not worthy of imitation, but in itself always remains a defect that [any] one must 
try to eliminate, though genius has, as it were, a privilege to allow the defect to remain 
[anyway], because the inimitable [element] in the momentum of his spirit would be 
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impaired by timorous caution.”203  Taking the restrictions of taste into account, genius 
must nonetheless be bold enough to advance expression by breaking new ground through 
its meaningful form.  By the same token, wing clipping must not be timid or overly 
cautious; it must be bold enough to check genius sufficiently, to check those “natural 
things”204 that inspirit it and move the agent to produce works of art in the first place.  As 
such, both genius and taste must be sufficiently bold in order to effectively stake out their 
positions with respect to expression. 
 
D. Dialectic of Taste 
 
The role of taste I have been examining thus far presents a stark contrast to the 
predominant formulation of taste as “disinterested interest” in The Critique of Judgment.  
When considered in conjunction with the act of wing clipping, taste establishes and 
enforces the norms of culture.  It is the “quasher of genius.”  Disinterested taste, on the 
other hand, judges art apart from purposes or interests.  In order to insure the purity of 
judgments, Kant says we must remove all interest from our considerations of art.  “All 
interest ruins a judgment of taste and deprives it of its impartiality.”205  We must direct 
our attention to the mere form of purposiveness in art, so that our liking is without a 
concept.206  Put differently, we like art because it exhibits purposiveness without a 
purpose.  Connecting our judgments of taste to particular purposes would be contrary to 
the aim of art.  Therefore, genius would be protected by disinterested taste because pure 
judgments are unclouded by ulterior motives or purposes, such as safeguarding culture or 
                                                
203 Kant, §49, p. 187, 318, emphasis in original. 
204 Ibid., §83.  I will deal with this notion when I connect the restrictions upon genius to the restrictions of 
culture that Kant articulates in Part II of the Critique of Judgment. 
205 Ibid., §13, p. 68, 223. 
206 Ibid., §11, p. 66, 221. 
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eliminating nonsense.  As Kant states, “When such a judgment is pure, it connects liking 
or disliking directly with the mere contemplation of the object, irrespective of its use or 
any purpose.”207  Innovative nonsense, the target of wing clipping, serves no purpose 
apart from free play.  A pure judgment of taste regarding a work that exhibits this 
characteristic would not be compelled by the question of the purpose it serves.  In other 
words, a pure judgment of taste disregards whether the art advances communication and 
culture.  Taste, in this light, has a protective role in relation to genius because it is not 
driven to restrict any purposes whatsoever, including those of genius. 
How can we reconcile these two senses of taste?  Is taste disinterested interest in 
art, and thereby the protector of genius, or is it the enforcer of cultural norms and the 
restrictor of genius?  This question is set in motion through the interpretation of the 
elimination of nonsense and the promotion of understanding and communication as a 
hidden purpose by which taste proceeds.  If taste moves to eradicate certain kinds of 
expressions and to secure others, then it is not disinterested after all.  Wing clipping 
performed under the guise of advancing culture can be used to cover over insidious 
purposes, even if this was not the original intention behind the restriction of genius.208  
Insofar as Kant makes clear that the purposes associated with wing clipping are interested, 
the resultant judgments of taste would be impure, hence not properly judgments of taste 
at all.  Yet it is taste that is the agent of wing clipping.  Several questions emerge from 
this ambiguity:  Can we be certain that our judgments are pure and uncompromised by 
interest?  Can we be clear about what motivates our judgments?  How can we reconcile 
these seemingly opposed senses of taste?  
                                                
207 Ibid., “General Comment on the First Division of the Analytic,” p. 92, 242, emphasis in original. 
208 See my comments about the abuse of power in community formation in IV., third moment, p. 34.   
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One potential solution to the dialectic of taste lies in Kant’s discussion of “our 
empirical interest in the beautiful.”  As if in rejoinder to my worry about the motivations 
behind restrictions of genius, Kant states:   
That a judgment of taste by which we declare something to be beautiful must not 
have an interest as its determining basis has been established sufficiently 
above.209 But it does not follow from this that, after the judgment has been made 
as a pure aesthetic one, an interest cannot be connected with it.  This connection, 
however, must always be only indirect.  In other words, we must think of taste as 
first of all connected with something else, so that with the liking of mere 
reflection on an object there can [then] be connected, in addition, a pleasure in the 
existence of the object (and all interest consists in pleasure in the existence of an 
object.210   
 
No interest can serve as the determining basis for a judgment of taste.  An indirect 
interest may develop and be connected to our judgments only after the fact without 
compromising their purity.  Kant states, “This [additional interest] may be something 
empirical, viz., an inclination inherent in human nature, or something intellectual, viz., 
the will’s property of being determinable a priori by reason.  Both of these involve a 
liking for the existence of an object and hence can lay a foundation for an interest in 
something that we have already come to like on its own account and without any interest 
whatever.”211  If interest is connected afterwards and in an indirect fashion, Kant finds no 
cause for concern about the purity of the judgment.   
This solution seems deeply problematic.  If the advancement of culture is the 
interest or purpose that is added after the fact of initial liking, the potential for slippage 
between liking and interest (and the proper timing of each) is extremely likely.  This is 
even more probable in cases where the agents seek to cover over their interests in their 
                                                
209 Pluhar points us towards the first moment of the Critique of Judgment, §1-6, 203-211. 
210 Kant, §41, p. 163, 296, emphasis in original. 
211 Ibid., §41, p. 163, 296. 
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judgments of taste, especially if they wield political or cultural power.  When considered 
in conjunction with restrictions such as wing clipping, the likelihood of this slippage is 
culturally and politically hazardous and ought to be of great concern to all.  Now, perhaps, 
my concern here regards the practices of judgment and wing clipping rather than Kant’s 
theoretical account of them.  Nonetheless, the potential for deviation from his carefully 
constructed and articulated system, especially in terms of smuggling in hidden interests 
and purposes, is extremely high.  As Kant suggests, “taste must be an ability one has 
oneself,”212 but one that must be cultivated by everyone through cultural training and 
discipline.  So the question of whether “fit for an ever advancing culture” is a norm that 
harbors anti-aesthetic purposes hinges upon several questions:  Whose culture?  Whose 
authority?  Whose purposes?  Training for what ends? 
To summarize, when posed with the choice, Kant sides with taste over genius 
when they come into conflict.  The inspiriting force that moves individuals to produce art 
is “too bold” or “too deviant” and is restricted so that its expressions can become more 
understandable.  While the imagination is praised for quickening the mind, attuning the 
mental powers, and spurring further activity through works of genius, Kant claims this 
natural force or predisposition needs discipline.  Instead of allowing cognitive free play 
with works of art to remain unimpeded, Kant seeks to restrict ingenious productions by 
making them conform more fully to rule-governed understanding.  He views the 
refinement and civilization of individuals (and their expressions) through training and 
taste as a positive move for the advancement of understanding and culture.  As such, 
while the cognition involved in judgment continues, the works themselves (and their 
                                                
212 Ibid., §17, p. 79, 232. 
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meanings) have already been clipped at the point of production.  Thus, cognition has been 
limited because its object, the work of art, has been restricted by taste.  This limitation 
extends to the level of judgment, because expression has already been affected by 
restrictions in the sphere of communication and culture.   
 
E. Disciplining Nature (Part II): Purposiveness and Culture 
In this section, I connect the restriction on expression found in Part I of the 
Critique of Judgment – taste clipping the wings of genius – with a similar restriction 
found in Part II – the culture of discipline.  While each mode of restriction proceeds 
differently, both impact expression through marginalization for the sake of culture.  I 
excavate the way Kant describes humanity and culture in order to expose how the 
relationship among art, purposes, and culture carries across Part I and Part II of the 
Critique of Judgment in an unexpected way.  The trajectory of this portion of the 
argument turns on how culture limits expression through taming or disciplining the 
natural aspects of human subjects.  I build upon the notion of taste as the enforcer of 
cultural norms in order to show the intimate relation between the restrictive power of 
taste and the culture of discipline.  
Kant describes humans as creatures that occupy a special position due to their 
capacity to reason and to recognize the limitations of their faculties.  He is quick to point 
out, however, that reason alone isn’t enough to raise humanity above the conditions and 
requirements of embodiment.  Kant states:  “Nature […] is very far from having adopted 
him [human being] as its special darling and benefited him in preference to other animals, 
but has in fact spared him no more than any other animal from its destructive workings: 
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plague, famine, flood, frost, attacks from other animals large or small, and so on.”213  
Humanity can’t eliminate its material needs and inclinations or prevent nature’s 
destructive power from having its effect.  Through rational thought and innovation, 
however, humanity can mitigate the impact of such hardships.  This is due to another 
factor that distinguishes rational humanity: its ability to design its own purposes, the 
aptitude for which is developed by culture.  
Man is indeed the only being on earth that has understanding and hence an ability 
to set himself purposes of his own choice, and in this respect he holds the title 
lord of nature; and if we regard nature as a teleological system, then it is man’s 
vocation to be the ultimate purpose of nature, but always subject to a condition: 
he must have the understanding and the will to give both nature and himself 
reference to a purpose that can be independent of nature, self-sufficient, and a 
final purpose. 214 
 
But what sorts of purposes does humanity set for itself?  One possibility is to use 
intelligence to create tools that minimize the grip and impact of nature.  Loosening 
nature’s grip allows humans to cultivate and pursue higher purposes of their own design.  
The attainment of these higher purposes is the definition of the advancement of culture.   
The ability to create one’s own purposes, however, is no guarantee that those 
chosen will be good, beneficial, or moral in nature.  In other words, humans are free to 
design purposes that are constructive or destructive, civilized or barbaric:  “[M]an’s own 
absurd natural predispositions land him in further troubles that he thinks up himself and 
[make him] put others of his own species in great misery through oppressive domination, 
barbaric wars, etc., and [so] man himself does all he can to work for the destruction of his 
                                                
213 Ibid., §83, p. 318, 430. 
214 Ibid., §83, p. 318, 431. 
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own species.”215  Despite such proclivities, Kant asserts humanity’s ability to overcome 
natural desires and inclinations through rationality and the ability to set purposes for itself. 
Hence among all of his purposes in nature there remains only this [one], as that 
which nature can accomplish with a view to a final purpose outside of nature, and 
this [one] may therefore be regarded as nature’s ultimate purpose:  It is a formal 
and subjective condition, namely, man’s aptitude in general for setting himself 
purposes, and for using nature (independently of [the element of] nature in man’s 
determination of purposes) as a means [for achieving them] in conformity with 
the maxims of his free purposes generally.  Producing in a rational being an 
aptitude for purposes generally (hence [in a way that leaves] that being free) is 
culture.  Hence only culture can be the ultimate purpose that we have cause to 
attribute to nature with respect to the human species.216 
 
In this passage, Kant makes clear that culture is the highest purpose humans can achieve 
through nature.  But what does Kant mean by culture?217  The brief answer to this query 
is: practices that are free from compulsion.218  Culture includes the development of a 
society of individuals living peaceably with one another, cooperating in order to establish 
morality through just laws and good customs.  This is the embodiment of what Kant 
refers to in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals as the “kingdom of ends” in 
which self-legislating beings create their own laws and abide by the same, treating 
themselves and others with dignity and respect.219  Such reflective moral behavior 
performed by agents acting out of duty rather than inclination is one of the primary aims 
of civilization.  As such, morality is the purpose for which humans strive.  In turn, 
                                                
215 Ibid., §83, p. 318, 430, emphasis in original.  Here, Kant merely aims to point out the effects unchecked 
human inclinations can have upon the sorts of purposes designed.  He goes on to suggest that these natural 
predispositions ought to be reined in or disciplined for the sake of culture.  Depending on how this 
disciplining is to be achieved, however, it may be the case that the manner by which civilization is achieved 
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216 Ibid., §83, p. 319, 431, emphasis in original. 
217 See my definition of culture in the Introduction, p. 2. 
218 I will return to the question of how free from compulsion cultured humans actually are when I get to the 
notion of the culture of discipline. 
219 Immanuel Kant.  Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.  Trans. Mary Gregor. In Ethics: History, 
Theory, and Contemporary Issues. 3rd Edition.  Ed. Cahn and Markie.  New York: Oxford University Press, 
2006, Section II, p.289, 292-294. 
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humans may cultivate their capacity for purposes (and purposiveness) by setting more 
complex and specific purposes for themselves.  In particular, they can design purposes 
that contain only the form of purposiveness, purposes that are not related to any particular 
concept of the good.220  In other words, humans can produce works of art as an aspect of 
their self-shaping.  In this light, even culture itself is a human purpose. 
In order to take up culture as a purpose, subjects must be self-conscious and 
reflect upon their experiences.  We must practice our purposive natures in order to 
achieve such goals.  Put in Aristotelian terms, humans must actualize their capacities and 
hone their skills through action, practice, and habituation.221  But how does culture relate 
to nature in the human subject, i.e., to our human nature?  In Part I of The Critique of 
Judgment, Kant answers this question with the relationship between genius and taste.  In 
Part II, however, Kant explores this question from a slightly different perspective. 
[W]hat is it, within man himself, that is a purpose and that he is to further through 
his connection with nature?  This purpose must either be such as can be fulfilled 
by nature itself in its beneficence, or else [must] be man’s aptitude and skill for 
[pursuing] various purposes for which he can use nature (outside or within him).  
On the first alternative the purpose of nature would be man’s happiness,222 on the 
second his culture.223  
 
It is on the latter of these two purposes that Kant most focuses.  The development of 
purposes involved in the advancement of civilization and culture requires the cultivation 
                                                
220 Kant.  Critique of Judgment, §11. 
221 Aristotle.  Nicomachean Ethics.  Trans. Terence Irwin.  Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 
Inc.  1999.  See Books I and II, and in particular, II, chp. 1, §3-4. 
222 In the Critique of Judgment and in the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant dismisses 
happiness as a serious candidate for the highest purpose humans can set themselves.  In the Groundwork, 
Kant claims that humans merely have an indirect duty to happiness in that without it, it is easier to succumb 
to the temptations of acting in an immoral fashion.  Happiness, then, serves as a safeguarding condition that 
contributes to the ability to perform one’s duty as a moral agent, but isn’t the ultimate purpose of humanity.  
See Groundwork, Section I, p. 276. 
223 Kant, Critique of Judgment, §83, p. 317, 429-430. 
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of our capacity to design purposes, or what Kant refers to as the “culture of skill.”224  
This is the actualization and practice of the human aptitude for purposiveness.  Kant 
points out that some of the higher purposes of culture, such as art and science, are its 
“less necessary ingredients.”225  He recognizes how these aspects of the “culture of skill” 
require resources and leisure that are not available to all members of society.226  Hence, 
culture, at its most basic level, is based upon inequality of condition according to Kant.  
The majority takes care of the needs of others, while the minority is free to pursue higher 
ends that include art and science.227 
While seemingly tangential to the philosophical point at hand, this inequality 
might be a necessary cost of the “progress” and “advancement” of culture.  If the culture 
of skill is made possible only by unfree labor of the majority of the population, then the 
resources and leisure afforded to the few that are meant to advance the whole are really to 
the detriment and inequality of others.  In reality, however, both groups are unfree in 
some respects.  The majority is unfree in the sense that they are subservient to interests of 
the whole that are nonetheless not in their own interest; the minority is unfree creatively 
due to the cultural pressure to make their expressions not just fit for culture, but suitable 
to contribute to and advance it.  This privileged minority is both supported by culture and 
confined by it.228  
Kant tries to equate, or at least compare, these restrictions upon freedom, but 
ultimately I find his claims untenable and take issue with his normative account of 
                                                
224 Ibid., §83, p. 319, 431. 
225 Ibid., §83, p. 320, 432. 
226 Ibid., §83, p. 319-321, 432-434. 
227 Ibid., §83, p. 319-320, 432. 
228 Recall the restrictions upon genius detailed above.   
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progress.  He states, “These others keep the majority in a state of oppression, hard labor, 
and little enjoyment, even though some of the culture of the higher class does gradually 
spread to the lower also.  But on both sides trouble increases with equal vigor as culture 
progresses.”229  While difficulty and restlessness increase for both, it is hardly defensible 
to assert that these two groups are equally restricted or even that this imbalance is for the 
overall good or improvement of society.230  This trickle down notion of culture is cold 
comfort to the majority who are oppressed and made to serve through hard labor.  Kant 
seems aware that the majority pays the highest price for the advancement of culture 
without being able to fully reap its benefits, as he suggests that only some of the benefits 
of culture will gradually reach the other members of society who have paved the way for 
it and made it possible.  The restrictions put upon the majority are of a different and more 
severe sort than those put upon individuals endowed with genius because they are 
uncompensated for, even if the advancement of culture means unhappiness for both 
groups.  While restrictions upon freedom are not always warning signs of infringements 
upon rights, they are points for critical reflection.  We must be wary, lest these 
restrictions shift from safeguards to encroachments through a lack of watchfulness on the 
part of citizens.231 
While at first blush, the limitations upon the minority may not seem to be of a 
comparably serious sort, I aim to establish the weight of these restrictions upon 
expression and innovation for all segments of culture.  The restrictions that culture places 
                                                
229 Kant, §83, p. 320, 432.   
230 I do not want to overstate the point.  Kant doesn’t quite defend the inequalities of these restrictions.  He 
also doesn’t do enough to convince me of their justification under the notion of “progress” or 
“advancement,” either.  It is an important and problematic issue worth further examination. 
231 Immanuel Kant.  “What Is Enlightenment?” from Philosophical Writings.  Trans. Lewis White Beck.  
New York: Continuum Publishing Co., 1986. 
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upon the privileged minority dictate what sorts of expressions are fit for culture, and 
more importantly, which are fit to advance it.  While thus far in the argument, I have 
sought to distinguish the restrictions on higher and lower social groups, now we must 
turn to their connection as seen through limitations upon expression.  Restrictions may 
begin in a “top-down” fashion, but all members of culture, not just those who craft new 
expressions and new ways to mean, will feel their implications.  This point applies to the 
restrictive impact that wing clipping has upon expression. 
Along with the aforementioned “culture of skill” by which individuals develop 
their capacity to design purposes, the “culture of discipline” guides humans towards our 
vocation as rational beings through training and restriction.  It directs us towards our 
humanity and the recognition of higher purposes for ourselves.  Furthermore, the culture 
of discipline attempts to temper the “crudeness” and “vehemence” of our inclinations in 
order to focus upon the development and refinement of our selves:  
But we also cannot fail to notice that nature [within us] pursues the purpose of 
making room for the development of our humanity, (namely, the inclinations [to] 
enjoyment).  [For we have] the fine art[s] and the sciences, which involve a 
universally communicable pleasure as well as elegance and refinement, and 
through these they make man, not indeed morally [sittlich] better for [life in] 
society, but still civilized [gesittet] for it: they make great headway against the 
tyranny of man’s propensity to the senses, and so prepare him for a sovereignty in 
which reason alone is to dominate; and the evils that either nature or our 
quarrelsomeness and selfishness visit on us do also summon, increase, and steel 
the soul’s forces to keep them from succumbing to those evils, and so let us feel a 
hidden aptitude within us for higher purposes.232 
 
Thus, the culture of discipline is involved in the recognition and promotion of rational 
ends and the pursuit of higher purposes.  One of the primary purposes of culture is to 
train individuals to recognize the rightful dominance of reason over desire and inclination 
                                                
232 Kant.  Critique of Judgment, §83, p. 321, 433-434. 
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and to obey the demands of duty.  The civilization of individuals through the control of 
desires requires the domination of certain aspects of human nature:  
The culture of discipline […] consists in the liberation of the will from the 
despotism of desires, a despotism that rivets us to certain natural things and 
renders us unable to do our own selecting; we allow ourselves to be fettered by 
the impulses that nature gave us only as guides that we would not neglect or even 
injure our animal characteristics, whereas in fact we are free enough to tighten or 
slacken, to lengthen or shorten them, as the purposes of reason require.233 
 
Kant’s expression is vague.  In German, “Gewisse Naturdinge”234 literally means “certain 
natural things.”  But what are the “natural things” to which we are riveted?  Why doesn’t 
Kant specify what he has in mind here?  The vagueness is intriguing in that the passage 
could apply to and have implications for both morality and aesthetics.   
On the one hand, this passage addresses how to negotiate and adhere to 
imperatives of morality and mitigate the influence of inclination, interest, and desire; in 
other words, it regards how to civilize the natural elements of human subjectivity in order 
to live in orderly society with others.  In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 
Kant fills this picture out by characterizing other subjects as the limiting condition of our 
freedom.  But while they limit our freedom, and are therefore hateful to us, other people 
also make our freedom possible.235  Kant thus directs us towards our humanity as 
something worthy of consideration over and above our animal characteristics.  In turn, 
this leads us towards our sociability and our duty to live in harmony and accord with 
others.  This is why we must try to develop habits that are beneficial not only for 
ourselves, but for the society in which we live.  This connects back to Kant’s comment 
about our ability to “tighten or slacken” our impulses as reason sees fit.  The cultivation 
                                                
233 Ibid., §83, p. 319, 432., emphasis mine. 
234 Immanuel Kant.  Kritik der Urteilskraft.  Hamburg, Germany: Felix Meiner Publishing, 1924., §83. 
235 Kant, Groundwork, Section Two, p. 289-290. 
   93 
of morality or virtue based upon deliberation and choice serves social and political 
purposes.  The ability to make decisions that are free from desires or inclinations is a sign 
of refinement, cultivation, and discipline on the part of subjects that contributes both to 
the individual good and the good of the group. 
On the other hand, the conflict between subjectivity and nature in the passage 
about the culture of discipline refers us back to the relationship of genius and taste.  In 
other words, the “natural things” to which Kant refers may be interpreted as “nature in 
the subject,” or “genius.”  Genius, recall, is necessary to the advancement of culture, but 
also threatening to it.  What allows individuals with genius to make contributions to art 
and culture is the nature within them.  Nature is what the subject cannot ever be rid of, 
despite the efforts of the culture of discipline to minimize its grip upon them.  Even if 
“taste clips the wings of genius,” thereby refining its expressions, genius still presses 
forward in order to express itself.  Genius is an unyielding and undeniable force.  This is 
why those endowed with genius are less free than other agents and therefore are always at 
great risk from the imperatives of advancing culture. 
It is important to point out that an individual can never escape her nature.  The 
force of genius in the subject needs to express itself, and in particular, to express aesthetic 
ideas.  According to Kant, those endowed with genius are unfree because they cannot 
control the source of the ideas they put forth through works of art.  Genius (or nature) 
renders us unable to do our own selecting and needs to be shaped by the purposes of 
reason in order to liberate the will and reveal our aptitude for higher purposes.  Due to 
this lack of control in expression, culture aims to rein in this potentially dangerous force.  
Genius continues to press for expression and culture continues to impose order upon it.  
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Because culture’s ongoing project is to civilize subjects, this conflict plays itself out 
again and again. 
Ingenious individuals are called by nature to express themselves, but they are 
pressured by taste and culture to express themselves in some ways rather than others.  As 
a talent, genius is despotic and unyielding.  Perhaps, then, we can interpret the “natural 
things” to which we are riveted in §83 as genius, or “nature in the subject.”  To further 
align these passages, we can now say that genius “renders us unable to do our own 
selecting.”  It is a talent for expression that is indomitable; we are forced to express 
ingenious ideas.  Even if refined and clipped by taste, genius continues to give form to 
expression.  The point that Kant is making in §83 is that through training, we can “tighten 
or slacken, […] lengthen or shorten” our impulses, and under this interpretation, our 
forceful talents “as the purposes of reason require.”  This move is analogous to the 
restrictive power of taste clipping the wings of genius for the sake of culture.236   
                                                
236  The implications of taste clipping the wings of genius unite the moral and aesthetic dimensions 
through the pivotal notion of purposiveness, bringing the social and political dimensions together more 
clearly.  On this reading, the restrictions under discussion would be about art and expression very explicitly, 
rather than restrictions in the abstract.  This interpretation is bolstered by the connections Kant makes 
between fine art and morality:   “For the pleasure we take in purposive form is also culture, and it attunes 
the spirit to ideas, and so makes it receptive to more such pleasure and entertainment […] Unless we 
connect the fine arts, closely or remotely, with moral ideas, which alone carry with them an independent 
liking,” the mind will be dissatisfied with itself and with the object. See Kant, The Critique of Judgment, 
§52, p. 195-196, 326.  Because Kant sees morality and taste as purposes that ought to be cultivated in the 
subject, he aims to connect them to one another towards the end of Part I.  
After enumerating the similarities and differences between the beautiful and the morally good, 
Kant links them through the attunement of the faculties and a manner of speaking associated with morality.  
He states: 
The common understanding also habitually bears this analogy in mind, and beautiful objects of 
nature or of art are often called by names that seem to presuppose that we are judging [these 
objects] morally.  We call buildings or trees majestic and magnificent, or landscapes cheerful and 
gay; even colors are called innocent, humble, or tender, because they arouse sensations in us that 
are somehow analogous to the consciousness we have in a mental state produced by moral 
judgments […] for taste presents the imagination as admitting, even in its freedom, of 
determination that is purposive for the understanding, and it teaches us to like even objects of 
sense freely, even apart from sensible charm. 
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Kant continues to expand upon this point:  “Plainly, then, the propaedeutic that 
will truly establish our taste consists in developing our moral ideas and in cultivating 
[Kultur] moral feeling; for only when sensibility is made to harmonize with this feeling 
can genuine taste take on a definite, unchangeable form.”237  Genius poses a challenge 
not to the unchangeable form of taste, meaning how the faculties harmonize with one 
another, but to the unchangeability of the particularities of taste at a certain time and 
place.238  That is, genius challenges the established rules and boundaries of taste and 
expands upon them through innovation and exemplarity, even as the subjective 
universality of judgments is maintained.239  As genius expands the sphere of expression, 
it poses a threat to status quo ideas of art, taste, and communication.   
Perhaps Kant’s equivocation in §83 isn’t due to vacillation after all, but is more of 
a problem that stems from a lack of ready-to-hand terminology that would characterize 
the forces of nature in an effective way.  To that end, the ambiguity suggests how 
intertwined morality and aesthetics are for Kant.  Because he does not specify a particular 
referent in this passage, perhaps he means to indicate the way in which culture involves 
restrictions that are both moral and aesthetic.  Since the need to check our natural and 
                                                                                                                                            
(Ibid., §59, p. 229-230, 354, emphasis mine.)  Although Kant asserts that there is a connection between 
moral judgment and aesthetic judgment, he does not fill out the analogy completely.  While the good is 
liked through its concept, the beautiful is liked directly through sensation. (Ibid., §59,p. 229,  353-354.) 
Perhaps what Kant has in mind is that while art exhibits purposiveness without a purpose (without a 
determinate concept), it nonetheless serves a purpose for us.  This is shown in the above passage, but also 
in the way Kant views art as an agent of the advancement of culture.  In part, this ability to advance culture 
has to do with what art requires of subjects cognitively, linguistically, and intersubjectively.  As a result, 
this passage illustrates the connection between purposiveness of mind and the cultivation of the higher 
purposes of culture.    
237 Ibid., §60, p. 232, 356.  J.H. Bernard translates this passage slightly differently:  “Hence it appears plain 
that the true propaedeutic for the foundation of taste is the development of moral ideas and the culture of 
moral feeling; because it is only when sensibility is brought into agreement with this that genuine taste can 
assume a definite invariable form.”  The Critique of Judgment.  Trans. J.H. Bernard.  Amherst, NY: 
Prometheus Books, 2000., §60, p. 255. 
238 Cannon, p. 61. 
239 Kant, The Critique of Judgment, §46, p. 175-176, 307-308. 
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personal inclinations is so well established in the Groundwork Concerning the 
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, the turn to the aesthetic dimension of this 
issue in the Critique of Judgment is fitting.   
Kant is cognizant of the innovation and exemplarity genius offers to art and 
culture, but he does not fully examine what could be lost in disciplining nature and 
clipping genius’s wings.  While he recognizes the need for genius, Kant doesn’t fully 
account for the productive potential of the struggle to express ourselves when met with 
works that thwart our expectations and exceed our conceptual arsenals.  The ability to 
communicate about challenging works in a creative fashion opens up the space for 
innovation in expression and for the expansion of the linguistic and aesthetic spheres.   
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have illustrated the unique demands set by art and the problems 
in expression that accompany them.  I have established the demands of art to 
communicate and the inability to fully expound aesthetic ideas, set forth the persistent 
and unfulfillable social demand of art to communicate our judgments of taste to other 
people, and explored how genius exacerbates the demand to respond because it sets the 
(new) rule to art.  Further, I have examined the subjective dimension of our response to 
art, the intersubjective dimension of individual interaction with other subjects, and the 
cultural dimension by which our responses are guided and restricted by the norms of the 
society in which we live.   
The fulcrum of this chapter is the conflict between genius (nature) and taste 
(culture).  In the next two chapters, I unpack the notion of wing clipping to investigate 
how innovative or exemplary expression is put under pressure by the “civilizing” forces 
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of culture.  It is important to examine the potential risks that such forces pose to the 
development of new forms of expression and how they may result in marginalization or 
censorship. 
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Chapter Three 
 
  Silence and Wing Clipping 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Recall that according to Kant, taste clips the wings of genius in order to make its 
contributions fit to enrich and advance culture.  As Chapter Two has shown, genius must 
be restricted so that its works will be comprehensible to culture.  In order to set the (new) 
rule to art, genius’s contributions must be both innovative and exemplary.  Therefore, 
Kant asserts that taste must temper genius to help insure genius’s place in culture as well 
as its impact upon it.  But the antagonistic relationship between genius and taste raises a 
concern about the freedom of aesthetic expression.  If genius serves as the engine of 
culture and is necessary for its improvement, why restrict or limit it?  Why not give this 
creative force free reign?  If the wings of genius are clipped, will the innovative character 
of its expressions be damaged?  Wouldn’t the freedom of genius provide an opportunity 
for even greater contributions to culture? 
  I explore three different interpretations of wing clipping according to the degree 
of the cuts:  (1) not restricting genius by not clipping its wings; (2) minimal or “tasteful” 
clipping; and (3) severe wing clipping or severing.  The first two interpretations will be 
discussed in this chapter, and the third interpretation in the next.  We will gain insight 
into the effects and implications of wing clipping by examining these various options and 
how each is related to silence or silencing.  Each scenario will illuminate a different way 
to understand silence and silencing in the arts and thus will explore terrain that was not 
fully developed in The Critique of Judgment.   
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In the first case, the lack of restraint on genius seems to present a liberating option.  
Without taste to clip its wings, genius should be able to soar to new heights of expression.  
As my argument will show, however, unclipped genius does not get recognized by or 
included in culture.  Instead, uncomprehended, it expresses itself outside of culture 
altogether.  This lack of recognition and inclusion displaces and silences genius.  Thus, 
even though culture does not actively censor genius, it nonetheless excludes its 
contributions.  In order to explore this sort of silencing, I investigate the unrestricted 
force of the Dionysian as presented in Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy.  In this section 
of argument, I also examine Needcompany’s King Lear as an example of the 
incomprehensibility of an unrestrained work of genius.  Because Jan Lauwers, the 
production’s director, refuses to restrict his vision or to temper it for the sake of his 
audience, his work effectively silences itself because it is too free.  While at first blush, it 
might seem that a lack of restraint would lead to more freely creative works of genius, 
their wings are nonetheless clipped due to a lack of comprehensibility. 
In the case of minimal wing clipping, I look at cases of marginalization and near 
exclusion.  The exclusion of Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain from the 1917 Society of 
Independent Artists show is an example.  This rejection was important because the work 
challenged conceptions of art, medium, and decency, and thereby threatened the 
standards of taste and morality.  The piece was so controversial that it was ultimately 
rejected from an open show in which all submissions were supposed to be welcomed and 
included.  For the purposes of the current discussion, I consider how something like 
tasteful wing clipping was involved in these influential rejections of avant-garde works of 
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art.  In this connection, I examine Peter Bürger’s notion of the avant-garde in order to 
illuminate tasteful wing clipping.   
In the third and final case, to be examined in Chapter Four, I investigate maximal 
wing clipping and censorship in the arts.  In particular, I examine the silencing of Richard 
Serra’s Tilted Arc through its removal from Federal Plaza in New York.  While many 
people polled about this sculpture did not object to its presence, it was nonetheless 
removed, leaving an ugly gash on the surface of the plaza.  Allegations that the sculpture 
broke up the space in a negative way and disrupted the movement of persons through it 
were enough to cause its removal, despite the fact that it had been commissioned by the 
General Services Administration’s Art-in-Architecture program in the first place.240  
Because the work had been sanctioned by the power invested in the commission, its 
removal raises questions about the status of public art and the authority to oversee and 
govern it.  Who has the ability to permit and / or prohibit public art?  What is the role of 
(public) taste in censorship?  In Chapter Four, I continue this line of argumentation by 
investigating the exclusionary power of publics in terms of Nancy Fraser’s “Rethinking 
the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy.”  
Afterwards, I deal with cults that communicate internally rather than with the mainstream 
public.  Here I rely on concepts borrowed from Walter Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in 
the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility.”   
 
 
 
                                                
240 Gregg Horowitz.  “Public Art / Public Space: The Spectacle of the Tilted Arc Controversy.”  The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 54 (1) (Winter 1996): 8-14, p. 8. 
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II. The Dionysian as a Lack of Wing Clipping 
 
A. Kant and Nietzsche 
 Upon first examination, Kant’s and Nietzsche’s aesthetic theories seem to stem 
from and react to different influences and deal with different art forms.  They also come 
to very different conclusions about art and how we respond to it.  As Nietzsche states in 
the introduction to The Birth of Tragedy, “I tried laboriously to express by means of 
Schopenhauerian and Kantian formulas strange and new valuations which were basically 
at odds with Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s spirit and taste!”241  In his “Attempt at Self-
Criticism,” written several years after the book’s initial publication, Nietzsche suggests 
that he should have had more courage to express his ideas in his own way rather than 
borrowing the language of philosophers who came before him.  More important than his 
note about language and tone is Nietzsche’s claim that his views about art and tragedy are 
directly opposed to those of Kant and Schopenhauer in spite of his mode of delivery.242  
Contra Nietzsche’s assertions in this preface, I aim to highlight the similarities between 
him and Kant as regards the role of genius in the production and reception of art.  After 
tracing out the affinities of the aesthetic theories of these philosophers, I explore the 
effects of unrestrained Dionysianism. 
Through an examination of the force of the Dionysian if it were to go unrestrained, 
I explore the implications of not clipping genius’s wings.  While it appears that not 
                                                
241 Friedrich Nietzsche.  The Birth of Tragedy.  Trans. Walter Kaufmann.  New York: Vintage Books, 
1967., Introduction §6, p. 24. 
242 The “Attempt at Self-Criticism” is a retrospective look at The Birth of Tragedy.  In Nietzsche’s 
Philosophy of Art, Julian Young warns us to be wary about the later Nietzsche’s portrayal of his earlier 
thought.  Because these reflections were expressed after his break with Schopenhauer and Wagner, to 
whom Nietzsche was indebted in The Birth of Tragedy, we must consider the reasons for the severity of his 
tone here.  The work was originally published in 1872; by the time Nietzsche wrote this introduction in 
1886, he was more than ready to disavow his early influences.  This does not mean that Nietzsche can 
eliminate their imprint on his early work, but only that he would like to do so later in his career.  See Julian 
Young.  Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Art.  New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992., pp. 27-30. 
   102 
clipping the wings of genius would remove the difficulties that result from the restriction 
of the creative engine of culture, this scenario merely shifts the problem of silence and 
silencing into a new arena.  More precisely, this situation shifts the problem of silencing 
outside of the arena entirely.243   When genius is free to express itself without limitation, 
its contributions cannot be comprehended by culture due to the excessive cognition they 
spur.  Instead, its productions and their significance exit culture – and hence are not part 
of pushing culture forward.  While these expressions are not forced out of culture through 
the violence of wing clipping, they silence themselves due to their lack of 
comprehensibility.  Put another way, unrestrained genius is silenced by its lack of 
recognition and acceptance from culture.  Although these ingenious expressions are 
articulated outside the confines of culture and may continue to buzz with excessive 
meaning there, culture does not have the tools to make sense of them.  So too, the 
unrestrained work doesn’t have the tools to demand that sense be made of it.  The excess 
of ideas presented by genius causes these ingenious works to be received in silence – or 
not to be received at all – due to their complexity and incomprehensibility.  As a result, 
we might say that works of unrestrained genius silence themselves. 
 According to Kant, genius is required to produce art, and socially enculturated 
taste is required to judge it.  “Judging beautiful objects to be such requires taste; but fine 
art itself, i.e., the production of such objects, requires genius.”244  Genius is rarer than 
taste.  Not everyone is inspirited by nature to produce works of genius, but all are 
expected to cultivate taste.  As Kant states, “genius is nature’s favorite and so must be 
                                                
243 In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche describes the spectators as “overlooking” the action of the play in an 
arena or amphitheater.  My contention is that the unrestrained Dionysian moves the action outside of the 
theater and outside of the polis entirely.  I will return to this point shortly. 
244 Immanuel Kant.  The Critique of Judgment.  Trans.  Werner Pluhar.  Indianapolis, IN: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1987., §48, 311, emphasis in original. 
   103 
regarded as a rare phenomenon.”245  Further, Kant adds, “his example gives rise to a 
school for other good minds…”246  The future of art depends upon the exemplary 
innovations of genius.  But while genius is extremely valuable, Kant argues, taste is 
important because it safeguards and regulates culture.  As Kant states, no work of fine art 
is without taste either because taste’s role in relation to art is to make genius’s rare 
contributions fit to advance general culture.247  For this reason, taste makes genius’s 
contributions comprehensible and thereby secures their place within culture.  As a result, 
the innovative but nonsensical offerings of genius cannot be permitted full play in culture.   
Both genius and taste are required for art even though they oppose or restrict each 
other.  This Kantian relationship is reconsidered in Nietzsche’s characterization of the 
opposing forces of the Dionysian and Apollinian in The Birth of Tragedy.  As Nietzsche 
states, “the continuous development of art is bound up with the Apollinian and Dionysian 
duality – just as procreation depends on the duality of the sexes, involving perpetual strife 
with only periodically intervening reconciliation.”248  The conflict in tragic art depends 
upon the different tendencies and aims of the Greek gods of Apollo, the god and guardian 
of the plastic arts, poetry, and sculpture, and Dionysus, the god and guardian of music. 
Nietzsche continues: 
 
These two different tendencies run parallel to each other, for the most part openly 
at variance; and they continually incite each other to new and more powerful 
births, which perpetuate an antagonism, only superficially reconciled by the 
common term ‘art’; till eventually, by a metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic 
‘will,’ they appear coupled with each other, and through this coupling ultimately 
generate an equally Dionysian and Apollinian form of art – Attic tragedy.249 
                                                
245 Ibid., § 49. 
246 Ibid., §49.  Cf. §46-50. 
247 Ibid., §50, 319. 
248 Nietzsche, §1, p. 33, emphasis in original. 
249 Ibid., §1, p. 33. 
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Nietzsche goes on to outline how the art of tragedy emerged out of the dynamic 
alternation of the Apollinian and Dionysian tendencies.250  This alternation is a form of 
aesthetic combat in which each force competes for dominance over aesthetic 
expression.251  As a result, each issues a challenge to the other in turn and their 
contributions become more robust and more in line with the character of the god they 
serve.  This competition can make the ideas in the resulting works more durable and 
lasting.252 
The Dionysian is associated with intoxication, ecstasy, revelry, the collapse of 
individuality, and the recollection of the primordial unity of humans.253  Dionysus, the 
god of wine, drinking, and revelry, activates this aesthetic force.  The Dionysian 
“celebration of life’s creative cycles, opened the Greeks to the richness of 
undifferentiated life beyond all established identities.”254  But even though the Dionysian 
indicates celebration, it is also associated with the revelation of the painful truths of 
existence such as the wisdom of Silenus.255  The Apollinian, on the other hand, is 
associated with dreams, illusion, and mere appearance, with “poetic immortalizing, myth, 
the state, and the agonistic affirmation of the individual [who] provide[s] a measure of 
                                                
250 This claim can be expanded to all the arts insofar as they are descended from tragedy. 
251 I will return to this point momentarily in relation to the importance of the agon in Greek art and culture. 
252 Consider Kant’s statement from §50:  “[Taste] introduces clarity and order into a wealth of thought and 
hence makes the ideas durable, fit for approval that is both lasting and universal, and [hence] fit for being 
followed by others and fit for an ever advancing culture.” 
253 Nietzsche, §1-2. 
254 Giacomo Gambino.  “Nietzsche and the Greeks: Identity, Politics, and Tragedy.”  Polity 28 (4) 
(Summer 1996): 415-444., p. 416. 
255 Nietzsche, §3, p. 42, emphasis in original:  “Oh, wretched ephemeral race, children of chance and 
misery, why do you compel me to tell you what it would be most expedient for you not to hear?  What is 
best of all is utterly beyond your reach:  not to be born, not to be, to be nothing.  But the second best for 
you is – to die soon.” 
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permanence against time.”256  As a result, the Apollinian serves as a seduction to life and 
the extension of the will through the presentation of beautiful appearances.257  We are 
driven to create art out of these two forces.  According to Nietzsche, art is a “protection 
and remedy” for us; we need art in order to survive and thrive.258  It makes life bearable 
and worth living.  Even from these basic descriptions, the relationship of Nietzsche’s 
Dionysian and Apollinian forces to Kant’s genius and taste begins to come into focus.  At 
the surface level, the Dionysian has a parallel in genius and the Apollinian in taste.  I 
argue that the Dionysian can be interpreted as that which is wild, natural, and inspired – 
namely, as genius – while the rigidity of the Apollinian can be interpreted as the rule-
boundedness of taste.   
However, Nietzsche moves beyond this basic parallelism with Kant to suggest 
that these forces work in an alternating pattern in which the Dionysian and Apollinian 
ebb and flow like the tides.  The Dionysian may strengthen the advance of its cause, and 
in turn, the Apollinian will strike back against this surge with ever increasing 
reinforcements.  Nietzsche states, “And so, wherever the Dionysian prevailed, the 
Apollinian was checked and destroyed.  But, on the other hand, it was equally certain that, 
wherever the first Dionysian onslaught was successfully withstood, the authority and 
majesty of the Delphic god exhibited itself as more rigid and menacing than ever.”259  
Thus, the Dionysian and Apollinian are rival tendencies locked in unending combat.  It 
must be noted that even in their opposition, the Dionysian and Apollinian are necessary 
to each other and that this conflict is required for the production of art. 
                                                
256 Gambino, p. 416. 
257 Ibid., §3, p. 43. 
258 Ibid., §15, pp. 96-98. 
259 Ibid., §4, p. 47. 
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Nietzsche combines the Dionysian and the Apollinian into Hellenic genius even 
though (or maybe because) their forces are antagonistic and opposed.  He states, “[T]he 
Dionysian and Apollinian, in new births ever following and mutually augmenting one 
another, controlled the Hellenic genius.”260  For Nietzsche, unlike Kant, the combination 
of these two forces comprises genius through a mutual antagonism, augmentation, and 
reconciliation; the dynamic relation of these forces gives rise to ingenious art.  
Nonetheless, the Nietzschean idea that the Apollinian and Dionysian serve as a system of 
checks and balances (so that neither can become too powerful) is similar to the Kantian 
account of wing clipping.  Kant distinguishes between genius and taste, but also 
recognizes both as necessary to the production and reception of art within culture.  Taste 
checks genius by clipping its wings, and in turn genius produces even bolder works of art.  
It must do so if it is to set the rule to art and thereby push art forward.261  Like a call and 
response, each mounts its offensive and each defends its cause in turn, with intermittent 
moments of reconciliation.  Both genius and taste under this Kantian reading are 
necessary to the other and to the dynamic process of art making.   
Despite the importance of the dynamic relation of the Dionysian and Apollinian 
forces, Nietzsche ponders stamping out the wildness of the Dionysian.  Upon careful 
consideration, he refuses to do so.262  More precisely, Nietzsche recognizes the 
impossibility and undesirability of such a course of action.  He states: 
                                                
260 Ibid., §4, p. 47. 
261 While Kant does not make this point explicit, it follows logically if the future of art is to advance.  If 
taste constantly restricts genius, genius must respond by renegotiating the rules of art and thereby pushing 
and stretching the boundaries of tradition. 
262 Keep this refusal in mind when we get to the option of severing genius’s wings.  Despite the presence 
of this line of argument in The Birth of Tragedy, some philosophers and critics go so far as to claim that the 
unrestrained Apollinian is the true character of Nietzsche’s aesthetics.  As Benjamin Bennett states in 
“Nietzsche’s Idea of Myth: The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Eighteenth Century Aesthetics,” 
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To separate this original and all-powerful Dionysian element from tragedy, and to 
reconstruct tragedy purely on the basis of an un-Dionysian art, morality, and 
world view – this is the tendency of Euripides as it now reveals itself to us in clear 
illumination.  In the evening of his life, Euripides himself propounded to his 
contemporaries the question of the value and significance of this tendency, using 
a myth.  Is the Dionysian entitled to exist at all?  Should it not be forcibly 
uprooted from Hellenic soil?  Certainly, the poet tells us, if it were only possible: 
but the god Dionysus is too powerful…263 
 
Although Euripides helps drive Dionysus from the tragic stage, Dionysus has not been 
vanquished.  Instead, through the demonic power of Socrates, Euripides’ un-Dionysian 
art becomes “naturalistic and inartistic.”264  Works of drama or art based exclusively on 
the Dionysian or the Apollinian are, Nietzsche claims, bound to fail, albeit in different 
ways.  The alternation of creative forces is necessary to Hellenic genius, and according to 
Nietzsche, to the production of art.  Interpreted in a Kantian way, this passage suggests 
that the severing of wings would destroy art.  Balance is stressed here – between 
Dionysus and Apollo or between genius and taste – because both make valuable 
contributions to art.265 
These forces augment each other and force each other into balance.  As such, they 
are necessary to each other.  As Benjamin Bennett states in “Nietzsche’s Idea of Myth: 
The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Eighteenth Century Aesthetics”: 
The Apollonian and the Dionysian are related by ‘mutual necessity,’ not in the 
sense that they modify each other, but in the sense that they intensify each other 
(sich gegenseitig steigernd), so that the whole essence of each may be revealed; 
and this idea is in turn indispensable in Nietzsche’s general argument that Greek 
                                                                                                                                            
“[Walter] Kaufmann maintains that Nietzsche, if forced to choose, would ‘favor’ the Apollonian over the 
Dionysian because the latter, taken by itself, is in essence a ‘destructive disease’ […] But there is nothing 
to justify coming down as firmly on one side of the question as Kaufmann does, or as those critics whom he 
opposes had done before him.”  Benjamin Bennett.  “Nietzsche’s Idea of Myth:  The Birth of Tragedy from 
the Spirit of Eighteenth Century Aesthetics.”  PMLA 94 (3) (May 1979): 420-433, p. 420. 
263 Nietzsche, §12, p. 81. 
264 Ibid., §12, p. 83. 
265 Uncareful readers of Nietzsche are all too ready to favor Dionysus in this conflict.  It is to Nietzsche’s 
credit that he favors neither force and promotes their dynamic relationship and mutual necessity.   
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tragedy represents ‘the culmination of the Apollonian as well as the Dionysian 
artistic aims.’  The Apollonian and the Dionysian are not born pure but, rather, 
become pure – they ‘become what they are,’ in a favorite phrase of both Hegel 
and Nietzsche – through their historical development and interaction.266 
 
Kant and Nietzsche agree on the dynamism of these forces, but as aforementioned, they 
conceive of their relation to genius differently.  Nietzsche stresses the power of both of 
them:  despite its decorous and rigid appearance, then, even the Apollinian has brute 
strength.  Given the proper circumstances, the Apollinian borrows Dionysian tools to 
execute its own goals.  This is an idea I gestured towards in Chapter Two.  If taste has the 
power at its disposal to check genius, it must be (just as) ferocious in the execution of its 
ends.  As Nietzsche states, “The opposition between Apollo and Dionysus became more 
hazardous and even impossible, when similar impulses finally burst forth from the 
deepest roots of the Hellenic nature and made a path for themselves: the Delphic god, by 
a seasonably effected reconciliation, now contented himself with taking the destructive 
weapons from the hands of his powerful antagonist.”267  Thus, Apollo isn’t just disarming 
his opponent.  He is taking up arms for his own cause against Dionysus with a ferocity 
befitting the god of war. 
 
B. The Political Dimension of Nietzschean Aesthetics 
These considerations about the conflict between the Apollinian and the Dionysian 
highlight the political dimensions of aesthetics.  In “Nietzsche and the Greeks: Identity, 
Politics, and Tragedy,” Giacomo Gambino states: 
This antagonism, however, achieved moments of harmony by establishing 
provisional ‘alliances,’ ‘treaties of peace,’ and ‘fraternal unions.’  Such fragile 
moments were the result of the artist’s powers of mediation, of doing justice to 
                                                
266 Bennett, p. 420, emphasis in original.  Bennett references §4 and §24 from the Birth of Tragedy here.  
Also, note that Bennett prefers “Apollonian” to Kaufmann’s “Apollinian.” 
267 Nietzsche, §2, p. 39. 
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conflicting demands in life.  That Nietzsche’s terminology for such mediation in 
Birth is explicitly ‘political’ is an indication that not only were such 
reconciliations between the Dionysian and Apollinian instincts the result of 
artistic play, but that artistic play was not itself unlike the political judgment 
needed to negotiate compromises between conflicting principles.268 
In this passage, Gambino compares aesthetic and political judgment and claims that their 
conflicts and compromises are analogous.  These reconciliations are crucial to the 
maintenance of balance between the Dionysian and the Apollinian.  The excess of either 
force degrades both art and politics.  Gambino argues: 
The political problem as Nietzsche describes it in Birth thus stems from two kinds 
of decay, both of which are associated with the breakdown in the relationship of 
the Apollinian and Dionysian instincts.  An excessive concern with Apollinian 
restraint leads to ‘a consuming chase for worldly power and worldly honor’ that 
requires an increasingly rigid social structure and form of political authority; 
Sparta and eventually Rome follow this line of development, which seeks to 
master the Dionysian.  On the other hand, unrestrained Dionysianism leads to a 
disgust with, and ultimately a rejection of, action and worldly affairs […] The 
first option, we might say, represents the human attempt to master temporality by 
means of a civilization that seeks to impose a universal identity of man; the latter, 
an attempt to escape the burdens of temporality altogether, a ‘yearning for the 
nothing.’269 
 
Without balance, a consuming desire for power and honor on the one hand (a desire to 
distinguish oneself), and disgust with life and worldly affairs on the other hand (a desire 
for nothing or nonexistence) results. 
In the first case of imbalance, the politically charged conflict produces the excess 
of the Apollinian.  The model of this kind of excess is seen in the rigidity of the Doric 
state.  Nietzsche states: 
[W]herever the first Dionysian onslaught was successfully withstood, the 
authority and majesty of the Delphic god exhibited itself as more rigid and 
menacing than ever.  For me the Doric state and Doric art are explicable only as a 
permanent military encampment of the Apollinian.  Only incessant resistance to 
the titanic-barbaric nature of the Dionysian could account for the long survival of 
                                                
268 Gambino, p. 439. 
269 Ibid., p. 429-430.  At the end of this passage, Gambino quotes The Birth of Tragedy, §21, p. 124-125. 
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art so defiantly prim and so encompassed with bulwarks, a training so warlike and 
rigorous, and a political structure so cruel and relentless.270 
 
In addition to describing Apollinian art or expression in warlike terms, Nietzsche extends 
his characterization to the realm of the state.  He describes the structure of the Doric state 
as “cruel and relentless,” indicating the intolerable nature of this political situation.271   
In the second case of imbalance, when the Dionysian goes unrestrained, its 
unconventional, uncultured, anti-cultural, or wild character dominates.  Gambino states, 
“The Dionysian religious cults provided an alternative to Greek political existence, 
relating individuals not to the ancestral origins of the city but to the universal community 
of mankind.  While Apollinianism demanded restraint and measure (Mass), Dionysianism 
relished in excess (Uebermass) and the uninhibited openness to, and participation in, the 
diversity of life.”272  Gambino goes on to describe the Dionysian as “anti-political” or as 
lying outside of politics.  In other words, if the Dionysian is completely unrestrained, it is 
not a welcome part of culture.  Nor, presumably, would it welcome culture’s embrace.  
Gambino states, “The rhythms of Dionysian life represented for the Greeks what J. Peter 
Euben calls the ‘moment of anti-politics.’  The Dionysian rituals not only relieved the 
Greeks of the tensions and agony of political life, but reminded them that politics could 
not absorb the diversity of life.”273  The inability to absorb the Dionysian energies into 
the normal functioning of culture (unless in careful balance with the Apollinian) is 
analogous to what would happen if the wings of genius were not clipped by taste.  I will 
return to this point momentarily.  
                                                
270 Nietzsche, §4, p. 47, emphasis in original. 
271 I alluded to this issue in Chapter Two when discussing the vigor of taste in clipping the wild wings of 
genius. 
272 Ibid., p. 427. 
273 Ibid., p. 427.  Cf. J. Peter Euben.  The Tragedy of Political Theory: The Road Not Taken.  Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990. 
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In response to these imbalances, Gambino suggests that a more productive way to 
manage and negotiate the Apollinian and Dionysian energies is to channel them into 
contests.  “The agon represented the Greek’s ability to transform such ambitions [such as 
fame and other distinguishing marks] into organized political and cultural competition.  It 
rested on the distinction between eris (discord), which leads men into fights of 
annihilation, and a second kind of eris, which is ‘the activity of fights which are 
contests.’”274  Here, Gambino highlights a Nietzschean strategy for overcoming the 
Apollinian desire to distinguish oneself at all costs.  In place of the drive to annihilate, 
Gambino advances a type of conflict that ends more amicably and productively – that of 
contests.  These, he points out, must rest upon the “mutual respect and honor of 
opponents.”275  Such a reading of Nietzsche reinforces the above point about keeping the 
Dionysian tendency within culture.  If channeled into contests, the Dionysian may 
indirectly serve the purposes of culture in spite of itself. 
 
C. Unrestrained Dionysus – Unclipped Genius 
Let us now turn to the second case of imbalance – unrestrained Dionysianism – in 
order to more fully understand the nature and the stakes of this scenario.  While at first 
blush this might appear to be a liberating option for expression, unruly expressions are 
forced out of culture due to a lack of understanding on the part of the community.  
Although the notion of unrestrained Dionysianism seems to present the opportunity for 
creative revelry and freedom of expression, in actuality, its excessive nature constrains it 
in its own way.  Because it is anti-political, the Dionysian cannot find a place within 
                                                
274 Gambino, p. 424, emphasis in original.  The quotation is a reference to “Homer’s Contest” in The 
Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann.  New York: Vintage, 1954, p. 35. Agon are contests, 
competitions, or challenges of all kinds in art, culture, and athletics. 
275 Ibid., p. 425. 
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culture unless it is balanced with the Apollinian in the form of art.  As such, it must exit 
the polis because it cannot be comprehended within it.  In what follows, I explore the 
aesthetic implications of this silencing and relocation. 
Kant claims that the impetus to liberate genius from all constraint is sophomoric 
and misguided:  
[S]hallow minds believe that the best way to show that they are geniuses in first 
bloom is by renouncing all rules of academic constraint, believing that they will 
cut a better figure on the back of an ill-tempered than of a training-horse.  Genius 
can only provide rich material for products of fine art; processing this material 
and giving it form requires a talent that is academically trained, so that it may be 
used in a way that can stand the test of the power of judgment.276 
 
An analysis of Nietzsche shows that he is in accord with Kant on this point, because 
freeing genius (or freeing Dionysus) does not remove all the limitations presented by its 
challenging, unrestrained expression.  Even if the restrictions do not issue from within 
taste or culture, ingenious expressions will not be comprehensible within culture.  In 
other words, even if Dionysus is free to do what he pleases, he is still unable to fully 
express himself because of his anti-cultural tendencies.   
Let us return to the Nietzschean discussion of the amphitheater where tragedy 
occurs.  He comments that the spectators “overlook” the action of the tragedy due to the 
shape and design of the theater.  Nietzsche states, “A public of spectators as we know it 
was unknown to the Greeks:  in their theaters the terraced structure of concentric arcs 
made it possible for everybody to actually overlook the whole world of culture around 
him and to imagine, in absorbed contemplation, that he himself was a chorist.”277  As 
Walter Kaufmann observes, the term “übersehen” can be translated as both “survey” and 
                                                
276 Kant, §47, p. 178, 310, emphasis in original. 
277 Nietzsche, §8, p. 62-63, emphasis in original. 
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“ignore.”278  When artists and their works exit the amphitheater, polis, or culture, the 
“audience” redoubles its capacity to overlook them.  It becomes easier to ignore artistic 
expressions the farther removed they are from the center of culture.  Instead of fancying 
themselves as chorists who are part of the action, the audience of spectators see 
themselves as the arbiters of culture.  By refusing to acknowledge anything that pushes 
beyond boundaries as speaking to or for them, these protectors of culture prevent the 
inclusion of anything that could challenge their culture.  The ability to ignore artists and 
works does not usually raise ultimate questions of acceptance or rejection.  Even if they 
are looked on unfavorably, artists and works still remain part of their culture.  However, 
those that exit from culture altogether appear altogether unworthy of cognition and 
communication.  This effectively amounts to silencing through collective disregard. 
As I argued in Chapter Two, the ability to communicate about works of genius 
through judgments of taste is valuable to our social and cultural selves.  Even though 
conversing about works of genius presents difficulties, it is important that we try to 
communicate about them.  Through the process of attempting to express our aesthetic 
experience to others, we can refine our formulations and hone our communication skills.  
Thus, struggling to comprehend difficult works of art can help us grapple with and 
communicate about challenging art in the future.  Not only do these conversations serve a 
vital function with respect to the establishment of taste and culture, but also, and more 
importantly, they develop our civility and sociability.  They train us to recognize social 
otherness more generally. 
                                                
278 Ibid., §8, note # 6, p. 63.  The acts of overseeing and seeing over have very different connotations and 
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The ability to contemplate and communicate about works that exhibit unrestrained 
Dionysian tendencies would serve similar purposes insofar as they excite the cognitive 
faculties as well.  As we shall see in Chapter Four, communities that form around a 
shared aesthetic experience that is difficult to communicate about are not located at the 
center of culture, but instead, form cults or subcultures at the margins.  Even if works that 
reflect unrestrained Dionysianism cannot ultimately change the fate of art – because they 
are innovative but not exemplary – discussing them impacts our social selves, changes 
the social sphere, and potentially results in alternative sites of communication.  If 
communication about these artists and works is forced out of culture, other sites and 
modes of communication may need to be explored.  The result of such activity is the 
formation of cults and subcultures that may not be recognized as speaking in meaningful 
ways.  
 
D. Needcompany’s Dionysian Excess: A Case of Unclipped Wings 
In addition to being a play about the dynamics of family and power, at its core, 
King Lear is about (mis)communication and (mis)understanding.  It explores the impact 
of power on personal and political relationships, especially in situations involving 
misplaced trust and deception.  With Needcompany’s adaptation, Jan Lauwers delves into 
these themes by stretching the bounds of comprehensibility even for those who are 
familiar with the source material.  Needcompany’s King Lear279 uses dialogue in several 
languages, innovative supertitles, a staged script reading of parts of the play, and a 
representation of war that verges on out-and-out chaos.280  Needcompany’s production 
                                                
279 Henceforth, NKL. 
280 See Martha Tuck Rozett.  “Needcompany’s King Lear.” (review).  Shakespeare Bulletin 20 (3) 
(Summer 2002): 22-23.  See also Christel Stalpaert.  “Beauty as a Weapon Against the Unbearable Cruelty 
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multiplies and amplifies the layers of misunderstanding and miscommunication between 
characters that is already present in Shakespeare’s text and then transposes them into the 
relationship between work and audience.  I deal with each sort of miscommunication in 
turn.  Then, I discuss how NKL is a work of Dionysian excess, of unclipped genius that 
lacks taste.  Finally, I examine the reasons for Lauwers’s refusal to conform or be 
restrained by theatrical conventions.  I conclude by examining the extra-cultural force of 
Needcompany’s production. 
 
1. Language and Miscommunication 
In NKL, the characters often speak to one another in different languages including 
Dutch, French, Italian, and English.281  These linguistic differences embody distinct 
perspectives on the world that generate problems in understanding.  Most starkly, family 
members speak but fail to understand one another in spite of their genetic connection.  As 
Lauwers comments, “Shakespeare uses ambiguity as a basic idea: what you see is not 
what you see, what you hear is not what you hear.”282  Sometimes, characters merely 
miss each other’s meaning because of ambiguous speech.  But on other occasions, 
characters deliberately conceal their intentions and attempt to deceive others through the 
use of multiple languages.  
The paradigmatic case of miscommunication in King Lear is the lack of 
understanding between Cordelia and Lear.  While her two sisters go to great lengths to 
flatter their father in hopes of acquiring their inheritance – their share of his kingdom – 
                                                                                                                                            
of Being in Needcompany’s King Lear.” In No Beauty for Me There Where Human Life is Rare: On Jan 
Lauwers’ Work With Needcompany.  Trans. Gregory Ball.  Ghent, Belgium: Academia Press and 
International Theatre & Film Books, 2007. 
281 Erika Rundle.  “Images of Freedom.” Theater  33 (1) (2003): 59-71, p. 59. 
282 Stalpaert, p. 120 
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Cordelia says nothing.  In an aside after the obsequious speeches of Goneril and Regan, 
Cordelia says, “my love’s / More ponderous than my tongue.”283  Cordelia is unable to 
display the false deference of her sisters, so when she is asked by Lear what she can say 
to “draw a / Third more opulent than [her] sisters?,” Cordelia says, “Nothing, my lord.”284  
Even when the king informs her that “[n]othing will come of nothing,”285 Cordelia 
refuses to alter her speech to secure her inheritance or avoid Lear’s wrath.  Because she 
loves her father, Cordelia cannot flatter him and instead simply declares that she loves 
Lear in a way that her sisters do not.  In comparison to the operatic overtures of Goneril 
and Regan, Cordelia’s candid declarations seem meager and disrespectful.  Though 
Cordelia’s is the only true statement of filial piety, Lear is unable to recognize it because 
of his pride.   
In Shakespeare’s play, this miscommunication occurs within a single language.  
In Needcompany’s production, Lauwers makes it even more explicit by having Cordelia 
speak to Lear, who only speaks Dutch, in French.286  The linguistic shift makes their 
distance and lack of community even more palpable.  Lear disowns his daughter despite 
her love and honesty, but Cordelia manages to maintain her love for him in spite of his 
mistreatment of her.  Lear’s misplaced trust in people who are intent on deceiving him in 
conjunction with his lack of recognition of Cordelia’s filial piety lead to their failure to 
communicate.  Despite their genetic relationship, Lear and Cordelia do not share a 
common tongue or a common heart.  To use Jerome Kohn’s phrase, they do not live in a 
                                                
283 William Shakespeare.  King Lear.  Ed. George Ian Duthie and John Dover Wilson.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1968., Act I, Scene i, ll. 75-76. 
284 Ibid., Act I, scene i, ll. 85. 
285 Ibid., Act I, scene i, ll. 88. 
286 Rozett, p. 22. 
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“common world.”287  Indeed, in my recollection of NKL, Cordelia is the only character in 
the production to speak French.288  She shares a language with no one.  Lauwers thus 
distinguishes Cordelia not only from her father and sisters, but from everyone, suggesting 
the singularity of Cordelia’s moral compass and her unwavering loyalty to Lear.289 
Characters in this production misunderstand each other not only due to natural 
linguistic distance, but sometimes also due to deliberate linguistic distancing.  Characters 
conspire within a language that is not shared by a third party of interest.  For instance, 
Goneril and Albany scheme with each other in English in order to deceive Lear.290  This 
creates a sense of dramatic irony for an English-speaking audience that is able to listen in 
on their machinations and easily grasp their betrayal.  
In both cases discussed above, the problems of miscommunication are amplified 
through the lack of a shared language.  This is partially a playful meta-commentary on 
the rampant miscommunication at work throughout King Lear.  But in NKL, multiple 
languages are also used for practical and artistic reasons.  In an interview, Lauwers states, 
“It’s a bit arrogant, I think, to do Shakespeare in English without being a native speaker.  
Better to see a good actor perform in his own language than try to find his way in 
                                                
287 Jerome Kohn.  “Kant’s Common World.” Raritan 22 (3) (Winter 2003): 102-113. 
288 As Bruce Weber notes in his New York Times review, “[T]he play is presented in three languages, 
mostly Dutch and intermittent English, though Cordelia […] in particular, is partial to French.”  I attended 
an American version of the production at the Brooklyn Academy of Music in November, 2001.  Reviews 
corroborate the fact that Cordelia speaks in French, but I have been unable to find support for the 
singularity of her language.  It is possible that Cordelia and France both speak French, as would be 
suggested by both their relationship and his name, but I have been unable to find these specific details.  See 
Bruce Weber.  “When Shakespeare Could Use a Warning Label.”  (theater review)  The New York Times. 2 
November 2001. 
289 This is also supported by the expansion of Cordelia’s role in Needcompany’s King Lear.  As Rozett puts 
it, “The principal dancers – Cordelia, France, whose long tunic echoes Cordelia’s shift, and Oswald, played 
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dancing solo or in groups.  Cordelia is thus a much more prominent presence than in conventional 
performances of King Lear.”  See Rozett, p. 23. 
290 Ibid., p. 22. 
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English.”291  In addition to these considerations, Lauwers recognizes the effect that the 
multiplicity of languages will have upon American audiences who, for the most part, will 
be unfamiliar with them.  He takes this as an opportunity to put pressure on conventions 
and to push audience members out of their comfort zones.292  Bruce Weber’s New York 
Times review recognizes the challenges of the production and even goes so far as to 
suggest that NKL ought to come with a warning:  “[T]hose who harbor expectations of 
any theatrical conventions at all would do well to abandon them before buying a ticket, 
lest the deconstructionist vision of the director, Jan Lauwers, drive them to the exits 
prematurely.”293  As Martha Tuck Rozett notes in her review, many audience members 
actually left the Brooklyn Academy of Music before the production was over.294  
By utilizing supertitles on an LED screen above the stage as would be 
encountered at an opera in a foreign language, Lauwers redoubles the miscommunication 
effect occurring among the characters on stage and transposes it into the relationship 
between the work and the audience.  For, instead of translating the multiplicity of foreign 
languages or clarifying the dialogue by simplifying it, the supertitles preserve 
Shakespeare’s language to the fullest extent.  They present a quickly scrolling line of 
unaltered Early Modern English.  Some reviewers such as Rozett found this use of 
supertitles objectionable.  Her critique focuses on the added obscurity they generated.295  
Lauwers explains his use of supertitles both culturally and aesthetically: 
With American audiences there’s one dominant language.  American English is 
the language of the Western world.  In Belgium, we see foreign films in their 
                                                
291 Rundle, p. 62. 
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293 Weber, Arts Section. 
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original language.  I learned English by watching American movies subtitled in 
Dutch.  In France and Germany they’re dubbed.  I’m used to reading subtitles, but 
Americans aren’t.  Consequently, it’s easier for us to watch theater with subtitles 
because we are used to it.  It’s part of our culture.  Needcompany’s King Lear 
plays with that idea.296 
 
While I concede that Americans as a general rule do not possess as many tongues as do 
the Belgians,297 explaining away the difficulty presented by the supertitles as a matter of 
cultural differences is an oversimplification.  Even if not all American audiences are used 
to reading subtitles, there is certainly a portion that is used to this practice.298  However, 
even those who are used to reading subtitles may not be prepared for Elizabethan 
supertitles that move quickly.  Because of the complexity of Shakespeare’s language, it 
would be difficult to grapple with Shakespeare’s text even if it were moving at a slow 
speed.  Some spectators might not be able to follow the supertitles and pay attention to 
the stage action at the same time.  The confusion expressed by audience and critics alike 
suggests that unsimplified Shakespeare may function as yet another foreign language at 
play in the work. 
Rozett argues:  
Needcompany’s Lear preserves large chunks of Shakespeare’s language but 
expects the supertitles to do the work of communicating them to the audience.  
Lines are delivered at a frenetic pace, alternating with long, mostly silent dance 
interludes.  Ironically, too much of the text is left relatively unchanged, so that 
only a spectator very familiar with the play can follow continuously scrolling 
lines while watching the actors move around the acting space.299   
 
From Rozett’s perspective, what might normally constitute a strength of an adaptation – 
its faithfulness to the source material – is viewed as a weakness of Needcompany’s 
                                                
296 Rundle, p. 63. 
297 In an interview with Erika Rundle, Lauwers explains that in Belgium, people have to learn multiple 
languages out of necessity if they are to be understood outside of their small country.  See Rundle, p. 63. 
298 Perhaps the audience of the Brooklyn Academy of Music Next Wave series would have experience with 
subtitles and supertitles. 
299 Rozett, p. 22. 
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production.  In part, this is because she interprets the role of the supertitles to be solely 
communicative.  As Rozett frames the point, Lauwers “expects the supertitles to do the 
work of communicating [large chunks of Shakespeare] to the audience.”  If the supertitles 
summarized the action or translated it for ease of understanding, then their merely 
communicative role would be clear.  I agree that the supertitles are doing some heavy 
lifting in this production, but not merely on the side of communication.  Rather, the 
supertitles in Needcompany’s production play a dual (and self-contradictory) role.  While 
there is certainly a communicative dimension to the information conveyed via the LED 
screen, their excessiveness also inhibits the audience’s ability to grasp it and the action 
taking place on stage simultaneously.  Put more directly, the supertitles are both a vehicle 
for communication (enriching it) and against communication (obscuring it).  The 
supertitles “translate” the multiplicity of languages in use back into the Shakespearean 
original, but this does nothing to simplify the linguistic challenges posed by the 
production.  In fact, the excess presented makes our comprehension even more difficult.  
But this is part of the point.  The sheer excess of information obscures communication in 
this case.  Lauwers takes the thematic issue of miscommunication present in King Lear 
and transposes it from a problem among characters to one between the work and the 
audience. 
Lauwers’s peculiar use of supertitles is a provocation; it calls the audience to 
become actively engaged with the play and to explore meaning in a new way.  As 
Christel Stalpaert states, “In NKL, Lauwers triggers the audience to question the value of 
knowledge and ‘common sense’ in order to think creatively.”300  While the difficulties 
                                                
300 Stalpaert, p. 120. 
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and excesses in language in NKL are meant to confuse, they are also intended to spur the 
audience to respond creatively and to communicate their judgments of taste to one 
another.  Just as Lauwers takes the performance of the play to be a creative endeavor – 
one about invention rather than memorization and enactment on the part of the actors – so 
too, he treats reception as a site of creativity and engagement.301  He uses the difficulty, 
complexity, and excessiveness of the production as an invitation to the audience to 
actively participate and engage with the material and each other.302   
At times the excessiveness of NKL serves the purposes of communication as well.  
Lauwers uses supertitles to indicate lines that remain unspoken on stage or that cannot be 
heard over the din of the action.  As Marvin Carlson recalls of the beginning of the play: 
[T]he actor playing Gloucester sits downstage in a comfortable chair (as he does 
throughout the first four acts).  Kent stands beside him, but neither of them speaks 
their opening lines.  Instead they, like the audience, watch these opening lines 
which appear only as supertitles (complete with the character attribution of each 
line) above their heads.  To these projected lines they react with nudges and 
gestures.  Thus, from the opening moments, supertitles are established as a 
channel of communication separate from the voices of the actors…303  
 
Carlson distinguishes between the meanings conveyed by the actors and by the supertitles 
to show how the supertitles supplement, or even comment upon, the action on stage.  One 
might even say that this knowing or reflexive use of supertitles constitutes an additional 
level of communication altogether. 
                                                
301 Rundle, p. 64, p. 66-67.  As Lauwers puts it, “It’s not about perfection, it’s about invention.  As a 
performer, you have to produce every moment.”  
302 Katrien Vuylsteke Vanfeleteren.  “‘Art is Always Politics’: A Lacanian Reading of Lauwers’ 
Newsletters.”  In No Beauty for Me There Where Human Life Is Rare: On Jan Lauwers’ Theatre Work with 
Needcompany.  Christel Stalpaert, Frederik Le Roy, and Sigrid Bousset, eds.  Trans. Gregory Ball.  Ghent, 
Belgium: Academia Press and International Theatre & Film Books, p. 354. 
303 Marvin Carlson.  “Needcompany’s King Lear and the Semiotics of Supertitles.”  In No Beauty for Me 
There Where Human Life Is Rare: On Jan Lauwers’ Theatre Work with Needcompany.  Christel Stalpaert, 
Frederik Le Roy, and Sigrid Bousset, eds.  Trans. Brigitte Auer. Ghent, Belgium: Academia Press and 
International Theatre & Film Books, p. 198. 
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Lauwers expands upon this aspect of supertitling by distinguishing between 
spoken word and written text, or what he refers to as word as image.  In an exchange with 
Rundle about the “material approach to language in Lear,”304 Lauwers says: 
When Lear says ‘kill,’ and then you read the word kill on the LED screen, they 
are totally different phenomena.  The word kill suddenly becomes an image.  In 
Belgium, we performed the play in Dutch, but we also put the Dutch translation 
on the LED screen, so you achieve that double effect.  I couldn’t do this in the 
States because it was too difficult for us to learn the play in English.305 
 
While there is a doubling at play between the dialogue and supertitles in the American 
production, it is different from the one in the Dutch production.  So is its effect.  
Linguistic differences aside, both versions of NKL show how miscommunication calls 
attention to language in different ways – as spoken word to be heard, textual word to be 
read, or an image to be seen.  Lauwers plays off the relationship among words, acts, and 
images as a series of confluences, collisions, and conflicts to explore how language 
eludes or exceeds us.  He investigates how language falls short of capturing excessive 
experience, even when language itself becomes profuse.  If one follows Lauwers’s sense 
of language as image, one can interpret the text of supertitles as the representation – the 
sign – of the excess that we cannot fully capture or comprehend.   
 
2. Reception of Needcompany’s King Lear:   
Unrestrained Dionysianism / Unclipped Genius 
 
The excessiveness of language in NKL causes difficulties in reception.  According 
to Stalpaert, “Lauwers […] uses what Erwin Jans calls a deliberate excess of language, 
something that explodes in an indefinable amalgam of sounds: ‘it seems as if language is 
                                                
304 Rundle, p. 62. 
305 Ibid., p. 62, emphasis in original. 
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constantly pushed to the limits…language somehow becomes ‘disbanded.’”306  The 
excess of sounds from various sources makes it difficult to distinguish them from one 
another and to comprehend the aural and visual information conveyed via the supertitles 
simultaneously.  Jans expands upon this point:  
Language has always been a problematic means of communication in Lauwers’ 
plays.  Bound up with power and desire, language is both a deficiency and an 
excess.  The plays abound in people speaking in several languages at once, in 
translations from one language to another, and in actors who are constantly 
interrupting one another, often with shouts.  Language seems always to be 
running up against its own limits.307 
 
We may interpret the excessiveness of NKL in several ways, two of which are 
particularly relevant to its reception as a controversial work that is difficult to 
comprehend.  On the one hand, the excessiveness of NKL may be viewed as Dionysian 
without the balance of its Apollinian counterpart.  On the other hand, it may be viewed as 
a work of genius without taste.  The similarity of the Nietzschean and Kantian readings 
has already been discussed in the first part of this chapter.  Under each interpretation, I 
argue that a large portion of the audience was silenced by the work and did not try to 
work through its responses in community with others, but instead left the production 
before it was over.  I will detail each in turn and then discuss the relation between 
Lauwers’s resistance to limitation or restriction and the reception of NKL. 
 The Nietzschean interpretation of NKL as excessive Dionysianism is bolstered by 
the lack of Apollinian order, decorum, restraint, or lucidity.308  In the previous section, I 
                                                
306 Stalpaert, p. 123. In this excerpt, Stalpaert quotes an article by Erwin Jans.  “Restless Search in the 
Interspaces: Observation in the Work of Jan Lauwers.”  Carnet: Performing Arts in the Netherlands and 
Flanders.  14 (June 1997): p. 2. 
307 Erwin Jans.  “A Broken Community: On Needcompany.”  In No Beauty for Me There Where Human 
Life Is Rare: On Jan Lauwers’ Work With Needcompany.  Trans. Gregory Ball.  Ghent, Belgium: 
Academia Press and International Theatre & Film Books, 2007. 
308 Nietzsche, §1, §2, §9. 
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focused on problems in understanding based upon the saturation of supertitles.  The chaos 
of Act V manifests excess through disorder and unruliness.  This in turn affects 
communication and comprehension both onstage and off.  Stalpaert recalls the scene in 
this way: 
In Act V the storm scene and the final section coalesce into a chaotic, 
hallucinatory assault on the spectator’s senses.  There is no doubt about the 
condensation or saturation of signs here […] The auditory component bursts at the 
seams.  The actors who have no lines to speak wage war; they blow the sound of 
gun shots into the microphone, shriek chilling cries expressive of the fear of death, 
and produce an amalgam of sounds that pierce the audience to the marrow.  The 
actors who are speaking their lines do not use a microphone.  They try to raise 
their voices over the hail of auditory bullets, over the chaos and sensory violence.  
They reel off their lines fast and in a flurry, as if driven on by the saturated stage.  
In the end even the supertitling goes into overdrive.  The spectator’s experience is 
one of disorientation.  The solid narrative ground slips away from beneath our feet.  
We no longer know what to think or in what direction our thoughts should go.309 
 
With so much to look at, it is difficult for the audience to select a focal point among the 
multiple centers vying for their attention.310  In addition to overloading the spectator’s 
senses, the chaotic and hallucinatory scene impedes thought.  This situation parallels the 
Dionysian cultic ritual in which comprehensibility falls by the wayside and the spectator 
must give in to the experience without being able to gain any distance from it.311  
Apollinian reason and order seem to be completely absent from the production at this 
point.  This strains the spectator’s ability to comprehend the work – a point that is 
corroborated by numerous negative and dismissive reviews.312 
                                                
309 Stalpaert, p. 122-123. 
310 Rundle, p. 65. 
311 This is indicated by Nietzsche’s description of the Dionysian as ecstatic, intoxicated, and trying to 
throw down barriers and “impudent conventions.” See §1. 
312 I want to pause here to note that some critical articles were more favorable towards the production.  
These authors could be interpreted as a cult audience for whom complete comprehensibility is not the 
leading value.  Chaos and mystery are more tolerable for such individuals if the work is sufficiently thought 
provoking or intriguing.  Naturally, this is a smaller group who finds something compelling about the 
production and seeks to understand it together with others.  So, in spite of the anti-communicative aspects 
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 Lauwers seems to deliberately push comprehensibility to its limits in NKL.  While 
he surely seeks an audience, Lauwers seems uninterested in its size.  He certainly does 
not want a large audience if it means he must restrict his vision.313  This leads to the 
Kantian interpretation of him as a genius who refuses the restrictions of taste or 
convention.  While Lauwers may be attempting to “set the rule to art” through his 
boundary pushing, without taste to temper his productions, the ideas will not be 
comprehensible to audience members.314  The lack of restrictions does not lead to 
increasingly interesting and innovative contributions to art and culture, but to stresses on 
comprehensibility.  As Kant frames the point, genius needs taste to make its ideas 
universal, lasting, and fit for an ever-advancing culture.315  Instead, because NKL is an 
unrestricted and unbalanced production, it falls outside of culture.  This point also relates 
back to the Nietzschean notion of culture overlooking the incomprehensible.  In this case, 
Lauwers’ resistance to restriction pushes the spectator out of the theater through 
aggressive disregard for her reception.  
Some might interpret the layers of obfuscation in NKL as a willful rejection of the 
audience; the complexity and obscurity could be viewed as an attempt to block 
understanding of the work in a deliberate fashion.  Rozett expresses a version of this 
scornful interpretation at the end of her review of the production:  “A two-and-a-half hour 
King Lear with no intermission and long, silent interludes can test the endurance of even 
BAM’s sophisticated ‘New Wave Series’ audience members, many of whom left before 
the play ended […] Lauwers’ ‘performance work’ fails to make a coherent statement 
                                                                                                                                            
of such productions, cults can form around works of art that do not have a wide appeal – or that do not 
seem to invite community building at all.  I will expand upon this issue in greater detail in Chapter Four. 
313 Rundle, p. 71 and Vanfleteren, p. 354. 
314 Kant, §46-§50.  
315 Kant, §50. 
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about the text it appropriates.”316  Rozett somewhat snarkily suggests that if sophisticated 
New York audiences don’t understand the production and walk out midway through it, 
then the production is “incoherent” or nonsensical.  She concludes that the evidence that 
the work does not “work,” is the audience’s reaction to it.  Put differently, Rozett takes 
the New York audience to be the arbiters of normative taste.  
Lauwers is more interested, however, in reexamining and subverting conventions 
than in obeying them.  As such, we might say he is trying to set the new rule to art, as 
would a Kantian genius.  In this case, Lauwers’s work is not tempered by taste; its wings 
are not clipped.  He refuses restrictions that would make the production more accessible 
to and comprehensible by the audience.  One explanation for this resistance to convention 
and restriction is his investment in the preservation of artistic freedom.  He is wary about 
regulations or restrictions that stem from cultural or conventional sources, especially if 
they are connected to governmental purse strings.317   
I wanted to preserve my freedom.  I thought funding was a trap.  By the time I 
received my first government support I had already been working in theater for 
eight years.  And then I received funding, but not a lot […] I’m proud that I used 
that system, but what I’m most proud of after twenty-five years of being an artist 
is that I haven’t been recuperated into the mainstream.  They didn’t get me.  I’m 
still on the fringe.  Yes, I play at the fantastic Harvey Theater at BAM, and I play 
at the Théâtre de la Ville in Paris, but I’m not an official star director.  Normally, 
at forty-five, you do big operatic productions […] But I still have a very small 
company and we’re still doing our own thing.  I want to keep my own freedom.  I 
never want to become a businessman.318  
 
Not only does Lauwers view his fringe status as a badge of honor, but also as a guarantor 
of his freedom as an artist.  In Lauwers’s mind, as long as he remains an outsider, he will 
                                                
316 Rozett, p. 23. 
317 See Clement Greenberg’s “Avant-Garde and Kitsch” for an in depth analysis of the relationship of the 
avant-garde to culture and commerce.   
318 Rundle, p. 71, emphasis in original. 
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not be compelled to conform to the tastes of culture or government.319  Therefore, he will 
be able to produce art as he conceives of it and in his own way, unconventional though it 
may be.  As Lauwers puts it, “Art is not a form of leisure activity but a form of freedom 
[…] Freedom is a notion that inspires us with increasing fear.  And that should not be the 
case.”320  Lauwers refuses restrictions that would compromise his vision of a production 
in order to preserve his freedom as an artist.   
The lack of conformity to accepted rules of taste is especially important in 
deciphering the reception of NKL.  Most audience members didn’t fully articulate what 
bothered them about the production, namely, its excessiveness, its indulgence, and its 
lack of taste.  To return to Weber’s formulation, audience members ought to abandon all 
hope for theatrical conventions at this production.  Audience expectations were thwarted 
by the excessiveness of NKL.321  So, while taste isn’t actively restricting Lauwers’s works 
by clipping their wings, his expression in NKL is equally as limited because it is equally 
incomprehensible within culture.  While works of unrestrained genius are free, they are 
not, strictly speaking, free to be part of culture.  A lack of wing clipping serves as its own 
form of restriction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
319 In the introduction to No Beauty for Me There Where Human Life is Rare, the editors refer to Jan 
Lauwers as the “pre-eminent outsider.”  See p. 25. 
320 Jan Lauwers, September 2002 Needcompany Newsletter.  Katrien Vuylsteke Vanfleteren quotes this in 
her article “Art is Always Politics,” p. 354. 
321 Stalpaert, p. 123. 
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III. 
 
The Avant-Garde as Moderate Wing Clipping: 
Bürger and Duchamp 
 
A. Introduction 
As seen in section II, a lack of wing clipping did not produce the liberating effects 
one might have anticipated.  Instead of being restrained by the force of taste, genius’s 
tendency to produce innovative nonsense limits it in its own way.  There is, however, a 
second way to interpret Kant’s notion of taste clipping the wings of genius: moderately.  
In order to examine the notion of moderate wing clipping, I will turn to the reception and 
treatment of the modernist avant-garde.  Like Lauwers, the artists of this movement 
presented works and ideas that challenged conventions of medium and style.  From Dada 
and Surrealism to the Lettrists and Situationists and on to more contemporary examples, 
the avant-garde has historically pushed the boundaries of comprehensibility and 
expanded them in the process.  But this expansion and inclusion should not be taken for 
granted.  In fact, some of these groups and styles were extremely controversial at the time 
of their emergence; the history of their reception includes moments of marginalization by 
culture.  These, I shall argue, are instances of moderate wing clipping. 
In the next two sections, I aim to show how the challenge to comprehension that 
Nude Descending a Staircase (No. 2) and Fountain posed is essential to the expansion of 
the artworld that these works made possible.  Avant-garde artworks, as part of the leading 
edge of expression, communicate something different than what came before them and 
demand that we find a way to understand and respond to them.  Fulfilling this demand 
requires that we engage with one another even if such conversations are difficult.  This 
expansion of expression – in both art and language – is in jeopardy if such works are 
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marginalized.  Their exclusion, if even for a short period of time, threatens the expansion 
of our expressive abilities and thereby silences us.   
With these thoughts in mind, let us turn to the avant-garde as a target for moderate 
wing clipping.  In the sections that follow, I trace out the avant-garde goals of integration 
of art into the praxis of life, the reconceptualization of the “work” of art, the availability 
of past styles as “material,” and the recontextualization of fragments into new contexts, 
themes drawn from considering the critical work of Peter Bürger and the art of Marcel 
Duchamp.  While Bürger ultimately treats these innovations as negative developments 
that jeopardize the unity and integrity of the work of art and lead to the failure of the 
avant-garde, I argue that his argumentation reveals a theoretical wing clipping that 
mirrors the exclusions that Duchamp endured in the artworld.  In particular, Bürger and I 
differ in terms of whether the avant-garde achieved the goal of integrating art into the 
praxis of life.  Bürger marks this as a failure of the movement because art as institution is 
neatly separated off from life for him.  He thereby misses the potential for boundary 
pushing that occurs along the edges of art and life that is of particular interest to my 
investigation.  The very act of fragmentation that Bürger objects to provides an 
opportunity for the reorganization of the relationship of art and life.  In section IV, I 
examine how Duchamp’s work, particularly his readymades, expanded the conception of 
the work of art, transformed art making, and reorganized the relationship of art and life, 
thereby altering the trajectory of art in significant ways. 
 
B. Bürger’s Avant-Garde 
The avant-garde is the advance guard or leading edge of expression.  It presses the 
current boundaries of thought and communication in the artworld and pushes them 
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forward.  Through the transformation of old modes or the addition of new modes of 
expression, avant-garde art challenges the status quo of aesthetic expression.  This 
innovation produces art that allows us to see or hear differently from how we did before.  
According to Bürger in Theory of the Avant-Garde, this movement held the potential for 
radical change both aesthetically and politically.  In fact, the integration of art into the 
praxis of life was often articulated as an explicit goal of the movement. According to 
Bürger, this goal was never fully actualized.  As a result, in this respect he classifies the 
avant-garde as a “failure.”322  In section IV below, I explicitly address this claim in 
relation to the life and work of Marcel Duchamp.  
Bürger’s account of this movement becomes more complex when he explores the 
effect that the avant-garde had upon the notion of the “work of art.”  He states, “Although 
the political intentions of the avant-garde movements (reorganization of the praxis of life 
through art) were never realized, their impact in the realm of art can hardly be 
overestimated.  Here the avant-garde does indeed have a revolutionary effect, especially 
because it destroys the traditional concept of the organic work of art and replaces it with 
another…”323  Avant-garde works, manifestations, and happenings reoriented and altered 
the relationship of art and spectator in significant ways – particularly by opening up the 
conception of art to more possibilities.  In Marcel Duchamp: Critical Lives, Caroline 
Cros claims that Duchamp’s art exemplifies the revolutionary reinterpretation of the work 
that had the potential to reorient such relationships.324  Elsewhere in this work, Cros 
                                                
322 See Peter Bürger.  Theory of the Avant-Garde.  Trans.  Michael Shaw.  Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1974., p. 57. 
323 Ibid., p. 59. 
324 Caroline Cros.  Marcel Duchamp: Critical Lives.  Trans. Vivian Rehberg.  London, UK: Reaktion 
Books, Ltd., 2006, p. 57.  
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refers to the readymade as a “revolution in thought.”325  Although Bürger recognizes the 
revolutionary effect of the avant-garde in this epistemological sense, he simultaneously 
argues that the movement failed to achieve its political goals in practice. 
According to Bürger, the radical goals of integrating art into the praxis of life and 
problematizing the work-status of art meant that avant-garde art was met by “shock” in 
its audience.  The defamiliarization and recombination of materials and techniques 
altered the relationship between audience and work.326  Avant-garde artists reconsidered 
the relationships of elements within the work and produced new audience reactions.327  
As I will go on to argue in section IV in accord with Cros, Duchamp’s challenging 
explorations of medium and alternative exhibition practices defamiliarized the aesthetic 
experience for many; these subversive explorations played a role in the troublesome 
reception and exclusion of some of his works.  Arguably, these avant-garde innovations 
led to their wing clipping for the sake of culture, an idea that even Bürger would agree 
with. 
The repositioning or recombination of materials undertaken by the avant-garde 
was made possible by access to all the historical styles and means of production.  
According to Bürger, these styles and modes of expression became the material for 
reexamining or rethinking expression: “For it is in the historical avant-garde movements 
that the totality of artistic means becomes available as means.  Up to this period in the 
development of art, the use of artistic means had been limited by the period style, an 
                                                
325 I will return to this point in section IV. 
326 As we shall see in the next section of argument, Duchamp’s questions about medium and alternative 
exhibition practices defamiliarized the aesthetic experience for many. 
327 Bürger comments that shock and defamiliarization are connected to one another in the historical avant-
garde.  As Bürger states, “What is claimed is no more than a connection – though a necessary one – 
between the principle of shock in avant-gardiste art and the recognition that defamiliarization is a category 
of general validity.” (p. 18) 
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already existing canon of permissible procedures, an infringement of which was 
acceptable only within certain bounds.”328  Bürger characterizes the avant-gardes as being 
able to utilize all materials and styles that had been set forth historically.  As Arthur 
Danto puts the point in “Three Decades After the End of Art,” “No art is any longer 
historically mandated as against any other art.  Nothing is any more true as art than 
anything else.”329  Styles are combined, juxtaposed in collage or montage, or played off 
against each other to create something new.  The traditional boundaries of style and 
technique are thwarted, thrown aside, or demolished altogether.  This is one source of the 
shock effect Bürger associates with avant-garde art.  Duchamp chose and combined a 
variety of materials and everyday objects in his collage and readymade projects.  The 
same shock effect that Bürger refers to above may account for the controversies 
surrounding Duchamp’s innovative projects.  With his readymades, the artist was 
challenging traditional style and technique and making a new kind of art that obeyed new 
rules of expression. 
 Bürger goes on to claim that avant-garde art has no style of its own.  Instead, its 
style is constituted by the challenge it poses to the historical tradition and the concept of 
the work of art.  Bürger states, “It is […] a distinguishing feature of the historical avant-
garde movements that they did not develop a style.  What did happen is that these 
movements liquidated the possibility of a period style when they raised to a principle the 
availability of the artistic means of past periods.  Not until there is universal availability 
                                                
328 Ibid., p. 18. 
329 Arthur Danto.  “Three Decades After the End of Art.”  After the End of Art: Contemporary Art and the 
Pale of History.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997., p. 27. 
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does the category of artistic means become a general one.”330  The universal availability 
of material allows for the exploration and combination of a multiplicity of styles, but for 
Bürger this pluralistic approach cannot solidify into a style of its own.331  Instead, he 
claims that the avant-garde is characterized by the treatment of past styles as material, or 
as “dead fragments,” and by the shock effect that is produced by the combination or 
juxtaposition of unlike styles.  Even if the avant-garde is not characterized by a single 
style, the innovative use of material and the exploration of new modes of art making 
unites the various artists and works under this heading. 
 Bürger’s argument echoes the Hegelian notion of the “end of art.”  In his lectures 
on aesthetics, Hegel claims that “art, considered in its highest vocation, is and remains for 
us a thing of the past.  Thereby it has lost for us genuine truth and life, and has rather 
been transferred into our ideas instead of maintaining its earlier necessity in reality and 
occupying its higher place.”332  Bürger’s discussion of using dead fragments as the 
material for new art as well as for art’s increasingly conceptual direction is in line with 
this Hegelian argument.  This accords with the ascending movement of spirit from 
religion to art to philosophy.  When art no longer serves its highest purpose, we must turn 
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one direction is as good as another direction, there is no concept of direction any longer to apply.”  See 
Arthur Danto.  “The End of Art.” The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art.  New York: Columbia 
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Expressionist next week, or a Pop artist, or a realist, without feeling that you have given up something.”  
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332 G. W. F. Hegel.  Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art.  Trans.  T. M. Knox.  Oxford: Oxford University 
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to the philosophy of art for greater understanding and self-consciousness.  As Hegel puts 
the point in the same passage, “The philosophy of art is therefore a greater need in our 
day than it was in days when art by itself as art yielded full satisfaction.  Art invites us to 
intellectual consideration, and that not for the purpose of creating art again, but for 
knowing philosophically what art is.”333  Many avant-garde artists posed the question, 
“what is art?” rather explicitly, including Duchamp.  He reconceptualized the work of art 
by exploring new modes of art making and new avenues of exhibition, as we shall see in 
the next section of argument.  For Bürger, such questioning and exploration isn’t the only 
subversive aspect of the avant-garde.  In the next section of argument I turn to the notion 
of fragmentation in order to explore its impact upon the unity of the work of art.  
 
C. “Dead” Fragments and the Limits of Work:   
A Critique of Bürger’s Theoretical Wing Clipping 
 
Bürger asserts that the avant-garde as a movement served to problematize the 
notion of the work of art by subverting its traditional conception (“defined as a unity of 
the universal and the particular”334) and thereby expanding the category itself.  Some 
examples of the avant-garde challenge to the “work” include Dadaist manifestations and 
Marcel Duchamp’s readymades; the former often utilized shock tactics or chance in order 
to challenge preconceived notions of art, while the latter engaged the category of “work 
of art” in a theoretical manner and thus called settled notions of work and medium into 
question.  In the case of Fountain, Duchamp questioned notions of originality, genius, 
medium, taste, and the role of institution in the artworld.  Along the way, these 
controversial avant-garde works also encountered resistance, marginalization, or 
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censorship – what I have been referring to as “wing clipping” throughout this chapter.  
Specifically, Bürger’s treatment of nonorganic art’s challenge to and expansion of the 
conception of the work shows moderate wing clipping in action.  While Bürger 
recognizes the way in which avant-gardes enrich, broaden, challenge, and subvert the 
category of the work of art, he still maintains a relatively narrow conception of the work, 
as did some critics and audiences in response to these movements.   
As a dialectical starting point, Bürger begins with a sense of organic art that relies 
upon the concept of work and the unity intrinsic to it.  He argues that an organic work 
requires an unmediated relationship of parts to whole.335  The nonorganic work, by 
contrast, is marked by the mediation of that unity.  The organic work “intends the 
impression of wholeness”336 and life, while the nonorganic work has no cohesive unity of 
parts to whole or interdependency of its parts.  Instead, the nonorganic work “proclaims 
itself an artificial construct, an artifact” made up of fragments selected by the artist.337  
Insofar as Bürger holds fast to the organic / nonorganic distinction, favoring the 
traditional notion of the unified work, he devalues contributions of the avant-gardes that 
utilize fragmentation as a way to rethink the notion of the work of art.   
As aforementioned, the organic work is characterized by unity of parts to whole 
and the appearance of life in the production.  Works of montage or collage, however, 
have a different approach to unity that is imparted by the artist.  For Bürger, this requires 
selecting and “killing of the life” of the reality fragments that will compose the work.  I 
argue that Bürger draws this negative conclusion prematurely.  With it, he clips 
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nonorganic works’ wings in order to preserve tradition and current taste rather than for an 
explicitly well-considered aesthetic reason such as a defect in form, content, or execution.  
Fragmentation and recombination do not require “killing” material in order to use it in 
new ways.  Rather, the life of the material is essential to the reconsideration of the work 
of art that Bürger himself recognizes as crucial to avant-garde movements.  I will return 
to this point momentarily. 
Bürger goes on to develop his own more sophisticated notions of the organic and 
nonorganic work of art via an examination and critique of Adorno’s notion of the “new” 
in Aesthetic Theory; considerations about Dada and chance; a discussion of montage; and 
especially, the investigation of Benjamin’s concept of allegory.338  Bürger’s reliance upon 
Benjamin’s notion of allegory critically informs the development of his own organic / 
nonorganic distinction.  While Benjamin’s concept of allegory refers to Baroque art, 
Bürger points out that “[perhaps] it is only in the avant-gardiste work that it finds its 
adequate object.  Differently formulated, we may say that it was Benjamin’s experience 
in dealing with works of the avant-garde that made possible both the development of the 
category and its application to the Baroque, and not the other way around.”339  In this way, 
Bürger draws together Benjamin’s notion of allegory and his own notion of the avant-
garde nonorganic work of art.  Based on the supposition that the creation of an allegory 
and of a nonorganic work of art require the act of fragmentation and reconstitution, 
Bürger claims that both sorts of art are composite.  Moreover, in each case, the “posited 
meaning […] does not derive from the original context of the fragments;”340 it stems from 
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the act of the allegorist or artist in question.  Bürger utilizes Benjamin’s language of 
isolation and deprivation when referring to the fragment and it is precisely at this point 
that Bürger’s account becomes problematic.341  
The language of violence, deprivation, and isolation suggest that Bürger does not 
view fragmentation as a means of art making in a fully positive light.  Whereas the 
organic artist treats material as a whole in order to create a unified work of art, the avant-
gardiste begins by destroying unity through fragmentation, according to Bürger.  
Moreover, because his notion of fragmentation implies “killing the life” of material, the 
avant-gardiste first destroys unity and life and then proceeds to reimpose a kind of unity 
through the recombination of fragments.342  He states: 
Artists who produce an organic work (in what follows, we shall refer to them as 
‘classicists’ without meaning to introduce a specific concept of what the classical 
work may be) treat their material as something living.  They respect its 
significance as something that has grown from concrete life situations.  For avant-
gardistes, on the other hand, material is just that, material.  Their activity initially 
consists in nothing other than in killing the ‘life’ of the material, that is, in tearing 
it out of its functional context that gives it meaning.  Whereas the classicist 
recognizes and respects in the material the carrier of meaning, the avant-gardiste 
sees only the empty sign, to which only they can impart significance.  The 
classicist correspondingly treats the material as a whole, whereas the avant-
gardiste tears it out of the life totality, isolates it, and turns it into a fragment.343   
 
Following Benjamin, Bürger claims that a work composed holistically – where the parts 
“hang together” in an integral way – is organic.  A work constructed from isolate 
fragments torn from their original contexts and then combined with other fragments lacks 
this unity and is therefore nonorganic.  The fragments are divorced from their former 
function, context, and life, and for Bürger, this means the composite lacks an 
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interdependency of parts to whole.  He argues that the “organic work of art is constructed 
according to the syntagmatic pattern; individual parts and the whole form a dialectical 
unity […] the parts can be understood through the whole, the whole only through the 
parts.”344  The nonorganic work, he asserts, rejects this relationship and therefore, its 
“parts lack necessity.”345  In the above passage,346 Bürger’s language suggests that the 
organic artist respects her material as the carrier of meaning and treats it with care.  The 
nonorganic artist savagely rips and rearranges it as merely lifeless material to be modified 
for her own purposes.  Bürger’s notion of the nonorganic work is subject to criticism 
because the act of fragmentation does not necessitate the sense of isolation, deprivation, 
violence, or coldness that he receives from Benjamin.   
What is particularly compelling and insightful about Bürger’s account is his 
emphasis on the idea of the original “functional context” in relation to fragmentation in 
nonorganic art.  In order to thoroughly examine or understand a work of art comprised 
(even if only partially) from fragments, it is crucial to recognize the fact that such 
fragments have an original functional context from which they derive meaning.  
Arguably, it is the separation of the fragment from its original functional context that is 
the source of the “shock effect” Bürger associates with avant-garde art.  But this means 
that tearing the fragment from its original context may not actually kill its life.347  I will 
return to this point momentarily.   
Bürger presents the activity of the avant-garde artist in stark and even somewhat 
vicious terms.  According to Bürger, the artist views material as that which can be taken 
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up, manipulated, and given new meaning through the process of fragmentation and 
recontextualization.  As aforementioned, he refers to this activity as “nothing other than 
killing the ‘life’ of the material, that is, in tearing it out of its functional context that gives 
it meaning”348 and in the reinscription of a new meaning by the creative activity of the 
artist in question.  As he puts it, “the avant-gardistes see only the empty sign, to which 
only they can impart significance.”349  In other words, the artist strips the fragment of its 
significance and gives it a new context and a new meaning.  While tearing fragments out 
of their original functional context and the act of imparting new meaning in a different 
context makes sense, it is unclear whether such acts “kill the life” of the material, or 
whether the life of the material can ever be fully “killed.”  If the avant-gardiste work aims 
at shock and disruption, as Bürger suggests, it is important to consider how such shock 
generated and whether it has something to do with the life of fragments that have been 
recontextualized.   
If the repositioning of fragments gives rise to shock due to friction between the 
old meaning (material in its original functional context) and the new meaning (that 
material as transplanted into another context, and thereby given new meaning by the 
artist), then the life of the fragment has not been killed.  Alternatively, shock could arise 
from the relationship of fragments to one another within the work.  In either case, it 
seems that the fragment must maintain a modicum of its original meaning if such 
reactions occur.  While fragmentation and recontextualization is by no means the only 
source of shock in avant-garde art, it is a potential source of such reactions.  As such, an 
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inner tension exists in Bürger’s account if he insists upon the (wholesale) death of the 
fragment. 
Moreover, regarding fragmentation in cubist collage, Bürger states, “the reality 
fragments remain largely subordinate to the aesthetic composition, which seeks to create 
a balance of individual elements (volume, colors, etc.).”350  The subordinate status of the 
fragments stems from the assumed goal of creating a unified whole in the work of art.  
However, according to Bürger’s definitions, if avant-garde artists deliberately utilized 
“reality fragments,” their works could not meet this goal of natural seeming unity.  He 
states, “The insertion of reality fragments into the work of art fundamentally transforms 
that work.  The artist not only renounces shaping a whole, but gives the painting a 
different status, since parts of it no longer have the relationship to reality characteristic of 
the work of art.  They are no longer signs pointing to reality, they are reality.”351  In other 
words, the nonorganic work is composed, in part, from pieces of undigested reality.  Thus, 
such paintings cannot represent reality because they contain reality.  This could be 
another reason for Bürger’s resistance to the nonorganic work of art.  As shown above, 
when composed of reality fragments, he has difficulty considering the nonorganic work 
to be fully distinct from reality.  As such, Bürger also has difficulty considering it to be 
art.    
His negative treatment of the nonorganic work and fragmentation suggests a kind 
of theoretical wing clipping.  Due to the nonorganic work’s undigested reality fragments, 
these parts of the work are subordinate to the aesthetic composition.352  For Bürger, this 
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means the nonorganic work has no coherent unity.  The intermixture of reality fragments 
within a painting challenges the category of art, but such works do not themselves have 
work character for Bürger.353  Instead, he considers them to be “manifestations”:  “This is 
not to imply that the avant-gardistes produced no works whatever and replaced them by 
ephemeral events.  We will see that whereas they did not destroy it, the avant-gardistes 
profoundly modified the category of the work of art.”354  Bürger argues that avant-garde 
artists altered and expanded the category of work by producing works that were not 
themselves works of art.   
We might consider how Bürger’s treatment of nonorganic art relates to the 
rejection of Fountain from the Society of Independent Artists show.  As a result of 
marginalization, Duchamp sought out alternative modes of exhibition for his readymades 
as we shall see in the next section of argument.  Arguably, Bürger would treat 
readymades as nonorganic, or perhaps, as not works of art at all because of their status as 
reality fragments.  This treatment constitutes a form of theoretical wing clipping.  As we 
shall see in the next section, some audiences reacted to Duchamp’s readymades in the 
same way – either overlooking them or rejecting them.  
 
D. Conclusion 
To summarize, I have argued here that Bürger’s account of the avant-garde 
performs a theoretical wing clipping that parallels the exclusions from exhibitions, shows, 
and negative criticism that avant-garde artists received during their own time.  In the case 
of Duchamp, his work suffered under the burdens of tradition and taste because of his 
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decisions to reconsider the work of art, to use past styles as material for new works, and 
to recontextualize fragments into new contexts.  Because Duchamp’s work was so 
innovative and challenging to the tradition it came out of, critics and audiences alike 
marginalized and excluded it.   
The rejection of Nude Descending a Staircase (No. 2) and Fountain show how 
moderate wing clipping marginalized unconventional and innovative expressions and 
prevented them from having a maximal impact in their time.  These works eventually 
carved out a place within the artworld and changed the trajectory of art and art making.  
However, their initial exclusion raises concerns about restrictions on the expansion of 
expression – both linguistic and aesthetic.  Avant-garde art actively examines and 
reimagines life by generating new art and expression; therefore, it is in constant 
“dialogue” with our experiences of a changing world.  It is important to allow these 
artists the space to develop their work in order to engage with and reflect the environment 
around them.  Restrictions along the lines of the wing clipping we have been dealing with 
throughout this dissertation endanger such expression and its free exploration. 
In the next section of argument, I explicitly examine how Duchamp 
defamiliarized and challenged the conception of the work of art through considering 
“choosing” to be a sort of making, as well as through treating past styles and existing 
objects as “material” to be reimagined and recontextualized.  Each of these innovations, 
as outlined by Bürger in The Theory of the Avant-Garde, is related to the wing clipping 
that avant-garde art received.  As such, I explore how these factors impaired the reception 
of Duchamp’s work.  In addition, I argue contra Bürger that avant-garde movements were 
not a failure.  Rather, I suggest that Duchamp successfully integrated art into the praxis of 
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life through both the work he created and the life he lived.  Duchamp’s alternative 
exhibition sites that included liminal spaces like balconies, entrances to exhibitions, and 
even his own studio, combined art and life.  The way Duchamp made new space for 
himself in the artworld after his rejections profoundly impacted the trajectory of art 
making and what it means to be an artist.  As we shall see in the next section of argument, 
Duchamp is an example of an artist endowed with genius whose wings were clipped by 
taste.  
 
 
IV. Marcel Duchamp and the Case of Minimal Wing Clipping 
A. Introduction 
The next step in this investigation is to examine the implications of moderate 
wing clipping.  The concern set out at the beginning of the chapter remains:  Will wing 
clipping damage or endanger innovative and challenging expressions by pressing them to 
the margins?  Will these expressions be excluded because they are so different from the 
norm that they threaten to subvert it?  In order to address such questions here, I examine 
restrictions upon avant-garde expression, and in particular, upon the work of Marcel 
Duchamp.   
Today, Duchamp is known as much for his innovative contributions to art as for 
the scandals that his works caused in their time.  Some of his works were so controversial 
that they were rejected from exhibitions, most notably in Paris and New York.  Thierry 
de Duve details how Duchamp consciously courted controversy and instigated his own 
exclusion from juried shows.  He argues that the selection and submission of alternative 
works in line with current expectations and taste could have secured more exhibition 
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success for Duchamp, but instead of submitting works that were similar to his prior, more 
successful efforts or the aesthetic vogue of the day, Duchamp often deliberately chose 
works that were challenging and different.  When faced with the threat of exclusion, he 
could have altered his style or even the titles of works in order to gain acceptance more 
easily.  But as Duchamp claimed time and time again, particularly with reference to the 
readymade, making art is a matter of choosing.355  Duchamp wanted the freedom to make 
his own aesthetic choices rather than having ideas dictated to him by the artworld.   For 
this reason, Duchamp explored the use of alternative materials and unconventional modes 
of art making and refused to conform to the established rules of the artworld.  He did not 
change his mode of art making when faced with artworld restrictions and exclusions.  If 
anything, these pressures reinforced Duchamp’s instincts and re-entrenched his approach 
to aesthetics.  
Significantly, the notion that choosing could be considered a kind of creative 
making posed a threat to traditional conceptions of art production.  The radicality of this 
move is one of the sources of the troublesome reception that Duchamp’s works received 
at first – and why his wings were clipped by taste and culture.  It is important to note that 
not only did Fountain and Nude No. 2 return to the artworld in spite of their initial 
exclusions, but they also influenced and ultimately pushed it forward.  After being 
rejected from the artworld, these works carved out new space for themselves in it, and 
thereby made room for other challenging works and ideas in their wake.  We can trace 
out the impact of Duchamp’s innovations on the trajectory of art in variety of movements 
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including avant-garde, Pop, and mixed media art.356  Nonetheless, we can see that 
minimal wing changed Duchamp’s perspective on the artworld and made him reconsider 
his place within it and whether he truly wanted one.  He challenged norms and 
conventions with his work – questioning the institution of art and of taste with his 
reconsiderations of work and exhibition practices.  So while Duchamp continued making 
art, it was often done in secret, or exhibited in an alternative way.  I argue that Duchamp 
never fully felt at home in the artworld after these early rejections.357  As such, we must 
consider whether Duchamp would have made more art if he had gained more acceptance 
and comfort in this environment, that is, if his wings had not been clipped.  We might 
alternatively wonder whether this pressure spurred an increase in Duchamp’s creativity.  
In addition, we must consider how Duchamp’s art and life serve as a model for the 
integration of art into the praxis of life, contra Bürger’s claims regarding the failure of the 
avant-gardes to accomplish this goal. 
 
B. Duchamp’s Early Rejection: Nude Descending a Staircase (No. 2) 
 
Early in Duchamp’s career, he received a rejection that turned out to be formative 
for his approach to aesthetics.  In 1912, he submitted Nude Descending a Staircase No. 2 
to the Paris Indépendants show, genuinely expecting the painting to be “welcome in the 
cubist room.”358   Instead, it was considered indecent.  Even his brothers, artists Jacques 
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Villon and Raymond Duchamp-Villon, told him so.  Never before had a nude been 
depicted in this way: not only was the nude in motion, but it was also going down the 
stairs, creating several abstract knees in the process.  While these innovations might seem 
minor from a contemporary perspective, they were downright shocking to an early 20th 
century audience.  With this work, Duchamp tested the boundaries of nude paintings in 
relationship to cubism, and thereby reimagined and recontextualized this subject matter.  
Perhaps, as de Duve suggests, if Duchamp had changed the title, the work would have 
been more acceptable to the group – the nude figure might have been swallowed up into 
the work’s cubist abstraction.359  However, Duchamp had no intention of altering his 
work or in tempering its innovative and subversive nature. 
T.J. Demos describes the events in this way: 
What contributed to this crisis of the identity of artistic mediums was Duchamp’s 
experience in the spring of 1912 of the rejection of his Nude Descending a 
Staircase, No. 2 by the Salon des Indépendants.  The exhibition featured a display 
of cubist paintings by the Puteaux group led by Albert Gleizes and Jean 
Metzinger, which also included Duchamp’s brothers Jacques Villon and Raymond 
Duchamp-Villon, all of whom objected to Duchamp’s canvas on the grounds of 
its perceived inappropriateness according to the tacit rules of artistic discourse at 
the time – nudes do not walk down stairs, they explained.  Rather than submit to 
self-censorship when the organizers asked him to at least change the title (which 
itself points to the newfound significance of naming functions for the meaning of 
art at the time), Duchamp preferred simply to remove the work from the 
exhibition.360 
 
Altering the work went against Duchamp’s principles and artistic integrity.  Despite the 
fact that the painting exhibited a different approach to cubism, Duchamp felt that his 
work was consistent with and contributed to the fledgling movement.  He removed his 
painting from consideration rather than changing it in any way – “out of affection for his 
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brothers but also out of real bitterness” according to de Duve.361  In the face of possible 
censorship, Duchamp dug in his heels – or should I say, his knees – and withdrew his 
work. 
It is important to note before proceeding further that Duchamp had a great respect 
for history and tradition, but was nonetheless frustrated by the artworld of his time.  
Gloria Moure states: 
Duchamp grew up in a cultured family environment in which, through his 
mother’s influence, the plastic arts played an important part.  This somewhat 
rarefied atmosphere […] brought with it a respect for authentic tradition that was 
deeply rooted and afforded Marcel in particular – and the Duchamps as a family – 
a certain distance and circumspection that enabled him to survive unscathed the 
cultural oppression of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and to 
comprehend early on the true signs of his time.  Nevertheless, the real extent of 
that independent nature was not revealed until social and artistic conventions 
threatened the artist’s own creative capacity.  And it should be borne in mind, too, 
that during his youth a continued dissatisfaction with the prevailing approach to 
artistic creation – and by extension, to the whole of life itself – certainly induced 
him to go his own way […] Such notorious events as Duchamp’s works failing to 
find a place at the Salon des Indépendants in Paris played a considerable part, but 
they were by no means the principal cause of change, for his dissatisfaction went 
much deeper than mere resentment.362 
 
Duchamp’s impulse to thwart conventions was a sign of his independent nature, but by 
no means was a sign of contempt or disregard for history and tradition.  At times, his 
status as an iconoclastic figure in aesthetics obscures this point.  Duchamp’s innovative 
explorations and choices were executed with the aim of pushing art forward and 
expanding the aesthetic sphere, not merely for the sake of stirring up controversy or 
attracting attention to himself.  
Nude Descending a Staircase (No. 2) would not be the only exclusion in 
Duchamp’s career.  This rejection at the Paris Indépendants show shaped his approach to 
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exhibition and the artworld going forward.  In spite of the pressure to alter his works to 
be closer to the taste of the day, Duchamp forged ahead with his own vision of art and art 
making.  Because of his experience with rejection, it is probable that Duchamp submitted 
Fountain in the knowledge that it would be considered controversial.  “[B]y 1917, 
sincerity was no longer the issue: Duchamp knew he was putting the Indeps to a test 
when he fabricated an unknown self-proclaimed artist whose supposed expectations he 
expected to be betrayed.”363  By this point in his career, Duchamp was cannily aware of 
the way his submissions might be treated, so much so that he probably knew that 
Fountain would be excluded from the show.  According to de Duve, “the least we can say 
is that neither Fountain nor the Nude met the expectations of the two societies, 
respectively.  It’s not that the works were not on the level, they were an act of treason, 
and as such, they were rejected.”364  Through a series of proportions, de Duve comes to 
the conclusion that had Duchamp submitted Portrait of the Chess Players to the Paris 
Indépendants and The Chocolate Grinder to the New York Independents, respectively, 
expectations would have been fulfilled rather than betrayed.365  Duchamp would have 
gained more exhibition success with works that were deemed to be more in line with his 
prior efforts as well as with the prevailing taste of the day.  As we shall see, Duchamp 
showed little interest in conforming to the standards of taste. 
 
C. A Pattern of Behavior Emerges: The Rejection of Fountain  
 
 In 1917, under the pseudonym of Richard Mutt, Duchamp submitted a urinal to 
the Society of Independents for display in their upcoming exhibition.  With this act, he 
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problematized the notion of the work of art and reconceptualized it.  Along with the 
urinal, he submitted the requisite six-dollar fee that should have guaranteed its acceptance.  
In spite of the fact that the show was designed to include all submissions regardless of 
medium or quality, the work was rejected.  The committee refused to show the work 
alongside the others, and instead, displayed it behind a partition where no one could see 
it.366 
In order to better appreciate the implications of the exclusion of Fountain, it is 
important to understand the mission of the Society des Indépendants, the French parallel 
to the Society of Independent Artists:  “Ni récompense, ni jury,” or “No prizes, no jury.”  
In other words, all works that are submitted will be included within the show.  The New 
York Independents show proved to be quite inclusive; it exhibited 2,125 works by 1,235 
artists (414 women and 821 men).367  The inclusive notion of “no jury” has a deeper 
meaning when examined from the perspective of taste, however.  No jury = no judgment 
= no taste.  Suspending or withholding judgment about a work means refusing to 
compare it to others you have encountered before or to compare your judgment to that of 
other people.368  Such a lack of judgment eliminates the socio-normative dimension of 
taste from the equation.  Thus, works included in the show have not been judged and 
therefore are without taste.  Despite the guarantee of “independence,” or even 
“tastelessness” of the exhibition, Fountain was rejected, or more accurately, segregated 
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and displayed away from the rest of the works behind a partition and away from the eyes 
of the exhibition attendees.369 
It should be noted, however, that this was not the first time Duchamp submitted a 
readymade to an exhibition.  He actually displayed readymades in the “Exhibition of 
Modern Art” at the Bourgeois Galleries and in the “Four Muskateers Show” at the 
Montross Gallery that received no public notice.370  It is possible that the audience did not 
realize that these everyday objects were on display, let alone that they were works of art.  
According to Duchamp in a letter to Marcel Jean in 1952, he displayed readymades “in 
an umbrella stand at the entrance of the [Bourgeois Galleries] show.”371  This subtle 
integration of art into life, made possible by the choice of everyday objects that would 
blend in to the scene of the gallery, may account for the lack of public reaction to 
Duchamp’s early readymades.  Their incorporation was so complete that individuals were 
unable to recognize these objects as works of art; the distinction between art and life had 
collapsed.  Thus, readymades are both controversial and banal; either an audience 
perceives these works as a threat because of their integration of art and life or it does not 
perceive them to be art at all.   
As controversial as Fountain was to the Society of Independents, the work’s 
exclusion received little notice in 1917, and then it disappeared.  Duchamp resigned from 
the board of Independents and from his role on the hanging committee after the exclusion 
of Fountain, but his true role in the submission of this work and the ensuing scandal 
would remain secret for quite some time.  Even in his communication with his sister and 
                                                
369 De Duve, p. 98. 
370 Ibid., p. 102.  The list of readymades in these shows varies widely, and as such they are officially 
“unidentified.” 
371 Ibid, p. 102.  See footnote #22.  See also Marcel Duchamp: Letters to Marcel Jean.  Munich: Silke 
Schreiber Verlag, 1987, p.77. 
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confidante, Suzanne, Duchamp concealed his role by attributing the work to another artist.  
In one letter he states, “One of my female friends under a masculine pseudonym, Richard 
Mutt, sent in a porcelain urinal as a sculpture.”372  Duchamp felt that he could not 
comment upon Fountain’s absence from the show (publicly or privately) without 
signaling his role in the submission.  
An unsigned editorial in The Blind Man (number two),373 likely written by 
Duchamp, defends the work.  In “The Richard Mutt Case,” he states: 
They say any artist paying six dollars may exhibit.  Mr. Richard Mutt sent in a 
fountain.  Without discussion, this article disappeared and never was exhibited.  
What were the grounds for refusing Mr. Mutt’s fountain:  – 1. Some contended 
that it was immoral, vulgar.  2.  Others, it was plagiarism, a plain piece of 
plumbing.  […] Whether Mr. Mutt with his own hands made the fountain or not 
has no importance.  He CHOSE it.  He took an ordinary article of life, placed it so 
its useful significance disappeared under the new title and point of view – created 
a new thought for that object.374 
 
Not only does the author point out that the urinal is not vulgar – after all, it is just a piece 
of plumbing – but he also stresses the artist’s choice of the object.  These emphases 
accord with Duchamp’s descriptions of the readymade selection process and his notion of 
choosing as a kind of making.375   
                                                
372 Ibid., p. 104.  From Francis Naumann, ed.  “Affectuesement, Marcel: Ten Letters from Marcel 
Duchamp to Suzanne Duchamp and Jean Crotti,” Archives of American Art Journal 22 (4) (1982): 8. This 
is an interesting dodge, and a heavily guarded move for Duchamp to make with his closest sibling.  We 
might also note that by this time, Duchamp was already playing with pseudonyms of his own, including 
Rrose Sélavy.   
373 The Blind Man was a magazine co-edited by Duchamp, Henri-Pierre Roché, and Beatrice Wood.  In 
Volume Two, the magazine included a photograph of Fountain taken by Alfred Stieglitz and a response 
article by Louise Norton entitled, “Buddha of the Bathroom.”  A short editorial, often attributed to 
Duchamp, preceded this article. 
374 Anonymous.  “The Richard Mutt Case.”  The Blind Man (2).  Ed. Henri-Pierre Roché, Beatrice Wood, 
and Marcel Duchamp.  New York: Published by Henri-Pierre Roché. p. 5.  Because of the defense and the 
description of the readymade included in this introduction, it is often attributed to Duchamp.  In what 
follows, I will treat the passage as if Duchamp had written it. 
375 De Duve, p. 161-162 and Cabanne, p. 48, p. 54, and p. 55. 
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Duchamp was reimagining and problematizing traditional notions of the work of 
art and rethinking what it means to be an artist.  Both moves are related to the 
controversy that sprung up in relation to Fountain.  In Bürgerian terms, with this work, 
Duchamp removed the urinal from its functional context – the bathroom – and resituated 
it in the gallery.  With Fountain in it, we can imagine that the gallery became a bathroom, 
the urinal a work of art – an unexpected and controversial confluence, to be sure.  Bürger 
would suggest that the change of context – and the conflict between a urinal’s functional 
context and the gallery context – is one source of shock for the audience.376  According to 
Caroline Cros, through such decisive and challenging moves, Duchamp was:  
inventing another category of artwork, ‘works of art that are not art,’ from wholly 
functional everyday objects devoid of any apparent aesthetic qualities that he 
purchased in hardware stores or, sometimes, assembled with one or more of his 
closest friends.  The English word ‘ready-made’ suited Duchamp perfectly and he 
made it his own in 1915; he could think of no better name for these now infamous 
‘objects with inscriptions’ that have generated countless interpretations.377 
 
Readymades spurred a number of different responses and interpretations; the difficulty of 
categorizing them contributed to the shock effect associated with avant-garde art by 
Bürger.  This shock effect was limited to members of the hanging committee due to 
Fountain’s placement behind a partition during its first show.378  But even as audiences 
gained more access to it, the tension regarding the categorization and evaluation of 
Fountain remained. 
 Beatrice Wood, one of Duchamp’s co-editors of The Blind Man, provides an 
account of the discussion that took place among Independents board members about 
                                                
376 Duchamp’s design for The First Papers of Surrealism in 1942 shows his interest in disrupting 
exhibition space.  He installed Sixteen Miles of String, making it difficult to view the works and to move 
about the exhibition space easily.  Demos, p. 9 and p. 190. 
377 Cros, p. 54. 
378 De Duve, p. 98. 
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Fountain.  In some versions, she recalls it as a conversation between George Bellows and 
Walter Arensberg.  In others, Arensberg and Rockwell Kent:   
‘This is indecent!’ went on Kent flatly, with red face. 
‘That depends upon the point of view,’ said Walter gently. 
‘We cannot show it,’ went on Kent flatly, with red face. 
‘The entrance fee has been paid, we cannot refuse it,’ blandly added Walter. 
‘But it is gross, offensive.’ 
‘Only in the eye of the beholder.’ 
‘There is such a thing as decency, an end to how far a person can go.’ 
Walter said mildly, ‘But the purpose of this project is to accept anything an artist 
chooses.  It is in our bylaws.’ 
There was an ominous silence, then Kent exploded, ‘Do you mean that if a man 
chose to exhibit horse manure we would have to accept it!’ 
‘I’m afraid we would,’ answered Walter, with mock sorrow, slowly shaking his 
head suggesting that all was not as simple as it seemed… 
‘Someone has sent it as a joke,’ continued Kent in anger. 
‘Or a test,’ finished Walter patiently. 
The pristine oval white object on a black pedestal gleamed triumphantly.  It was a 
man’s urinal upside down.379 
 
Despite Arensberg’s protests, the work was segregated.  According to Louise Norton in 
“Buddha of the Bathroom,” the urinal challenged the committee and founding motto of 
the group:  “Like Mr. Mutt, many of us had quite an exorbitant notion of the 
independence of the Independents.  It was a sad surprise to learn of a Board of Censors 
sitting upon the ambiguous question, what is ART?”380   
Even if the Independents proved to be bound by the current standards of taste, and 
so were independent in name only, Duchamp was interested in questioning the definition 
of art and how far it extends.  As Gloria Moure puts the point, “The conventions that bore 
down on the sensibilities of Marcel Duchamp went beyond the superficial level of 
establishing social customs and cultural norms; they concerned the classification and 
interpretation of objects and phenomena, and consequently, the role played by art and by 
                                                
379 Ibid., p. 90-91.  The reflection is borrowed from Francis Naumann, ed. “I Shock Myself: Excerpts from 
the Autobiography of Beatrice Wood,” Arts Magazine 51 (9) (1977): 135-136. 
380 Louise Norton.  “Buddha of the Bathroom.” The Blind Man 2 (May 1917): 6. 
   154 
the artist in all this.”381  This unconventional bent is also reflected in Duchamp’s 1913 
work, The Green Box.  In it, he ponders, “Can one make works which are not works of 
art?”382  This question goes part of the way towards explaining his choice of everyday 
objects as works of art.  It also corresponds to Duchamp’s editorial defense of Fountain 
and of readymades generally.  
As Moure goes on to explain, the choice of readymades runs in both directions.  
You choose it just as it chooses you:   
Duchamp […] speak[s] of objects observed through a shop window, pointing out 
that the choice is a two-way one in the sense that the window also demands 
something from the viewer.  Nevertheless, the demands made by the object upon 
the creator–selector are not based on attraction – which depends on the latter’s 
taste – but on absolute indifference, on neutrality, in other words, on a complete 
absence of good or bad taste (aesthetics), or total ‘anaesthesia.’383   
 
According to Duchamp, choosing was as important as making.  In fact, choosing was 
making for Duchamp – a radical reorientation to and reconceptualization of the work of 
art.  In the case of the readymade, Duchamp argued that the object must not be 
considered to be beautiful or ugly.  “It’s very difficult to choose an object because at the 
end of fifteen days you begin to like it or hate it.  You have to approach something with 
indifference, as if you had no aesthetic emotion.  The choice of ready-mades is always 
based on visual indifference and, at the same time, on the total absence of good or bad 
                                                
381 Gloria Moure. Marcel Duchamp: Works, Writings, and Interviews.  Barcelona: Ediciones Polígrafa, 
2009., p. 6. 
382 Ibid., p. 63. 
383 Ibid., p. 63.  The notion of “anesthesia” as outlined here recalls the motto of the Independents – “no 
jury, no prizes.”  Moreover, I want to pause here to note that Duchamp, like Warhol, was interested in 
window displays.  Warhol used the window of Bonwit Teller for an exhibition space early in his career, 
before securing a show at a traditional gallery.  Duchamp took inspiration for his readymades from window 
displays; he encountered The Chocolate Grinder in a window in Rouen.  See Cabanne, p. 14. 
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taste.”384  Such indifference to established taste challenged and defied aesthetic norms.  
The selection of commonplace items subverted notions of medium, originality, and the 
institution of art. 
On the one hand, Duchamp claimed to have chosen his readymades indifferently, 
but on the other, he must have been aware of how a urinal would be received by an 
artworld that was not aesthetically indifferent.  For one thing, this was not the first 
rejection Duchamp had received from the artworld.385  Not everyone would be able to 
recognize Fountain as “just a piece of plumbing” and divorce it from its usual function 
and the repugnance associated with bodily functions and human waste.386  Nor for that 
matter, would many be able to see it as a work of art.  Cros states, “For Duchamp, the 
ready-made was above all a ‘rendez-vous,’ a fortuitous encounter with an object that he 
plucked from its habitual context and promoted to the status of an artwork.  It was not, 
strictly speaking, an idea, but a ‘revolution’ in the conception and the definition of the 
artwork.”387  This argument stresses how Duchamp recontextualized objects in order to 
problematize and expand the concept of art by questioning whether he could make works 
that were not works of art.  In this sense, Duchamp’s readymades were a provocation. 
It is my contention that Duchamp’s work was an assault on the current standards 
of taste.  He chose and submitted in the knowledge that his works would be controversial.  
Despite this insight, or perhaps because of it, Duchamp refused to modify his work or 
change his selections.  As Yve-Alain Bois frames the point:  “…with his R. Mutt, 
                                                
384 Cros, p. 55.  The quote stems from an interview with Pierre Cabanne.  See Cabanne, p. 48. 
385 See the discussion of the rejection of Nude Descending a Staircase No. 2 in the next stage of the 
argument. 
386 See Julia Kristeva’s Powers of Horror, for a fuller discussion of repugnance and abjection.   
387 Cros, p. 57.  The idea of placing objects in a new context in order to get individuals to see them in a 
new way links up with the Situationists’ notion of “détournement.”  See Sadie Plant’s The Most Radical 
Gesture: The Situationist International in a Postmodern Age.  New York: Routledge, 1992. 
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Duchamp would be pinpointing the tautological norm of exclusion on which the modern 
establishment is based.”388  Duchamp, in this case with Fountain, pressed the boundaries 
of art and institution for a show that was designed to be without jury or judgment.  By 
selecting a urinal, Duchamp consciously courted controversy and aimed to shock his 
audience.  He wanted to see how far the selection committee would be willing to go for 
the sake of their mission.  Having established the fact of Duchamp’s wing clipping, in the 
next section of argument, I examine the consequences of it for his aesthetics and 
exhibition practices.  
 
D. The Effects of Duchamp’s Wing Clipping: 
Playing at Giving Up Art, Alternative Exhibition Practices, and the Boîte-en-Valise 
 
Due to the exclusions outlined above, Duchamp didn’t feel fully at home in the 
artworld.  As Jindřich Chalupecky puts it, “[Duchamp] realized that there was no place 
for him in the contemporary art world.  He drew the appropriate conclusions.”389  
Although Chalupecky does not expand upon this thought, as I have argued above, 
Duchamp’s response to his heimatlos feeling was to make his own work on his own 
terms, crafting art that would challenge and ultimately expand the aesthetic sphere and 
the circle of what can be considered a work of art.  In order to do so, Duchamp needed to 
negotiate his discomfort and place within the artworld carefully.  For one thing, he rarely 
stayed in one place for very long.  He lived a nomadic life, often in exile, moving 
between France, New York, and Buenos Aires, and later crisscrossing America in order 
to collect information for the Boîte-en-Valise project.  He fled Paris during the German 
                                                
388 Benjamin Buchloh, Rosalind Krauss, Alexander Alberro, Thierry de Duve, Martha Buskirk, Yve-Alain 
Bois.  “Conceptual Art and the Reception of Duchamp.”  October 70 “The Duchamp Effect” (Autumn 
1994): 126-146., p. 136. 
389 Jindřich Chalupecky.  “Marcel Duchamp: A Re-Evaluation.”  Trans. Paul Wilson.  Artibus et Historiae 
6 (11) (1985): 125-136., p. 134. 
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occupation, keeping his general level of creativity intact all the while:  “In order to cross 
Nazi checkpoints without drawing attention to his infamous artistic identity, which might 
have put him at risk at a time when collaborationist Vichy France was purging its 
enemies of the state, he disguised himself as a cheese merchant and shuttled a large 
suitcase containing material for the Boîte.  Its portable structure seems to have anticipated 
such journeys.”390  Duchamp took care to fabricate an alibi for himself – including 
buying cheese and keeping track of his expenses – but he never had to answer any 
questions during border crossings.391  Although fleeing Europe during the war is the most 
extreme case of Duchamp’s expatriation, it exemplifies his state of homelessness in both 
nation and the artworld.  “[H]e had lived as a voluntary nomad for the majority of his 
adult life.  Embracing an internal mobility as much as an itinerant residency, he escaped 
the pressures of traditions and the limitations of place-bound cultural conventions.”392  
Duchamp’s feelings of discomfort with artists and the artworld freed him to explore 
working outside of the confines of tradition and allowed him not to be limited to or 
restricted by a single culture or its influences. 
As a result of these factors, Duchamp retreated from the artworld, and was 
rumored to have quit art making altogether in order to pursue chess playing.393  In truth, 
Duchamp never stopped working, even if he abandoned painting.  He experimented with 
                                                
390 Demos, p. 13. 
391 In Duchamp’s own words, “I had a friend, Gustave Candel, who was a wholesale cheese merchant in 
Les Halles, and I asked him if he could commission me to go and buy cheese for him in the unoccupied 
sector.  He gave me a letter, which I took to the German authorities, and with that letter and a bribe of 
twelve hundred francs I got from a secretary that famous little card, called an Ausweis, which allowed me 
to travel by train from Paris to Marseilles.  I thought I had to be very careful and buy cheese, and probably 
give an account of my expenses when I crossed the border between two zones, but the Germans never 
asked me any questions.”  See Demos, p. 13.  See also Calvin Tomkins’ Duchamp: A Biography.  New 
York: Holt, 1996, p. 323-324. 
392 Demos, p. 20. 
393 We might consider this to be yet another example of how Duchamp blurred the boundaries of art and 
life. 
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the notion of the work, explored alternative exhibition sites and practices, began a multi-
year retrospective project that would occupy him for years (Boîte-en-Valise), and often 
worked in secret (the Étant Donnés assemblage was not revealed until after his death).  
When asked about this change in practice by Pierre Cabanne, Duchamp reflected upon 
the discomfort he experienced in the artworld after Nude Descending a Staircase No. 2 
was rejected. 
Cabanne:  Before going into details we could tackle the key event in your life, that 
is, the fact that, after about twenty-five years of painting, you abruptly abandoned 
it.  I’d like you to explain that rupture. 
 
Duchamp:  It came from several things.  First, rubbing elbows with artists, the 
fact that one lives with artists, that one talks with artists, displeased me a lot.  
There was an incident, in 1912, which ‘gave me a turn,’ so to speak; when I 
brought the ‘Nude Descending a Staircase’ to the Indépendants, and they asked 
me to withdraw it before the opening.  In the most advanced group of the period, 
certain people had extraordinary qualms, a sort of fear!  People like Gleizes, who 
were, nevertheless extremely intelligent, found that this ‘Nude’ wasn’t in line 
with what they had predicted.  Cubism had lasted two or three years, and they 
already had an absolutely clear, dogmatic line on it, foreseeing everything that 
might happen.  I found that naïvely foolish.  So, that cooled me off so much that, 
as a reaction against such behavior coming from artists whom I had believed to be 
free, I got a job…394 
 
The exclusion was a disappointment on many levels.  Duchamp’s sense of homelessness 
can be traced, in part, to this event. 
 These rejections and the heimatlos feeling they created led Duchamp to explore 
alternative exhibition sites and practices.  He avoided traditional gallery shows, turning 
down many invitations, including those of the Dada Salon in 1920 and Walter 
Arensberg’s requests to exhibit work:   
Duchamp installed his work during this time in unlikely places – specifically, 
domestic sites and studio contexts in New York, and hotel balconies in Buenos 
Aires and Paris.  These are unusual display areas for sure, resistant to easy 
                                                
394 Cabanne, p. 17. 
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classification and clear definition, which is perhaps why Duchamp favored them.  
They suggest so many quotidian sites that would offer refuge from the structured 
zones of official order, dominated by specialized activities and conventional 
modes of reception, namely the art galleries and museums that Duchamp made 
every effort to avoid during the later part of the war.  It appears that the debacle 
surrounding the exhibition of the Fountain, as well as the early controversy 
prompted by his Nude Descending a Staircase, left him reluctant to exhibit his 
work in any formal environment for years to come.  On this Duchamp was 
suggestive, if evasive:  he was fond of explaining that the French verb ‘exposer’ 
was too close to ‘épouser’:  he wished to avoid ‘exhibition’ as much as ‘marriage’ 
during these years, each implying an unacceptable level of restriction.395 
 
Duchamp made the active decision not to exhibit on any terms but his own.  This meant 
that he rethought exhibition entirely.  He often selected spaces that indicated his interest 
in boundaries – balconies, entrances to exhibitions, and even his own studio.396  
Duchamp’s exhibition choices incorporated art into the praxis of life by enmeshing 
everyday locations and aesthetic experience. 
 Duchamp’s fondness for exhibiting his works in his studio, where he mixed the 
domestic aesthetic functions of the space, is an interesting case in point.  Regarding 
Trébuchet (Trap), a readymade hatrack, Duchamp said the following:  “It was on the 
floor and I kept walking into it.  It was making me crazy so I finally said: okay, if it is 
going to stay on the floor I will nail it there.”397  This playful approach to exhibition is 
central to Duchamp’s attitude.  Photographs included in Boîte-en-Valise show that he 
placed Fountain hanging above one of the doorways and Bicycle Wheel in a corner.398  
Consistently, Duchamp placed the readymades in ways that highlighted their change of 
                                                
395 Demos, p. 118. 
396 Duchamp specifically had a balcony or terrace in mind when he sent a gift to his newly married sister 
Suzanne and her husband Jean Crotti.  He called the work Unhappy Readymade.  He instructed the couple 
to hang a geometry book on their balcony – exposing it to wind and the elements, as well as any chance 
occurrences.  In his playful manner, Duchamp commented, “the wind had to go through the book, choose 
its own problems, turn and tear out the pages.”  See Demos, p. 115.  See Cabanne, p. 61.   
397 Cros, p. 58.  This quotation is from an unpublished interview with Sidney Janis, of the Carroll Janis 
Collection in New York. 
398 Demos, p. 119-120. 
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context and their newfound reusability.  One might say this move pointed out the 
readymades’ homelessness.  Duchamp’s desire to coinhabit space with these works also 
highlights his own feeling of homelessness in the artworld.   
Helen Molesworth comments on both the placement of the readymades in the 
studio and on Duchamp’s documentation of them: 
[W]e see the readymades installed, not on pedestals or in vitrines, but positioned 
(strategically, in a manner that evokes furniture and objets d’art) around an 
armchair – a coatrack nailed to the floor in front of a bicycle wheel atop a kitchen 
stool.  There is a photograph in the background of which we spy the urinal 
suspended from a doorjamb; in the foreground a shovel dangles from the ceiling.  
More photographs: a film-noirish one of the shadows cast by an off-kilter hat rack 
[…] That Duchamp thought enough of these photographs to include them in his 
retrospective Boîte en Valise (1941) and to color them, their sepia tones rendering 
them ‘historical,’ is not surprising.  During the initial ‘invention’ of readymades 
his studio was their major site of reception.399 
Through the “exhibition design” of his studio, Duchamp created an aesthetic atmosphere 
for himself and any guests he might have.  In this way, he blurred the boundaries between 
domestic, work, and display space.  In the process, Duchamp simultaneously blurred the 
public / private distinction.  Duchamp was not only molding his space into an aesthetic 
space for living.   He was also shaping himself in the process.  To borrow a Nietzschean 
phrase, Duchamp was making himself into a work of art and becoming himself in the 
process.400  In spite of his rejections, in other words, he was making himself comfortable 
with himself and his aesthetic tendencies.  Duchamp merged art and life on an everyday 
basis. 
                                                
399 Helen Molesworth.  “Work Avoidance: The Everyday Life of Marcel Duchamp’s Readymades.”  Art 
Journal 57 (4) (Winter 1998): 51-61, p. 51.  While I agree with Molesworth that the inclusion of these 
photographs of readymades is significant, their coloring may not carry the weight she suggests.  Duchamp 
handcolored all of the reproductions included in Boîte-en-Valise.  Their sepia hue could indicate a historical 
eye upon the works, but it does not single them out wholesale. 
400 See Friedrich Nietzsche.  The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs.  
Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1974, §270 and §290. 
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The placement of the readymades in his own studio and living space may have 
also served the function of keeping his works close to him.  As aforementioned, 
Duchamp’s works became part of collections all across the United States and ultimately, 
around the world.  Rejection, expatriating, and the scattering of his works had a startling 
effect upon Duchamp.  He thought more and more often about the collection of his works 
– and so the Boîte-en-Valise (Box in Valise) – project began.  More than just a traveling 
museum of his works, Boîte-en-Valise allowed Duchamp to preserve his personal and 
aesthetic identity.  Accuracy and faithfulness in the reproduction process was of 
paramount importance to Duchamp.  In order to ensure such fidelity, Duchamp traveled 
to see each of his works in order to refresh his memory and aid in the reproduction 
process.  The colors were so important to Duchamp that he hand-colored each 
photographic reproduction personally, returning the artist’s hand into the reproduction 
process.401  As Demos points out, the more scattered his works became, the harder 
Duchamp worked to regain them: 
The more something is lost, the more energy is expended in its recapture.  What 
results is an obsessive series of replications, a fetishistic multiplication seemingly 
without end, evident in the decades-long Boîte project as a whole, which, in its 
totality, amounts to an edition of 300 boxes with more than 22,000 reproductions 
in all.  The point is that La boîte-en-valise was poised to both satisfy memory as 
well as to announce the cyclical pursuit of its impossible reconstitution.402 
 
Duchamp’s response to the threat of the dissolution and scattering of his works was to 
create a traveling museum of his oeuvre – that way, he would have an ongoing exhibition 
                                                
401 Demos, p. 49.  Demos elaborates upon the process further:  “For the coloring of the Boîte’s 
reproductions Duchamp employed the pochoir technique, an anachronistic, cottage-industry procedure, 
which required the time-consuming hand-coloring of each print by the use of stencils.  By doing so, 
Duchamp avoided the excessive cost of color photography.  But what resulted was an intensive artisanal 
process.  ‘The time required for obtaining a satisfactory first print is about a month for a highly skilled 
craftsman,’ Duchamp explained.  ‘An average of 30 colours is required for each plate…[It takes] seven or 
eight weeks to apply 30 colours by hand through stencils.’” (p. 49). 
402 Demos, p. 48. 
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that preserved his work, and thereby, his identity.  Making his corpus whole is part of 
Duchamp’s quest to maintain his identity in exile.  In addition to the “standard box,” 
Duchamp created deluxe editions that contained both his previously exhibited works as 
well as an original work by Duchamp.403   
It is clear that Duchamp was thinking about institution, exhibition, and legacy in 
his workings and reworkings of the Boîte-en-Valise project.  As Martha Buskirk 
comments:  
The curious thing about Duchamp is the way he resituated his work over and over  
again in relation to a changing network of institutional structures.  Fountain was  
named first for a one-time show and simply disappeared.  And then only later, as 
the museum itself became more of an institution to be reckoned with, did he start 
to make his work into a sort of museum.  And so he himself was resituating his 
work in relation to the whole idea of exhibition context as other people were 
starting to think about those issues either through him or not through him.404 
Perhaps we might go so far as to say that due to Duchamp’s rejections, he sought to 
create his own institution in which to preserve his works on his own terms.  Moreover, 
based upon the arguments set forth above, Duchamp is simultaneously working and 
reworking his sense of identity through this project. 
E. Conclusion 
 
To summarize, wing clipping had several effects upon Duchamp and his work.  
On the one hand, it restricted his activities and moved him to explore alternatives to 
mainstream aesthetic production and reception.  On the other hand, these explorations 
                                                
403 As Demos argues, “these first proofs paradoxically acquired the status of originals.  As opposed to the 
procedural depersonalization contained within the process of the coloration of reproductions, owing to the 
task-based method embodied in the use of stencils, Duchamp’s artisanal fixation on the surface unfolds to 
yet another level of fetishistic desire: reproductions became endowed with the auratic traces of originals.  
This is especially true of the first proofs, the so-called coloriages originaux, which served as prototypes for 
further reproductions.” Ibid., p. 51. 
404 Martha Buskirk and Mignon Nixon, eds.  The Duchamp Effect: Essays, Interviews, Roundtable.  
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996., p. 215-216. 
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turned out to be extremely fruitful for Duchamp.  He thrived on the outskirts of the 
artworld, producing many works, even if he did not display them in traditional exhibition 
spaces.  Thus, tasteful wing clipping shows contradictory tendencies.  Duchamp, 
arguably an artist endowed with genius, found a way to make the restrictions in part 
“work” for him by working with, around, and against them.  He never stopped making 
art; he just made it on his own terms instead of those of the artworld – and he ceased to 
care what its reaction would be to his works.  Arguably, such restrictions could force an 
artist to stop working because they threaten to silence their new or controversial 
expressions.  Not only did Duchamp continue to make art, but his works have also 
become extremely important to the artworld.  These different reactions make it clear that 
it is crucial to examine the reception of avant-garde works over time.  While Duchamp 
was momentarily silenced by the rejection and criticisms he received, his voice was 
ultimately heard when taste caught up to his works – so much so that Duchamp is 
considered one of the most influential artists of the 20th Century. 
Ultimately, Duchamp’s aesthetic experiments changed exhibition practices and 
the trajectory of art making.  He set the new rule to art through his readymades; with 
these works, Duchamp problematized and reconceptualized the notion of the work of art.  
Readymades posed a challenge to traditional notions of art and ultimately changed the 
trajectory of art making in the future.  Duchamp chose and recontextualized objects to 
create a new idea – a revolution in thought as Cros frames the point.405  The tension 
between the objects in their original functional context and their new aesthetic context is 
the source of the shock effect that these works often received.  This shock, in turn, 
                                                
405 Cros, p. 57. 
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resulted in their troublesome reception.  Readymades blurred the boundaries of art and 
life and injected art into the praxis of life, particularly when Duchamp exhibited them in 
his own domestic living space.  As such, sometimes these works of art were 
indistinguishable from everyday objects.  Duchamp’s feeling of homelessness in the 
artworld after his various rejections led him to explore alternative exhibition spaces and 
retrospective options.  His innovative use of everyday materials to reconceptualize the 
work of art led Duchamp to become one of the most influential artists of the 20th Century.  
   165 
Chapter Four 
 
Extreme Wing Clipping and the Multiplicity of Publics 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
In Chapter Three, I began examining different ways we might understand Kant’s 
notion of wing clipping in The Critique of Judgment.  There, I investigated the effects on 
expression of a lack of wing clipping and moderate wing clipping.  In the first case, a 
lack of wing clipping did not prove to be liberating for expression, but instead, led to 
incomprehensibility, a limitation on expression in its own right.  In the second case, 
moderate wing clipping led to mixed results involving alienation, displacement, and 
homelessness in the art world.  However, Duchamp’s wing clipping also facilitated his 
ingenious expression because it forced the artist to explore new ways of making and 
exhibiting art that proved to be exemplary.  In this chapter, I continue the exploration of 
wing clipping by looking at extreme cases where the wings of genius have been severely 
clipped or severed by taste. 
As the previous sections have illustrated, wing clipping is both an aesthetic and 
political matter.  It involves questions of inclusion and exclusion from community and 
culture.  For the final interpretation of wing clipping it is important to examine the nature 
of public(s) in further detail.   In particular, I investigate how it is that publics interact in 
order to authorize or condemn works of art.  Put another way, I explore how extreme 
wing clipping could be considered a form of intense marginalization or censorship.  In 
order to perform this analysis, I must first look at some of the different notions of 
public(s) in circulation.  The leading question for the outset of this argument is whether 
“public” is a singular conception, as in Habermas’s bourgeois public sphere, or whether 
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there are multiple publics that interact with one another.  Notions of multivocality, 
publicity, and isolation will figure prominently in this analysis.  Who has the power 
within a public to approve or censor works of art?  Who has the power to remove them 
from consideration altogether?  In order to address such queries, I explore the removal of 
Richard Serra’s Tilted Arc from Federal Plaza in New York City, where competing 
publics or “counterpublics” were involved in the debate about the sculpture’s place in the 
plaza.   
The final argument of this chapter involves distinguishing publics, counterpublics, 
and cults.  As has been intimated throughout the dissertation, pressures on expression can 
lead to the forced exclusion of certain types of expression.  I argue that such restrictions 
are a form of silencing.  While some communities whose expressions are under pressure 
of censorship may seek to rejoin the central public in question, others may prefer to 
maintain a separate status, even if it is unequal.  Nancy Fraser outlines this distinction in 
terms of the publicist and the isolationist functions of counterpublics.  In this section, I 
argue that while counterpublics may maintain this duality, cults purposely choose to 
isolate themselves from the central public in order to preserve their expressions and not 
be co-opted by normalizing forces.  To reinforce this point, I turn to the notion of cult as 
understood by Walter Benjamin in “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological 
Reproducibility.”  While cults may begin their existence by defining themselves 
negatively against culture, they often develop their own values and expressions that serve 
to define and unite them in a positive way as well. 
 The arguments in this chapter help us to understand silence and silencing in 
different ways from in previous chapters.  As mentioned above, some groups choose to 
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communicate exclusively with like-minded individuals who are already part of their own 
community.  From an outside perspective, such communities may appear to be silent 
because their meanings are not heard, in the sense of understood.  In such cases, the 
apparent silence of the group is chosen by the members that comprise it.  This silence is 
intimately bound up in the intricacies of community-formation.  Cultic expressions are 
not silenced per se, but are instead communicated only to a select few who will 
understand them more fully.  We might contrast this with communities that are forced to 
communicate outside of society or the public at large due to the controversial or 
subversive nature of their views.  This is a forced silencing or even “ghettoization” of 
expression.406  In other words, this is censorship.  
 
II. Publics and Counterpublics 
A. Introduction 
Questions of taste and community are political.  Who or what gets included 
(whether persons or works) depends upon the authorities or “tastemakers” in positions of 
power.  Allowing space and giving voice are bound up with power dynamics and 
relationships.  To return to an image from Chapter Three, authorities in the society 
determine who or what is located in the public arena and who or what is overlooked or 
pushed out.  This formulation points to the fact that completely homogenous societies are 
actually quite rare if they exist at all.  What happens to heterogeneity in restrictive 
societies?  What happens to multivocality or even polyphony in such environments?  Can 
all the various voices be heard, or are some silenced?         
                                                
406 We might even reconsider Wittgenstein’s new boroughs or cul-de-sacs as marginalized centers of 
meaning where “illegitimate” or “unacceptable” expressions are ghettoized. 
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With these questions in mind, let us turn to the oft-debated work of Jürgen 
Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society, which provides the background for the ensuing 
argument.  In particular, Habermas’s characterization of the bourgeois public sphere is 
central to my arguments about the inclusion and exclusion that take place in publics.  I 
address Habermas indirectly, however, by engaging with his critics such as Nancy Fraser, 
Robert Asen, and Michael Warner, who point to the limits of Habermas’s model of 
publicity insofar as his conception of the public excludes individuals and groups by 
definition from the outset.  Their focus on the importance of heterogeneity and 
multivocality is crucial to my argument going forward.  For this reason, I deal with 
Habermas’s critics directly and begin with the notion of multiple publics from the start.  
 
B. Publics 
According to Michael Warner in Publics and Counterpublics, “Several senses of 
the noun ‘public’ tend to be intermixed in usage.  People do not always distinguish even 
between the public and a public, though in certain contexts the difference can matter a 
great deal.  The public is a kind of social totality.  Its most common sense is that of the 
people in general.”407  Many theorists critique conceptions of the public sphere that claim 
to represent all people but nonetheless exclude some individuals from participation.  
According to Nancy Fraser, “[T]he concept of a public presupposes a plurality of 
perspectives among those who participate within it, thereby allowing for internal 
                                                
407 Michael Warner.  Publics and Counterpublics.  New York: Zone Books, 2002., p. 65, emphasis in 
original. 
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differences and antagonisms, and likewise discouraging reified blocs.”408  As we shall see 
shortly, the Habermasian notion of the public sphere has been criticized because it does 
not account or allow for the multiplicity addressed by both Warner and Fraser.409 
Warner argues that “[a] public can also be a second thing: a concrete audience, a 
crowd witnessing itself in visible space, as with a theatrical public.  Such a public also 
has a sense of totality, bounded by the event or by the shared physical space.”410  Here, 
Warner discusses the gathering of individuals in perceptual proximity to one another due 
to a shared interest in a specific event or occasion.  This gathering could occur for several 
distinct reasons, including political, aesthetic, or entertainment purposes.  Not all publics 
require the coming together of individuals in physical space, however.  Warner argues 
that texts of various sorts also have the ability to generate publics, and that these publics 
in turn generate more texts.411  For Warner, “the kind of public that comes into being only 
in relation to texts and their circulation – like the public of this essay”412 constitutes the 
third and final sense of public.  He focuses upon this third sense of public throughout the 
remainder of the essay.  Although Warner distinguishes among three senses of the public, 
                                                
408 Nancy Fraser.  “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing 
Democracy.”  Social Text 25/26 (1990): 56-80., p. 70. 
409 I will return to this argument in the next section in relation to Fraser’s notion of “counterpublics.” 
410 Fraser, p. 66. 
411 Warner deals with this circularity in terms of the existence and address of publics.  He considers the 
causality at work here to be a sort of  “chicken and egg” problem.  Arguably, this cyclical relationship can 
be extended to the dynamic, cyclical relationship that exists between public and text.  Do texts generate 
publics?  Or do publics first generate the texts?  Finding the starting point of this process is actually quite 
difficult; therefore, determining the causal relationship is difficult as well.  See Warner, p. 67. 
412 Ibid., p. 66. 
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he also recognizes that they are not mutually exclusive.413  They may overlap or combine 
in various ways.414 
Furthermore, it is important to distinguish between publics and other kinds of 
groups.  In “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually 
Existing Democracy,” Fraser distinguishes between publics and communities during her 
discussion of publics and counterpublics.  She states, “the concept of a public differs 
from that of a community.  ‘Community’ suggests a bounded and fairly homogeneous 
group, and it often connotes consensus.  ‘Public,’ in contrast, emphasizes discursive 
interaction that is in principle unbounded and open-ended, and this in turn implies a 
plurality of perspectives.”415  Fraser utilizes this distinction to critique Habermas’s 
conception of the public sphere.  It is to this critique that we turn now. 
 
C. Fraser and Habermas 
According to Fraser, Habermas’ public sphere “designates a theater in modern 
societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk.  It is the 
space in which citizens deliberate about their common affairs, hence, an institutionalized 
arena of discursive interaction.  This arena is conceptually distinct from the state; it is a 
site for the production and circulation of discourses that can in principle be critical of the 
                                                
413 Ibid., p. 66. 
414 Warner goes on to argue that several characteristics are central to the contemporary notion of the public 
sphere, three of which are important to our argument:  1) publics are self-organized bodies; 2) they are 
constituted by a relation among strangers; and 3) the address of public speech is both personal and 
impersonal.  See Warner, p. 67-74; 74-76; and 76-87, respectively. The Habermasian conception of the 
public sphere satisfies all three of these qualifications.  It constitutes a totality of some kind; it gathers 
persons together through face-to-face communication; and it disseminates texts in relationship to itself and 
/ or texts are part of what generates the public sphere. 
415 Fraser, p. 80, footnote #29.  We might also distinguish among the notions of public, counterpublic, cult, 
and subculture.  I develop this line of argument in the next section. 
   171 
state.”416  The public sphere is essential to political life in that it promotes communication 
and deliberation among its participants.  As Fraser argues:  
At another level, [the public sphere] designated a specific kind of discursive 
interaction.  Here the public sphere connoted an ideal of unrestricted rational 
discussion of public matters.  The discussion was to be open and accessible to all; 
merely private interests were to be inadmissible; inequalities of status were to be 
bracketed; and discussants were to deliberate as peers.  The result of such 
discussion would be ‘public opinion’ in the strong sense of a consensus about the 
common good.417 
 
Fraser points out that Habermas’ account would exclude people even under ideal 
conditions, and discourse counter to the state would not be openly permitted.418  She 
reminds us that Habermas is investigating the development and decline of the bourgeois 
public sphere, as the subtitle of his work suggests.  She further argues that Habermas’ 
account is restricted to a “historically specific and limited form of the public sphere 
which Habermas calls the ‘liberal model of the bourgeois public sphere.’”419  Not all 
individuals were welcomed into the public sphere during its early stages of development.  
Notably, race, gender, and economic status were treated as prohibitive considerations 
barring persons from the public sphere.  As a result, participants in this sphere (and their 
lack of diversity) were determined at the outset.   
Fraser goes one step further and argues that Habermas ignores the counterpublics 
that existed at the same time as the bourgeois public sphere addressed in his account.420  
In order to support her point, she turns to revisionist historiographers like Mary Ryan, 
                                                
416 Ibid., p. 57.  For our purposes, these discursive interactions involve the exchange of judgments of taste.  
Moreover, the claim is that these judgments may run counter to the official taste of the artworld or the 
prevailing discourses of the day.  I will expand upon this point shortly.  In addition, I would like to pause to 
note the resonance of “theater” and “arena” imagery with Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy. 
417 Ibid., p. 59. 
418 Ibid., p. 60-61. 
419 Ibid., p. 58 
420 Ibid., p. 60-61. 
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who “documents the variety of ways in which nineteenth century North American women 
of various classes and ethnicities” were excluded from the public sphere, and how 
nonetheless they “constructed access routes to public political life.”421  This corroborates 
Fraser’s sense that multiple public spheres existed from the very beginning, and that they 
were always positioned to compete with the mainstream public sphere.  She states:  
In fact, the historiography of Ryan and others demonstrates that the bourgeois 
public was never the public.  On the contrary, virtually contemporaneous with the 
bourgeois public there arose a host of competing counterpublics, including 
nationalist publics, popular peasant publics, elite women’s publics, and working 
class publics.  Thus, there were competing publics from the start, not just from the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as Habermas implies.422 
 
As Robert Asen notes in “Seeking the ‘Counter’ in Counterpublics,” “Fraser […] 
discerns an underlying assumption structuring this bourgeois public that regards the 
circumscription of public deliberation into a single, encompassing arena as ‘a positive 
and desirable state of affairs, whereas the proliferation of a multiplicity of publics 
represents a departure from, rather than an advance toward, democracy.’”423  While unity 
and community are generally positive attributes of groups, this does not imply that 
univocality ought to be the goal of public deliberations, particularly democratic ones.  
Fraser, in contrast to Habermas, argues that a multiplicity of voices and of public spheres 
would increase deliberation and in effect, promote democracy.  In fact, on her account, 
multivocality is essential to the functioning of deliberative democracy.  The exchange of 
genuinely different and even conflicting viewpoints is not only permissible in a 
                                                
421 Ibid., p. 61. 
422 Ibid., p. 61, emphasis in original. 
423 Robert Asen.  “Seeking the ‘Counter’ in Counterpublics.”  Communication Theory 10 (4) (Nov 2000): 
424-446., p. 424.  See also Fraser, p. 66. 
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democracy, but is a foundational practice.424  Fraser argues that “in stratified societies, 
arrangements that accommodate contestation among a plurality of competing publics 
better promote the ideal of participatory parity than does a single, comprehensive, 
overarching public.”425   
Unrestricted rational discussion is certainly an ideal, but as Fraser argues, even 
Habermas recognized that the ideal was not fully achieved.  She states, “According to 
Habermas, the full utopian potential of the bourgeois conception of the public sphere was 
never realized in practice.  The claim to open access in particular was never made 
good.”426  The exclusion of persons and expressions has prompted theorists and 
philosophers to consider alternative conceptions of the public sphere.  As Robert Asen 
argues:  
This movement toward multiplicity [in conceptions of the public] has been  
spurred by recognition of social complexity and sociocultural diversity.  A single, 
overarching public sphere ignores or denies social complexity insofar as it 
invokes a notion of publicity as contemporaneous face-to-face encounters among 
all citizens potentially affected by issues under consideration […] A singular 
public sphere also suppresses sociocultural diversity in constituting an arena 
inimical to difference.427  
 
Two important points emerge here.  First, the contemporary public sphere has 
increasingly relied upon technological communication systems.  In particular, the rise of 
the Internet and social networking sites has transformed communication methods and 
                                                
424 In musical terms, we might characterize the multiplicity of potentially conflicting voices as a form of 
polyphony.  Polyphony accounts for the possibility of dissonance as part of the melodic structure of music 
rather than as a force destructive to it. 
425 Fraser, p. 66. 
426 Ibid., p. 59.  In aesthetic terms, this open access translates into the uninhibited exchange of judgments 
of taste – Kant’s ideal of a shared community of interlocutors.  In this context, openness ought to extend to 
all persons and to their varied aesthetic perspectives even if they are unpopular according to the standards 
of taste in the artworld, understood here as a specific kind of public sphere.   As I will go on to argue, 
aesthetic judgments or counterdiscourses that are silenced by the mainstream public can serve as the focal 
point for the formation of alternative communities, counterpublics, or cults. 
427 Asen, p. 425.  
   174 
thereby has transformed publics.428  The face-to-face model of deliberation still plays a 
role in public sphere communication, but it no longer maintains dominance.429  Second, 
because in our contemporary moment we are more willing to consider the social effects 
of our differences, we have moved towards models of publicness that are more inclusive 
of the diverse population and its multivocality.430  The recognition of exclusions of 
persons and ideas made it apparent that a univocal public is an illusion; such a public 
does not and cannot include all despite its claims to the contrary.  Thus, because factors 
like race and gender are no longer considered to be legitimate bases for exclusions, our 
discourses have increasingly recognized the multiple (and already existing) publics and 
the multivocality present within them. 
In this light, Seyla Benhabib “rejects the notion of a singular, overarching public 
sphere in favor of a ‘plurality of modes of association’ that constitute a medium of 
mutually interlocking and overlapping networks of opinion formation and 
dissemination.”431  This formulation argues for a multiplicity of public spheres and 
intimates how these spheres might relate to and interact with one another.  The ideas of 
“interlocking” and “overlapping” also lead to considerations about the persons who 
traverse and participate in several different communities or public spheres.  Along similar 
                                                
428 Asen argues against technology’s suitability for deliberative communication.  He asserts that 
“electronic ‘agoras’ threaten to eclipse the deliberative functioning of the public sphere and reduce citizen 
participation to registering unreflected preferences through a vast telecommunications network.” (p. 425)  
Undoubtedly, many use the Internet in this fashion – some Facebook and Twitter participants, for example.  
However, some online communities function in a critical and thoughtful fashion and are explicitly designed 
to promote open deliberation and discourse.  These, I would argue, could function efficaciously in the 
service of deliberative communication, contra Asen’s claims. 
429 In the next chapter, I investigate how the cult of David Lynch utilized newsgroups, message boards, 
chat rooms, and early blogs to communicate about Twin Peaks with one another via the Internet and how 
this expanded the cult beyond face-to-face communication. 
430 I mean this in particular relation to Habermas’ conception of the public sphere. 
431 Ibid., p. 424.  This is drawn from Benhabib’s Democracy and Difference: Contesting Boundaries of the 
Political.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996. 
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lines, Gerard Hauser articulates a vision of multiple public spheres in which “discursive 
practices form a lattice of spaces with boundaries of variable permeability [in a ‘reticulate 
structure’].”432  Here, groups with different discursive practices exist alongside one 
another in clusters that crisscross and overlap.  Hauser highlights the point that if these 
communities are open enough, individuals can participate in many different publics.  This 
suggests the possibility of cross-public participation.433 
 
D. Alternative Publics, Counterpublics, and Cults 
Once we embrace the notion of a multiplicity of publics, we need to consider 
what different publics actually exist and how they relate to each other.  In particular, 
because the theoretical move towards multiplicity is spurred by exclusions from a 
singular, allegedly univocal public sphere, we need to examine how alternative publics 
seek to define themselves vis-à-vis the mainstream public.  On the one hand, alternative 
publics may seek to identify themselves based upon a shared set of values and 
expressions and to only communicate within their smaller, closed community.  They may 
not seek a wider public, but instead, may be driven to preserve their identities and values 
apart from a larger public.  We might refer to this as the “isolationist” function of 
counterpublics.434  On the other hand, alternative publics may explicitly establish 
                                                
432 Ibid., p. 425.  See Gerard Hauser.  “Vernacular Dialogue and the Rhetoricality of Public 
Opinion.”  Communication Monographs 65 (2) (June 1998): 83–107.  See Gerard Hauser.  Vernacular 
Voices: The Rhetoric of Publics and Public Spheres, Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina 
Press, 1999. 
433 Both Benhabib’s and Hauser’s ideas about the multiplicity and multivocality of the public sphere call to 
mind Wittgenstein’s notion of language games as set forth in Philosophical Investigations.  In particular, 
public multiplicity resonates with the way in which individuals may be a part of multiple communities or 
participate in multiple language games at the same time. (See Ludwig Wittgenstein.  Philosophical 
Investigations.  Trans.  G.E.M. Anscombe.  Third Edition.  Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2001.) 
The criss-crossing and interplay of such games and networks of association points towards the 
multivocality that Benhabib and Hauser argue for in their accounts of multiple public spheres. 
434 Fraser, p. 67-68. 
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themselves against the public that excluded them.  That is, these groups not only 
constitute themselves as a coexistent public that presents an alternative to the central 
public; they also actively define themselves contra that public.  In some other cases, 
members of a counterpublic seek to communicate with the central public in order to gain 
acceptance and to rejoin it after a time.  We might refer to this as the “publicist” function 
of counterpublics.435  Alternative publics may express one or both of the aforementioned 
functions, depending upon the context.436  Let us examine each of these functions of 
counterpublics as set out by Fraser437 and then proceed to contrast her notion of the 
counterpublic with the notion of the cult.  
Fraser goes through several distinctions in her iterations of “counterpublic,” 
beginning with counterpublics as an “alternative” to the established or central public.438  
Fraser states: 
The history records that members of subordinated social groups – women,  
workers, people of color, and gays and lesbians – have repeatedly found it  
advantageous to constitute alternative publics.  I propose to call these subaltern  
counterpublics in order to signal that they are parallel discursive arenas where  
members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counterdiscourses,  
which in turn permit them to formulate oppositional interpretations of their  
identities, interests, and needs.439 
 
Fraser begins with this notion of “parallel” or “alternative” publics that exist side by side 
with the mainstream public.  As her account goes on, however, it becomes less neutral in 
tone; she stipulates that these communities are explicitly “counter” to the established 
                                                
435 Fraser, p. 67-68. 
436 According to Fraser, these functions of counterpublics exist in a dialectical relationship to each other.  
See Fraser, p. 68. 
437 While Fraser was not the first to coin the term counterpublic, she popularized its use in contemporary 
discourse, especially because she connected it with the notion of the subaltern.  Rita Felski was actually the 
first to use the term in 1989 in relation to the feminist public sphere in Beyond Feminist Aesthetics: 
Feminist Literature and Social Change.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989. 
438 Ibid., p. 67-68.  
439 Ibid., p. 67, emphasis in original. 
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public as “subaltern.”  Fraser makes the jump from separation and exclusion to “counter” 
without much evidence or argument.  In part, Fraser may argue in this way because the 
alternative sites of expression under discussion have arisen in response to the exclusion 
of persons and expressions from the central public.440  However, just because individuals 
or groups are excluded from the mainstream public does not necessitate that they will be 
against that public; it merely suggests that they differ from that public.  If anything, the 
mainstream public is counter to these alternative persons and expressions, not the other 
way around.  Put simply, Fraser needs more evidence to back up the argumentative leap 
from alternative publics to counterpublics.  In particular, it seems, she needs to get from 
exclusion, which is a social fact, to oppression, which requires or demands redress from 
the oppressor. 
Fraser’s formulation makes it seem as if counterpublics form and that only 
afterwards they invent new expressions and develop interpretations of their identities.  
But this overlooks how counterpublics form based upon the exclusion or silencing of 
their identities and expressions.  In other words, their segregation did not cause the 
development of new expressions, even if when separated, these groups continued to 
generate new expressions.  Fraser seems to invert this causal relationship in her account.  
In fact, only because they are treated as alternative or subversive, individuals are forced 
to form a new community in which their expressions will be understood and accepted.  In 
this setting, these counterpublics might amplify their defenses of identity in order to 
justify themselves vis-à-vis the central public.441  Of course, these counterpublics 
continue to coin new phrases that reflect their experiences and situations as time goes by.  
                                                
440 As articulated above, Fraser has argued that Habermas’ notion of the bourgeois public sphere is 
inherently discriminatory. 
441 Fraser, p. 68. 
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To reiterate the point, I propose an alternative theory of counterpublic formation in which 
the allegedly unacceptable nature of certain expressions and identities causes segregation 
into counterpublics rather than vice versa.  
Multiple discourses reflect the identities of the individuals who express them and 
are therefore essential to the preservation of diversity within heterogeneous societies.442  
We must recognize difference(s) in speech and choose expressions that do not imply that 
society is homogeneous.  As Fraser points out:  
Theorists like Jane Mansbridge have argued that ‘the transformation of “I” into 
“we” brought about through political deliberation can easily mask subtle forms of 
control.  Even the language people use as they reason together usually favors one 
way of seeing things and discourages others.  Subordinate groups sometimes 
cannot find the right voice or words to express their thoughts, and when they do, 
they discover they are not heard.  [They] are silenced, encouraged to keep their 
wants inchoate, and heard to say “yes” when what they have said is “no.”’443  
 
When a heterogeneous public is treated as if it were univocal, some voices and 
perspectives are not fully heard or included.  In effect, the treatment of diverse 
individuals and their expressions as part of a homogeneous “we” silences difference by 
silencing alternative modes of expression within the “we.”  Under these conditions, 
multivocality is made to seem nonexistent within the mainstream public. 
As Fraser goes on to point out, “In stratified societies, unequally empowered 
social groups tend to develop unequally valued cultural styles.  The result is the 
development of powerful informal pressures that marginalize the contributions of 
members of subordinated groups both in everyday life contexts and in official public 
                                                
442 Importantly, it is also related to the preservation of open public deliberation.  I will return to this 
momentarily. 
443 Fraser, p. 64.  See also Jane Mansbridge.  “Feminism and Democracy.”  The American Prospect 1 
(Spring 1990): 127. 
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spheres.”444  For this reason, publics may splinter into alternative publics or 
counterpublics in which endangered expressions may be heard, accepted, and understood.  
Individuals who are silenced often seek to express themselves within an alternative public 
sphere, if only for a time.  We might, along with Asen, refer to this as the “isolationist” 
function of counterpublics.445  In this mode, groups consolidate into counterpublics in 
order to preserve their identities and expressions apart from the central public and to 
resist the pressure to conform.  
Fraser goes on to argue that counterpublics function as “publicist”446 when 
excluded groups actively seek to communicate with the mainstream public.  As publics, 
Fraser presumes that these groups ultimately want to communicate with wider and wider 
publics in order to persuade the mainstream about the legitimacy of their identities and 
expressions.  Fraser states:  
The point is that, in stratified societies, subaltern counterpublics have a dual  
character.  On the one hand, they function as spaces of withdrawal and 
regroupment; on the other hand, they also function as bases and training grounds 
for agitational activities directed towards wider publics.  It is precisely in the 
dialectic between these two functions that their emancipatory potential resides.447 
 
Here, Fraser articulates the isolationist and publicist functions of the counterpublic.  On 
the one hand, she focuses upon the contestatory nature of counterpublics,448 in which they 
define themselves as against the mainstream public due to their exclusion or silencing by 
it.  On the other hand, she argues that although the public sphere is constituted by conflict, 
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these counterpublics aim to communicate, persuade, and ultimately rejoin the wider 
mainstream public.449  Although Fraser acknowledges the importance of both the 
isolationist and publicist functions of the counterpublic, she focuses largely upon the 
publicist mode in her work.  Fraser is interested in the interrelation of publics and 
counterpublics as seen through their communication, not in their “separatism” or isolation.  
There remains much to be said about the sort of communication that takes place within 
counterpublics in their isolationist mode, especially when they embrace their separatist 
status.  I return to this point in my discussion of cults. 
The publicist and isolationist modes of counterpublics might be better understood 
through an examination of the direction or goal of the communication in question.  Asen 
states:  
Counterpublic spheres maintain their public character by directing their  
arguments outward to society as a whole.  In this way, they serve a dual function.   
Referencing the feminist counterpublic sphere, Felski explains that ‘internally, it  
generates a gender-specific identity grounded in a consciousness of community  
and solidarity among women; externally, it seeks to convince society as a whole  
of the validity of feminist claims.’450  
 
Here, Asen refers to Rita Felski’s demarcation of two different discourses – 
communication that takes place within a public and communication that takes place 
between or among publics.  We can call these discourses “intra-public communication” 
and “inter-public communication.”451 
Fraser focuses upon the “publicist” mode of the public because of the importance 
of preserving the identities and expressions of the excluded community and in order to 
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“complicate the issue of separatism.”452  To maintain the voice of communities 
undergoing silencing by the wider public, Fraser highlights the possibility of 
reestablishing inter-public communication. 
In my view, the concept of a counterpublic militates in the long run against  
separatism because it assumes an orientation that is publicist.  Insofar as these  
arenas are publics they are by definition not enclaves – which is not to deny that  
they are often involuntarily enclaved.  After all, to interact discursively as a  
member of a public – subaltern or otherwise – is to disseminate one’s discourse to  
ever widening arenas.453 
 
I agree with the spirit of Fraser’s account here; the drive to preserve excluded or 
endangered discursive communities is a goal worth pursuing.  But Fraser is making 
dubious assumptions about publics here.  She argues that all publics – counterpublics 
included – seek to express themselves to increasingly wider publics.454  In doing so, 
Fraser leans too heavily on the “publicist” conception of counterpublics, almost entirely 
neglecting their “isolationist” function in the process.  This is particularly troublesome 
because Fraser also seeks to highlight the emancipatory potential of the dialectical 
relationship of the dual modes of counterpublics.455 
While Fraser and Felski argue that all counterpublics exercise both the isolationist 
and publicist functions of the public sphere in an alternating fashion, this relationship is 
by no means guaranteed.  Even when counterpublics emerge and define themselves 
against the central public, what happens next depends upon the goals of the group in 
question and how successful they are in accomplishing them.456  Some groups may 
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remain in the isolationist mode for a long time or perhaps even indefinitely.  On Fraser’s 
terms, those that remain in the isolationist mode are termed “enclaves” rather than 
counterpublics.   
Asen, in contrast to Fraser, maintains a more neutral tone in his formulations 
about publics, and therefore, he can account for the expression of multiple counterpublics.  
He states: 
Counterpublics emerge as a kind of public within a public sphere conceived as a 
multiplicity.  They illuminate differential power relations among diverse publics 
of a multiple public sphere.  Counterpublics signal that some publics develop not 
simply as one among a constellation of discursive entities, but as explicitly 
articulated alternatives to wider publics that exclude the interests of potential 
participants.  Counterpublics in turn reconnect with the communicative flows of a 
multiple public sphere.  Counterpublic theory discloses relations of power that 
obliquely inform public discourse and, at the same time, reveals that participants 
in the public sphere still engage in potentially emancipatory affirmative practice 
with the hope that power may be reconfigured.457 
 
Asen recognizes that counterpublics express alternative meanings to those expressed by 
the central public.  However, the hope he articulates here that power may be reconfigured 
need not imply that counterpublics will seek to rejoin the larger community even if 
communication remains open.  This is, of course, one possibility among a series of 
possibilities, but in the sections that follow, I explore another possibility: isolationist 
counterpublics that seek to communicate only internally rather than to the central public. 
Before I do so, however, I will further examine the exclusionary power of publics 
through an investigation of Richard Serra’s Tilted Arc affair and how its fate exemplifies 
silencing and censorship I have been outlining in this section. 
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III. Extreme Wing Clipping and the Public Sphere: Richard Serra’s Tilted Arc 
In Section II, I examined how individuals are excluded from the public sphere.  In 
this section, I investigate this issue in terms of the story of Richard Serra’s Tilted Arc.  I 
argue that the removal of Tilted Arc from Federal Plaza in New York affected a double 
silencing by 1) censoring the work and the artist by removing Tilted Arc from its 
installation space and 2) forcing the public debate surrounding the work to come to a 
close after the trial and appeals process ended in 1988.  While aestheticians continued to 
critically discuss and debate the work and its status in spite of these attempts at silencing, 
what we might call “general public deliberation” about the legitimacy of the work was 
curtailed when the case was finally closed and the work was removed from Federal Plaza 
in 1989.458  The persistence of philosophical debate demonstrates that the silencing of 
Tilted Arc was incomplete even as culture clipped its wings in an extreme fashion, but the 
case nonetheless exemplifies the dangers to aesthetic expression posed by wing clipping.   
Tilted Arc brings the question of the power of publics to censor into sharper focus.  
Erected in 1981 by Richard Serra on the grounds of New York’s Federal Plaza  (26 
Federal Plaza, off Centre Street, New York, New York), Tilted Arc drew attention to the 
space of the plaza in a new way.  Made of Cor-Ten steel and arranged in a slightly 
curving shape, the work was 12 feet high x 130 feet long x 3 inches thick.  By some 
accounts,459 the work divided, cut up, or separated the plaza into discrete areas – making 
these spaces “difficult” or “dangerous” to access and making movement through the 
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plaza troublesome.460  Tilted Arc immediately generated much public debate about the 
work and whether it ought to be located in Federal Plaza.  Questions under discussion 
ranged from the most fundamental, “Is it art?” to “Is it legitimate to have such a work or 
object in the plaza?”  to “Does the work represent or reflect the plaza effectively?”   
As Gregg Horowitz notes, “A few objections were raised immediately, but since 
expressions of displeasure are typical at first when any public art is installed, nothing 
came of them.”461  That is, Horowitz argues, nothing came of them until William 
Diamond, the General Services Administration’s New York Regional Administrator, 
spearheaded a crusade to remove the work from the plaza.462  This turn of events 
transformed the debate surrounding the work into a full-fledged controversy that 
ultimately ended in the work’s removal from the plaza.  For those who argued that Tilted 
Arc was site specific, its removal amounted to the work’s destruction.463  
Before proceeding further, it is important to note that Tilted Arc was 
commissioned by the United States General Services Administration’s Art-in-
Architecture program.  The program was to devote “one-half of one percent of the cost of 
                                                
460 Ibid., p. 8, p. 11-12.  Some particularly overheated responses to the sculpture suggested that the work 
could benefit terrorists by serving as a blast wall for bombings and explosions. 
461 Ibid., p. 8. 
462 Ibid., p. 8.  This is particularly interesting because the GSA commissioned, approved, and installed the 
work in the first place. 
463 For a thorough treatment of the site-specificity question, see Michael Kelly.  “Public Art Controversy: 
The Serra and Lin Cases.”  The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 54 (1) (Winter 1996): 15-22.  
Critics take both sides in this debate, arguing that it is a site-specific work and alternatively that it is not.  
While I do not want to enter into this debate in earnest, I recognize its importance vis-à-vis the discussions 
and arguments about Tilted Arc.  Serra’s own stance on installation is crucial to understanding his 
resistance to the removal of his work in this case.  As Serra puts the point, “Based on the interdependence 
of work and site, site-specific works address the content and context of their site critically.  A new 
behavioral and perceptual orientation to a site demands a new critical adjustment to one’s experience of the 
place.  Site-specific works primarily engender a dialogue with their surroundings.”  See Richard Serra.  
“Tilted Arc Destroyed.”  Art in America 77(5) (1989): 35-47, p. 41. Not only would Serra consider the 
fragments of Tilted Arc to not be the sculpture, properly speaking, but he would also consider its removal 
as a way to hinder or stop the dialogue it started.  
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the construction or repair of federal property to the funding of public art.”464  Titled Arc 
underwent a standard approval procedure in which it was reviewed along with other 
proposals for the site.  Serra’s submission was selected by a jury of “artworld judges” – 
not by a panel of bureaucratic administrators.465  That the work was commissioned by a 
federal program like the AIA as well as approved by a jury from the artworld is 
significant.  This double endorsement provided Tilted Arc with governmental and 
aesthetic authority.  However, the legitimacy of the work is ironic when viewed from the 
standpoint of the controversy that it generated.  How could a work that was 
commissioned by a federal program and agreed upon by a panel of artworld experts be 
deemed improper or controversial enough to spur a campaign aimed at its removal?  We 
might better understand the difficulties the work encountered through examining Tilted 
Arc’s nature and goals.   
Serra intended to utilize Tilted Arc to make the passage through space into a 
contemplation about space, and in particular, the space of New York’s Federal Plaza.466  
Hilde Hein argues:  
[Serra] meant to confront the public in behavioural space ‘in which the viewer 
interacts with the sculpture in its context…to engage the public in a dialogue that 
would enhance, both perceptually and conceptually, its relation to the entire 
plaza.’  The sculpture would not literally interdict movement, but it would (and 
did) cause the viewer to feel blocked.  The experience of oppression was real 
enough, but Serra wanted it to redirect attention to its actual source in the 
mechanisms of state power.467   
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Put another way, Serra wanted passersby to consider the space anew and to engage with 
their environment in ways that they had not before; he aimed to “bring the viewer into the 
sculpture.”468  Serra wanted workers and other users of the plaza to notice the space and 
to talk about it.  What is interesting is that this “noticing” was experienced in a negative 
fashion.  In fact, the engagement and discussion that Serra spurred with Tilted Arc were 
central to the work’s undoing and removal.  But instead of fixing their negativity onto the 
government and its potential to oppress or restrict individuals, many people focused their 
ire on the sculpture itself for drawing these negative feelings to the surface.469  As 
Michael Kelly puts the point, “Tilted Arc had the effect of criticizing Federal Plaza – 
regardless of Serra’s intentions, designs, or words – by revealing its dysfunctional state.  
While exposing these problems, however, Tilted Arc also compounded them and soon 
became the scapegoat when people decided to do something about them.”470 
According to preliminary studies done by Serra for the work, Tilted Arc would not 
actually disrupt the most traveled walking paths or the use of the non-functional 
fountain.471  As Horowitz argues, “Tilted Arc did not interfere with paths of transit; rather 
it appeared to do so, but in the domain of fantasies of easy use that was exactly the 
problem.  Serra did not cause the deadness and unusability of Federal Plaza, but he did 
make it manifest.”472  So while Tilted Arc didn’t actually block foot traffic or cause 
workers to circumvent the sculpture on a daily basis, people experienced the work as if it 
prevented their “easy use” of the space.  This spurred individuals to react negatively to 
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the sculpture rather than to the space itself.  After all, the space had not actually changed; 
the addition of the sculpture merely drew attention to the quality of the space in a new 
way.  According to Horowitz, it exposed the unfulfilled promise of the plaza.473  Because 
of this manifestation, people reacted negatively towards the sculpture for making the 
unactualized potential of the space more evident in their experience.  
In Horowitz’s terms, responses regarding ease of use were actually fantasies about 
the potential of the plaza.  As one federal worker, Joseph Liebman, testified, “I have 
worked at 26 Federal Plaza since 1969.  While the plaza never fulfilled all my 
expectations, at least until 1980, I regarded it as a relaxing reflective space where I could 
walk, sit, and contemplate in an unhurried manner.”474  Liebman goes on to articulate his 
“dreams” for the plaza, which include its potential use for public gatherings, concerts, 
and children at play.  Horowitz argues that these ideas were merely Liebman’s fantasies 
for the space, which were belied by the material conditions of the plaza and its lack of 
community events.  Horowitz claims:  
When we consider that in the seventeen years of the plaza’s existence prior to 
Tilted Arc there were fewer than twenty public events, that other than the steps 
into the buildings there was no public seating, except, of course, for the lip of the 
fountain because the fountain was usually dry, that the plaza is a notoriously 
windy site, we can see that Liebman’s dream was blocked not by the sculpture but 
the space itself.  Liebman envisioned a festive, multiuse space which never 
existed, but for its nonexistence he blames the arc.475 
 
Here, Horowitz points out that negativity towards the sculpture was generated by the 
discrepancy between the fantasies projected onto the space and the reality of the space 
itself.  Put differently, Tilted Arc made manifest what was there all along, i.e., the 
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unfulfilled potential of an actually unwelcoming space.  The result of this newfound 
awareness about the space was that individuals focused their negativity upon the 
sculpture.  Rather than generating conversation, debate, or even complaints about the 
plaza, its design, or its lack of events, Tilted Arc generated complaints about its own 
presence in an inhospitable space. 
 To recapitulate the last point, projected fantasies about the plaza got in the way of 
the reception of Tilted Arc.  However, I argue that this claim is actually connected to one 
of the other central objections Horowitz deals with in his article regarding the 
“unsuitability” of the sculpture as a symbol for the plaza, federal building, and 
government.  Horowitz outlines several instances in which objections focused not on the 
sculpture, but on what it symbolized (or failed to symbolize).  Horowitz states, “Judge 
Edward Re of the United States Court of International Trade said that ‘this rusted steel 
barrier’ undermines the goals of ‘provid[ing] proper identification for the Courthouse’ 
and ‘generat[ing] respect for its symbol of justice.’”476  Moreover, as Dwight Ink, Acting 
Administrator of the GSA noted when handing down his decision about the sculpture, 
“‘those testifying in favor of relocation regarded the Plaza and the open space it 
symbolized much more highly than did those who favored retention.’”  Horowitz takes 
particular interest in Ink’s phrasing here: “not ‘the open space the plaza is’ but ‘the open 
space it symbolized.’”477  Horowitz argues that these objections had more to do with the 
plaza as a symbol of openness and “democratic accessibility” (when combined with the 
federal building located there) than with the sculpture itself.478   
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These objections are notable because of their connection with the aforementioned 
fantasies about the plaza.479  The “symbolic” objection was related to illusions held by 
some individuals regarding the openness of the space and of the government.  Tilted Arc 
generated a psychic tension between the ideal of a liberal government that is open and 
accessible, and one that is open only as an ideal, or one that is potentially oppressive.  Put 
another way, Tilted Arc brought the illusion of openness in the physical space of Federal 
Plaza to the fore, as well as the psychological illusion of openness and accessibility to the 
government itself.  This recognition was the source of hostility for many individuals and 
it accounts for why many critiques of the sculpture retreated to the level of symbology.  If 
Tilted Arc was perceived as an inadequate representation of the openness of government 
or the plaza that housed a federal building, it forces critical audiences to consider whether 
it was meant to function as a positive symbol.  We must also ask deeper questions about 
what is being symbolized – here, the government, and more broadly, America.  Specters 
of restriction and oppression lurk in the background of such inquiries.  Even if questions 
about the lack of fit between illusion or fantasy and their counterparts in reality were not 
involved in Serra’s plans for Tilted Arc, the artist certainly wanted to generate discussion 
about the plaza, its uses, status, and relationship to the federal government.  Arguably, 
Serra wanted to call the government’s role and beneficence into question through the 
installation of this sculpture and generation of discussion about it.  In this way, openness 
of government, public debate, and taste are central to the Tilted Arc’s aims. 
With these aims in mind, let us now consider how the debate surrounding Tilted 
Arc relates to Kantian wing clipping.  As Hein comments, “Public art cannot promise 
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public understanding, any more than private art assures private salvation, whatever these 
might be.”480  To put Hein’s statement in Kantian terms, works of art cannot promise 
understanding, even as they demand that we respond to them in some way.  As I argued 
in Chapter Two, responses to art in the form of judgments of taste are crucial to the cycle 
of production and reception.  Works of art demand that we respond to them by 
communicating with other individuals about our judgments of taste.  However, what 
reception these works receive is by no means guaranteed.481  As Hein puts the point here, 
there is no guarantee that we will understand (or appreciate) particular works of art.  The 
demand to respond is met more uncertainly as the works become more difficult to 
understand.  In fact, works that are difficult to understand or are challenging, insofar as 
they make it difficult to arrive at a settled response, exacerbate the urgency of the demand 
to respond.  For these reasons, we are silenced by the works while we attempt to make 
sense of them.  As I have been arguing throughout the dissertation in terms of wing 
clipping, if works are perceived to be challenging or subversive, the publics they seek to 
address may silence them. 
In the Serra case, the silencing took the form of the removal of the work from the 
plaza.  A secondary silencing occurred when the ruling in favor of the work’s removal 
cemented its status as either a questionable work of art or an illegitimate one.  After the 
court proceedings were concluded, the finality of the ruling and appeals process tried to 
settle the matter once and for all by ending discussion and debate about the work.  Tilted 
Arc was not simply physically removed from its site but also “legally” silenced at this 
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point.  The public questions and controversy regarding the status of the work came to a 
close only through the legal resolution of the case.  Tilted Arc’s potential was removed 
along with the sculpture itself; it was replaced by the actuality of a censured and censored 
work of art that was removed (or destroyed).  The finality of the proceedings limited 
additional discussion, further cementing its destruction.  
It is important to note that Diamond, who spearheaded the campaign to remove 
Tilted Arc, attempted to silence some voices by conducting proceedings that were not 
fully free and open.  We might characterize this as yet a third silencing that occurred as 
part of the Tilted Arc affair.  Diamond “stacked the deck” by soliciting some testimony 
and thereby silencing those voices that were not “welcome” to his proceedings.482  This 
deliberate inclusion of some voices and the exclusion of others is censorship in the 
clearest sense.  Interestingly, Diamond might be interpreted as performing Serra’s point 
about the illusion of the openness of government.  Restricting the use of the space of 
Federal Plaza displayed the lack of openness of the government; Diamond’s manipulation 
of the testimony in his favor redoubles this lack of freedom and openness.  Moreover, 
Diamond deliberately put on a show of public deliberation and court proceedings that 
stood in stark contrast to the skewed process he actually conducted.  The farcical nature 
of these proceedings exemplifies the “machinations of state power”483 that Serra had in 
mind to expose.  Recall that while the GSA approved and installed Tilted Arc, it was also 
the agent of its removal and destruction.  When federal authority was called into question, 
the government, in the form of the long arm of the GSA, moved to remove the work and 
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stifle the debate about it.  Diamond put the “performative touches” regarding 
governmental power upon the deal by manipulating the testimony and court proceedings.   
While this silencing worked on the level of “general public deliberation,” the 
critical response, especially among aestheticians, continued long after Tilted Arc was 
removed from Federal Plaza.  As a case in point, the Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism printed a symposium in 1996 on the Tilted Arc affair and its implications.484  
We might say then, that even excessive wing clipping may fail to completely silence a 
work or artist.  Aestheticians have taken up Tilted Arc and the controversy surrounding it 
as a call for further reflection and judgment.  In spite of the controversy that Serra 
endured regarding Tilted Arc, he has continued to make works of art on his own terms.  
He continues to insist upon the close connection of installation and work, claiming that 
his site-specific works are not complete until they are installed on their designated 
sites.485  Serra’s aesthetic perseverance aside, the danger involved in extreme wing 
clipping and silencing remains a serious threat to freedom of expression.  Even if the 
debate about Tilted Arc continues today among aestheticians, other works or artists may 
not have the same power to inaugurate debate on a wide scale.   
Still, a reconsideration of the reception of Tilted Arc might lead us to re-read the 
debate generated about the work as a mark of its success rather than of its failure, even if 
Serra did not anticipate the consequences of it.  Hein states: 
We have turned to artists in moments of distress as we formerly turned to religion, 
and then to science, for public enlightenment and private satisfaction.  Each has 
stirred up its own problems and given us some gratification in return.  To cite 
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Patricia Phillips’s appreciation of public art: ‘It is an art which is absolutely 
engaged with the world and this engagement often invokes spirited 
disagreement…Absolute consensus is not necessarily a happy state.’486 
 
In other words, the fact that Serra’s work generated so much discussion and disagreement 
is a sign of its success as a work of art as well as the success of the public sphere vis-à-vis 
its openness.  Put another way, the deliberative ideal that is attached to some democracies 
is alive and well when debate about public works of art is allowed to flourish.  This 
means that complete agreement may not actually be a positive sign of the health of the 
society, nor does it guarantee the quality of the work in question.  As Kelly argues, 
“Discussions of public art might rather start from the recognition that complete consensus 
is impossible because the public comprises many different subspheres, organizations, and 
institutions, each with many voices in terms of race, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, and 
class […] Instead of consensus, debate and dialogue about these representations should 
be the mandate in public art.”487   With this multiplicity of publics and counterpublics in 
mind, what is successful about Tilted Arc is the amount of conversation and debate it 
generated among several groups before (and after) its removal.   In the next section of 
argument, I return to the question of reception from the perspective of isolationist 
counterpublics, or what I term “cults” that seek to communicate amongst themselves 
about works of art that are difficult to understand and respond to, i.e., works of genius.  
 
 
IV. Benjamin’s Notion of Cults  
 
In Section II, I suggested that cults might be one way to understand the 
isolationist function of counterpublics when they remain isolated in a strict fashion. 
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Fraser refers to such groups as “enclaves.”  In order to get clearer on isolationist 
communication, particularly with respect to aesthetic concerns, let us turn to Walter 
Benjamin’s sense of cult articulated in “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological 
Reproducibility.”  Here, Benjamin sets out a problem regarding the authenticity of the 
work of art in modernity.  In particular, he is concerned about what he calls the loss of 
“aura” taking place as a result of the mechanical reproduction process.  I explain 
Benjamin’s notions of cult value and aura in order to investigate different configurations 
of publics and their approaches to communication.  In particular, I am interested in how 
cults specifically aim to communicate internally rather than to a larger group.  This 
follows upon my critique of Fraser outlined in Section II and expands upon the 
isolationist sense of counterpublics.  I also explore, contra Benjamin, the potential of film 
to generate discourses and aesthetic communities (cults) because of auracity. 
The closure of distance between audience and work and a change in the 
conditions of reception – from attention to distraction – have thrown the art historical 
tradition into a crisis, according to Benjamin.  Benjamin traces the history of 
reproduction in the arts – from replicas made by apprentices in workshops to the use of 
woodcuts, moveable type, engraving, etching, and lithography.488  He argues that “[i]n 
even the most perfect reproduction, one thing is lacking: the here and now of the work of 
art – its unique existence in a particular place.”489  For Benjamin, the “here and now of 
the original underlies the concept of its authenticity.”490  The work’s unique existence is 
intertwined with its particular ownership and reception history.  Put more strongly, 
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reception, context, and physical particularity constitute the authenticity of the work of art.  
Reproductions, according to Benjamin, do not possess the richness of the original work’s 
history, context, or specificity.491  Instead, as copies, they are disconnected from the 
history associated with the original and break the link between physical particularity and 
reception. 
Benjamin acknowledges that technological reproduction carries some 
recognizable benefits: 
[T]echnological reproduction is more independent of the original than is manual 
reproduction.  For example, in photography it can bring out aspects of the original 
that are accessible only to the lens (which is adjustable and can easily change 
viewpoint) but not to the human eye; or it can use certain processes, such as 
enlargement or slow motion, to record images which escape natural optics 
altogether.  […] [T]echnological reproduction can place the copy of the original 
in situations which the original itself cannot attain.  Above all, it enables the 
original to meet the recipient halfway, whether in the form of a photograph or in 
that of a gramophone record.  The cathedral leaves its site to be received in the 
studio of an art lover; the choral work performed in an auditorium or in the open 
air is enjoyed in a private room.492 
Here, Benjamin grants that because reproductions are more independent than originals, 
they may be placed in different contexts and may be manipulated in order to magnify 
specific details that are inaccessible to the naked eye.  During the reproduction process, 
artists may choose to enhance or distort effects present in the original.  From one point of 
view, these attributes may be treated as advantages of reproduction.  Copies can do things 
and be places that the originals cannot, precisely because they are not physical 
                                                
491 One might argue that reproductions are also part of this historical lineage, albeit of a lesser status than 
the original work.  I explore this point in Chapter Five during my discussion of Andy Warhol.  Through the 
use of mass production techniques, Andy Warhol distanced himself from “authenticity” as understood by 
Benjamin in this article.  Furthermore, Warhol problematized the notion of the singularity of artistic genius 
by actively enlisting the help of “The Factory” in producing silkscreened paintings.  Mass production and 
teamwork were essential to Warhol’s creative process.  I will return to this point in Chapter Five. 
492 Benjamin, p. 254. 
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particulars.  However, instead of conceiving the ability to change the location and context 
of a work of art in a positive way – because it opens up new possibilities of exhibition 
and increases access to the work – Benjamin views reproduction in a negative light.  The 
reproduction is divorced from the particular history and context of the work, and 
ultimately, from its particular tradition.  Therefore, its authority and originality is in 
jeopardy.  The greater availability and circulation of reproductions damages the auracity 
of the works because they are brought closer to their audiences.493 
The aura of the work of art, according to Benjamin, is the “core [of] […] its 
authenticity;” “the quintessence of all that is transmissible in it from its origin on;” and 
“the authority of the object.”494  The power and authority of auratic works are derived 
from the aforementioned history and context of the work, including its ownership and 
reception history, and from their physical materiality and presence here-and-now.  
Benjamin argues that the aura of the artwork is jeopardized in the age of technological 
reproduction because the object is removed from “the sphere of tradition.”  In other 
words, when the work is freed from its context and can be transported into a variety and 
multiplicity of locations in ways that were closed to the original, it makes a break with 
the established historical tradition.  The separation of the reproduction from the original 
work’s historical tradition in conjunction with its recontextualization causes the work to 
lose aura, according to Benjamin.495  As a result, the copy is viewed as a subversive 
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Disenfranchisement of Art about the hostess who put a postcard of Guernica up on her kitchen cabinet 
because it is “sufficiently handsome in its gray and black harmonies”– who is completely unaware of the 
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element vis-à-vis that tradition rather than as a part of it.  Furthermore, the proliferation 
of reproductions enables copies to throw off the yoke of context entirely.  According to 
Benjamin, reproductions as a class foster a crisis in the art historical tradition and 
ultimately threaten to destroy that tradition altogether.496 
According to Benjamin, “the desire of present-day masses to ‘get closer’ to things 
spatially and humanly, and their equally passionate concern for overcoming each thing’s 
uniqueness [Überwindung des Einmaligen jeder Gegebenheit] by assimilating it as a 
reproduction”497 fosters the crisis in auratic authenticity.  This line of argument draws 
upon Benjamin’s notion of aura as the “unique apparition of a distance, however near it 
may be.”498  Although Benjamin utilizes this latter definition of aura in reference to 
natural objects, he seems to draw upon it when discussing the crisis brought about by 
reproduction technologies.  The desire of contemporary audiences to get closer and closer 
to artworks draws upon this (natural) sense of aura, but closing the distance between the 
individual and the work endangers its aura because it demystifies the object.  That is, 
proximity with the work makes it seem less foreign, more accessible, and therefore, less 
unique.499   
For Benjamin, the modern condition is marked by the desire to “extract […] 
sameness even from what is unique.”500  Rather than revering objects precisely because 
they are special, modern audiences want to demystify and assimilate works into 
themselves.  This demystification is partially accomplished by separating the work from 
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its history, mystery, and context.  This is a departure from the way cult objects and works 
of art have historically been treated. 
Originally, the embeddedness of an artwork in the context of tradition found 
expression in a cult.  As we know, the earliest artworks originated in the service 
of rituals – first magical, then religious.  And it is highly significant that the 
artwork’s auratic mode of existence is never entirely severed from its ritual 
function.  In other words:  the unique value of the ‘authentic’ work of art has its 
basis in ritual, the source of its original use value.  This ritualistic basis, however 
mediated it may be, is still recognizable as secularized ritual in even the most 
profane forms of the cult of beauty.501 
Benjamin traces the auracity of artworks back to the usage of special objects in cults and 
religious sects.  In these groups, objects were utilized as part of arcane rituals in the 
service of magic or religion.  Such rituals were designed to simultaneously interest 
onlookers (in this case, members of the cult) as well as to mystify them by feeding the 
mystery surrounding the group, objects, or beliefs.502 
Ritualistic objects were valued due to their centrality to the cult as a source of 
mystery, power, and knowledge.  These objects functioned in a dialectical relationship to 
knowledge, thereby securing their cult value and significance for the group.503  On the 
one hand, revered objects played a central role in the practices and beliefs of the cult.  
                                                
501 Ibid., p. 256, emphasis in the original. 
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503 Daniel Herwitz makes a version of this point in The Star as Icon: Celebrity in the Age of Mass 
Consumption in relation to starpower.  Quoting P. David Marshall, he states:  “‘The film star aura 
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group.  See Daniel Herwitz.  The Star as Icon: Celebrity in the Age of Mass Consumption.  New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008., p. 16.  See Also P. David Marshall, Celebrity and Power: Fame in 
Contemporary Culture.  Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997., p. 81-82. 
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These objects were crucial to the identity of the cult as well as to its system of belief.  On 
the other hand, however, these objects were treated in a way that amplified their mystery 
and made them deliberately difficult to comprehend or communicate about.  For this 
latter function to be carried out effectively, it was essential that the designated objects 
remain mysterious, unapproachable, and inaccessible.  In other words, it was necessary 
for the objects’ auracity to remain intact.  
In the last few paragraphs, we have noted the close connection Benjamin 
establishes between aura and cult.  In the remainder of the essay, he traces out the 
relationship of cult objects and works of art.  To tie this back to our argument, recall that 
severing the work from its historical tradition damages its authenticity and aura.  These 
are further damaged when individuals attempt to close the distance between self and 
work by “strip[ping] away its veil.”504  According to Benjamin, in prehistoric times, 
absolute emphasis was placed on the “cult value” of the object, i.e., the object’s role in 
ritual.  The transition from ritualistic treatment to specifically aesthetic reception might 
seem puzzling at first glance, but Benjamin argues that this path of the historical 
transition is made possible by maintaining the cult status of the work of art.505  In other 
words, the treatment of objects and works as valuable, mysterious, and unapproachable 
reveals a similarity between cult objects and works of art.  Importantly for Benjamin, this 
transition preserves the auracity of the cult object in the work of art.  (It is for this reason 
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that works of art can be the impetus for the formation of aesthetic communities that are 
similar to Benjamin’s cults.  I will return to this point momentarily.) 
The cult value of works of art is derived from the special treatment of unique 
objects by a particular group.  Their inaccessibility to a general public helped to confer 
their sacred status. 
Cult value as such tends today, it would seem, to keep the artwork out of sight: 
certain statues of gods are accessible only to the priest in the cella; certain images 
of the Madonna remain covered nearly all year round; certain sculptures on 
medieval cathedrals are not visible to the viewer at ground level.  With the 
emancipation of specific artistic practices from the service of ritual, the 
opportunities for exhibiting their products increase.506 
Benjamin argues that during earlier eras, emphasis was placed upon the cult value of 
works.  Limiting access to these unique objects was essential to establishing their status, 
mystery, and significance for these groups.  In more contemporary times, on the other 
hand, the emphasis is placed upon the exhibition value of works.507  For Benjamin, the 
move to and embrace of exhibition value results in: 1) the treatment of cult objects as 
works of art rather than as instruments in rituals, and 2) the destruction of aura.  First, the 
detachment of sacred objects from their cults makes the move to treat them as works of 
art possible.  Releasing sacred objects from their ritualistic roles makes greater access to 
them possible; exhibition possibilities open up that were formerly closed.508  Persons who 
previously had no access to these objects were able to view and experience them for the 
first time.  As such, the treatment of revered objects as works of art brings the potential 
for commercialization along with the embrace of exhibition value, detaches the object 
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rather a negative one, as does Benjamin.  Because a greater number of individuals may participate in 
reception, a potentially greater number of individuals may appreciate the beauty of the object or work. 
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from the cult, and leads to the loss of aura.  The mysterious or sacred dimension of these 
objects was diminished in part because of their greater accessibility.  Moreover, the move 
towards commercialization spurred people to treat the objects as commodities rather than 
as an essential part of their religious or sacred lives.   
Benjamin argues, however, that “cult value does not give way without resistance.  
It falls back to a last retrenchment: the human countenance.”509  In order to illustrate his 
point, Benjamin argues that photography and film technology benefited from and perhaps 
even exploited the human countenance and its connection to aura.  Benjamin states: 
It is no accident that the portrait is central to early photography. In the cult of 
remembrance of dead or absent loved ones, the cult value of the image finds its 
last refuge.  In the fleeting expression of the human face, the aura beckons from 
early photographs for the last time.  This is what gives them their melancholy and 
incomparable beauty.  But as the human being withdraws from the photographic 
image, exhibition value for the first time shows its superiority to cult value.510 
 
Although technological reproduction allows for the transmission of the semblance of aura 
during early portrait photography, Benjamin argues that it ultimately leads to the 
destruction of the aura.  As aforementioned, technological reproduction decreases the 
distance between individual and work; as a result, the “unique apparition of a distance, 
however near it may be,”511 is diminished.  For Benjamin, technological reproduction 
undermines the authority and dominance of cult value and supplants it with exhibition 
value. This is because the increased potential for exhibition undermines the secretive 
nature of the cult by making these objects and works more public.512 
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 According to Benjamin, the aesthetic crisis spurred by technological reproduction 
is compounded by the change in conditions of reception caused by the development of 
means of mechanical reproduction.  For Benjamin this means a change from more 
individualized absorbed contemplation to a mass reception in distraction.513  Whereas 
“traditional” arts such as painting, sculpture, and theatrical performance make 
uninterrupted contemplation possible, “contemporary” arts promote inattentive 
reception.514  In particular, Benjamin argues that film images prevent contemplation from 
taking place due to a scattering or shattering of focus.  Intercutting, music, and various 
“shock effects” call attention to the technical aspects of filmmaking being employed and 
therefore distract from the work as a whole.  Put another way, according to Benjamin, 
film highlights fragmentation of parts rather than unification of the work.  He states, 
“Reception in distraction – the sort of reception which is increasingly noticeable in all 
areas of art and is a symptom of profound changes in apperception – finds in film its true 
training ground.  Film, by virtue of its shock effects, is predisposed to this form of 
reception.  It makes cult value recede into the background…”515 
To highlight this point, Benjamin argues:  “Distraction and concentration form an 
antithesis, which must be formulated as follows.  A person who concentrates before a 
work of art is absorbed by it; he enters into the work, just as, according to legend a 
Chinese painter entered his completed painting while beholding it.  By contrast, the 
distracted masses absorb the work of art into themselves.”516 
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I argue that this isn’t the only mode of reception open to contemporary audiences.  
As Brecht argues in relation to epic theater, the model of reception that we ought to 
emulate involves concentration and rapt attention, not distraction.517  Using the 
possibility of this type of reception as my basis, I argue that cults can form around shared 
interest in aesthetic experiences coupled with the desire to communicate about them with 
others.  This type of collective reception carves out space for attention to and 
communication about the work that doesn’t threaten to fully unveil or absorb it into the 
masses, but instead, maintains the work’s revered status in the cult.  I will return to this 
point momentarily, after a brief aside about Benjamin’s conception of the last “refuge” 
for aura and cult value. 
Benjamin recognizes the persistence of cult value in relation to the movie star or 
icon, but he simultaneously claims it has a mere shadow of its former worth.  According 
to Benjamin, the aspect of authenticity internal to cults has disappeared.  The cult of the 
movie star is based upon the creation of a star persona that will serve the economic 
interests of the movie studio in question.  In other words, the last remnant of cult value is 
turned towards the ends of exhibition value. 
Film responds to the shriveling of the aura by artificially building up the 
‘personality’ outside the studio.  The cult of the movie star, fostered by the money 
of the film industry, preserves that magic of the personality which has long been 
no more than the putrid magic of its own commodity character.  So long as 
moviemakers’ capital sets the fashion, as a rule the only revolutionary merit that 
can be ascribed to today’s cinema is the promotion of a revolutionary criticism of 
traditional concepts of art.518 
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In other words, the authenticity of the individual actor is lost due to the manipulation in 
the service of financial gain enacted by the Studio’s media machine.  What remains is 
“the putrid magic” of commodification rather than the mysterious authenticity and 
auracity of the individual.  The accessibility of images that is made possible by the 
reproduction process in conjunction with their commodification taints the objects for 
Benjamin.  Commodification and exhibition damage whatever semblance of auratic 
presence may remain in the work.  Instead of attributing any remaining auracity to the 
agency of the movie star, Benjamin discusses the artificiality the promotion process.  He 
argues that studios manufacture a personality to build a cult around – purely in the 
service of making money for themselves – with little or no regard for the work of art.  
When individuals focus upon the aura present in such works, cults may form. 
Benjamin states, “for the first time – and this is the effect of film – the human 
being [actor] is placed in a position where he must operate with his whole living person, 
while foregoing his aura.   For the aura is bound to his presence in the here and now.  
There is no facsimile of the aura.”519  In films, actors perform several different takes that 
can be edited together to compose a single performance, a technique that further dispels 
the aura of the actor because it fragments what once was an organic whole (as in a 
theatrical performance).  Because the director can create a composite performance from 
the selection of different takes, the singularity and wholeness of the performance (and the 
work) is subverted.  Furthermore, Benjamin argues that technological effects such as the 
close up, tracking shot, reaction shot, fade, shot-reverse-shot, etc., distance the audience 
from the performance even more by changing our focus to the technology that makes the 
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work possible.  Benjamin ultimately claims that film is incompatible with cult value and 
aura because film actors do not have the benefit of a live audience, but instead perform 
for a camera.   
In my view, however, there remain two contemporary vestiges of cults: 1) the cult 
of the movie star / icon, and 2) the aesthetic cults that form based upon shared interest in 
specific aesthetic experiences.  In both of these situations, a modicum of aura is 
preserved.  In the first case, as outlined above, Benjamin denies the connection of film 
star and aura by arguing that the aura has already been destroyed because of the 
commercialization and marketing of the star as just another commodity.  This is what 
Benjamin refers to as the “putrid magic” of the film star.520  In Chapter Five, I pick up on 
this thread of argumentation in relationship to the work of Andy Warhol and the cult or 
subculture of individuals who fostered its production and reception.521  For now, I take 
the Bazinian perspective to argue that the authenticity and aura of some actors (icons) is 
indeed transmitted in their films.  In other words, instead of just the character or role, 
arguably, the actress herself shines through in a mysterious way.   
As Bazin states, “The photographic image is the object itself, the object freed 
from the conditions of time and space that govern it.  No matter how fuzzy, distorted, or 
discolored, no matter how lacking in documentary value the image may be, it shares, by 
virtue of the very process of its becoming, the being of the model of which it is the 
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reproduction; it is the model.”522  In virtue of the technology that engendered it, the 
photographic or cinematic image becomes– or even is  – “the real thing,” according to 
Bazin.  While he does not explicitly use the concept of aura in this passage, Bazin’s view 
of images as more than mere representations suggests that something auratic is 
transmitted through photography and film.  Not only do photography and cinema offer a 
realism that was lost to painting over time, but according to Bazin, they also affect us in 
the way that beautiful nature does.523  This effect is due to the auracity of these works. 
Contra Benjamin, there is an additional manner in which cult and cult value 
survive in the contemporary moment.  While Benjamin highlights the aura-destroying 
aspects of technological reproduction, it is possible to view reproductive technology as 
offering up the potential for community building.524  I propose an alternative reading of 
cult in which authenticity and auracity are the impetus for community formation.  When 
individuals and groups seek to communicate about aesthetic experiences that challenge or 
confound them in some way, aesthetic cults may form.  Rather than having a cult that 
draws upon the ritualistic use of mysterious objects, these types of cult form based upon 
the desire to communicate about confounding experiences, particularly aesthetic ones.  In 
this way, cults may form around works of art or artists of various sorts. 
Picking up on the Kantian line of argument from Chapter Two, it is possible that 
individuals may gather together to communicate about aesthetic experiences that are 
difficult to cognize, namely, experiences of works of genius.  In such cases, in spite of the 
difficulties involved (lacking a concept by which to make sense of or unify the 
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experience), individuals try to communicate their experiences and judgments of taste to 
one another.  This struggle to communicate draws upon and sustains the dialectical 
relationship of mystery and knowledge outlined above in relation to Benjamin’s cults.  
Rather than viewing the mysteriousness and difficulty of works of genius as a sufficient 
reason not to communicate about them, I consider their difficulty and mysteriousness a 
primary reason why cults attempt to communicate about them with one another.  
Individuals want to exchange their reactions to and judgments about works of art with 
one another, especially when they are extremely difficult to understand. 
Recognizing the difficulty involved in such an undertaking, it is important to note 
that the goal of communicating about difficult works of art is not adopted by everyone.  
Some works seem so confounding that audience members do not wish to devote more 
time to trying to figure them out.  At times, the difficulty of the works turns into a reason 
to dislike them, especially if individuals get the impression that the works do not have 
much of a point.525  It follows that only some individuals choose to become cult members 
– whether of a particular work or a particular artist, broadly construed. 526  These 
individuals isolate themselves into a community of their own where they can 
communicate with other like-minded individuals about their selected artists and works.  
With this in mind, we must rethink Benjamin’s views on reception.  If individuals try to 
make sense of difficult works of art in community with one another, we must suppose 
that their desire and attempt to grapple with them implies attention rather than distraction.  
                                                
525 See David Foster Wallace.  “David Lynch Keeps His Head.” In A Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll  
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For aesthetic cults, this may even involve experiencing (viewing, listening to, etc.) the 
same work on more than one occasion and then trying to think through their experiences 
in community with a group.  Repetition in the experience of art, in conjunction with 
critical engagement and communication, requires the sort of rapt attention advocated by 
Brecht.   
This particular mode of reception marks out the cult as distinct from the general 
public.  Because members of the aesthetic cult are interested in communication about 
these difficult works and artists, they are a self-selecting lot who respond affirmatively to 
the demand posed by the works and artists in question.  They certainly do not exemplify 
the “norm” of general reception.  Even if we concede, in accord with Benjamin, that 
attentive reception is not the norm, this does not rule out the possibility for contemporary 
audiences to be attentive.527  Attention may simply require a social supplement, in other 
words, aesthetic cult formation.  I also acknowledge that cults are not part of the general 
public because they express ideas that are difficult to communicate about with others.  As 
a result, the central public sometimes marginalizes their ideas.  
While cults may appear to be silent groups from perspectives outside them, they 
are actually characterized by internal communication about their shared interests.  From 
the outside, the group may appear to be silent because members are not attempting to 
communicate with those external to the cult.  To return to Fraser’s formulation of the 
enclave, cults seek only to communicate amongst themselves; they exhibit or exemplify 
internal communication that does not address the central public.528  Recall that this is 
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what Fraser calls the “isolationist” mode of counterpublics.529  Aesthetic cults try to come 
to terms with a work or artist in community with others insofar as those others share their 
withdrawal from the general public.  For this reason, cults are often rather small groups 
of people.  But this still involves expressing and exchanging judgments of taste with 
other people. 
Here again, we must note a further connection between works of genius and the 
foci of aesthetic cults.  Because works of genius are so difficult to communicate about, 
they maintain some of the mystery associated with objects utilized in cult rituals.  The 
crucial difference regards the desire to know and communicate about the work of art 
more deeply.  The dialectical relationship between knowledge and mystery vis-à-vis the 
cult object is central to its significance and power for the cult in question.  So too, the 
aesthetic cult adopts a similar stance towards their works and artists of choice.  Cults 
must strike a delicate balance between the desire to understand the work and artist more 
deeply and the effort to preserve its status as a revered object or person of shared 
significance.  This is a very precarious dance – if one prods too much, the mystery and 
value could be jeopardized.   Because the artist or work is so valuable, it is also in danger 
of being damaged if one strips away too many veils.530  From a Kantian perspective, cult 
members demand agreement not, or not only, in matters of knowledge about but in 
matters regarding their judgments of taste about their favored artists and works.  This 
demand can have deeper implications for the membership of the cult.  Disagreement with 
or denunciation of the work or artist in question on too many occasions may be grounds 
for the expulsion of a member from the cult.   If several members of the cult express such 
                                                
529 Fraser, p. 67-68. 
530 Recall the Benjaminian and Nietzschean image of stripping away veils in pursuit of knowledge about an 
object. 
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judgments, it could alternatively cause the splintering of the cult into yet smaller groups 
or cults.   
 
 
V. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have established the distinction between publics, counterpublics, 
and cults in terms of the type and direction of the communication of the group in question.  
Counterpublics, in particular, are capable of communicating internally, in an isolationist 
fashion, and externally, in a publicist fashion.  Often these groups alternate between both 
modes of communication in order to preserve their identities and expressions as 
constituting valuable contributions to culture.  However, when such identities and 
expressions are put under pressure, they may deliberately choose to isolate themselves in 
order to guard against their marginalization or exclusion.   
As an example of such exclusion, I examined the controversy surrounding Tilted 
Arc and how its removal from its site constitutes a case of extreme wing clipping.  The 
silencing was actually two-fold: not only was the work removed, and thereby silenced, 
but the public debate about Tilted Arc’s status and legitimacy was also brought to a close 
when the work was taken from the plaza.  This case demonstrated that even extreme wing 
clipping can prove unable to fully silence works of art the debates regarding them.  The 
controversy also helped to illustrate the stakes of the exclusion of aesthetic expression, 
even when governmental authorities approved the art in advance.  In part, my reading of 
these events works on a general level regarding the censorship of art that challenges the 
status quo or authorities in question.  In a more specific way, my interpretation regards 
the difficulty of responding to works of genius and how these works and artists may be 
silenced by the publics they aim to address. 
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From there, I examined Benjamin’s notions of cult, cult value, and aura in order 
to investigate different configurations of publics and their approaches to communication.  
In particular, I investigated how cults specifically aim to communicate internally rather 
than to a larger group.  Cults may start out by defining themselves in a position counter to 
the public, as counterpublics do, but then desire to keep to their own community 
afterwards.  While Fraser calls this “separatism,” I argued that we could also understand 
it as a strict version of the isolationism exhibited by some counterpublics.  I also explored 
the potential of film to generate discourses and aesthetic communities (cults) because of 
auracity.  In the next chapter, I continue this line of argument through the exploration of 
how cults function in relation to the work of Andy Warhol, Gordon Matta-Clark, and 
David Lynch.  In addition, I introduce the notion of subcultures as a foil for cults and 
another way to understand Kantian wing clipping and its impact upon works of genius.    
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Chapter Five 
 
Cults and Subcultures 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In Chapter Four, I introduced cults as the analogue to Fraser’s notion of 
isolationist counterpublics.  Contrary to Fraser, I argued that not all groups aim to 
communicate with increasingly larger publics, meaning that isolationism or internal 
communication can be more than merely a stage in the dialectical movement of 
counterpublics.  I argued that although communication with those external to the group 
may be the goal of some counterpublics, this aim does not adequately characterize all 
counterpublics.  Some groups focus upon internal communication and talk amongst 
themselves rather than aiming their communication towards a larger group or public.  
This is especially true if the mainstream public proves to be hostile to isolationist-
counterpublic expressions.  Utilizing Benjamin’s notion of cults, I explored how such 
groups function apart from mainstream culture while maintaining meaningful 
communication within their group, particularly if that group shares an aesthetic interest. 
As illustrated in Chapter Four, it is possible for cults or internally communicating 
groups to exist and function apart from the mainstream public.  In this chapter, I 
investigate another possibility.  What if groups exist in which internal communication 
takes place, but where individuals are open to the possibility of publicist communication, 
i.e., of communicating with the culture from which they exited willingly or were ejected 
from unwillingly?  That is to say, what if some groups do not embrace their isolationist 
status in the way that cults of the Benjaminian variety might, but instead, interact with or 
direct their communication towards mainstream culture?  In order to address such 
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questions, I explore the notion of subculture.  I argue that subcultures can be connected to 
mainstream culture in a variety of ways ranging from actively seeking reintegration to 
engaging with or critiquing mainstream culture while maintaining some distance to being 
minimally open to the possibility of communicating with mainstream culture.  I explore 
the comparison of subcultures and cults in order to determine what subcultures add to the 
ongoing analysis of expression under pressure of restriction.  While cults may appear 
from the outside to be silent, subcultures may appear to speak, but the meaning of the 
expression is not understood by culture.  In this way, subcultures may be understood to 
occupy an intermediate position between cults and culture based upon the direction and 
type of communication they utilize. 
As the final move of the chapter, I explore the connection of restricted or 
excluded expression (works of genius whose wings have been clipped by taste and 
culture) with cults and subcultures.  Here, I return to the artists introduced in Chapter One 
– Andy Warhol, Gordon Matta-Clark, and David Lynch – in order to unite wing clipping 
and restriction on expression with the processes of community or group formation.  As I 
argued in Chapter Four, restriction on expression can be the impetus for establishment, 
consolidation, and unification of aesthetic communities.  Here, I explore the reception of 
three ingenious artists and the cults and subcultures that grew up in response to their 
works.  This moment of argumentation will illuminate silence and silencing in relation to 
the formation of aesthetic communities. 
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II. Subculture 
A. A Return to Culture 
 
In order to define subcultures, it is important to return to our working definition of 
culture from Chapter Two.  As I articulated the term there, culture is that set of customs, 
practices, mores, traditions, and ways of life particular to a group of people.  Culture 
unites group members through the shared perspectives and habits they develop through 
living together.  Often the commonalities are linguistic, moral, and aesthetic in nature.  
Culture can also refer to those individuals who possess it; one can be a “cultured” or 
“civilized” person.  This is slightly different from the sense articulated above, in that it 
signifies the development of higher motivations, purposes, and tastes that are not based 
upon mere need, desire, or natural inclination.  This sense of culture is important because 
it highlights the notion of civilization through a contrast with that which is “natural,” 
“untrained,” or “unrefined.”  As we explore the notion of subcultures and their use of 
style as a form of critique, the sense of “refinement” will become especially important.  
In particular, the use of style and appearances as a way to refuse cultural norms is crucial 
to understanding of subculture.  I will return to this point momentarily. 
In addition to the definitions of culture provided above, let us consider one 
provided by Dick Hebdige in Subcultures: The Meaning of Style.  In this work, Hebdige 
provides an anthropological definition of culture that he adopts from Raymond Williams’ 
Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society:  “[Culture is a] particular way of life 
which expresses certain meanings and values not only in art and learning, but also in 
institutions and ordinary behavior.  The analysis of culture, from such a definition, is the 
clarification of the meanings and values implicit and explicit in a particular way of life, a 
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particular culture.”531  This notion of culture is crucial to the analysis of subcultures, 
because of its emphasis upon institutions and norms of “ordinary behavior.”  In other 
words, Williams’ definition articulates the normative dimension of culture, as that which 
wields the power to legitimate certain acts and values as authoritative and to make these 
the expectation.  In what follows, I argue that subcultures, in addition to presenting a 
contrast to culture, often critique culture’s legitimacy and authority through behavior and 
style.  I argue that subcultures occupy a variety of attitudes towards communication with 
normative culture – from openness to active engagement to critique.  Subcultures attempt 
to show that their values and expressions make a significant contribution to culture, and 
thus, that their communities have been illegitimately excluded from it.  In other words, 
subcultures attempt to reimagine and reconfigure the normative structure of society. 
 
B. Subculture: Communication and Goals 
In contrast to cults, which focus upon internal communication within their 
separate group, subcultures may express a range of attitudes towards expression.  At a 
minimum, subcultures are open to the possibility of communication with mainstream 
culture even though they exist apart from and in contrast to it.  This openness to 
communication is often based upon the desire to rejoin mainstream culture at some point.  
Here, we already move from openness to communication with mainstream culture to the 
desire to communicate with it in order to change it in some way.  As Fraser frames the 
point, reintegration into mainstream culture hinges upon the ability to make manifest the 
fact that the expressions and identities sequestered into the subculture are not only 
                                                
531 Dick Hebdige.  Subculture: The Meaning of Style.  New York: Methuen, 1979., p. 6.  See also 
Raymond Williams.  Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society.  New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1976. 
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acceptable, but also that they matter to culture because they are and always were 
legitimate and valuable contributions to it.  Hence, openness to communication on the 
part of subcultures is related to mainstream culture’s willingness to make room for their 
identities and expressions.   
If cultures are to make space for subcultural expressions and identities, 
subcultures must demonstrate their value to mainstream culture and show that the means 
by which they were excluded were not legitimate or were wrongly motivated by the 
status quo (e.g., the desire to secure political standing by excluding those groups, 
identities, or expressions that pose a threat to maintenance of power).  So, we might say 
that subcultures have two options:  either they attempt to show that their members and 
expressions were unjustly ousted from culture or they aim to show that they constitute 
legitimate and valuable additions to culture that enrich rather than undermine it.  Both of 
these avenues are related to Fraser’s notion of publicist counterpublics that earnestly 
seek to reintegrate into culture.  These groups “function as spaces of withdrawal and 
regroupment […] [but] they also function as bases and training grounds for agitational 
activities directed towards wider publics.  It is precisely in the dialectic between these 
two functions that their emancipatory potential resides.”532  Here, subcultures might be 
understood as not only open to the possibility of communication, but as actively seeking 
to communicate in order to persuade mainstream culture about their value to it through 
agitation, i.e., drawing attention to itself or its identities, or through critique.  As Felski 
                                                
532 Nancy Fraser.  “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing 
Democracy.”  Social Text 25/26 (1990): 56-80., p. 68. 
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frames the point, these groups seek to “convince society as a whole of the validity of 
[their] […] claims.”533  
This openness to communication, coupled with the attempt to convince 
mainstream culture of the value of a different point of view is related to the overarching 
subcultural goal of critique.  Because individuals or groups that later emerge as 
subcultures cannot find acceptance within culture – or are even actively excluded from it 
– they critique culture’s shortcomings and what its norms do not account for.  This 
critique could be accomplished through argumentation and political agitation on the part 
of individuals and groups, as highlighted by Fraser and Felski.  Alternatively, critique of 
culture could be approached more obliquely through style, behavior, and signs.  Because 
some of these critiques are rather assaultive, they may appear to be quite direct because 
of our inability to turn away from their in-your-face criticisms of culture.  However, 
critique through style is a sort of indirect or oblique communication that is not always 
understood by the mainstream culture it aims to address.  I will return to this point 
momentarily. 
 Hebdige focuses upon stylistic critique in Subculture, where he argues that 
subcultures are groups that display their critique of culture through style, behavior, signs, 
and symbols.  By showing what culture’s norms do not include or accept as legitimate 
expressions or identities, subcultures manifest their refusal of the dominant societal 
norms by which such exclusions were made possible.  Because cultures often proceed by 
“winning and shaping consent so that the power of the dominant classes appears both 
                                                
533 Rita Felski.  Beyond Feminist Aesthetics: Feminist Literature and Social Change.  Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1989., p. 168.  See also Robert Asen.  “Seeking the ‘Counter’ in Counterpublics.  
Communication Theory 10 (4) (November 2000): 424-446.,  p. 429, emphasis in original. 
   218 
legitimate and natural,”534 the work of stylized subcultures is to disturb such appearances.  
They both criticize culture for not allowing their modes of expression and identity proper 
hearing and also try to undermine the authority and legitimacy of culture by executing 
their critique in a very public fashion.  As Hebdige articulates the point, subcultures are a 
form of critique, but especially, a form of refusal of culture’s norms of expression and 
behavior.535  This refusal of norms challenges the cultural authorities that prescribed and 
sought to normalize them in the first place.536  Thus, subcultures not only critique the 
hegemonic structure of culture in terms of what counts as “normal” and “authoritative,” 
they simultaneously combat it by providing alternatives.  Subcultures supply their own 
sense of normativity and displace the norms and values provided by culture. 
Hebdige argues that subcultural critique of culture is articulated indirectly:  
“[T]he challenge to hegemony which subcultures represent is not issued directly by them.  
Rather, it is expressed obliquely, in style.  The objections are lodged, the contradictions 
displayed (and, as we shall see, ‘magically resolved’) at the profoundly superficial level 
of appearances: that is, at the level of signs.”537  While Hebdige refers to style and signs 
as an oblique method of critique, it is nonetheless a powerful method.  The fact that 
subcultures perform their critique, in part, through appearances, does not mean that the 
critique is itself superficial.  Rather, as Hebdige notes towards the end of this passage, 
subcultures address others through signs and symbols because they are one way to 
control meaning and signification.  He argues, “The struggle between different discourses, 
different definitions and meanings within ideology is therefore always, at the same time, 
                                                
534 Hebdige, p. 14., emphasis mine.  See also Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson, eds.  Resistance Through 
Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-War Britain.  New York: Routledge, 1975. 
535 Hebdige, p. 3, p. 18. 
536 Ibid., 17. 
537 Ibid., p. 17. 
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a struggle within signification: a struggle for possession of the sign which extends to even 
the most mundane areas of everyday life.”538  Signs, understood here to include style and 
appearances, are a powerful means of resistance to and critique of dominant culture.539   
Stylistic resistance is powerful because of how it manifests an alternative vision 
of what might be included within culture – and thereby points out what is currently 
missing or excluded from culture.  As Hebdige puts the point: 
The meaning of subculture is, then, always in dispute, and style is the area in 
which the opposing definitions clash with most dramatic force […] [T]his process 
begins with a crime against the natural order, though in this case the deviation 
may seem slight indeed – the cultivation of a quaff, the acquisition of a scooter or 
a record or a certain type of suit.  But it ends in the construction of a style, in a 
gesture of defiance or contempt, in a smile or a sneer.  It signals a Refusal.  I 
would like to think that this Refusal is worth making, that these gestures have a 
meaning, that the smiles and the sneers have some subversive value...540 
 
Here, Hebdige points out that subcultures both refuse the norms of dominant culture and 
also present a different set of norms and values that might be accepted in their stead.  
Returning to Wittgenstein’s notion of language as a way of life, we might say that the 
                                                
538 Ibid., p. 17. 
539 In some cases, this means that subcultures take signs from dominant culture and reinterpret them to 
serve their own ends.  That is, they appropriate signs of power or significance from within culture and 
utilize them in a different way – sometimes at counterpurposes to the original use – in order to reveal a new 
meaning, make a critical point, or to undermine the authority that deemed these signs to be legitimate in the 
first place.  This is accomplished by placing the object or sign in another context or by altering it in some 
significant way.  “Turning the sign,” or “détournement,” was a strategy utilized by the Situationists to 
critique society and to open up new ways of thinking and meaning.  According to Sadie Plant, 
détournement “characterized the upsetting of relationships with people, cities, and ideas with games, 
dérives, and constructed situations.  Détournement became the ‘signature of the situationist movement, the 
sign of its presence and contestation in contemporary cultural reality,’ and was ultimately the sense in 
which the situationists conceived the social revolution: a gigantic turning around of the existing social 
world.” See Sadie Plant.  The Most Radical Gesture: The Situationist International in a Postmodern Age. 
New York: Routledge, 1992., p. 89, emphasis in original.  Dérive is a French term that is usually translated 
as “drift.”  The Situationists used dérives as a way to drift through and explore their surroundings, and in 
particular, urban landscapes.  The experimental technique was meant to bring individuals closer to their 
environments in an authentic way.  According to Guy Debord, the dérive is “a mode of experimental 
behavior linked to the conditions of urban society: a technique of rapid passage through varied ambiances.”  
See Guy Debord.  Internationale Situationniste 1 (June 1958).  See also “Détournement as Negation and 
Prelude.”  In Internationale Situationniste 3 (Dec. 1959).  See also Ken Knabb, ed.  Situationist 
International Anthology.  Berkeley, CA: Bureau of Public Secrets, 1981., p.55.  
540 Hebdige, p. 3. 
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subcultural critique of culture is enmeshed with considerations of what ought to be 
valued in culture and what is currently excluded from it by mainstream culture.    
Hebdige argues, “Style in subculture is, then, pregnant with significance.  Its 
transformations go ‘against nature,’ interrupting the process of ‘normalization.’  As such, 
they are gestures, movements towards a speech which offends the ‘silent majority,’ which 
challenges the principle of unity and cohesion, which contradicts the myth of 
consensus.”541  The very existence of subcultures indicates that society or ‘the public’ is 
not homogeneous.542  Thus, one goal of subcultural criticism is to manifest the 
restrictedness of culture and what has been excluded from it as well as to point out what 
it ought to include.  However, as we shall see shortly, these critiques are not always 
understood by mainstream culture because of their subtlety or brashness.  As a result, 
these expressions are sometimes treated as if they make no sense, or as if they are merely 
“noise.”  This treatment can be based on genuine misunderstanding, or upon a willful 
rejection of the critiques subcultures aim to convey.  Thus, the treatment of subcultural 
expression as a kind of “noise” is a way to disarm the critique or not to take it seriously.  
Yet, another cultural strategy for dealing with subcultural expression may be to defuse its 
critique by appropriating subcultural style and behavior.  In the next section, I examine 
each of these strategies in turn. 
 
1. Two Strategies for Cultural Response 
Subcultures present us with an interesting picture of groups that exhibit a desire 
both to communicate with mainstream culture and to criticize, resist, or undermine it.  
                                                
541 Ibid., p. 18. 
542 Fraser, p. 64. 
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The subcultural goals of communication and subversion may be in tension with each 
other.  Resistance or subversion on the part of subcultures may, in turn, be met with 
resistance and suspicion on the part of culture.  In other words, the subcultural critique 
may not be warmly received, if it is understood and received at all.  Subcultures 
sometimes aim to unravel the comfort that culture has cultivated over time – resisting and 
potentially strongly repudiating culture through style and behavior in response to their 
exclusions (perceived or actual).  The stylistic resistance displayed in subculture can 
approach the level of assault with its critiques, and therefore, is often met with similar 
levels of hostility or rejection by mainstream culture.  According to Hebdige, the 
mainstream cultural response often takes two forms:  “(1) the conversion of subcultural 
signs (dress, music, etc.) into mass-produced objects (i.e. the commodity form); (2) the 
labeling and re-definition of deviant behavior by dominant groups - the police, the media, 
the judiciary (i.e. the ideological form).”543  The first form of response is unexpected – 
subcultural critique is defused by making its expressions seem less subversive by making 
them seem more common and safe.  I will deal with each of these techniques in turn, 
beginning with the “re-definition” of subcultural expression as “noise” or “interference” 
and proceeding to discuss the recuperation or co-optation of subcultural style through 
commodification.   
 
a. Noise, Opacity, and Interference: 
Disarmament Through Interpretive Devaluation 
 
 Unlike cults, whose internal communication appears to be silence from the 
outside, subcultures may appear to the mainstream to express a kind of “noise,” 
                                                
543 Hebdige, p. 94. 
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“interference,” “blankness,” or “opacity.”  All of these descriptions of subcultural 
expression convey a recognition that meaning making is taking place within these groups, 
but that the meaning is not understood by all.  As Hebdige puts the point, “‘Subcultures 
represent ‘noise’ (as opposed to sound): interference in the orderly sequence which leads 
from real events and phenomena to their representation in the media.  We should 
therefore not underestimate the spectacular subculture not only as a metaphor for 
potential anarchy ‘out there’ but as an actual mechanism of semantic disorder: a kind of 
temporary blockage in the system of representation.”544  Dominant culture seeks to 
defuse the subversive power of subcultural critique by treating it as something that does 
not speak or mean on its own terms, but merely interrupts the meaning making of 
mainstream culture.  This devalues subculture’s critique.   
However, while subcultures may seem to proceed in a “noisy” fashion that does 
not make any sense, their stylistic critiques can actually be quite deliberate and orderly.  
As Hebdige points out, subcultures attempt “through perturbation and deformation to 
disrupt and reorganize meaning.”545  When the style in question is particularly assaultive 
– such as punk outfits involving “T-shirts covered in swear words”546 and “the most 
unremarkable and inappropriate items – a pin, a plastic clothes peg, a television 
component, a razor blade, a tampon”547 – it may not outwardly appear to present a 
critique, even if it is, from the perspective of its creators, a carefully articulated message 
of refusal.  In punk subculture we see an active rejection of this value, but, as aggressive 
                                                
544 Ibid., p. 90.  See also Hall.  My own caveat here is that subcultures do not “represent” noise.  On the 
contrary, subcultures are treated as if they do not express themselves intelligibly, but only interrupt the 
meaning making of others within culture.  Instead of a “representation” of noise, I would like to substitute 
“interpretation” as a kind of noise by cultural authorities. 
545 Hebdige, p. 106. 
546 Ibid., p. 106. 
547 Ibid., p. 107. 
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as punk style could be, it was quite refined in its own way.  In fact, punk stylistic choices 
are the cultivated rejection of the norms of culture.  Punks utilized chaotic appearances in 
order to systematically critique culture and what was included or represented in it.548  
Hebdige states, “We could go further and say that even if poverty was being parodied, the 
wit was undeniably barbed; that beneath the clownish make-up there lurked the 
unaccepted and disfigured face of capitalism; that beyond the horror circus antics a 
divided and unequal society was being eloquently condemned.”549 
Because of their shocking tactics, punks were commonly misunderstood by 
mainstream culture.  As aforementioned, interpretations ranged from “blank” to “opaque” 
to “noise.”  However, none of these ways of seeing recognized or gave credit to the 
criticism leveled by punk subculture; they merely dismissed it as nonsensical.  Hebdige 
states, “Notions concerning the sanctity of language are intimately bound up with ideas of 
social order.  The limits of acceptable linguistic expression are prescribed by a number of 
apparently universal taboos.  These taboos guarantee the continuing ‘transparency’ (the 
taken-for-grantedness) of meaning.”550  The methodical transgression of social order 
through style suggests that punks may have deliberately presented their critique in ways 
that could be misunderstood by others.  In other words, punks refused traditional meaning 
making by expressing themselves in assaultive ways.  
Insofar as punks were refusing culture and its norms, they may not have wanted 
fully open communication with culture.  In other words, perhaps punks wanted to remain 
incomprehensible.  Hebdige states, “punks dislocated themselves from the parent culture 
                                                
548 Ibid., p. 113. 
549 Ibid., p. 115. 
550 Ibid., p. 91. 
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and were positioned instead on the outside: beyond the comprehension of the average 
(wo)man in the street in a science fiction future.  They played up their Otherness, 
‘happening on the world as aliens, inscrutables.’”551  In this sense, punks wanted to 
display their difference from culture even if what this difference meant or amounted to 
was not clear to outsiders.  The refusal of (traditional) meaning making is itself a kind of 
meaning making; however, this meaning typically remains unperceived by mainstream 
culture.   Often, the punk refusal to be labeled and positioned by culture was interpreted 
as aggressive, nonsensical, noisy, or even blank by mainstream culture. 
 In the case of the mods, a British working class subculture obsessed with the 
minutiae of style, the critique was difficult to detect because of its subtlety.552  We might 
say that their criticism was hidden in plain sight – because it was felt but not fully 
understood.  Arguably, this means that mod subculture was treated as a kind of 
background noise.  Hebdige states:  
‘[T]here was something in the way they moved which adults couldn’t make out’;  
some intangible detail (a polished upper, the brand of a cigarette, the way a tie 
was knotted) which seemed strangely out of place in the office or the classroom.   
Somewhere on the way home from school or work, the mods went ‘missing’: they  
were absorbed into a ‘noonday underground’ of cellar clubs, discotheques, 
boutiques and record shops which lay hidden beneath the ‘straight world’ against 
which it was ostensively defined.553  
 
So even though the mods were visible as a working-class group within or alongside of 
mainstream culture, the precise meaning of their difference was not clear.  Perhaps this 
misinterpretation of mods is based upon their extremely orderly and refined appearance.  
In contrast to the punks who clearly did not fit into mainstream culture with their 
                                                
551 Ibid., p. 120-121. 
552 Ibid., p. 52. 
553 Hebdige, p. 52-53.  The imbedded quotes are from Thomas Wolfe.  The Pump House Gang.  London, 
UK: Bantam Publishing, 1969. 
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blatantly assaultive style, the mods at least appeared to fit in because of their refinement.  
Mods participated in the “straight world” by day, “quietly disrupting the orderly sequence 
which leads from signifier to signified, […] [and] undermin[ing] the conventional 
meaning of ‘collar, suit and tie,’ pushing neatness to the point of absurdity.”554  The 
group fetishized fashion as a means to critique the dysfunctional consumer culture and 
the class system they saw at work in Great Britain at the time.  The extreme cultivation of 
style was an indication of the mods’ lack of fit in culture.  However, the relative 
“quietness” of the mods’ critique of culture made it difficult to discern what their goals 
were. 
The two interpretations of subcultural expression presented above through the 
analysis of mod and punk – as “noise” or “opacity” – complicates how we understand 
subcultures and their goals.  Both mods and punks displayed a resistance to 
communication that is in tension with their desire to speak.  The refusal to be positioned 
by mainstream culture leads to expressions and styles that are deliberately difficult to 
contextualize and understand.  In particular, these difficulties in comprehension are 
connected to the subcultural goals of critiquing and subverting culture.  Subcultural 
resistance to conformity and comprehensibility is deeply connected with the group’s 
desire not to be dominated by mainstream culture.  The desire to live on its own terms 
can be taken to extremes; when style is apprehended as blankness or expressionlessness, 
the refusal of cultural norms is interpreted as an ultimate refusal of signification as such.  
But, if the group cannot be defined, it cannot be dominated, either.  This desire not to be 
dominated might be construed as a refusal of the entire communicative enterprise.  
                                                
554 Hebdige, p. 52. 
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Therefore, obliqueness is interpreted by mainstream culture as a deliberate tactic 
utilized by subcultures to avoid easy definition and domination.  However, this 
obliqueness can lead to culture’s attempt to defuse subcultural criticism by treating 
subcultural expression as noise or interference.  By treating subcultural critique as 
“noise,” “interference,” or “nonsense,” rather than “sound” or “meaning,” its significance 
is diminished from the outset.  Treating subcultural expression in this way defuses the 
apparent threat it poses to mainstream culture by treating it as illegitimate and 
nonsensical.   
 
b. Closeness to Culture and the Potential for Co-Optation 
 
As argued above, one strategy for dealing with the dangers of subcultural 
expression is to treat it as mere noise or interference.  However, the cultural response to 
such expression can also include co-optation or recuperation, by which resistance to 
culture becomes yet another element of culture.  This will be the focus of this section.  
According to Hebdige:  
We have seen how subcultures ‘breach our expectancies,’ how they represent  
symbolic challenges to a symbolic order.  But can subculture always be 
effectively incorporated and if so, how?  The emergence of a spectacular 
subculture is invariably accompanied by a wave of hysteria in the press.  The 
hysteria is typically ambivalent: it fluctuates between dread and fascination, 
outrage and amusement.555 
 
In this passage, Hebdige points towards other avenues of response – those of 
reintegration and co-optation.  We must ponder whether culture can reintegrate 
subcultures into itself by making room for their expressions and identities or whether 
these groups and meanings must remain outside of it because of their resistance and 
                                                
555 Ibid., p. 92-93. 
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subversion.  Another response is for subcultures to be integrated into culture by diffusing 
their critiques (rather than recognizing their legitimacy) and co-opting their style in order 
to undermine its force and power. 
Because of their openness to communication with culture and closeness to it, 
subcultures are in greater danger than cults for co-optation.  Especially when we are 
dealing with appearances, we must consider the ease with which culture can adopt 
subcultural styles and make them their own.  By taking subversive styles into themselves, 
culture diminishes their revolutionary potential and impact by making them available for 
purchase, distribution, and ordinary consumption.  In such cases, the act of inclusion does 
not recognize or give weight to the critique leveled against culture, but instead diminishes 
it by making it appear to be compatible with culture in its current form.  As Hebdige 
frames the point, “the other can be trivialized, neutralized, domesticated.  Here, the 
difference is simply denied (‘Otherness is reduced to sameness.’)”556  By treating 
subversive styles as mere parts of culture – reducing their differences into sameness 
through incorporation – their critique is dissolved.  It is important to note that in some 
cases, the inclusion of subcultural expressions and identities is a positive step towards the 
generation of a more diverse and meliorative culture.  However, in cases where the 
subcultural critique of culture is neutralized through inclusion, culture takes a step 
backwards.  Instead of being inclusive, culture resists difference and change by means of 
co-optation.  
While I argued above that some styles move well beyond critique of culture to an 
assault upon it, incorporating them into culture detracts from their subversive impact.  
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Inclusion, in this case, makes subcultural styles seem less dangerous, more normal, or 
even “trendy.”  This co-optation takes style and recontextualizes it, giving it a different 
meaning and significance.  In other words, subcultural style, when co-opted, can be 
bought and sold just like any other commodity.  Hebdige argues: 
Youth cultural styles may begin by issuing symbolic challenges, but they must 
inevitably end by establishing new sets of conventions; by creating new 
commodities, new industries or rejuvenating old ones […] punk clothing and 
insignia could be bought mail-order by the summer of 1977, and in September of 
that year Cosmopolitan ran a review of Zandra Rhodes’ latest collection of 
couture follies which consisted entirely of variations on the punk theme.  Models 
smoldered beneath mountains of safety pins and plastic (the pins were jeweled, 
the ‘plastic’ wet-look satin) and the accompanying article ended with an aphorism 
– ‘To shock is chic’ – which presaged the subculture’s imminent demise.557 
 
In this scenario, we see that stylistic challenges to culture are defused, not because the 
critique they present has been analyzed and accepted such that the norms in question have 
been altered to account for these meanings, but because these critiques have been reduced 
to the level of “mere style.”  That is, the norms and values that were critiqued through 
stylistic means have not been reconsidered by mainstream culture. 
 Interestingly, in the battle for signification or “control of the sign,” culture 
alternates between “othering” and “normalizing” subcultures.  Both are strategies by 
which mainstream culture seeks to neutralize the perceived threat of subculture.  Hebdige 
states:  
[P]unk’s threat to the family was made ‘real’ (that could be my child!) through the  
ideological framing of photographic evidence which is popularly regarded as  
unproblematic.  None the less, on other occasions, the opposite line was taken.  
For whatever reason, the inevitable glut of articles gleefully denouncing the latest 
punk outrage was counterbalanced by an equal number of items devoted to the 
small details of punk family life […] Photographs depicting punks with smiling 
mothers, reclining next to the family pool, playing with the family dog, were 
placed above a text which dwelt on the ordinariness of individual punks: ‘It’s not 
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as rocky horror as it appears’...‘punk can be a family affair’…‘punks as it happens, 
are non-political,’ and, most insidiously, albeit accurately, ‘Johnny Rotten is as 
big a household name as Hughie Green.’558 
 
Treating subcultural expressions as noise, nonsense, opaque, or as “normal,” defuses their 
critique of culture and neutralizes it.  By casting punk subculture in a wholesome light, it 
can be interpreted as safe or as a part of culture that poses no threat.  Thus, its critique is 
defused and treated as though it were not incisive or worthy of deep consideration by 
culture. 
 
2. Summary 
Subculture resists mainstream culture by attempting to critique, subvert, and 
change it.  It presents an alternative to mainstream culture by showing what identities and 
expressions mainstream culture does not currently include, and suggests that mainstream 
culture ought to include them.  This is the normative dimension of subculture.  As Stuart 
Hall frames the point, “New...developments which are both dramatic and ‘meaningless’ 
within the consensually validated norms, pose a challenge to the normative world.  They 
render problematic not only how the...world is defined, but how it ought to be.  They 
breach our ‘expectancies.’”559  Not only do subcultures present an alternative vision of 
culture and what it should include, but their expressions and identities also clash with 
current norms and values.  Here, the tension between openness to communication and 
critique arises.  The desire for recognition from mainstream culture – and the ability to 
change it to include those identities and values – can lead to difficulties in 
communication and understanding between culture and subculture.  This requires 
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mainstream culture to recognize subculture’s difference from itself, but also to evaluate 
the subculture in a positive way as a group making an important contribution to 
mainstream culture through identity and expression. 
The desire to communicate with culture is sometimes coupled with resistance to 
culture.  So while subcultures are open to communication, they also express a refusal of 
the norms of culture.  This resistance may come across negatively and turn into a conflict 
with culture.  It may be interpreted as noise or opacity rather than meaning making either 
because it is misunderstood, or in order to defuse the cultural critique it presents.  
However, subcultural openness to communication may also provide an opportunity for 
co-optation.  Culture may attempt to neutralize the revolutionary spirit of subculture by 
treating it as “mere style” instead of recognizing the organized alternative use of signs as 
a form of critique. 
 
III.  Transition: 
 
Communication and Community Building in Cults and Subcultures 
 
With this analysis of cults and subcultures in place, I want now to return to the 
three artists of concern to this dissertation, Andy Warhol, Gordon Matta-Clark, and 
David Lynch.  As articulated in Chapter One, these three artists exhibit Kantian genius.  
Throughout the dissertation, I have been examining the question of what is at stake when 
taste clips the wings of genius for the sake of culture – to make its expressions more fit 
and lasting.  Through the various degrees of clipping under investigation, the question of 
marginalization and silencing came into play with respect to judgments of taste and the 
inclusivity of culture.  Whether the wings were not clipped at all, minimally clipped, or 
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extremely clipped, inclusion, exclusion, and silencing were at stake.  Simultaneously, 
when particular forms of or interests in expression were put under pressure by culture, 
communities that valued these expressions and meanings and what they had to contribute 
to culture gathered themselves together.  The distinction articulated between cults and 
subculture amounts to the following:  While cults are content to preserve their meanings 
apart from culture – and focus upon isolationist communication within their group – 
subcultures are open to the possibility of communication with culture.   
Openness to and engagement with culture stems from the hopes of finding a place 
within culture for subcultural identities and expressions.  However, openness can lead to 
a different form of silencing – through co-optation by mainstream culture.  So while both 
cults and subcultures express themselves in relation to culture, their strategies and 
approaches are markedly different.  While cults aim only to communicate internally with 
their group, subcultures ultimately aim to communicate outwardly or externally with 
individuals or groups outside of their own.  And while cults appear to be silent from the 
outside, subcultures appear to make a kind of noise that isn’t fully comprehensible to 
culture.  Cults, we might say, enclave themselves and are subsequently pushed aside or 
even ignored because they appear not to express anything valuable.  Subcultures, by 
contrast, are often co-opted by culture such that its critiques are undermined or dissolved 
entirely.   
Both kinds of groups are essential to the inquiry at hand because they articulate 
meanings from the fringes, meanings that are themselves fringe or marginal.  Returning 
to Fraser’s notion of counterpublics, we might say that cults and subcultures approach the 
issue of communication from the perspective of isolationism and publicism, respectively.  
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While cults aim to communicate with their group internally, subcultures aim, in some 
cases, to communicate with individuals or groups outside their own, most notably, with 
mainstream culture as such.  But regardless of these differences, both cults and 
subcultures form themselves around identities, meanings, or expressions they consider to 
be valuable and worthy of maintenance and sharing.   
The desire to communicate about particular artists or works of art serves as a focal 
point for aesthetic community formation and unification.  As I argued in Chapter Two in 
accord with Kant, we are driven to respond to art through the exchange of our judgments 
of taste with one another.  Even if we cannot fully make sense of the art in question, we 
try to work through it in conversation with other people by sharing our judgments of taste 
and demanding that others agree with our assessments.  This is particularly complicated 
when we encounter works of genius that defy our expectations and thwart our attempts to 
fully cognize them.  Even or especially in such moments, however, we are driven all the 
more strongly to attempt to make sense of such complicated works of art by 
communicating with other people who are also drawn to these works and desire to make 
sense of them in accord with other judges.   
As I suggested in the section on cults, members are self-selecting.  I say “self-
selecting” because not everyone will embark on the enterprise of thinking through a work 
of genius that stretches the bounds of comprehensibility, let alone want to form a 
community that is based upon this interest.  In some sense, the work calls out to these 
persons.  Something irresistible in it attracts them, but they might not be able to express 
what that is.560  The work chooses them.  To put the point in a Kantian way, the 
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individual feels her self in response to the work.561  Something about the work resonates 
with her.  In reaction to this attraction, some individuals respond to the work through the 
exchange of judgments of taste with other persons.  Those who are very interested may 
eventually choose to form a community.  I claim that aesthetic group formation can be an 
effect of the collective goal of trying to comprehend works of genius, especially when 
these works are under pressure of marginalization or silencing.  In the next sections of 
argument, I return to the artists with whom I opened the investigation with this idea about 
group formation in mind. 
  
 
IV. Andy Warhol, Reception, and Group Formation 
 
In one sense, we might say that the difficulty of Warhol’s entrance into the fine 
art world pushes him towards cult status.  I argue, however, that Warhol ultimately 
fostered a subculture that sought to critique the current norms of the artworld.  Warhol’s 
aesthetics sought to integrate art and life and thereby to reimagine art’s relation to culture.  
In order to make my case, I explore the pressures that Warhol faced when he attempted to 
enter the world of fine art and how he became the facilitator of an underground aesthetic 
scene which was steeped in communal art making.  To do so, I focus upon the Factory, 
the location and home of Warhol’s creative art making community, as a center for 
subcultural activity that critiqued art and society.  In particular, I focus upon the 
cooperative process of making silk-screen paintings and what this indicates about 
Warhol’s approach to art, community, and reception.  Of course, despite his difficulties 
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early on, Warhol has become one of the most important artists of the 20th Century.  
Questions about recuperation or co-option will therefore reenter our analysis. 
 
A. Warhol’s Uncertain Beginnings:  Cult or Subculture? 
 
Warhol had a difficult time securing his place in the fine art world.  Initially, he 
was not speaking the same language of the artworld, and so he was viewed as not 
speaking in a meaningful way.  To put it pointedly, we might interpret Warhol’s 
expression during the 1950s and early 1960s as under pressure from the conventions of 
the artworld – or even that he was being silenced by the artworld, as is evidenced by the 
fact that he could not find a gallery to exhibit his works.  Warhol was defying the 
predominant norms of art making of his time – combining commercial with fine art or 
“low” with “high” art.  This fact might explain his rejections from the artworld and go 
some way towards indicating his cult status during this stage of his career.  By turns, it 
was too “commercial,” too “low-brow,” or too “ad avenue.”  Instead of being seen as art, 
it was seen as advertising or commerce.  The difference, for example, between Warhol’s 
work and mere advertising was not fully clear, and this was interpreted negatively.  In 
Chapter One, I explored the way in which Warhol’s propensity to blur the boundaries of 
distinctions like art / life and fine art / commercial art made it difficult for him to break 
into the artworld in spite of his earnest efforts and the quality of his work.  Here, I want 
to explore what this difficulty meant for the reception of Warhol’s work and the 
directions his aesthetic took subsequently.  In particular, I want to examine how these 
events may be related to the formation of an aesthetic community. 
While Warhol’s Pop Art is today considered a pivotal moment in the history of art 
and aesthetics, it was not embraced at its introduction.  Warhol was not speaking the 
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predominant language of the artworld in the 1950s – Abstract Expressionism in 
particular; he was speaking in the vernacular of everyday people.  For a time, Warhol 
toyed with Abstract Expressionism in his work by making sure that splashes and 
splotches of “action” marked his paintings to show his “sensitivity.”562  He did this in 
order to fit in or gain acceptance in the artworld and to mark his work as “now.”563  But 
according to Emile de Antonio, this detracted from rather than added to Warhol’s work:   
[Andy] put two large paintings next to one another.  Usually he showed me the 
work more casually, so I realized that this was a presentation.  He had painted two 
pictures of Coke bottles about six feet tall.  One was just a pristine black-and-
white Coke bottle.  The other had a lot of Abstract Expressionist marks on it.  I 
said ‘Come on Andy, the abstract one is a piece of shit, the other one is 
remarkable.  It’s our society, it’s who we are, it’s absolutely beautiful and naked, 
and you ought to destroy the first one and show the other.’564  
 
While Abstract Expressionism was an American movement, it didn’t express Warhol’s 
aesthetic interests.  This feedback from a trusted friend served as a crucial turning point 
for Warhol.  Instead of trying to “fit in” to Abstract Expressionism, Warhol started to go 
his own way toward the expression of everyday life.  In doing so, he raised questions 
about what could be considered art and what the difference between art and life amounted 
to.  As Danto puts the point, “The mandate was: paint what we are.  The breakthrough 
was the insight into what we are.  We are the kind of people that are looking for the kind 
of happiness advertisements promise us that we can have, easily and cheaply. […] 
Warhol began to paint the advertisements in which our deficiencies and hopes are 
portrayed.”565  In advertisements, Warhol saw the dreams and desires of the American 
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people depicted in vivid detail.  In selecting everyday advertisements or commodities as 
his subject matter, Warhol started to explore the border between commercial and fine art. 
In a telling move, before Warhol secured a “proper” gallery show, he exhibited in 
liminal spaces: “the Loft Gallery was a modest showroom adjoining an advertising office, 
Serendipity was a restaurant, and Bonwit Teller was a store.  Just as they weren’t ‘real’ 
galleries, Andy’s work was not regarded as ‘real’ art.  He was not on the radar screen.”566  
These liminal exhibitions indicate that the kind of art Warhol was interested in making 
was not understood to be fine art – it was closer to commerce and everyday life.  But this 
leads to a conundrum regarding how to categorize Warhol’s work.  Was it a form of 
isolationist, cult expression?  Or was it a form of publicist, subcultural expression?   
The lack of understanding of Warhol’s work is not on its own enough to justify 
classifying it as cult expression.  It is also crucial to examine Warhol’s goals for his art.  
Because Warhol genuinely aimed to engage and communicate with wider publics 
including that of the artworld, I hesitate to categorize his work as isolationist cult 
expression.  Warhol’s tenacious pursuit of an exhibition in the artworld means that he 
aimed at publicist rather than isolationist expression.  However, the subcultural 
classification should also give us pause because Warhol did not yet have a real 
community to receive or collaborate with him on his work, as became the case later in his 
career with the Factory.  Is it possible that Warhol was a one-man subculture?  Or that he 
produced subcultural expressions without the support of a subcultural community?  Is it 
possible that Warhol’s early years were marked by a combination of these expressions?  
It seems to me that Warhol’s early years were marked by a combination of cult and 
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subcultural expression based upon the lack of understanding of his work in combination 
with his goal of expressing himself to wider publics.  
To address these questions, let us return to the Advertisement paintings Warhol 
displayed in the window of Bonwit Teller’s department store that appeared to be 
advertisements that were related to the clothing on display.  Danto states: 
Warhol’s first exhibition […] belonged by rights to the Warhol of shoes and 
pussycats: the Fifty-seventh Street windows of Bonwit Teller.  But the paintings 
on display for one week only, in mid-April 1961, belong to his new phase.  There 
are five in all.  Advertisement is based on a montage of black-and-white 
newspaper ads: for hair tinting; for acquiring strong arms and broad shoulders; for 
nose reshaping; for prosthetic aids for rupture; and (“No Finer Drink”) Pepsi-
Cola.567   
 
The images looked more like advertisements for elixirs promising quick cures from the 
back pages of disreputable newspapers than like works of art.  As a result, few who saw 
Warhol’s paintings in this window display viewed them as works of fine art.  As Danto 
comments, “Who, pausing to look at the display would have predicted that Advertisement 
would find its way to Berlin’s National Gallery by way of the museum at 
Monchengladbach and the Hamburger Bahnhof Museum for Contemporary Art?”568  In a 
sense, this near-lack of reception is similar to that of the overlooked readymades that 
Duchamp displayed at the entrance to a gallery show.569   
Because of their similarity to advertisements or illustrations, Warhol’s paintings 
blended in with the rest of the window display.  Danto states, “What almost nobody in 
1961 would have seen, had they passed the window at Bonwit Teller, is that it was full of 
art.  They thought they were looking at women’s wear, with some vernacular images 
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taken from the culture…”570  While most did not recognize Warhol’s paintings to be art 
of any sort, some viewers might have understood the paintings to be a form of 
commercial art or advertising due to the similarity of the images they contained.  The use 
of subject-matter like soup and scouring pads might be one reason for their problematic 
reception, for it raised the question: what distinguishes Warhol’s work from advertising?  
The use of familiar products as subject-matter also suggests that art is for everyone, just 
as Campbell’s soup or Coke is for everyone, not just for the monied artworld elite.571  As 
Warhol put the point, “Pop art is for everyone.  I don’t think art should be only for the 
select few, I think it should be for the mass of American people…”572  Warhol’s 
populism extended from the subject-matter of his works to their exhibition and sale.  As 
Danto recalls, Warhol later had a stack of paintings at the front desk of the Castelli 
Gallery that were priced for everyday people:  “A genuine work of art for five bucks!”573  
The “ads” in Bonwit’s window and the Coke Bottle paintings would ultimately 
develop into a Warholian love affair with depicting commercial products – from 
Campbell’s soup cans to Brillo boxes.  By some accounts, Warhol got the idea for his 
“soup” paintings from Muriel Latow, who suggested that he paint something “everybody 
sees every day, that everybody recognizes…like a can of soup.”574  Interestingly, Warhol 
made the commonness or everydayness of Campbell’s soup an aesthetic by mass-
producing these works using the silk-screening process.  As the size and number of 
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paintings grew, Warhol began to employ the assistance of his friends and associates and 
ultimately the Factory subculture was born.  I will return to this point in the next section 
of argument. 
According to Danto, part of the reason for Warhol’s selection of Campbell’s soup 
cans as subject-matter for his paintings was that he thought it would put him in the 
company of other avant-garde artists of his day.  Danto states: 
[I]t would have seemed to Warhol that painting that kind of subject [Campbell’s 
soup cans] was a step toward becoming one of Castelli’s artists, and showing in 
his gallery, which specialized in a certain kind of cutting edge art.  Castelli had 
taken on Robert Rauschenberg and Jasper Johns – the artists Warhol admired 
most.  He had just taken on Lichtenstein, whose art was close to what Warhol 
himself was producing, though Warhol had evidently been unaware of him.575 
 
In fact, Warhol’s first solo show took place at the Ferus Gallery in Los Angeles in July, 
1962.  It featured a series of the Campbell’s Soup Cans that Warhol produced utilizing 
the silk-screening technique.  This process allowed Warhol to use a stencil to 
manufacture multiple copies of a single image, or, in this case, to manufacture uniform 
(and un-painterly) silk-screened paintings of all of the thirty-two varieties of Campbell’s 
soup.  According to Danto, “The Campbell’s Soup Cans were portraits, in that each 
contained a different variety of soup, the name of which was printed on its label.  
Repetition came to be one of the master elements in what could be called the Warhol 
aesthetic.”576 
In one sense, the Campbell’s Soup Cans were portraits of commodities.  For 
Warhol, what made Campbell’s soup great was its reliable “sameness.”  Everyone, 
regardless of his or her class or economic status, could get the same soup and no one 
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buying Campbell’s could get a better soup than anyone else.577  In this sense, the 
Campbell’s Soup Cans were oblique portraits of the American people who consumed 
these soups.  This made the art accessible to everyone because of the product’s 
familiarity in their everyday lives, that is, because the paintings were for and about them.  
From a different perspective, one could even argue that the paintings were a portrait of 
Warhol himself, because he reportedly ate Campbell’s soup for lunch everyday as well.  
Again, the reliable sameness of the soup appealed to Warhol’s habitual nature.  
Combining these two perspectives, one can argue that the paintings are about Warhol as 
much as they are about America and its products. 
 Repetition would ultimately play an important role in Warhol’s aesthetic.  Not 
only did Warhol display Campbell’s Soup Cans as a series at the Ferus Gallery,578 but he 
also continued to produce silk-screened paintings based upon the principles of repetition 
and difference.  Importantly, as the number and size of his paintings grew, it became 
clear that Warhol needed an assistant in his work.  In fact, Warhol built a community 
around making aesthetic projects of various sorts.  In addition to the increased publicity 
surrounding Warhol, the formation of the Factory is a decisive point in turning his status 
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from cult to subculture.  Repetition and community would become leading factors in 
Warhol’s aesthetics moving forward.    
To summarize this section of argument, Warhol’s early career is marked by both 
cult and subcultural expression.  While Warhol continually sought out opportunities to 
show his work, he had difficulty securing an exhibition in a traditional gallery.  This 
shows that Warhol aimed to address a wider audience with his art, and as such, that he 
utilized a type of publicist subcultural expression.  As noted above, however, Warhol did 
not yet have a community with whom he shared and collaborated on his art.   So, we 
might say that Warhol was a “one-man subculture” who expressed himself in ways that 
were difficult to understand by the standards of mainstream culture and of the artworld.  
However, because most who saw Warhol’s early work did not understand it to be art, we 
might instead characterize these paintings as a form of cult expression.  Because his 
Advertisement paintings were overlooked while on display in the window of Bonwit 
Teller’s, we might even say that Warhol’s expression was “received” by culture as a form 
of silence.  If these paintings were seen at all, they were understood as a kind of 
background noise rather than as aesthetic expression.  My indecision about how to 
classify Warhol’s early career points to the difficulty of distinguishing between cult and 
subcultural expressions.  Because the notion of a “one-man subculture” is a contradiction 
in terms, I favor the interpretation of Warhol’s work as a form of cult expression that 
mysteriously combined fine art and commercial art. 
 
B. Warhol’s Factory Subculture 
In the 60s and 70s Warhol engaged in art making in a way that invited and 
demanded the community and participation of others.  Ultimately, Warhol’s interest in 
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communal art projects culminated in the rise of the Factory, Warhol’s studio, and the 
center for art making, gathering, happenings, work, and life.  It was a permissive and 
creative space where almost anything went and where painting, music, poetry, and film 
were made with others.  In addition to more traditional artworld figures, Warhol also 
drew in a variety of creative individuals who were outsiders or misfits in their day-to-day 
lives.  Their outsider status stemmed from the fact that their identities and expressions 
were unacceptable to mainstream culture.  In the Factory these individuals gained 
acceptance and voice and would ultimately be embraced as Superstars.  This aspect of 
Warhol’s aesthetics is crucial in that it shows how an aesthetic community formed in 
response to exclusion and silencing.  
Even after some initial successes, and the making of in-roads into the artworld, 
Warhol was nonetheless not part of the art establishment.  Indeed, in his first show at the 
Ferus Gallery, Warhol sold only six of thirty-two paintings.579  He was becoming more 
connected, but Warhol was still on the fringes of the artworld.  As Watson notes of 
subsequent exhibitions: 
Elvis Presley was the sole subject of Andy Warhol’s exhibition at the Ferus 
Gallery in September 1963: none sold […] In the wake of his sold-out debut at the 
Stable Gallery, one might assume Warhol felt flush.  He was instead experiencing 
the vagaries of the art world.  Eleanor Ward had refused to show his Death and 
Disaster paintings.  Andy felt financially strapped.  He decided not to frame his 
paintings before shipping them to L.A.  He simply left the silk-screened images 
on long, uncut rolls to be stretched and framed on the West Coast.580 
 
Warhol’s work was sometimes met with success, but it was still quite controversial.  The 
controversy made Warhol a popular topic of conversation – his Campbell’s Soup Cans 
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were discussed in Time magazine before they were shown at the Ferus Gallery581 – but 
this notoriety didn’t always translate into being taken seriously as a fine artist or into 
securing exhibitions.  In fact, during the early sixties, Warhol’s reception was marked by 
as much failure as success. 
In connection with this point, Watson writes about a road-trip from New York to 
Los Angeles that Warhol and some of his coterie took in 1963 for the September opening 
of his show at Ferus.582  In part, this mode of transportation was chosen based upon 
financial considerations; in part, it was chosen because it presented an opportunity to 
bond and to “see America on the road,” as Gerard Malanga, Warhol’s assistant, put it.583  
Watson writes:  
[Taylor] Mead recalled, ‘It was a whole new way of looking at the United States, 
filled with the bright, primary colors that Warhol or Lichtenstein might have 
painted.  Especially the signs over the motels along Route 66.  As we got farther 
west, all the signs on motels were real Pop Art.’ The biggest sensations of all 
were the signs and billboards along Sunset Strip in Los Angeles: towering images, 
exaggerated colors, reproductions that were hyperreal and improbably big. ‘Oh, 
this is America!’ Andy repeatedly said.584 
 
This anecdote illustrates that by 1963 Warhol was already working cooperatively with a 
group of individuals on art projects across several media.  Malanga, a poet, became 
Warhol’s trusted assistant who played a critical role in executing the larger silk-screening 
projects because of his prior experience in this area.585  Together, Warhol and Malanga 
                                                
581 Danto, p. 35. 
582 Watson, p. 444. 
583 Ibid., p. 110. 
584 Ibid., p. 111. 
585 According to Watson, “Gerard had worked as an $1.25-an-hour apprentice for […] Leon Hecht, from 
whom he learned the craft of silk-screening fabric for RoosterCraft ties.”  See Watson, p. 93. 
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would silk-screen series including Elizabeth Taylor and Elvis Presley and Ethel Scull 
Thirty-six Times.586   
Warhol’s use of mechanical reproduction, in conjunction with his cooperation 
with assistants, raised further questions about the originality of his work.  Warhol’s 
orientation towards a community of art making distanced him even further from the 
model of a singular artistic genius.  Perhaps as a result of being silenced by the artworld 
through his early rejections, Warhol sought to create his own community, or what I argue 
became a subculture.  I’m not claiming that this is a directly causal relationship, but 
rather, that as Warhol’s art developed, it developed in conjunction and community with 
other individuals who had similar interests, concerns, or criticisms of the contemporary 
artworld in the 1960s.  The community that Warhol garnered was not only made up of 
those who thought his work was worthwhile or interesting in its own right, but was also 
comprised of other artists, “outsiders” and “transgressors” of norms.  They were 
interested in “seeing and being seen” and in art that raised questions about this 
relationship.  Just as in subcultures as defined earlier in this chapter, Warhol’s Factory 
raised the question of appearances or style to as a form of critique. 
The Factory, in its various incarnations, was more than just a studio space for 
Warhol. 587  It was a gathering place for a community of misfits and outsiders from all 
walks of life.  As Danto puts the point, “almost from the beginning, the Silver Factory 
became a ‘scene’ – a place where people dropped in and became part of what was 
                                                
586 By this time in 1962, Warhol had already begun his Marilyn and Death and Disaster series. 
587 The Silver Factory was the name of Warhol’s studio from 1964-1968.  It was so called because its walls 
and décor were silvered with paint and foil.  The location was a former hat factory located on East 47th 
Street.  The Factory ultimately moved to Union Square when the Silver Factory was condemned.  Watson 
writes, “[it] was a distinctly different environment.  Instead of reflective tinfoil and silver concrete, the new 
studio featured light pouring through tall windows and natural wood on the floor.”  See Watson, p. 371, xi-
xii, and p. 359. 
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happening.  It was certainly unlike any art studio at the time in its openness.  Work went 
on, but a lot more than that went on.”588  Almost everyone who came to the Factory was 
asked to participate in whatever project was underway at that moment – whether it was 
an experimental short film or silk-screening paintings.  Occasionally, movie stars or 
musicians stopped by just to take in the scene and ended up becoming a part of it.589   
The collective time, creativity, and talent of these individuals yielded various silk-
screen paintings (Flowers in particular were a collective endeavor; Warhol commonly 
had several people working on the smaller canvases which are estimated at a total of 900 
in all, with the Factory producing up to eighty per day),590 the Screen Tests, which had 
multiple “portrait” subjects, with a total number of films estimated at 472,591 films like 
Sleep, Tarzan and Jane Regained…Sort Of, Batman / Dracula, Kiss, Eat, and the Chelsea 
Girls,592 and experimental musical happenings from the Exploding Plastic Inevitable 
(featuring the Velvet Underground).  The people who were invited in to the Factory were 
selected for their personality, creativity, or style.  Many were artists in their own right – 
like Malanga, who was a poet, the Velvet Underground, who were musicians, and Paul 
Morrissey, who was a filmmaker.  Other members of the Factory were from the farther 
fringes of society.  Because they were treated as different or unequal by culture due to 
their sexual orientation, manner of dress, or drug habits, they gravitated towards the 
openness and acceptance that the Factory had to offer.  Over time, Warhol’s coterie 
                                                
588 Danto, p. 74-75. 
589 See Steven Watson’s Factory Made: Warhol and the Sixties for a detailed account of the individuals 
who participated in Warhol’s art making.  
590 Patrick S. Smith.  The Art and Films of Andy Warhol.  Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press, 1986., p. 
193.  Sometimes there were as many as fifteen Factory members working on the smaller Flowers paintings 
together in the afternoon. 
591 Callie Angell.  Andy Warhol’s Screen Tests: The Films of Andy Warhol Catalogue Raisonné.  New 
York: Abrams, in association with the Whitney Museum of American Art, 2006., p. 8. 
592 Watson, p. 104, p. 133, p. 138, p. 179, p. 304-306, p. 409. 
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coalesced into a collective of artists, poets, musicians, movie stars, socialites, glitterati, 
transvestites, drag queens, amphetamine junkies, homosexuals, and personalities of all 
sorts. 
The Factory subculture was a creative environment in which individuals could get 
together and do whatever they wanted under Warhol’s permissive and ever-watching eye. 
Warhol’s single caveat was that he could observe or even film the activities taking place 
in the Factory.593  The Factory gave artists and outcasts a place to be themselves and 
where they were shielded from the negativity and judgmental restrictions of the outside 
world.  Despite the fact that Warhol was watching and filming these personalities, they 
still felt free to do as they pleased.  This is because Warhol was not interested in judging 
them;594 he just wanted to be part of their scene and facilitate their creativity.  Their 
identities and expressions were valued in the Factory in a way they were not in 
mainstream culture.  Warhol not only accepted these unconventional individuals, but he 
invited them into his inner circle and sometimes raised them to the level of Superstars.595  
Moreover, even though they were being filmed, the footage would only be consumed by 
others in the underground film scene of the day. 
With Warhol’s interest in creating Superstars, we see style and meaning-making 
closely intertwined, just as in any subculture.  When Warhol made appearances in public, 
                                                
593 Watson, xiv. 
594 Recall that this is similar to Lynch’s lack of judgment of his characters in Blue Velvet, as established in 
Chapter One. 
595 Ibid., xii,-xv.  According to Watson, “Warhol often allowed his associates to do things they had never 
done before; he provided them an intimate stage for performing themselves.  Some described that 
interaction’s social dynamic as ‘mutual vampirism’ while others just called it ‘total freedom.’ […] The 
Silver Factory was, above all, a zone of possibility and play.  Warhol greeted everything that happened 
with the same nonspecific enthusiasm.  He absorbed the outlandish behavior of the Sixties culture, gleaning 
bits from art and gossip and fashion and movies.  He simply said ‘wow’ or ‘great.’  He didn’t appear to 
filter reality as it registered on his radar, but of course he did.  He framed.  You were in the frame or you 
were not.”  See Watson xiii-xiv. 
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he was virtually inseparable from his coterie.596  The various characters and personalities 
who gathered around Warhol were as interested in art making as in making a scene.  
Some even aspired to become famous based upon their connection to Warhol and their 
roles in his various films and projects.  In some cases, Warhol changed everyday people – 
sometimes misfits or rejects – into glamorous “Superstars.”  The transformation of their 
identities made these individuals visible for the first time and raised their status; it also 
presented a critique of culture for not accepting and making space for them in the first 
place. 
Warhol facilitated a subcultural scene in which individuals who felt like outcasts 
could feel welcome and accepted, perhaps because Warhol himself felt like an outsider 
throughout his life.  Warhol understood difference very deeply from his own Ruthenian-
American upbringing as Andrew Warhola.  His constant desire was to fit in by appearing 
to be American and attractive, but his awkwardness and acne made this difficult.  Hence, 
the aforementioned transformation from outcast misfit to glamorous Superstar was 
something Warhol aspired to throughout his life.  Moreover, Warhol was raised at a time 
when being openly homosexual was not as widely accepted as it is today.597 
This outsider status led Warhol to facilitate the Factory subculture.  He created an 
environment in which everyone could be who they were – who they wanted to be – 
without restrictions or judgments.  Warhol stoked the creativity of those around him by 
                                                
596 See Watson for a detailed account of Warhol’s connection to Sedgwick. 
597 Even as he grew older and became an established artist, Warhol wasn’t fully accepted by other artists, 
even homosexual ones.  This was particularly disappointing to Warhol in the cases of Robert Rauschenberg 
and Jasper Johns – two artists he admired greatly.  According to Emile de Antonio, mutual friend to all 
three, when pressed to explain why they disapproved of Warhol:  “Okay, Andy, if you really want to hear it 
straight, I’ll lay it out for you.  You’re too swish, and that upsets them…Yes, Andy, there are others who 
are more swish – and less talented, but the major painters try to look straight; you play up the swish – it’s 
like an armor with you.” See Watson, p. 78-79.  At the time, many homosexual artists affected a hyper-
masculine personality in public, so Warhol’s effeminacy was perceived to be too open an indicator of his 
sexual orientation, and therefore, inappropriate by the likes of Rauschenberg and Johns.   
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making the Factory a place where just about anything was permitted.  It is important to 
note that the subcultural environment Warhol made possible was not sustainable.  The 
permissiveness led to disaster, when Valerie Solanas entered the Factory and shot Warhol 
on June 3, 1968.  While he survived the event, he and the Factory were never the same 
again.  Warhol became much more guarded and protective of his person and wary of 
those around him. 
 
Summary 
In this section, I have argued that Warhol’s artwork and position vis-à-vis culture 
changed over time.  During his early years of trying to secure an exhibition for his 
seemingly commercial works, Warhol was a cultish figure.  From the perspective of the 
artworld at the time, Warhol’s work did not seem distinguishable from advertising or 
from the work of other Pop artists.  Because this was a new move in the language game 
of art making, Warhol’s contributions were not fully heard or accepted at first.  As I have 
argued here and in Chapter One, Warhol experienced much resistance in his search for an 
artworld exhibition space.  As he gained more acceptance, Warhol’s inner circle grew 
into a full-fledged subculture at the Factory.  Warhol’s work was marked by mechanical 
reproduction and communal art making techniques.  The acceptance that Warhol sought 
throughout his life and career was found in the permissive atmosphere of the Factory.  
There, Warhol facilitated an atmosphere in which many who felt outcast or adrift found a 
voice as they participated in the work and play that were taking place there. 
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V. Gordon Matta-Clark 
 
 Gordon Matta-Clark lived and worked in New York City slightly after Warhol’s 
Factory subculture was in bloom.  Like Warhol, Matta-Clark gathered an interesting 
group of artists and intellectuals around him with whom he worked in efforts to generate 
a community.  He collaborated with other artists and creative individuals on a variety of 
projects including a restaurant called simply Food.  As highlighted in Chapter One, 
Matta-Clark was interested in gathering individuals together in order to experience and 
participate in art because he was interested in the generation of aesthetic communities 
around which meaning making could take place.  His projects were often made in public 
spaces like restaurants, piers, houses, and on the street – locales that were accessible to all.  
While at first blush, some of Matta-Clark’s projects might appear to be more private 
because they took place in abandoned or condemned spaces, they were nonetheless 
accessible to all who dared venture into them.  In this way, Matta-Clark sought to reclaim 
spaces that were forgotten or dilapidated in the spirit of creating community and sharing 
an experience.   
In Chapter One, we saw this with Splitting.  With this work, Matta-Clark made a 
house in suburban New Jersey a focal point for art and life by bussing in people in order 
to explore its spaces and gaps together with others.  Because he physically split the house 
in half, it was quite difficult to move through the structure as the gap widened.  Sculptor 
Alice Aycock recalls: “Starting at the bottom of the stairs where the crack was small, 
you’d go up, and as you’d go further up, you’d have to keep crossing the crack.  It kept 
widening as you made your way up to the top, the crack was one or two feet wide.  You 
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really had to jump it.  You sensed the abyss in a kinesthetic and psychological way.”598  
In order for the work to be complete, people had to interact with and climb through it.  
Through such works, Matta-Clark facilitated community formation. 
 In this section of argument, I investigate some of Matta-Clark’s other aesthetic 
interventions that were developed with the hope of stirring up and galvanizing an 
aesthetic community, including Pig Roast, Food, and Day’s End.  As aforementioned, 
Matta-Clark’s work was meant to establish a shared sense of community with other 
individuals.  This involved participation in the works of art as well as the exchange of 
judgments of taste about them.  Here, I argue more specifically that the aesthetic 
community that developed in response to Matta-Clark’s work can be characterized as a 
subculture.  In particular, his works forged a community who aimed to assess and critique 
the current state of the artworld in order to expand the concept of art because his works 
were close to, and perhaps even blurred the line with, life. 
 
A. Community Revitalization: Gordon Matta-Clark’s Subculture 
In undated notes, Gordon-Matta Clark states, “Among the conditions my training 
and personal inclination have taught me to deal with is neglect and abandonment.  These 
are words which when applied to children or human beings of any age evoke a profound 
call for alarm and rectification, yet when existing in massive proportions throughout our 
urban environment evokes only bureaucratic or juridic ambivalence and in-action.”599  
Put differently, problems of neglect and abandonment have a profound impact upon 
                                                
598 Pamela M. Lee.  Object to Be Destroyed: The Work of Gordon Matta-Clark.  Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2001., p. 29. 
599 Judith Russi Kirshner.  “The Idea of Community in the Work of Gordon-Matta Clark.”  In Gordon 
Matta-Clark.  Ed., Corinne Diserens.  New York: Phaidon Press, Inc., 2006., p. 148.  Kirshner provides this 
quote from Matta-Clark’s undated notes in the GMCA. 
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individuals, families, and communities and therefore need to be redressed in a serious 
fashion.  However, as Matta-Clark points out here, bureaucratic responses have been 
inadequate.  As an artist, he tried to bring the crisis of a lack of unity and the 
disintegration of community into sharper focus by assembling people to share in an 
aesthetic experience.  To borrow a Kantian phrase, we might say that Matta-Clark 
demanded that people gather to feel and experience works of art together.  This gathering 
would help combat the disintegration of community, first by recognizing this 
phenomenon in their cities and towns and second by forging a community that could 
experience and discuss art together. 
As I have argued above, the exchange of judgments of taste with one another can 
be the basis for the development of sociability into community formation.600  Consider 
again the work Splitting, in which people moved through the abandoned space of a 
suburban home in New Jersey.  In this work, Matta-Clark reconfigured the building’s 
physical structure to manifest the split of family from home and family from community 
that took place along with the eviction of the tenants.  But he did so in a way that brought 
an ephemeral beauty to the space and that gave voice to the evicted / excluded tenants.  
By bringing persons “back home,” Matta-Clark reestablished a community there and 
made the home vital once again.  
 Matta-Clark was in constant pursuit of connection in his artworks.  Because he 
grew up with his mother, Ann Clark, and twin brother, Sebastian, but apart from his 
father, Roberto Matta-Echaurren,601 the themes of abandonment and community 
                                                
600 See Kant, particularly §9 and §60. 
601 Roberto Matta-Echaurren (1911-2002) was a famous Chilean Surrealist painter who was very 
influential in the avant-garde during the 1940s.  Matta’s friendship with Marcel Duchamp led him to serve 
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permeate Matta-Clark’s works in a very personal way.602  The estrangement of Matta-
Clark from his father, compounded with the loss of his twin,603 stoked his desire to forge 
strong bonds of connection with others.  While Matta-Clark was not related to the 
audience of his work through ties of blood, he was nonetheless connected to them 
through interests such as art and community life.  As Judith Russi Kirshner puts the point, 
“Matta-Clark’s empathy and search for solidarity connected him repeatedly to local 
communities.  Fundamentally generous, his art practice challenged the traditions of 
specific cultural, social, and political sites.  Often events culminated in meals: for 
instance, a pig roast under the Brooklyn Bridge in 1971 and the inventive menus at Food, 
the fabled restaurant he cofounded with Caroline Goodden, supplying nourishment and 
jobs for artists.”604  The intimacy of breaking bread together points towards the notion 
that community and family can be fostered through the practice of eating meals together.   
Pig Roast was the finale of a group show that took place beneath the Brooklyn 
Bridge.  Matta-Clark “conceived a multipart epic”605 involving an interactive pig roast 
and multiple sculptures including Fire Boy and Jacks.  The latter was erected from “hulks 
of wrecked cars” which were decorated with dried branches atop them.  These sculptures 
                                                                                                                                            
as godfather to Matta’s twin sons.  See Thomas Crow, “Gordon Matta-Clark.”  In Gordon Matta-Clark.  
Ed., Corinne Diserens.  New York: Phaidon Press, Inc., 2006., p. 16. 
602 Ibid., p. 16. 
603 Ibid., p. 102.  The cause of Sebastian’s death in 1976 is officially undetermined; either he fell from a 
window in Matta-Clark’s apartment, or he committed suicide.  This event was the cause of much sadness 
and guilt for the artist.  A year later, he made Descending Steps for Batan, as a memorial for his brother.  
According to Pamela Lee, “No work challenges this illusion [of permanence] as poignantly as the site piece 
Matta-Clark produced for Galerie Yvon Lambert, Descending Steps for Batan.  A deeply mournful piece, 
Descending Steps for Batan attenuates the issue of lost community through the example of the artist’s own 
personal grief: it was dedicated to Gordon’s twin brother Batan (Sebastian), who had allegedly committed 
suicide by jumping from the window of Gordon’s studio the summer before.  Devastated, Matta-Clark 
produced a memorial to his brother in France, a cavernous hole dug directly into the foundations of the 
gallery.  Every day of the exhibition, which began April 21, 1977, and lasted through the first week of May, 
he continued to dig deeper into the ground, creating a progressively larger and dirtier hole within a space 
traditionally pristine and white.”  See Lee, p. 207. 
604 Kirshner, p. 148. 
605 Crow, p. 38. 
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were moved into temporary shelters under the bridge.  The placement of branches atop 
these sculptures made them look as if they were to be set on fire, like pyres of some 
sort.606  According to Thomas Crow: 
At the conclusion of the event, marked by a Philip Glass concert, Matta roasted an  
entire pig on a spit over an open fire, then passed out five hundred pork 
sandwiches.  Though this visceral performance, Pig Roast, effected only an 
imperfect transition from raw to cooked (‘It would have taken two days to roast a 
pig that size to cook it properly,’ remembers sculptor Jackie Winsor with a 
shudder), he managed for the first time to act out his favorite mythic subtexts as 
communal ritual on a truly grand scale.607 
 
Matta-Clark’s interest in art making and community making are joined in this act.  
Because individuals were participating in the event by attempting to consume the 
undercooked roasted pig, the boundaries of art making and community building were 
blurred in a way similar to what transpired at “happenings” in the 1960s.  According to 
Allan Kaprow:  
Happenings are events that, put simply, happen.  Though the best of them have a 
decided impact – that is, we feel, ‘here is something important’ – they appear to 
go nowhere and do not make any particular literary point.  In contrast to arts of 
the past, they have no structured beginning, middle, or end.  Their form is open-
ended and fluid; nothing obvious is sought and therefore nothing is won, except 
the certainty of a number of occurrences to which we are more than normally 
attentive.608 
 
In some ways, Matta-Clark’s work could be considered a type of happening.  But 
while, for Kaprow, “[h]appenings are events that, put simply, happen,” for Matta-Clark, 
the purpose was to build community and seek ways to solicit the participation of 
individuals in his works, whether by getting them to climb through his building cuts or 
                                                
606 Diserens, p. 194.  This is from an interview with Caroline Goodden that was compiled as part of the 
catalogue for Gordon Matta-Clark: A Retrospective at the Museum of Contemporary Art, Chicago, in 
1985.  Joan Simon compiled the catalogue notes.  In future notes from these interviews, I will merely refer 
to the page in Diserens’ volume and indicate the interviewee. 
607 Crow, p. 40. 
608 Allan Kaprow.  “Happenings in the New York Scene.”  In Essays on the Blurring of Art and Life.  Ed., 
Jeff Kelley.  Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003., p. 16. 
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consume sandwiches as part of Pig Roast.  Matta-Clark felt that his works were 
incomplete until he could get the audience involved as participants.  “My understanding 
of art in a social context is as an essentially generous human act, an individually positive 
attempt to encounter the real world through expressive interpretation.”609  Not only did 
Matta-Clark want to bring people together to see or experience his works; he invited his 
audience to participate as well.  Pig Roast and the associated works from Matta-Clark’s 
“multipart epic” required cooperation and participation.  These works involved an 
“encounter [with] the real world” and an encounter with other individuals.  The people 
present at this event shared their experiences and became part of an aesthetic community 
through communication about the works and sharing their judgments of taste.  They 
shared what Jerome Kohn’s calls a “common world.”610 
Matta-Clark’s notion of “art in a social context” also intertwined the health of 
society with the health of its art.  Works like Pig Roast explore the relationship of art and 
life, or art and society as Matta-Clark frames the point.  Through such works, Matta-
Clark sought to effect change by generating community among individuals who need and 
want to support one another.  We might consider this community to be an aesthetic 
subculture in which not convention and tradition, but the exchange of judgment is the 
guiding value.   This again relates to Kaprow’s notion of happenings.  Kaprow states, 
“Happenings invite us to cast aside for a moment these proper manners and partake 
wholly in the real nature of the art and (one hopes) life.  Thus a Happening is rough and 
                                                
609 Kirshner, p. 148. 
610 Jerome Kohn.  “Kant’s Common World.”  Raritan 22 (3) (Winter 2003): 102-113. 
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sudden and often feels ‘dirty.’  Dirt, we might begin to realize, is also organic and fertile, 
and everything, including the visitors can grow a little in such circumstances.”611 
Arguably, these themes of growth and community were explored even more 
directly when Matta-Clark paired with Caroline Goodden to open Food.  Here, 
community and eating are brought back together, but with more edible results than with 
Pig Roast.  In their restaurant, Matta-Clark offered a variety of creative meals at 
affordable prices.  The restaurant not only fed artists, but also provided work for some of 
them.612  Thomas Crow writes:  
Taking over the premises of a defunct bodega in the heart of SoHo (and 
consuming most of Goodden’s inheritance), Food became something of a 
permanent stage for Matta-Clark and numerous friends, while providing 
reasonably cheap, fresh, and healthy nourishment for the youthful contingent of 
loft-dwellers in a neighborhood with next to no commercial infrastructure.  His 
Louisiana friends, musician Dickie Landry and performance artist Tina Girouard, 
put them in touch with a spirited community of Cajun expatriates in lower 
Manhattan, from whom they drew talented cooks, novel recipes, and a certain 
festive dining philosophy that matched the art community’s own developing 
rituals.613 
 
While Crow resists calling Food an artwork in its own right,614 when considered in light 
of Kaprow’s notions of happenings articulated above, Food qualifies in terms of its goal 
and ability to gather persons together to eat and work together as a community.  
According to Goodden, Matta-Clark considered the restaurant to be “one big 
sculpture.”615  Goodden recalls, “He designed everything in it – the tables, counter, low 
                                                
611 Kaprow, p. 18.  It is interesting to note in connection with the “dirtiness” of happenings that many of 
Matta-Clark’s works dealt with earth or dirt both directly and metaphorically.  Cases in point include 
Garbage Wall (1970), Tree Dance (1971), Cherry Tree (1971), and Descending Steps for Batan (1977).  
Each of these works dealt with dirt in its own way – whether by assembling garbage into a structure or 
digging holes in gallery floors. 
612 Kirshner, p. 148. 
613 Crow, p. 44. 
614 Ibid., p. 44. 
615 Diserens, p. 194. This is from an interview with Caroline Goodden. 
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stove, cooking pots, wonderful-looking containers and cooking utensils (which we could 
never afford to build). […] He made a film of Food and spent hours editing it with 
filmmaker Bob Fiore’s help.”616  At the time, the menu was incredibly fresh and 
inventive, and many of its innovations are now the standard for cuisine.  According to 
Randy Kennedy in “When Meals Were the Muse”:   
The restaurant lasted not quite three years in its original incarnation, as the artists 
who cooked in it and who ran it, more as a utopian enterprise than a business, 
burned out or moved on.  But many of the vaguely countercultural ideas fostered 
there – fresh and seasonal foods, a geographically catholic menu, a kitchen fully 
open to the dining room, cooking as a kind of performance – have now become so 
ingrained in restaurants in New York and other large cities that it is hard to 
remember a time when such a place would have seemed almost extraterrestrial.617 
 
In addition to local and fresh fare, the restaurant served foods that were practically 
unheard of at the time.  According to Kennedy, “The restaurant, for example, served 
sushi and sashimi at a time when they were still not widely seen in New York. […]The 
same menu featured ceviche, borscht, rabbit stew with prunes, stuffed tongue Creole and 
a fig, garlic and anchovy salad.”618  Variety and creativity were the touchstones of Food’s 
menu. 
Matta-Clark also introduced “guest-chef” days during which artists would cook 
for the restaurant, often in very experimental fashion.  Matta-Clark’s meals were widely 
talked about due to their culinary and performance art interest.  In one meal, Matta-Clark 
served homemade aspic, oxtail soup, and then a “bone platter,” which included bones 
from chicken and beef stuffed with rice and mushrooms, as well as bone marrow.619  
                                                
616 Diserens, p. 194.  This is from an interview with Caroline Goodden. 
617 Randy Kennedy.  “When Meals Played the Muse.”  The New York Times.  21 February 2007. 
618 Ibid. 
619 As unusual as it sounds, bone marrow is sometimes served in restaurants. See Daniel Maurer.  “When 
Did Bone Marrow Become a Menu Must?” (20 March 2009) 
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After the meal, the bones were cleaned and made into jewelry so that customers could 
“wear their dinners home.”620  In another meal, Matta-Clark “served live brine shrimp in 
the hollow of a hard-boiled egg sliced in half.  Pretty with parsley, the plates were all set 
carefully in front of the customers.  With great delight Gordon watched the reactions:  
Jackie Winsor actually ate hers; I think Liza Bear screamed.  Some people promptly got 
up and left; others just stared at the live shrimp.”621  All of these examples show the way 
in which Food, as a functional restaurant, combined unfamiliar gastronomy with avant-
garde aesthetics.622 
While unconventional, these aesthetic interventions nonetheless generated 
community – an aesthetic subculture.  The restaurant was a gathering place for artists to 
try out creative ideas with one another.  According to Ned Smyth: 
The experimental theater company Mabou Mines, the Phillip Glass group, the 
dancers of Grand Union, and the artists who were involved with the 112 Greene 
Street exhibition space either worked or hung out there – and Matta-Clark was the 
catalyst. The restaurant was a central meeting place.  For me, too, that experience 
was something of an epiphany.  The openness, research, exploration, camaraderie 
and energy were unlike anything I've experienced before or since – and Gordon 
was at the center of it all.623 
 
In a way similar to Warhol in the Factory, Matta-Clark was a facilitator of aesthetic 
activity at Food as well as at 112 Greene Street, a gallery and performance space with 
which he was associated.  It was a central gathering place and planning spot for artists of 
                                                                                                                                            
http://newyork.grubstreet.com/2009/03/when_did_bone_marrow_become_tr.html.  See also Frank Bruni. 
“Where to Take Thoreau and Dr. Atkins.”  The New York Times. 30 March 2005. 
620 Diserens, p. 194.  This is from an interview with Caroline Goodden. 
621 Ibid., p. 194.  This is from an interview with Caroline Goodden. 
622 The restaurant was also where Matta-Clark started his building cuts.  According to Crow, “Gordon 
decided to cut himself a wall sandwich: he cut a horizontal section through the wall and door and fell in 
love with it.  And so the cutting pieces began.”  See Crow, p. 44.  This would be a crucial turning point for 
Matta-Clark’s aesthetics and the exploration of impermanence.  These building cuts would be the 
paradigmatic case of Matta-Clark’s works that encountered difficulty in reception and classification. 
623 Ned Smyth.  “Gordon Matta-Clark.”  http://www.artnet.com/Magazine/features/smyth/smyth6-4-04.asp.  
Accessed 24 February 2011. 
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all sorts, especially because the gallery’s director, Jeffrey Lew, left the doors unlocked so 
that artists could access it at all hours.624  A wide range of artists worked, played, 
socialized, and performed at 112 Greene Street including Alice Aycock, Vito Acconci, 
Chris Burden, the Grand Union Dance Company, Susan Rothenberg, Trisha Brown, 
Phillip Glass, Mel Bochner, Laurie Anderson, Juan Downey, and William Wegman, 
among others.625  
Between Food and 112 Greene Street, Matta-Clark’s aesthetic subculture was in 
full bloom.  At both locations, artists gathered to try out new ideas and make art in 
community with one another.  While it was not treated as an explicitly “alternative” 
exhibition space, 112 Greene Street was nonetheless on the fringes of the traditional 
artworld.  Pamela Lee argues: 
[I]t was as much a social space as an artistic one, a place in which artists, dancers, 
and performers could work and collaborate with little restriction, a place ‘that 
wasn’t pristine, one that we could knock about in,’ as the late Suzanne Harris 
recalled.  The sculptor Jene Highstein remembers the atmosphere of the early 112 
Greene Street in similar terms, emphasizing its alternately democratic or chaotic 
nature.  ‘It was a constant kind of social scene,’ he notes, ‘…a way for people to 
meet and exchange information, almost as though you were living as a family.’626 
 
This is precisely the kind of environment that Matta-Clark gravitated towards time and 
again, and actively sought to create at Food.  It was collaborative, familial, permissive, 
and creative.  It was sometimes chaotic, unruly, and even verged on the dangerous in the 
minds of some.627  One of the least traditional aspects of the space was the way in which 
exhibitions came about.  As Lew recalls, they just sort of happened: “There wasn’t really 
                                                
624 Lee, p. 60. 
625 Ibid., p. 60. 
626 Ibid., p. 61. 
627 Ibid., p. 61. 
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a first show there because everybody just arrived.”628  In other words, while Lew served 
as the official director of the space, the artists really “ran the show” and decided when 
and how to exhibit their works.629 
 Throughout this section, I have been making the case that Matta-Clark established 
an aesthetic subculture.  His community is not that of a cult, whose internal expressions 
are passed over as silence that appears to express no meaningful content.  Rather, the 
visibility of Matta-Clark’s works and their closeness to culture implies at the very least 
the openness to communication with the culture from which it also seeks distance.  
Publicist communication is one distinguishing mark of a subculture.  So although Matta-
Clark’s works were sometimes mysterious, they were nonetheless addressed towards 
culture in order to foster community.  He wanted to affect positive change for 
communities in disarray by bringing their problems to light and by building new 
community through art making.  To accomplish these goals, Matta-Clark could not utilize 
isolationist cult expression; he had to communicate with culture in order to try to change 
it. 
Matta-Clark’s art questions the traditional conception of the work and attempts to 
expand its boundaries to include a wider variety of forms that are admittedly difficult to 
classify.  Here, by traditional, I mean works in established media such as architecture, 
music, painting, music, sculpture, etc.  Matta-Clark primarily challenged architecture and 
sculpture with building cuts that pushed against and expanded the concepts of these 
discrete media.  He also explored what traditional exhibition spaces do and do not offer to 
                                                
628 Ibid., p. 61. 
629 Ibid., p. 62.  In this environment, Matta-Clark made several site-specific works including Winter 
Garden: Mushroom and Waistbottle Recycloning Center, Cherry Tree, and Time Well.  These works 
explored organic substances and ephemerality in a different way than did his building cuts. 
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artists.  Matta-Clark utilized spaces such as restaurants, piers, abandoned buildings, as 
well as gallery spaces like 112 Greene Street, as locations to make and show his work.  
These locales helped Matta-Clark to explore the relationship between art and life.  
Arguably, establishing and patrolling this relationship is a central concern of culture, 
even if culture wants to keep this distinction firmly in place.  His desire to blur art and 
life could be interpreted as a critique of culture as well as a critique of what can be 
classified as a work of art.  Matta-Clark’s building cuts and happenings expanded the 
concept of the work of art and thereby set the new rule to art, as would works of genius.  
 
B. Ephemerality and the Specter of Silencing 
 
At this juncture, I want to return to the question of exclusion in relation to Matta-
Clark’s work.  While I have been focusing upon how he established a subcultural 
aesthetic community in conjunction with others, it is important to restate why Matta-
Clark was working on the fringes of the artworld.  His works, particularly the building 
cuts, were difficult to classify.  Were these works of architecture?  Were they some sort 
of deconstructed architecture?  Works of “an-architecture”?  Were they somewhere in 
between?  Not only were Matta-Clark’s building cuts ephemeral – they lasted only until 
the buildings were demolished – but they were not always authorized projects.  
Sometimes, as in the case of Splitting, he had the permission of the owner to perform his 
work in and on the structure.  In other cases, however, like Day’s End, Matta-Clark 
trespassed into the space of an abandoned building and started making cuts into the 
structure.  For this work, Matta-Clark selected an abandoned pier.  Because Matta-Clark 
didn’t have permission to work there, he risked arrest and his own safety.  So we might 
say that Matta-Clark’s work explored both medial and legal liminality.  
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The area near Pier 52 off of Gansevoort and West Street in New York City was 
often frequented by cruisers and hustlers who were looking for a place to hook up or 
conduct business as well as muggers who were looking for a target to rob.630  While not 
all the people who hung out at the pier were dangerous, they still may not have wanted to 
be disturbed by an artist who sought to cut holes out of the pier.  In a letter to his friend 
Wolfgang Becker, Matta-Clark explores his experience at Pier 52:   
I totally devoted myself to a working vacation by the water on the Hudson.  My 
‘studio retreat’ consisted of appropriating a nearly perfectly intact turn-of-the-
century wharf building of steel truss construction having virtually basilical light 
and proportions.  A beautiful shape for such an industrial ‘hangar.’  Once [I had] 
secur[ed] the space from other intruders, mainly S&M cruisers, I…spent the next 
two months working out – that is cutting and working out sections of dock 10-18” 
thick, roof, walls and heavy steel trusswork.631   
 
Because Matta-Clark was trespassing on the property and altering the structure of the pier, 
he risked arrest.  But he also risked his life in the process.  While Matta-Clark was trained 
in architecture, challenges to structural integrity were always crucial to his working 
process.  In all of his unauthorized building cuts, Matta-Clark faced dangers because of 
the degradation of the buildings he worked on, the degree of which might be difficult to 
ascertain in some cases.   
Matta-Clark and his assistants continually trespassed into the pier to work, even 
after being discovered by the “authorities.”  The idea of working on the fringes, creating 
something beautiful and ephemeral that would engender community, appealed to Matta-
Clark.  But he was also disrupting the current configuration of community in the process.  
As Lee puts the point: 
                                                
630 Ibid., p. 120-121. 
631 Ibid., p. 121.  The letter was from Gordon Matta-Clark to Wolfgang Becker, Aachen, Germany, and is 
dated September 8, 1975.  See Lee’s endnote #16, p. 257. 
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While the production of the work was physically demanding, its reception was 
enmeshed in an equally trying bureaucratic scenario.  A few days prior to the 
completion of the piece, Matta-Clark’s illegal activities were discovered by a city 
worker, most likely from the Department of Sanitation.  Efforts to lock up the 
space were repeatedly transgressed by the artist and his assistants, but when 
Matta-Clark finally held an opening at the pier on August 27, the event was 
closed down by authorities from the New York City Economic Development 
Administration.  In the months that followed, an investigation against the artist 
was launched by the EDA, with the threat of litigation mounting.  In his defense, 
Matta-Clark and his supporters claimed the work to be part of the ‘public domain’ 
and suggested further that it represented an artistic contribution to a ‘decaying 
city.’632 
 
Even in this context, Matta-Clark frames the project in terms of community formation 
through aesthetic experience.  Matta-Clark continued working on the project in spite of 
its being illegal.  But he left New York “shortly after the work was discovered but this 
was because he was scheduled to produce the site work Conical Intersect for the Paris 
Biennale in early September.”633  While the charges against Matta-Clark were later 
dropped, he was momentarily regarded as a fugitive because of the controversy 
surrounding Day’s End. 
Nonetheless, according to Joel Shapiro, who experienced Day’s End: 
The pier was probably the most successful of the pieces I saw.  It was a 
mysterious, decrepit place – a huge space – and the cuts had a certain scale.  It 
was frightening.  I recalled thinking, whose building is this?  It is dangerous…To 
go into an abandoned place and chop it up – I don’t know what I thought about 
that.  The destructive aspect, […] [t]he willful aspect, I don’t know.  The piece 
was dangerous to the viewer.  It was large; it had scale.  He was creating some 
kind of edge – flirting with some sort of abyss.  It wasn’t like the earthworks of 
the same time.634 
 
Shapiro’s emotionally jumbled reaction speaks to the difficulty of comprehending the 
work.  Lee argues that the cuts made into the pier were actually rather simple in 
                                                
632 Ibid., p. 121-123.  The negative involvement of authorities and bureaucracy resonates with the difficult 
reception of Serra’s Tilted Arc as discussed in Chapter Four.  The irony here is that Tilted Arc was both 
commissioned by power and rendered asunder by it. 
633 Ibid., footnote #17, p. 257. 
634 Ibid., p. 130. 
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comparison with other projects by Matta-Clark.  Nonetheless, the effect of the work was 
close to sublime because of its overall enormity and the placement of the cuts and what 
they revealed.635  One was “a nine-foot wide cut in the floor that ran seventy feet in 
length, bisecting the width of the space.  Admitting a view of the water below, a drop of 
at least ten feet, it was echoed by a ‘sail-like’ shape carved out from the roof above.”636  
This cut was crucial to establishing the depth of the space; it prevented viewers from 
forgetting that they were actually on the water. 
Based upon the placement of the cuts as well as the passage of time (and sun), the 
work had a strikingly different appearance at different times of of day.  According to Lee, 
“Paradoxically, it was at the end of the day – at the day’s exhaustion, so to speak – that 
the work was most vibrant, most suffused with light.  Thus the falling of light in the 
space was allegorically charged as well.  For its passage within Day’s End was 
structurally coincident with the building’s historical passage into outmodedness, 
illuminating the twilight of the pier itself.”637   
Day’s End brings together Matta-Clark’s concerns of community and 
impermanence with a work that is difficult to comprehend in the Kantian sense of the 
term.  Viewers were unable to “wrap their minds around” the work and to conceptualize 
it easily.  This led to some frightened reactions like Shapiro’s.  Moreover, the difficulty in 
classification and categorization of the work led to questions about the status of project as 
a work of art that contributed to its difficult reception.  While all art poses a cognitive and 
communicative challenge and a demand that we respond to it, in cases where 
                                                
635 For a full discussion of the relation of Day’s End to the Kantian sublime, see Lee, pp. 137-161. 
636 Lee, p. 123. 
637 Ibid., p. 127. 
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categorization is difficult, these challenges are intensified.  Therefore, the demands of 
such works are more difficult to meet.  The fugitive nature of Matta-Clark’s constructions, 
in combination with their liminality, means that only subcultures can provide a suitable 
context for apprehending them.  
 
Summary 
Matta-Clark expanded the concept of the work of art through happenings like 
Food and Pig Roast as well as his building cut projects.  His exploratory art generated a 
subcultural community interested in his expression.  All of his works required the 
involvement of the audience in some sense – whether that meant consuming a meal 
together or traversing the gaps and cuts through a building.   The communities that 
gathered for these works and events were interested in questions of ephemerality and 
community and actively sought to come together to experience them.  However, the 
challenging nature of the works made their reception difficult.   At times, Matta-Clark’s 
works were hard to categorize.  Were they sculptures?  Works of architecture?  
Happenings?  Were they art at all?  Such category questions, coupled with the transitory 
nature of the works, reinforce the way in which Matta-Clark’s projects were on the 
fringes of expression.  The difficulty in categorization contributed to the subcultural 
reception of the work. 
 
 
VI. David Lynch 
 
As we have seen in the cases of Warhol and Matta- Clark, artists who exhibit 
genius can garner either cult or subcultural followings.  That is, works of genius do not 
dictate one type of community alone.  Rather, much depends upon the goals of the work 
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and the type of group that is interested in contemplating and discussing it in community 
with others.  To apply this distinction, we must consider how much pressure is being 
placed upon these expressions and how much acceptance they receive both initially and 
over time.  Works of genius may set the rule to art, but this rule is only discernable 
retrospectively.  
In the case of Warhol, we saw the trajectory of his reception move from cult to 
subculture as his work was embraced by the artworld and his production came to involve 
the participation of others at the Factory.  In the case of Matta-Clark, his interests in 
community revitalization, happenings, and works that required the participation of an 
audience led to the formation of aesthetic communities that can be categorized as 
subcultures.  In the case of David Lynch, the question, “Cult or Subculture?” may 
produce radically different answers, depending upon which work we take to be our focal 
point.  We can trace a trajectory similar to Warhol’s in Lynch’s career.  It took some time 
for him to make his first feature film.  Eraserhead exemplifies the lengths he would go to 
produce a labor of love on a shoestring budget, a labor that turned Lynch into a cult icon.  
Thereafter, his films experienced moments of reception indicative of both cult and 
subculture throughout his career. 
In Chapter One, I focused upon the Wittgensteinian resonances of Lynch’s Blue 
Velvet.  Here, I highlight the aesthetic communities that grew up around some of his 
works, particularly Eraserhead and Twin Peaks.  There is much to be said about Lynch’s 
transition from a cult director who creatively managed with a small and dedicated crew to 
a more mainstream director who flirted with the Hollywood system.  The importance of 
this trajectory lies in the fact that, regardless of how close he came to mainstream 
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production, Lynch still sought editorial control of his projects.  Without the power of 
final cut, Lynch found that he could not wholeheartedly stand behind projects that were 
reworked or mercilessly cut by the studios without his input or permission.   As such, 
although the financial backing of Hollywood might seem to present a temptation, Lynch 
preferred to maintain his own vision, even if this decision meant that his work would only 
reach and appeal to a smaller, cult audience.  
Dune is the clearest case of Lynch’s loss of editorial control.  While it was the 
best-financed of Lynch’s projects, his lack of creative control left a bitter taste in his 
mouth.  He even tried to remove his name from the film.  According to Lynch, “Dune 
was like a kind of studio film.  I didn’t have final cut.  And, little by little, I was 
subconsciously making compromises – knowing I couldn’t go here and not wanting to go 
there.  I just fell, you know, into this middle world.  It was a sad place to be.”638  Lynch 
couldn’t fully execute his own vision for the project because of the constraints of Frank 
Herbert’s source novel and the strong personalities of Dino and Rafaella De Laurentiis, 
the producers of the project.639  In response to a question about creative control of 
projects that cost millions of dollars, Lynch replied: 
Where there’s money involved, there’s always tension and worry.  The more 
money, the more worry.  And you can understand that.  The best attitude for the 
money people would be, if you’re going to make a film with this director, sit 
down at the very beginning and talk enough so that you feel good about whatever 
it is.  Then go with them and support them; see it through to the very end in that 
spirit.  It gets tougher and tougher towards the end because, in the beginning, it 
can be anything.  And in the end it is, you know, what it is.640 
 
                                                
638 Chris Rodley, ed.  Lynch on Lynch.  London, UK: Faber and Faber Limited, 1997., p. 120. 
639 Ibid., p. 119. 
640 Ibid., p. 123-124. 
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Because he felt that he had to deliver a film in line with de Laurentiis’s expectations, 
Lynch wasn’t able to fully realize his vision for the production, even though no expense 
was spared.641  Rather than feeling greater freedom due to the generous financing of the 
production, Lynch felt greater pressure to conform.642 
This lesson about maintaining creative control would stay with Lynch throughout 
his career; he would never again relinquish the right to final cut.  Even though Dune was 
not a financial or creative success by any means, it still led to Blue Velvet.643  As the story 
goes, Lynch managed to secure backing for the project from De Laurentiis despite the 
debacle of Dune.  Part of the deal was that Lynch would retain creative control over Blue 
Velvet, but that he had to take a pay cut for his work and a budget cut for the project.644  
Even while working within the Hollywood system, Lynch would go on to make his films 
on smaller budgets in order to maintain control.  The importance of control also meant 
that Lynch produced and financed his projects when possible with his company, 
Asymmetrical Productions, and that he sometimes worked with smaller studios like 
Studio+Canal and CIBY in France.645   
In an everyday sense, we can say that Lynch’s work has a cult following – a small, 
self-selecting group of individuals appreciate his work and his vision of the world.  In the 
                                                
641 Ibid., p. 123-124 and p. 108. 
642 Lynch had been hired on the basis of The Elephant Man, which is a remarkably different film from 
Eraserhead.  According to Lynch, “When Dino and I first talked, he had not seen Eraserhead, so there 
were a lot of things in my head he didn’t know about.  When he finally saw the film, in fact, he hated it.  In 
some ways I knew I’d have to hold back.  For one thing, the film had to be a PG.  You can think of some 
strange things to do, but as soon as they throw in a PG, a lot of them go out the window.  And you know, I 
kinda like to go off track, to go off in a strange direction, but I wasn’t able to do that.”  See Rodley, p. 113-
114. 
643 Martha Nochimson.  The Passion of David Lynch: Wild at Heart in Hollywood.  Austin, TX: University 
of Texas Press, p. 123. 
644 Rodley, p. 136-137. 
645 David Foster Wallace.   “David Lynch Keeps His Head.”  In A Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never Do 
Again.  New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1997., p. 146. 
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stronger sense alluded to in Chapter Four, Lynch’s cult involves a devoted fan-base who 
seek to understand his work through communication with other people who are similarly 
interested and devoted.  The cult of Lynch is based not only upon the now seemingly 
standard process of making, reproducing, and distributing films, but also upon the 
community building that new technologies have made possible.  Midnight movie 
screenings of Eraserhead and VHS recording / watching parties of Twin Peaks show that 
the cult of Lynch longed to experience the work with one another and to discuss it 
together afterwards.   
The communication within the cult of Lynch expanded with the rise of the 
Internet.  Not only did it take place around the water cooler at work on the day after 
viewings, but also in Internet newsgroups, the online equivalent of message and 
discussion boards, and later on fanpages, blogs, and in chatrooms.  The early rumblings 
of social media allowed even the farthest flung of Lynch cult members to communicate 
with one another over the Internet.646  This virtual community, like the local ones, was 
united by the desire to exchange judgments of taste with one another regarding Lynch’s 
complicated and mysterious art.  Both the virtual and local communities were interested 
in contemplating and discussing Lynch’s works of genius with one another, even when 
their mainstream popularity waned, as in the case of Twin Peaks.  It almost seems as 
though the cult of Lynch was made possible when general interest in his work flagged.  
At this point, the cult of Lynch emerged online with an obsessive interest in discussing 
the minute details of Twin Peaks.  Online, the group could compare notes about the series 
                                                
646 I will discuss newsgroups in more detail momentarily. 
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and even trade video recordings of episodes with others who had missed them during 
their television broadcast. 
We can see the cult following for Lynch’s works more clearly against the 
background of the difficulty in critical reception that his works encountered.  At times, 
critics didn’t know what to say about Lynch’s work.  Some retreated to what they 
considered the safe ground of regarding Lynch as a “sicko.”  Such critics judged his work 
as strange, immoral, or reprehensible, and then rejected it out of hand without troubling 
themselves much to consider its merits.647  A notable exception to this rule is the critical 
work of David Foster Wallace.  In “David Lynch Keeps His Head,” he presents a more 
nuanced view of Lynch’s work and his relationship to morality or “sickness.”  He states: 
Pauline Kael has a famous epigram to her 1986 New Yorker review of Blue 
Velvet:  she quotes somebody she left the theater behind as saying to a friend 
‘Maybe I’m sick, but I want to see that again.’  And Lynch’s movies are indeed – 
in all sorts of ways, some more interesting than others – ‘sick.’  Some of them are 
brilliant and unforgettable; others are jejune and incoherent and bad.  It’s no 
wonder that Lynch’s critical reputation over the last decade has looked like an 
EKG: it’s sometimes hard to tell whether the director’s a genius or an idiot. […] If 
the word sick seems excessive to you, simply substitute the word creepy.  Lynch’s 
movies are inarguably creepy, and a big part of their creepiness is that they seem 
so personal.648 
 
Due to their perversity, Lynch’s works have sometimes been rejected or panned by critics 
and the mainstream public.  Upon one interpretation, this troublesome reception has 
relegated Lynch to the fringes of the Hollywood community.  However, an alternative 
interpretation of Lynch’s comportment towards mainstream filmmaking and funding is 
that even though over time his films have gained more acceptance, Lynch nonetheless 
                                                
647 Jeff Johnson’s Pervert in the Pulpit: Morality in the Works of David Lynch is one example of this 
phenomenon.  This tired line of argumentation has become a go-to for critics who do not want to think 
through or reconsider the works and what they might have to offer to the viewer.  See Jeff Johnson.  
Pervert in the Pulpit: Morality in the Works of David Lynch.  Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 
2004. 
648 Wallace, p. 166, emphasis in original. 
   270 
chooses to work on his own terms.  He does this in order to be free from the expectations 
and restrictions of the Hollywood machine.  Rather than being forced out of Hollywood, 
it means that Lynch voluntarily locates himself and his work outside of it.  
 
A. Eraserhead 
In contrast to the big budget production of Dune, Eraserhead was made on a 
shoestring budget and based upon the work ethic and dedication of Lynch and his close-
knit crew.  The core of this production team was “cameraman Herbert Cardwell (later to 
be replaced by Frederick Elmes), soundman Alan Splet, Catherine Coulson (in a 
multitude of roles), production manager / props person Doreen Small and actor Jack 
Nance.”649  Many of these individuals would go on to comprise the stable of Lynch’s 
closest associates on his film and television projects.  Notably, Catherine Coulson and 
Jack Nance would both go on to star in Twin Peaks and other projects.  It took five years 
for this film family to complete Eraserhead, which sometimes involved cobbling props 
and set-pieces together from spare parts picked from trash heaps when the production ran 
out of money.650  According to Rodley:  
[Peggy Reavey] recalls one particular night, during hard times in Philadelphia, 
when Lynch needed a shower head, a curtain and some very particular nuts and 
bolts for a shot.  It was already 2 a.m.: ‘It was trash night, so he went out and 
picked through all the trash cans in this little alley and came back with every 
single thing he needed. […] He is incredibly resourceful and determined, and has 
                                                
649 Rodley, p. 55. 
650 Ibid., p. 74.  According to Lynch, “It was horrifying.  Yet I like talking about Eraserhead because it 
pulls me back into one of the most beautiful times.  And great memories.  But in between, when we ran out 
of money, I was always amazed that so many things held for the film.  Jack’s hair didn’t suddenly change, 
and the stables and the American Film Institute were still there.  There was one shot where Henry walks 
down the hall, turns the doorknob and a year and a half later he comes through the door!  Those things can 
be extremely frightening, to think about holding a mood and a correctness, something that will stick 
together after five years.  It’s pretty hard.”  See Rodley, p. 74. 
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this amazing creative energy to pull things together so that they work.  He always 
had the sense that things were possible.’651 
 
The sheer dedication of Lynch and his crew, combined with a make-it-work aesthetic, 
helped see the project through to its completion.  
When asked by Chris Rodley how he sustained interest and enthusiasm in the 
project, Lynch replied, “It was the world.  In my mind it was a world between a factory 
and a factory neighborhood.  A little, unknown, twisted, almost silent lost spot where 
little details and little torments existed.  And people were struggling in darkness.  They’re 
living in those fringelands, and they’re the people I really love […] I always say it’s my 
Philadelphia Story.  It just doesn’t have Jimmy Stewart in it!”652  As though employing 
the Wittgensteinian idea of new boroughs directly, Lynch comments upon the outskirts or 
fringelands of Philadelphia in a loving way.  His description of Eraserhead’s setting 
could equally apply to Lynch’s own squalid living conditions among the spectral 
remainders of disused urban factories.  At times, Lynch even took up residence at the 
stables of the American Film Institute Centre for Advanced Film Studies while working 
on the project.653  According to Rodley, “Lynch’s attachment to the film is part of an 
obvious affection for the people, the times, and for a particular way of making cinema – 
the slow way.  All the more reason, perhaps, to preserve its essential mysteries.”654 
One of the enduring mysteries about Eraserhead regards how the “baby” was 
made.  Lynch has refused on several occasions to describe this process, instead offering 
                                                
651 Ibid., p. 55. 
652 Ibid., p. 55-56. 
653 Ibid., p. 60. 
654 Ibid., p. 55, emphasis in original.  Reflecting upon the process of making Eraserhead, Lynch states, “I 
feel now that I shouldn’t have spent so much time on Eraserhead.  I should like to have made more films in 
that time, but it wasn’t happening.  It was extremely frustrating to hold on to everything for so long.  I 
couldn’t do anything new because Eraserhead wasn’t finished.  I didn’t have anything to show anybody.  
So I just saw the world going by and tried to raise money and, little by little, I did it.”  See Rodley, p. 75. 
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statements like “it was born nearby” or “maybe it was found.”655  While on the surface 
such statements seem to be red herrings, they are accurate in the sense that the baby was 
born or found in Lynch’s imagination.  Lynch states:  
Certain things are just so beautiful to me, and I don’t know why.  Certain things 
make so much sense, and it’s hard to explain.  I felt Eraserhead, I didn’t think it.  
It was a quiet process: going from inside me to the screen.  I’d get something on 
film, get it paced a certain way, add the right sounds, and then I’d be able to say if 
it worked or not.  Now, just to get to that point, there’s a million times more 
talking.  And in Hollywood, if you can’t write your ideas down, or if you can’t 
pitch them or if they’re so abstract they can’t be pitched properly, then they don’t 
have a chance of surviving.  Abstract things are important to a film, but very few 
people get the chance to really go all out with cinema.  Creations are an extension 
of yourself, and you go out on a limb whenever you create anything.  It’s a risk.656 
 
Lynch feels that talking too much about a film ruins its mysteries by unraveling abstract 
ideas and images and explaining them to death.  As one critic commented after viewing 
Eraserhead, it is a movie “to be experienced rather than explained.”657  Lynch’s 
statements are versions of the Kantian view that the artist who is endowed with genius 
cannot fully explain the aesthetic ideas present in her works.  Insofar as Lynch claims that 
he felt rather than thought Eraserhead, his explanations are not fully rational or logical.   
As Peggy Reavey puts the point, “If [Lynch] could tell you what his movies are about, 
they wouldn’t be about that.”658 
 In addition to Lynch’s inability to explain the source of his ideas and imagery, he 
also seeks to preserve some of the mysteries of the production.  Lynch is the keeper of 
secrets who helps maintain or even stokes the desire for knowledge on the part of 
audiences (particularly cult members) through his inability and refusal to explain the 
                                                
655 Ibid., p. 54, p. 77-78.  Lynch has expressed a desire to maintain some of the mystery of his films.  From 
his point of view, talking too much about how they were made would detract from the viewing experience. 
656 Rodley, p. 64, emphasis in original. 
657 Ibid., p. 54. 
658 Ibid., p. 54. 
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works in detail.  This makes him a Benjaminian cult-priest of sorts.  Rather than destroy 
the mysteries of his films by talking too much about them, Lynch insists that the works 
be experienced firsthand.  The unavailability of specific answers to questions about the 
baby or other curious aspects of Eraserhead, among other projects, requires the audience 
to explore the work together with others.  This means that although Lynch cannot to say 
too much regarding his own work, he does want his audiences to discuss it, to exchange 
judgments of taste, and to trade theories with one another.   
Lynch’s attraction to abstract images leaves room for multiple interpretations and 
provides fodder for cultic-aesthetic discussion.659  He expands upon this idea by saying: 
Everybody and his little brother now knows how things are done.  Just like 
finding out the house wasn’t on Sunset Boulevard.  Or like Cliffhanger.  More 
people have seen how they did the helicopter shot in that than people have seen 
the movie!  Magicians keep their secrets to themselves.  And they know that as 
soon as they tell, someone will say, ‘Are you kidding me?  That’s so simple.’  It’s 
horrifying to me, that they do that.  People don’t realize it, but as soon as they 
hear or see that, something dies inside them.  They’re deader than they were.  
They’re not, like, happy to know about this stuff.  They’re happy not to know 
about it.  And they shouldn’t know about it.  It’s nothing to do with the film!  And 
will only ruin the film!  Why would they talk about it?  It’s horrifying!660 
 
Part of what interests Lynch viewers is the establishment of the strange, off-kilter, or 
unusual.  Showing how all of the effects were accomplished, as Lynch notes above, 
would detract from their magic or from their ability to affect the viewer as strange. 
Here’s the plot of Eraserhead:  Henry Spencer, the protagonist, is undergoing 
stressful life changes when his girlfriend, Mary X, becomes pregnant and gives birth to a 
premature baby.  However, the child might be better described as a creature rather than a 
human baby.  The couple struggle to care for the difficult to soothe baby and are soon at 
                                                
659 Ibid., p. 63. 
660 Ibid., p. 78, emphasis in original. 
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their wit’s end.  When Mary, unable to cope with the situation, moves back in with her 
parents, Henry is left to care for the baby alone.  Ultimately, Henry cannot handle the 
situation, and he kills the child.  While this précis sketches the events of the film, it does 
little to describe the aesthetic meaning of Eraserhead, which depends upon mysterious 
and / or obscure imagery to generate a feeling of danger, darkness, and surreality.  Lynch 
himself describes Eraserhead as a “night-time film.”661  For instance, in between the key 
plot points, Lynch weaves images of “the Planet,” an industrial setting where levers are 
pulled, the Lady in the Radiator, a woman with gigantic, deformed cheeks who sings to 
Henry about how everything is fine in heaven and who sometimes crushes spermatozoa-
like creatures beneath her dancing shoes, a traumatic meal at the X family home where 
the conversation is strained and where miniature artificial chickens pulsate and bleed 
profusely as Henry tries to carve them, Henry’s head popping off and being taken to a 
factory where it will be made into erasers for pencils, etc.  Adding descriptions of such 
imagery to the précis of the film does little to convey how the images work in context or 
what feeling they evoke for audiences.  The surreality of the images, which contributes to 
the uneasy feeling that audiences experience, remains to be felt by seeing the film. 
At its initial release, many didn’t know what to make of Lynch’s nightmarish film.  
At Cannes, Eraserhead played to an empty theater and it was rejected from the New 
York Film Festival.  It finally found a place at the Los Angeles Film Festival, but it 
received unfavorable reviews.662  Variety reviewed the film and described it as “a 
sickening bad-taste exercise.”663  In screenings prior to the release of the project, the 
                                                
661 Ibid., p. 61. 
662 Ibid., p. 83. 
663 http://listverse.com/2009/04/26/top-10-classic-midnight-movies/ 
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financial backer of Terrence Malick saw several scenes.  During the middle of the 
screening, he stood up and screamed, “PEOPLE DON’T ACT LIKE THAT! PEOPLE 
DON’T TALK LIKE THAT! THIS IS BULLSHIT!,”664 and then stormed out.   
While many initial reactions to the film were puzzled or negative, Eraserhead 
eventually became a staple of the midnight movie circuit.  According to Lynch, “It played 
seventeen cities regularly.  And in those days, which is unfortunately not the case now, 
midnight screenings were really strong.  So at the Nuart here in LA, for instance, it 
played for four years.  It only played one night a week, but every day of the week it was 
on the marquee.  So whether people had seen it or not it became known over four 
years.”665  Eraserhead continues to enjoy a spot in midnight movie lineups across the 
country and has achieved the level of cult status.666  According to Manohla Dargis of The 
New York Times, Eraserhead is “an amazing, still mysterious work.”667  It is important to 
note that Dargis responds favorably to the work thirty years after Eraserhead’s release.  It 
is doubtful that had she reviewed the film upon its initial release in 1977 she would have 
received it so positively.  Again, this points to the way in which the rules set by works of 
genius can only be understood retrospectively.  In her Critic’s Notebook on Eraserhead, 
she comments more carefully on the film’s imagery.  She states: 
The black-and-white world of “Eraserhead” disturbs, seduces and even shocks 
with images that are alternately discomforting, even physically off-putting, and  
                                                
664 Rodley, p. 82. 
665 Ibid., p. 84. 
666 I say achieved the level of cult status because this term indicates Eraserhead’s difficulties – from its 
five-year making to its eventual release and near-failure.  I could equally have said “sunk” to the level of 
cult status in order to indicate the relatively small number of viewers and fans the film has garnered over 
time.  But because Eraserhead has garnered the praise of critics over the years and the film (and others in 
Lynch’s oeuvre) has influenced other artists and directors, I count Eraserhead’s cult status as a success.  In 
2004, the National Film Registry, part of the Library of Congress, selected Eraserhead for preservation.  
667 Manohla Dargis.  “Distorted, Distorting and All-Too Human: Critic’s Notebook: Eraserhead.”  The 
New York Times. 7 December 2007. 
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characterized by what André Breton called convulsive beauty. It also amuses, in 
its own weird way, with scenes of preposterous, macabre comedy, among them a  
memorable family dinner involving a cooked bird that wiggles obscenely on its 
plate while it gushes forth a menacing dark liquid. Like Henry’s vexing baby, this 
pathetic creature seems to have sprung from Mr. Lynch’s head like a messenger 
from another planet. If you pay close enough attention, you just might hear what 
it’s saying.668 
 
Here Dargis points to the importance of Brechtian attentive reception on the part of 
audiences.  She suggests that paying attention to the work will help the viewer understand 
it better; this is crucial due to the complexity of Eraserhead.  Along these lines, Dargis 
obliquely refers to Lynch’s genius by suggesting that the work is unlike others, coming as 
if from another planet entirely – the planet where Lynch’s cult lives. 
We might extend this thought to suggest that the demand issued by Eraserhead 
comes forth all the more strongly because the film is more difficult to understand than 
run-of-the-mill commercial films.  Eraserhead requires more careful examination on the 
part of viewers to make sense of it.  For this reason, the small group of people interested 
in this task has come together to form the cult of Lynch.  The modes of distribution of 
mechanical reproduction have promoted the cult value of Lynch’s works by making them 
increasingly available to a scattered public.  However, because the work is so difficult to 
comprehend, this public remains small and self-selecting.  The individuals comprising the 
cult desire to understand Lynch’s works more deeply by communicating about them with 
other cult members.  In the case of Eraserhead, the cult of Lynch views and reviews the 
film together at midnight screenings.  In the next section of argument, I expand upon the 
notion of online aesthetic communities in relationship not to a movie, but to a television 
series.  
                                                
668 Ibid. 
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B. Twin Peaks 
Twin Peaks is about the tragic death of Laura Palmer (Sheryl Lee), high school 
student, homecoming queen, and Meals on Wheels volunteer.  In the first episode of the 
series, her body washes up on the shore of a riverbank, wrapped in plastic.669  As the 
town mourns Laura’s passing, the mystery of “Who Killed Laura Palmer?” begins to 
unfold.  FBI Special Agent Dale Cooper (Kyle MacLachlan) is sent to investigate matters 
and with the help of local law enforcement, becomes embroiled with the intrigues of this 
small town set back in the Douglas firs of Washington State.  As Laura’s mystery unfolds, 
the trail leads through the overlapping secrets of several Twin Peaks residents.  Everyone 
has something to hide and many of these revelations lead down dark roads both natural 
and supernatural.  As one character comments later on in the series, “the owls are not 
what they seem.”670  This comment could be equally applied to any of the seemingly 
innocent residents of Twin Peaks.   
In many ways, Twin Peaks is a soap opera serial that intermixes law enforcement 
drama with mystery, science fiction, and horror.  Instead of adhering to any of these 
genres strictly, the show often twists their conventions and performs playful but gentle 
parodies of them.  For instance, the show breaks with the stereotype of the rational-to-a-
fault male detective.  Early on in the series, Agent Cooper utilizes mysticism and Tibetan 
Buddhism in order to close in on the killer.671  Cooper, it turns out, is a seeker in touch 
                                                
669 A fanzine about the show would later be titled Wrapped in Plastic because of this important detail. 
670 Major Garland Briggs makes this statement in reference to a top secret Air Force mission called Project 
Blue Book.  In particular, this mission involves supernatural or extraterrestrial life. 
671 Episode two develops this aspect of Cooper’s character.  After giving his new colleagues in Twin Peaks 
a brief history of Tibet, he begins to describe a deductive technique he discovered in a dream.  Cooper then 
instructs the sheriff to intone each name on a blackboard and give a description of their relationship to 
Laura Palmer.  If Cooper breaks the glass bottle by throwing a stone, he conjectures, the killer will be 
found.  See http://www.lynchnet.com/tp/tp02.html for a transcription of episode two. 
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with his emotions.672  Moreover, the addition of supernatural and horror elements to the 
plotlines breaks with standard police procedurals.673  Perhaps the most parodic aspect of 
Twin Peaks deals with its soap operatic elements.  The melodramatic storylines on Twin 
Peaks involving murder, multiple love affairs, drug addiction, kidnapping, and abuse 
were mirrored by a series within the series entitled An Invitation to Love which utilized 
traditional tropes from soap operas and heightened them to the level of absurdity. 
The kind of community that formed around Twin Peaks in the early nineties is 
akin to the community spurred by Eraserhead who met at midnight screenings of the film.  
In particular, the face-to-face meeting among friends at watching parties and post-
viewing analysis and discussion sessions maintained the kind of attentive interest that the 
midnight screenings held for the fans of Eraserhead.  With Twin Peaks, David Lynch’s 
work was making its way from the big to the small screen and into the intimate confines 
of the living room.  While the viewing audiences for Eraserhead and Twin Peaks shared 
much in common, it is worth noting that with the rise of VCR and Internet technologies 
expanded the distributive reach of the cult of Lynch. 
During season one, Twin Peaks enjoyed more general viewership and popularity 
than had any Lynch project to date.674  In 1990, the show was one of the highest rated and 
                                                
672 See Nochimson, Chapter Three. 
673 This genre combination would be echoed in television shows like The X-Files and Fringe. 
674 In an interview with Chris Rodley, Lynch discussed his reaction to the popularity of series:  “Chris 
Rodley: It must have been intriguing to know that Twin Peaks was being seen by so many people, 
compared to a movie in the cinema.  Does that matter to you?  David Lynch: See, these figures are based on 
a falsehood, so you can never tell if it’s true.  So right away you’ve got to question everything.  But it’s still 
way more people than go to my films.  It was a surprise to me that so many people got into that show.  It 
was really a pleasant surprise.”  See Rodley, p. 176.  Lynch felt both warm excitement and a healthy level 
of suspicion regarding this popularity.  He continues:  “It’s nice when people really like something you’ve 
done, but it’s sort of like love, in that it seems inevitable that people reach the point where they’ve had 
enough of you and they fall for the next thing.  You’re helpless to control that process, and the awareness 
of it is like a dull ache.  It’s not like a sharp pain – it’s like a little bit of a heartache, and that heartache is 
about the fact that we’re living in the Home Alone age.  Art houses are dying.  What we have instead are 
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viewed series during that year.  In addition to its popularity in America, several other 
countries including Japan, France, and Germany were transfixed by Twin Peaks and the 
mystery of “Who Killed Laura Palmer?”  In explanation of the series’ popularity, Robert 
Engels, a writer for the show, commented, “It was a TV show about free-floating guilt.  
Something was captured there that people responded to emotionally.  Also, the characters 
in Twin Peaks were so real.  Other shows lack that.”675  The show drew its viewers in.  It 
was as if the show was always on the tip of people’s tongues, especially on Friday 
mornings after Thursday night’s latest episode aired.  Practically everyone was talking 
about the show around the watercooler – and it was a sign of your hipness if you were 
able to participate in these discussions and debate minute plot points with others at 
work.676  In addition to its popularity among viewers, critics also embraced the first 
season of Twin Peaks; it was nominated for several Golden Globe and Emmy Awards, 
ultimately winning two and three, respectively.677   
The popular interest in Twin Peaks in the early 1990s could indicate the existence 
of something like a “mass cult.”  Viewers and critics alike enjoyed the show.  Twin Peaks 
won several prestigious awards and the hearts of millions.  But this seems to present a 
contradiction in terms.  How can a mass participate in cult behavior, especially if cults 
are marked by isolationist communication?  How can the revered focal point of the cult 
be recognized as having popular importance?  It is difficult to say what factors converged 
                                                                                                                                            
mall cinemas showing twelve pictures and those are the pictures people see.  Television has lowered the 
level and made a certain thing popular.  That TV thing moves fast, doesn’t have a lot of substance, has a 
laugh track and that’s all.”  See Rodley, p. 177. 
675 Rodley, p. 156, emphasis in original. 
676 Bill Carter.  “The Media Business: Twin Peaks May Provide Ratings Edge for ABC.”  The New York 
Times.  16 April 1990.  According to Alan Wurtzel, ABC’s senior vice-president of research, the popularity 
of the show was fueled, in part, by the desire to fit in at work during conversations about the show.  He 
called it the “watercooler syndrome.” 
677 See the entry for Twin Peaks on IMDB for further details.  (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0098936/) 
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to make Twin Peaks the kind of work that could garner mass interest.  Perhaps the 
mystery of “Who Killed Laura Palmer” was enough to invite the kind of intense scrutiny 
and desire to know more that marks cult interest in an object or a work.  However, this 
mass-interest was unsustainable, especially after the central mystery of the show was 
solved.  It is my contention that the true cult of Lynch emerged during the show’s 
declining critical and popular viewership.  True cult members still found value in Twin 
Peaks after the mystery was solved and continued to discuss the intricacies of the show 
with one another in Twin Peaks newsgroups.  I will return to this point momentarily. 
To continue, during the height of its popularity, people held viewing parties at the 
local level in order to enjoy Twin Peaks with one another.  Because the watching parties 
were jovial occasions, friends would stay long into the night discussing what they had 
seen that night and how the events related to the progression of the show, and particularly, 
to the mystery regarding Laura Palmer.  These conversations were wide-ranging, and 
sometimes included references to avant-garde filmmaking and fine art.  In advanced 
cases, people took advantage of VHS technology in order to tape Twin Peaks so that they 
could re-watch the episodes and repeat single scenes multiple times.  When beneficial, 
people also used slow motion to help decipher minute details.678  According to Umberto 
Eco, such dissection on the part of audiences helps qualify an object as cult: 
The work must be loved, obviously, but this is not enough.  It must provide a 
completely furnished world, a world about which one can make up quizzes and 
play trivia games so that the adepts of the sect recognize through each other a 
shared expertise […] I think that in order to transform a work into a cult object 
                                                
678 For an in-depth discussion of the lengths Twin Peaks viewers would go to decipher the series see David 
Lavery. “Introduction: The Semiotics of Cobbler: Twin Peaks’ Interpretive Community.”  In Full of 
Secrets: Critical Approaches to Twin Peaks.  Ed. David Lavery.  Detroit, MI: Wayne State University 
Press, 1995.  See also Henry Jenkins.  “‘Do You Enjoy Making the Rest of Us Feel Stupid?’: 
alt.tv.twinpeaks, the Trickster Author, and Viewer Mastery.”  In Full of Secrets: Critical Approaches to 
Twin Peaks.  Ed. David Lavery.  Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1995. 
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one must be able to break, dislocate, unhinge it so that one can remember only 
parts of it, irrespective of their original relationship with the whole.679  
 
This is precisely the sort of activity that members of the cult of Lynch participated in 
when obsessively viewing and reviewing episodes of Twin Peaks in order to understand 
them more fully.    
While taping episodes using a VCR and watching in slow motion might seem 
mundane in the age of TiVo and access to television episodes online directly after they 
air, the use of VCRs was crucial to the original Twin Peakers.  In “‘Do You Enjoy 
Making the Rest of Us Feel Stupid?’: alt.tv.twin-peaks, the Trickster Author, and Viewer 
Mastery,” Henry Jenkins states, “As one fan remarked just a few weeks into the series’ 
second season, ‘Can you imagine Twin Peaks coming out before VCRs or without the 
net?  It would have been Hell!’[…] Another explained, ‘Video-recording has made it 
possible to treat film like a manuscript, to be pored over and deciphered.’”680  While the 
Internet as we know it today didn’t exist yet, Usenet and newsgroups made it possible for 
individuals in different locations to discuss topics of common interest from afar.681   
The VCR and primitive net technologies might have seemed an improbable 
avenue for the generation and maintenance of community and community identity 
because of their distant and virtual aspects.  However, the Internet allows otherwise 
distant individuals to be in close contact with one another.  While a fan in California and 
one in New York couldn’t normally sit down together to watch an episode of Twin Peaks 
and to talk about it afterwards, they can sit down and communicate their aesthetic 
experiences and their judgments of taste with one another online.  With the increasing 
                                                
679 Umberto Eco.  “Casablanca:  Cult Movies and Intertextual Collage.”  In Travels in Hyper Reality.  
Trans.  William Weaver.  New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Publishers, 1983., p. 198. 
680 Jenkins, p. 54. 
681 I will discuss the newsgroup alt.tv.twin-peaks in more detail momentarily. 
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popularity of the Internet and social media, the demands of aesthetic communities can 
now be met regardless of locale.  One might object that the technologies that permit these 
communities to come together from afar force the cults to become disaggregated.  
However, in spite of the distance, I claim that these communities are still cults united by 
their shared interest in Twin Peaks.  Instead of weakening these communities due to 
distance, technology makes these cults possible.  
Thinkers like Robert Asen argue against technology’s suitability for deliberative 
communication on the grounds that participants are not reflective in such situations.682  
However, the popularity of newsgroups about Twin Peaks prove the contrary: 
The Internet, in those days before the World Wide Web, was dominated by 
‘Usenet,’ the worldwide newsgroup system.  Almost overnight from the April 8, 
1990 broadcast of the “Twin Peaks” pilot episode, the alt.tv.twin-peaks 
newsgroup was created and became one of the most active, as hundreds of 
postings were made each week, as participants attempted to unravel the mysteries 
of the latest episode.683 
 
Participants in the series’ online community displayed a mastery of the show and hotly 
debated interpretive issues with one another.  Instead of unreflective ramblings typed and 
sent out into the universe for all to see, members of the Twin Peaks newsgroup 
constructed careful and thoughtful posts based upon multiple viewings of a single episode 
or scene.  They were real devotees in the cult of Twin Peaks. 
Twin Peaks’ online community took the aforementioned face-to-face exchange of 
judgments of taste and the careful dissection of episodes together to a new level of 
complexity.  Alt.tv.twin-peaks was formed within weeks of the series’ premiere; the 
popularity of Twin Peaks was mirrored by the popularity of its newsgroups.  According 
                                                
682 Asen, p. 425. 
683 http://www.twinpeaks.org/colophon.htm 
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to Jenkins, “[o]ne estimate suggests that some twenty-five thousand readers subscribed to 
alt.tv.twin-peaks, though the vast majority remained ‘lurkers’ who did not actively 
contribute to the discussion.”684  Jenkins notes that the group was characterized by 
specific interpretive concerns and strategies, including “their fixation on resolving 
narrative enigmas, their development of multiple alternative restagings of the core 
plotline, their complex relationship to Lynch as author, their appeal to extratextual 
discourse and intertextual linkages […] as well as their perceptions of themselves as 
sophisticated television viewers and of the series as standing outside the mainstream of 
American television.”685 
 The newsgroup allowed the community to try out their interpretations and verify 
what they thought they had seen on Twin Peaks.  “The computer net […] allow[ed] fans 
to compare notes, elaborate and refine theories through collaboration with other 
contributors.  All of the participants saw this group as involved in a communal enterprise.  
Entries often began with ‘Did anyone else see…’ or ‘Am I the only one who thought…,’ 
suggesting a felt need to confirm one’s own produced meanings through conversation 
with a larger community of readers…”686  The Twin Peaks cult functioned as a Kantian 
reception community built upon the demand to respond to works of art and to achieve 
agreement in judgments of taste.  In this case, the online platform allowed individuals to 
articulate their judgments of taste and try out their interpretations on other group 
members who were equally invested in the work and in interpreting it well.  These 
members could provide the most effective feedback because of their attentive reception.  
                                                
684 Jenkins, p. 53. 
685 Ibid., p. 53. 
686 Ibid., p. 57. 
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An additional reason for utilizing the online discussion boards was to show to other 
community members that your interpretation was the strongest.  In this way, individuals 
“stak[ed] out a claim for their own superior knowledge of the shared narrative.”687  
Nothing was off limits in these interpretations.  An episode, a scene, or even the 
previews of next week’s episode were all ripe for analysis.688  Jenkins recounts the 
popularity of VCR recording of the program as follows:  “According to one news story 
posted on the net, Twin Peaks had become the most video-taped program on network 
television during the time of its airing, with about 830,000 recording it each week.  Most 
netters claimed that they watched the episodes multiple times during the week between 
their initial airing and the appearance of a new episode.”689  This sort of viewing fed the 
commitment to expert knowledge.  Viewers who were master members of the online 
community sought to outdo others and competed to post their innovative interpretations 
as soon as possible.  This one-upsmanship amongst a small group is indicative of the cult 
character of the Twin Peaks online community. 
After the mystery of “Who Killed Laura Palmer?” was solved on the show – or 
more accurately, was forced to be resolved due to network pressure690 – the widespread 
popularity enjoyed by Twin Peaks fell precipitously.  From Lynch’s point of view, the 
mystery could have been sustained for several more episodes, if not several more seasons, 
but ABC had other ideas in mind.  The central mystery having been solved, the series 
floundered in search of direction.  As a result of declining viewership, the show was 
                                                
687 Ibid., p. 57. 
688 According to Jenkins, “The program’s coming attractions, with their split second shots and mismatched 
sounds, mandated the use of the VCR as an analytic tool, required that the image be frozen, frame-
advanced, and watched several times.  The coming attractions became yet another puzzle that could be 
eagerly controlled by Lynch’s ever-dwindling number of hardcore fans.”  See Jenkins, p. 55. 
689 Ibid., p. 67, footnote #5. 
690 Rodley, p. 180. 
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moved from Thursday to Saturday night, which is a virtual kiss of death for television 
programs.691  It was at this shaky moment in the show’s history that the true cult of Lynch 
emerged.  Those who remained loyal to Twin Peaks in spite of its decline in ratings and 
critical acclaim were the most cultish viewers.  Instead of treating inconsistencies in the 
show as a matter for criticism, cult members found ways to turn them into productive 
mysteries worth exploring together. 
In aesthetic cults, debate about the work or artist in question is permissible, but 
maintenance of the group requires loyalty to a specific aesthetic vision.  In this sense, the 
artists and their works of art remain sacred to the cult.  However, if too many changes 
occur, and it appears as if the project has been betrayed at some level, a rift may open in 
the cult.  For instance, when certain characters are given plot lines that seem to conflict 
with their central narratives – Cooper’s getting too comfortable in Twin Peaks and 
trading in his formal FBI attire for flannel shirts – the group begins to question the 
direction of the work and whether it is maintaining its significance for the cult.  If or 
when the artist betrays the vision that the cult has for the work and its place in their 
community, then some criticism of the artist is permitted.  However, we should note that 
a cult can withstand only so much criticism before it collapses.  In other words, at a 
certain point, the perception of the disarray of Twin Peaks extended from mainstream 
audiences into the cult itself.  Twin Peaks: Fire Walk With Me, the cinematic “prequel” to 
the series that was released in 1992 could not save the cult; instead, it further betrayed 
                                                
691 Ibid., p. 183.  After the lobby to return the show to its original timeslot was successful, promos were 
made poking fun at the situation.  Agent Cooper wakes up from a nightmare surrounded by several people 
from Twin Peaks gathered around his bedside.  He describes his dream as taking place in a region called 
“Saturday night.”  Everyone reacts with horror. 
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cult members’ expectations.692  Critics and cult members alike were dissatisfied with the 
film, and the cult blended back into mainstream culture.693 
 
C. Lynch’s Cult and Aura 
Contemporary aesthetic cults are involved in the collective enterprise of coming 
to understand their favored works or artists more deeply.  This involves communication 
and the exchange of judgments of taste with one another – the trading of interpretations 
and analyses.  Cults are not interested in the financial success of what they worship.  As 
Wallace comments:  “You almost never in a Lynch movie get the sense that the point is 
to ‘entertain’ you, and never that the point is to get you to fork over money to see it.  This 
is one of the unsettling things about a Lynch movie: you don’t feel like you’re entering 
into any of the standard unspoken/unconscious contracts you normally enter into with 
other kinds of movies.”694  While television shows and films have some connection to 
Benjamin’s notion of exhibition value, the reproduction process makes a wider reaching 
cult possible.  Physical proximity of location is no longer central to the notion of the cult, 
due precisely to the reproductive technologies that Benjamin criticizes.  Persons who are 
                                                
692 According to David Lavery in the introduction to Full of Secrets: Critical Approaches to Twin Peaks: 
“When it was released in August of 1992, Twin Peaks: Fire Walk with Me met with a derisive critical 
response from critics who often took pride in their near-complete ignorance of the television series (the 
film had already been booed at the Cannes Film Festival the previous spring), and in large part it was 
ignored, at least in the United States.  Devoid of the series’ wacky humor, short on cherry pie and joe, 
missing (left on the cutting room floor) many of its favorite minor characters, unrelentingly dark and 
sinister and obscure, Fire Walk with Me announced in its very first image a rejection of television.  The 
film’s credits are shown against a backdrop of blue static which we gradually realize to be the screen of an 
unreceptive television set.”  See Lavery, p. 10.  
Instead of satisfying viewers’ curiosity about the fate of Cooper’s soul after having been inhabited by the 
evil spirit, BOB, Lynch went in another direction entirely.  He decided to give viewers more of the 
backstory of Laura Palmer, by following her during the final days of her life and allowing her to tell her 
own story.  This is a shift away from Twin Peaks, where Laura’s story was told by practically everyone but 
her.  The film is a decidedly dark vision that is nearly bereft of the quirky fun, characters, and quotable 
lines of the series.  By all accounts neither critics nor cult members were satisfied with the film. 
693 Lavery, p. 11. 
694 Wallace, p. 170-171. 
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interested in interpreting works of art together – particularly difficult to understand works 
of art – are generally not interested in the financial underpinnings of the marketing and 
distribution of them.  But their ability to interpret these works nonetheless depends upon 
their accessibility, on television and online.  Thus, not only does their ability to interpret 
these works depend upon exhibition value.  The cult is actually preserved and promoted 
by it. 
Aesthetic cults thrive upon the sacred and mysterious aspects of the work.   
 
That is, they are invested in auracity.  According to Lavery: 
Again and again, through cult-building images, details, bits of dialogue, Twin 
Peaks solicited our engagement with the ‘wacko banality’ of its text.  Solicits – 
would it be too much to say? – our love: according to Eco, another cult 
prerequisite.  The cult viewer watching these moments – indeed watching for 
these moments – may, and I speak from experience here, let out an audible ‘I love 
this.’  These would be the moments sought in fast-forward and rewind (the show 
was reportedly the most videotaped on all of television); these would be recalled 
the next day.695 
 
Lavery goes on to recall several of his favorite moments from the show, a laundry list of 
quirky elements that helped comprise the spirit of Twin Peaks.  He comments that if 
every fan composed a list of the details and moments that struck them, each list would be 
slightly different.696  To return to the above point about Twin Peaks’ online community 
that circulated multiple interpretations of the show, each individual vying for narrative 
control and mastery, indicates that Lynch’s cult is built around an auratic work.  The 
intricacy of the work made it seem as if there was always more to know about Twin 
Peaks.  The cult viewers of the series were attracted to the show because of the “unique 
                                                
695 Ibid., p. 11, emphasis in original. 
696 Recall Eco’s comment above how cult objects “must be able to break, dislocate, [and] unhinge […] so 
that one can remember only parts of it, irrespective of their original relationship with the whole.”  See Eco, 
p. 198. 
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apparition of a distance, however near it may be.”697  No matter how many mysteries the 
cult unraveled, there were always more to try to solve.     
Wallace comments upon this distance in relationship to Lynch’s films: 
Depending upon whom you talk to, Lynch’s creepiness is either enhanced or 
diluted by the odd distance that seems to separate his movies from the audience.  
Lynch’s movies tend to be both extremely personal and extremely remote.  The 
absence of linearity and narrative logic, the heavy multivalence of the symbolism, 
the glazed opacity of the characters’ faces, the weird ponderous quality of the 
dialogue, the regular deployment of grotesque figurants, the precise, painterly 
way scenes are staged and lit, and the overlush, possibly voyeuristic way that 
violence, deviance, and general hideousness are depicted – these all give Lynch’s 
movies a cool, detached quality, one that some cinéastes view as more like cold 
and clinical.698 
 
While Wallace is referring to Lynch’s films here, these points can be extended to Twin 
Peaks.  Because the show was full of secrets hidden in plain sight, in a town where the 
“owls are not what they seem,” the cult of Lynch attempted to unravel the mysteries and 
make sense of the multivalence of Twin Peaks in accord with one another.  This 
sometimes meant that individual members puzzled over the show’s mysteries and even 
developed mysteries out of small details that may not indicate anything in particular 
about the trajectory of the series.  The use of technology – from VCR to Internet 
newsgroups and fanpages – made it possible for the community to connect to one another 
more easily, especially when cult members were located far away from one another, by 
sharing their god regardless of their distance from one another.   
 The true cult members of Twin Peaks treated the series reverently even after its 
popularity had waned.  This respect was shown most clearly in the continuation of the 
online discussion on alt.tv.twin-peaks.  Although the mass audience and critics had 
                                                
697 Walter Benjamin.  “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility.”  Third Version.  
In Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, Vol. IV, 1938-1940.  Trans.  Suhrkamp Verlag. Ed. Howard Eiland 
and Michael W. Jennings.  Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006., p. 255. 
698 Wallace, p. 166-167. 
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abandoned the work, the cult continued its worship by deciphering small details and 
hidden clues.  The cult’s criticism of Twin Peaks was by no means ginger, but no topic 
was taboo, either.  While some might suggest that this means the cult object was secular, 
the care with which this criticism was conducted shows a reverence for the work and 
what it meant to the cult.  The delicate balance between the desire to know and the desire 
to preserve the mysteries of Twin Peaks was kept alive by its cult.   
Moreover, the members of this community valued Lynch’s directorial and 
authorial role at the center of the cult.  The first season of Twin Peaks, in particular, bears 
the mark of Lynch’s influence and tone.  Lynch directed the pilot, as well as episodes 1, 2, 
8, 9, 14, and 29 and co-wrote several episodes with Mark Frost.699  Even though Lynch 
only directed a handful of episodes, they established the tone and dealt with crucial 
moments of development of character and plot.  Lynch states, “I just picked the ones I 
couldn’t bear not to do.  I knew I wanted to do the one with Leland/Bob.  And there were 
a couple of others.  I wanted to do the very last one – [laughs] – and the very beginning 
one!  And all the ones in between! [Laughs.]”700  Arguably, the other directors tried to 
emulate Lynch’s style in order to bring coherence to the series.  During Lynch’s absence 
in season two while he was working on Wild at Heart, the cult hung on for a time.  But 
when Twin Peaks diverged from Lynch’s vision too much, the cult no longer perceived 
its center; the cult disintegrated.701  
 
 
 
 
                                                
699 Rodley, p. 255. 
700 Ibid., p.175. 
701 Ibid., p.182 and p. 192. 
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VII. Coda 
 
Having performed the above analysis of aesthetic communities based upon shared 
interest in a work of art or particular artist, what have the arguments regarding the effects 
of wing clipping on expression amounted to?  While Kant claims that wing clipping is 
necessary to make the ideas in works of genius durable, lasting, and fit for an ever-
advancing culture, he did not fully consider the effects of this process – both positive and 
negative.  In the foregoing Kantian argument, I have shown that restrictions on 
expression are actually restrictions on individual subjects.  Because the individual feels 
her self in response to art, the communication of judgments of taste is extremely intimate 
in nature.   So when some expressions are under pressure of wing clipping – understood 
here as silencing – so are the identities and ways of living of those individuals who feel 
attracted to those works and artists.  Combining this thought with Wittgenstein’s notion 
that language is a form of life, restrictions upon expressions are also restrictions on ways 
of living and being.  For this reason, it is important to recognize the role of community 
building as a form of response to restrictions on expression.  Because of the connection of 
wing clipping and silencing, alternative communities can form in order to preserve 
particular expressions and identities apart from culture. 
Throughout the dissertation, I examined three different levels wing clipping – no 
wing clipping, minimal wing clipping, and extreme wing clipping – to understand the 
results of each more fully.  While at first blush, a lack of wing clipping might seem to 
promote free expression, it turns out that uninhibited expressions are incomprehensible to 
culture.  Because culture and community are based upon shared norms of communication, 
works that do not share this basis for comprehensibility are silenced.  I explored the 
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avant-garde theater of Needcompany, and in particular, Needcompany’s King Lear to 
show how pushing the bounds of comprehensible communication through the use of 
multiple languages and scrolling Shakespearean supertitles silenced the work.  Audiences 
at the Brooklyn Academy of Music left the production before it was over because of its 
lack of restraint, and thus, its lack of taste.   
Minimal wing clipping showed the way in which innovative expressions can be 
stifled or marginalized for a time.  The exclusion of Marcel Duchamp’s Nude Descending 
a Staircase (No. 2) and Fountain forced the artist to reconsider his relationship to the 
artworld and whether he had a place in it.  The resistance to his work pushed Duchamp to 
continue to express himself as he saw fit, but to avoid traditional exhibition practices.  So 
while his future works were not fully silenced or excluded as in prior cases, his works 
were received at the margins rather than at the center of the artworld.  After his early 
rejections, Duchamp rarely accepted invitations to exhibit in galleries and instead 
displayed his works in liminal spaces like his own studio and in the entryways to 
exhibitions.  In the case of readymades, this meant that Duchamp’s work was not even 
recognized as art in many cases. 
 Rather than merely pushing works aside or delaying their reception, extreme 
wing clipping shows us cases of silencing in its most ordinary sense.  I examined the 
reception and removal of Tilted Arc from New York’s Federal Plaza.  In this case, 
Richard Serra’s work had been commissioned for the site, but due to objections from 
workers in the building as well as bureaucrats, a movement to remove the work began.  A 
long court case and appeals process ensued.  Serra lost, and Tilted Arc was removed from 
the plaza – or if you consider the work to have been site specific, it was destroyed.  The 
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work’s removal ended the debate about it among workers, bureaucrats, and the general 
public.  But this proved to be an incomplete silencing because aestheticians and art 
historians continued to discuss Tilted Arc, its status as public or site specific, and the 
significance of the case and the debate surrounding the work. 
 The notion of Kantian wing clipping has always concerned me because when 
expressions are endangered, so are the individuals who value them.  As we saw in this 
chapter, cults and subcultures can ensure that expressions are not fully silenced by wing 
clipping in spite of the pressures put upon them by culture or taste.  Such groups can 
preserve these expressions in a community of like-minded individuals in order to discuss 
and defend them privately amongst themselves as an isolationist group, or more publicly 
with openness to communication with culture.  In other words, we see that endangered 
expression can find a place outside of the confines of culture in communities that form 
based upon shared interests, particularly aesthetic ones. 
Throughout this argument, I have highlighted the positive attributes of cults and 
subcultures in order to recuperate the negative connotations these groups have in popular 
culture.  From the perspective of culture, cults and subcultures are fringe elements at best 
and subversive elements at worst.  They often appear not to make meaning and thus, are 
treated with disdain or as unworthy of consideration.  Insofar as subcultures are open to 
the possibility of communication with culture, these communities are often treated with a 
modicum more respect.  Cults, however, are often shrouded with mystery, ritual, and the 
sort of “insiderness” that makes mainstream comprehension of these groups and their 
expressions quite difficult.  
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According to the Oxford English Dictionary’s draft additions from 2001 and 2004, 
a cult is a “relatively small group of people having religious beliefs or practices regarded 
by others as strange or sinister.”702  Because cults are often associated with deviant 
behavior or illegal activity such as brainwashing, coercion, kidnapping, abuse, murder, 
and suicide, I hoped to focus upon the aesthetic dimensions of cults in order to break the 
association with notorious cults such as Heaven’s Gate, the Manson Family, or the 
People’s Temple in Jonestown.  In such groups, devotion to a questionable cause was 
pursued in a way that betrayed the madness of the particular cult and its goals.  It is this 
popular and pejorative sense of cult that I aimed to avoid in my argument.  As the Oxford 
English Dictionary points out, cult can also refer to “cultural phenomena with a strong, 
often enduring appeal to a relatively small audience; (also) designating this appeal or 
audience, or any resultant success; fringe, non-mainstream. Hence: possessing a 
fashionable or exclusive cachet; spec. (of artistic figures or works) having a reputation or 
influence disproportionate to their limited public exposure or commercial success. Freq. 
in cult figure, cult status.”703  This sense of cult is much closer to the Benjaminian sense I 
traced out in Chapter Four and helps to highlight the shared interests of cult communities.  
As we have seen throughout the dissertation, the stakes of silence and silencing are 
crucial to the identities of community members and the expressions they value as a group.  
While silence can be a productive moment of response that takes place as an individual 
considers the work and tries to cognize it, we must be aware of the dangers that cultural 
silencing pose to expressions, individuals, and groups when they are considered to be 
                                                
702http://www.oed.com.proxy.library.vanderbilt.edu/view/Entry/45709?rskey=1hExtg&result=1&isAdvanc
ed=false#eid 
703http://www.oed.com.proxy.library.vanderbilt.edu/view/Entry/45709?rskey=1hExtg&result=1&isAdvanc
ed=false#eid 
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subversive or unwelcome to the culture in question.  We must guard against such 
illegitimate restrictions in order to preserve diversity in identity and expression and to 
expand their bounds in the future. 
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Conclusion 
The notion of Kantian wing clipping has always concerned me because exclusions 
on expressions are (or indicate) exclusions of persons.  Not only does wing clipping limit 
the type of art that individuals can produce, but it also restricts the type of art to which 
individuals may respond.  In other words, wing clipping affects a double silencing of 
individuals who are the producers of art (especially those endowed with genius) and the 
responders to art (everyone in society who attempts to cultivate their taste).  As we have 
seen here, restrictions upon genius limit the horizons of culture for all persons. 
The ability to express ourselves is vital to our sense of belonging to a particular 
society or culture.  If our expressions are deemed unacceptable, they mark us as marginal 
persons who are on the fringes or are excluded from a society or culture.  History shows 
us many examples of restrictions on communities that involve limitations on expression 
and identity.  Even as we make progress towards inclusivity, we must still be vigilant 
about restrictions because of their implications for both individual and group identities.  
To clarify, although this dissertation has focused primarily upon aesthetic expression and 
the restrictions of such, it has also argued for the social and political implications of these 
restrictions on expression. 
One of the strongest implications of the above analysis is that wholly unrestricted 
works of genius do not contribute to culture.  All works of art pose demands to the 
audience that tries to comprehend them because of the complexity of the aesthetic ideas 
they present.  Works of genius exacerbate these demands due to their innovative 
exemplarity for which there is not yet a rule by which to make sense of them.  The new 
rules that these works set for art are only derivable retrospectively.  If the works are 
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especially innovative, they may be difficult to understand in a way that makes thinking 
about them and talking about them a frustrating and potentially difficult undertaking.  
The desire to think the works through in order to figure them out wanes if they seem to 
exclude their audiences from the outset.  In other words, unrestrained genius does not 
produce works that are beneficial to culture and communication.  A lack of wing clipping 
does little to promote greater innovation and creativity; instead, innovative and 
nonsensical works challenge the audience in a merely negative way.  Their reception 
shows the importance of at least a degree of comprehensibility for audiences lest they 
become frustrated to such an extent that they refuse to consider these artworks at all.  
So too, extreme wing clipping in the sense of the censorship is also dangerous for 
artists and audiences alike.  While comprehensibility is always worth pursuing, if taken 
too far, it strangles the expression and renders it unable to speak.  From the above 
analysis, we have seen that a moderation of wing clipping most contributes to human 
flourishing and community formation and maintenance.  Let us turn in closing to an 
example of how this works in artistic practice.  The filmmaking career of Pedro 
Almodóvar will give clarity to this point, and in particular, to the modulation of his work 
from his exuberant and often subversive early films to his more contemplative recent 
contributions.  Again, while it may seem as if restrictions on art will destroy the work or 
damage its expressive power, I aim to briefly show that restrictions may actually promote 
communication and serve to refine the themes, content, and significance of what is being 
conveyed by the artist.  To do so, I will contrast Almodóvar’s early films with his later 
Broken Embraces in order to show that when he restrains himself and adopts a more 
reflective tone, his work shines forth all the more powerfully for it. 
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Almodóvar’s early films focus upon the transgression of norms and the 
exploration of taboos for the explicit purpose of scandalizing and titillating audiences.  In 
addition to the “telenovela” plotlines and tone, the depiction of violence, gender, and 
overt sexuality was meant to shock and, in some cases, delight audiences.  According to 
Marsha Kinder, The Law of Desire (La Ley del Deseo) (1987) is an “outrageous 
melodrama featuring homosexual and transsexual protagonists in a sado-masochistic 
triangle involving incest, murder, and suicide and involving several sexually explicit 
homoerotic love scenes.”704  Almodóvar’s later films, by contrast, show restraint and the 
reflectiveness of a mature artist.  Case in point is Broken Embraces (Los Abrazos Rotos) 
(2009), which both breaks new ground and is itself a reflective (and reflexive) play on 
many of Almodóvar’s earlier works especially Women on the Verge of a Nervous 
Breakdown.   
Broken Embraces begins in 2008 with a blind writer named Harry Caine (Lluís 
Homar), who relates a dramatic story of his own past as a prominent director named 
Mateo Blanco through a series of detailed flashbacks.  In 1994, he was making a film 
called Girls and Suitcases (Chicas y Maletas) which features many recognizable, albeit 
rearranged, elements of Women on the Verge of a Nervous Breakdown.  Mateo finds 
inspiration when Lena (Penélope Cruz) auditions for a part in his production.  This raises 
the ire of Ernesto Martel (José Luis Gómez), Lena’s controlling longtime lover, because 
he doesn’t want to share her with anyone, not even with her work.  Thus, Martel decides 
to produce the film as a way to stay involved and to keep an eye on Lena.  As the filming 
progresses, Mateo and Lena become romantically entangled, which sends Martel into a 
                                                
704 Marsha Kinder. “Pleasure and the New Spanish Mentality: A Conversation with Pedro Almodóvar.”  
Film Quarterly 41 (1) (Autumn 1987): 33-44, p. 33. 
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possessive rage.  When Martel’s jealousy turns violent, Lena and Mateo resolve to run 
away together.  In their absence, Martel releases an unauthorized version of Girls and 
Suitcases composed of the worst takes in order to humiliate Lena and Mateo.  In exacting 
his revenge, Martel also hopes to lure the couple back to Madrid in order to make them 
pay for their affair.  During their drive back, the couple is in a terrible crash that kills 
Lena and blinds Mateo.  This ends Mateo’s filmmaking career and breaks his heart.  
Through telling this story to his assistant and her son, Harry finds out that all of the takes 
of Girls and Suitcases have been preserved along with the soundtrack.  At the end of the 
film, Harry reclaims his identity as Mateo and begins re-editing the film according to his 
original plans. 
Formally, Broken Embraces is structured through a series of flashbacks between 
2008 and 1992-1994 and between the now blind Harry Caine and the sighted Mateo 
Blanco.  Just as Harry tells the story of the making of Girls and Suitcases and of how he 
lost his sight, Almodóvar reflects upon his own filmmaking career by making several 
references to his works’ themes and characters.  According to Marsha Kinder,  
In Broken Embraces, the most explicit Almodóvar inter-text is Women on the 
Verge, his first crossover success in the global market and the film being remixed 
in Mateo’s Girls and Suitcases.  Pina’s laments about Ivan, her gazpacho spiked 
with sleeping pills, burned bed, discarded phone, and suitcase full of cocaine—
these elements make the connection to Women on the Verge impossible to miss, 
but (like those from the Oedipal myth) they are reshuffled.705 
In Broken Embraces, we have not only a film-within-a film structure, but also the parallel 
reflection and reflexivity of Mateo and Almodóvar himself.  Because of the intermixture 
of several of his films within Broken Embraces, we might say that vision and revision are 
crucial to Almodóvar’s reflection upon his own career and process of art making.  
                                                
705 Marsha Kinder. “Restoring Broken Embraces.”  Film Quarterly 63 (3) (Spring 2010): 28-34, p. 34. 
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Because of his distance from his earlier films, Almodóvar is able to recombine them in 
new ways in order to re-see and remix the themes and images predominant in his works. 
Fragmentation and intertextuality form a complex foundation for the film noir 
intrigues and the layering of multiple secrets in the plot.  According to Kinder: 
At one point we see thousands of fragments from torn photographs of Mateo and 
Lena embracing, forming a giant collage that fills the entire screen.  Almodóvar 
calls it the film’s ‘most expressive image,’ one that evokes not only the title 
Broken Embraces but also the film’s underlying database structure.  Diego selects 
a few fragments and begins reassembling them like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle.  
This is the same process he and Mateo later follow in restoring the original 
version of Girls and Suitcases.  It’s also the process that each new film by 
Almodóvar demands of us spectators: rereading his entire body of work through 
each new remix, a process I call ‘retro-seriality.’706  
The complexity of the form of the film shows Almodóvar’s development as a filmmaker 
as well as his careful reflection upon his art.  In Broken Embraces, we get these 
reflections in the form of fragments, some thematic and some in the form of direct 
reference as in the repetition of pieces of dialogue from Women on the Verge of a 
Nervous Breakdown.  “Intertextuality and remix are nothing new in Almodóvar movies, 
but no film uses them more powerfully [than Broken Embraces], for here they are pivotal 
to the plot.”707  In Broken Embraces, Almodóvar avoids the trademarks of his earlier 
career (shock tactics and the exploration of taboos) and instead utilizes fragmentation, 
montage, and remix as the formal foundation for the film’s action.  Rather than 
destroying meaning by fragmenting and combining elements from his earlier films, 
Almodóvar has refined his expression through carefully reflecting on his works.  I argue 
that the restraint shown by Almodóvar in Broken Embraces can be considered a form of 
moderate wing clipping.  Some might argue that the referencing and remixing Almodóvar 
                                                
706 Ibid., p. 33. 
707 Ibid., p. 30. 
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executes in Broken Embraces mutilates his earlier films.  However, I argue that 
Almodóvar has found a way to see his works anew which opens up his vision of cinema 
going forward.  Arguably, with Broken Embraces Almodóvar has achieved what 
Kierkegaard terms “repetition with a difference.”708 
The consideration of the passage of time in Broken Embraces shows Almodóvar’s 
concern for the process of art making and the kind of vision and insight that it requires.  
Kinder states, “Broken Embraces asks whether a filmmaker can survive a loss of vision – 
the same question raised in 81⁄2 where the loss was figurative – an aging auteur not 
knowing what to do next.  Here the loss is literal.”709  In many ways, Broken Embraces is 
a love letter to filmmaking and to the liberating and transformative power of art.  
According to Almodóvar: 
I believe [Broken Embraces] is the most complex script I've ever written and 
during the writing of this film and also during the shoot, I did find myself in a 
different place.  The way of making the film, the way of telling the story, the 
actors’ tone and the way of editing was, you could say, a departure from some of 
my previous films.  The film is much more balanced between the female 
characters and the male characters.  This is also something new for me.  I do feel 
that this film is a true declaration of love for cinema.  I could almost say that 
cinema perfects all the irregularities, or the imperfections, of life.710 
 
Because Almodóvar is reflecting upon his own process of art making and love of cinema, 
much of the film depicts filmmaking in progress, whether it is Mateo’s Girls and 
Suitcases production at the beginning and end of the film, his writing of scripts as Harry 
Caine after he has lost his sight, the documentary-spy film of Ernesto Jr., or Lena’s acting 
                                                
708 See Søren Kierkegaard.  Fear and Trembling / Repetition.  Trans. Hong and Hong.  Princeton 
University Press, 1983. 
709 Ibid, p. 28. 
710 http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000264/bio 
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through multiple takes in which she tries to apply Mateo’s direction. 
While most critics emphasize the relationship of men and art in the film, 
especially the parallels between Mateo and Almodóvar, little space is devoted to the 
relationship of women and art.  While commentators focus upon the way in which 
Broken Embraces thematizes the process of filmmaking (art making), little is made of 
Lena’s motivation to continue acting in Girls and Suitcases even though she is risking so 
much – her life – in order to do so.  I argue that the transformative power of art making is 
seen most clearly, however, with Lena, who finds liberation through her role in Girls 
With Suitcases.  Not only does she work hard and try to hone her craft as an actress, but 
she also finds freedom and her own voice as she breaks away from her possessive lover, 
Ernesto.  Although Ernesto finances the production, he cannot fathom what draws Lena 
to this role or what she could possibly gain from exploring her talents.  Simply put, he 
does not take her seriously as a woman who has something to offer to the world.  In fact, 
Ernesto does not view Lena’s acting or the film she is starring in as art at all.  
Interestingly, this attitude is mirrored by critics who manage to overlook how Lena is 
transformed through her participation in the production.  Because of the film, she is more 
vibrant and alive; Lena finds the strength to pursue her own goals and explore her own 
identity apart from Ernesto.  Lena is liberated through art making because of how 
enlivening and extremely personal it is, just as responding to art is, as we have explored 
throughout the dissertation. 
Many critics, instead of viewing Broken Embraces as Almodóvar’s masterwork 
that is in conversation with his oeuvre, treat its reflexivity and restraint in a negative light.  
According to Kinder:  
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Many reactions to Pedro Almodóvar’s latest film, Broken Embraces, have been 
less than enthusiastic.  Some critics claim it repeats what he has already done 
while others feel it lacks the comic exuberance of early films like Labyrinth of 
Passions, the subversive sexuality of transformational works like Matador and 
Law of Desire, and the emotional fire of mature masterpieces like All About My 
Mother and Talk to Her.  While some of these complaints are justified, they don’t 
acknowledge what this new film contributes: a masterful celebration of cinema’s 
powers of resilience, at an historic moment when the medium has gone digital and 
its methods of distribution are being redefined.711 
Rather than viewing his directorial repetitions as carefully considered choices through 
which Almodóvar reflects on his career, critics view them as signs that Broken Embraces 
is merely derivative and therefore less powerful than the works he quotes.  In fact, 
Almodóvar goes beyond mere quotation to “repetition with a difference.”  As Kinder 
claims, the director remixes his films and utilizes them as intertexts within Broken 
Embraces.  In this way, he reconsiders his prior efforts in order to make something new. 
 By carefully reflecting on his prior films, Almodóvar is able to compose a subtler, 
more expressive work with Broken Embraces.  Again, while freedom of expression must 
be preserved, restraint enhances the expression that is put forth.  Moderate wing clipping 
is beneficial to the expression of ideas and the communities who value them.  Instead of 
understanding this restriction in a merely negative fashion, we can see that it also 
promotes communication and community building. 
                                                
711 Kinder, p. 28. 
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